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ABSTRACT 
 
In this study, Turkish foreign policy (FP) during the Özal (1983-1993) and Erdoğan 
eras (2003-2012) is comparatively analyzed. There are two main motivations in conducting 
this research. The first one is related to the arguments that the Erdoğan leadership has been 
pursuing a novel FP line compared to the past experiences of the Turkish Republic. This study 
suggests that even if it is an advanced form based on a serious theoretical and conceptual 
ground, the Erdoğan leadership’s FP is an extension of Özal leadership's FP line. Considering 
their common goals to make Turkey first a regional and later a global actor, it is hypothesized 
that both leaderships have pragmatically evaluated Turkey's potential in accordance with their 
identity definitions and shaped their FP approaches and practices according to their identity 
perceptions and paradigms. It is also hypothesized in this respect that similar identities bring 
about similar FP understandings and practices. 
 
Therefore, the second goal of the dissertation is to employ constructivism with its 
identity-oriented brand so as to explain Turkish FP in two different time periods. In this 
context, the social construction processes of both leaderships’ identities have been particularly 
highlighted. Subsequently, the FP approaches and the corresponding FP principles in both 
eras have been discussed and the impact of identity on their FP understandings as well as 
policy practices has been studied. With a view to analyzing the reflection of these FP 
approaches and principles to the practical level, bilateral relations between the USA and 
Turkey are elaborated with an eye to these two allies' common interests in the Middle East, 
Balkans and Central Asia. In this manner, while this study seeks to demonstrate the 
similarities in terms of FP approaches and policy practices of both Özal and Erdoğan 
leaderships, it aims to explain the differences at the practical level again from a constructivist 
point of view.   
 
The last goal of this thesis is to make an academic contribution to the literature by 
suggesting the accuracy of the holistic constructivist approach to explain the FP practices and 
find out their roots.  Holistic constructivism seeks to take the domestic and international as 
two faces of a single social order and underlines the importance of accommodating all factors 
affecting the identities and interests of state. Thus, this dissertation proposes that FP of a 
country, like Turkey, cannot be analyzed only with the role of agents. Even if these agents 
might be extraordinarily influential, other factors such as structure might be also determining. 
However, the bottom line here is how the agents see and perceive the structure as well as 
other determining factors of FP and define the course of FP of their countries. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Introductory remarks 
Election results on 4 Nov 2002 excited many people from various backgrounds for 
different reasons. Justice and Development Party (or AK Party) won the election and gained a 
great majority in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM). After a decade-long rule by 
coalition governments, Turkey was to be administrated finally by a single party government. 
That was judged by many people as an important opportunity in terms of economic and 
political stability. Moreover, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the leader of the AK Party, was 
compared to Turgut Özal, former Prime Minister and the President of Turkish Republic, in 
many respects in the immediate aftermath of the November election by some prominent 
figures (like Sakıp Sabancı, a very well known businessman in Turkey) in terms of his 
expected economic and political performance.1 After all, between Özal and Erdoğan, along 
with Adnan Menderes, some parallels have also been drawn by some circles in terms of their 
strong public support, their democratic election and their significant steps they took on the 
way of democratization of Turkey, and they have been regarded by many as the chains of 
democratic tradition in Turkey.2 However, since the leader of the newly established AK Party 
along with its cadres had Islamist credentials in the past, there were deep tensions and 
questions marks in the minds of many people as to what was going to happen in the aftermath 
of the November 3 election. Acts and attitudes of some power centers against the AK Party 
government were themes of curiosity.  
 
Today, long time has passed since the November 3 general election and Turkey has 
been experiencing a transformation process in many fields, and some even have named it 
“silent revolution.”3 In domestic policy, while reform process has continued speedily with the 
European Union alignment packages, significant steps have been taken on the way of 
democratization and de-militarization. Even more importantly, a "settlement process" has 
been commenced in 2013 by the government with a view to solving Turkey's chronic 
"Kurdish question." On the other hand, with 5.45 percent average annual growth rates 
between 2002 and 2012,4 an economic boom has been experienced in which, inter alia, the 
single party government has played a primary role. With high growth rates (in 2004 with 
9.9% passed even China5), Turkey has been among the fastest growing economies of the 
                                               
1 "2. Özal dönemi başlıyor" [The second Özal era begins], Türkiye, 04.11.2002, accessed 05.01.2012, 
http://www.turkiyegazetesi.com.tr/haberdetay.aspx?haberid=157890   
2 Taha Akyol, "Menderes ve Özal" [Menderes and Özal] , Hürriyet, 20.06.2013, accessed 07.07.2013, 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/23545909.asp. "Menderes'i astınız, Özal'ı zehirlediniz, Erdoğan'ı 
yedirmeyiz," Türkiye, 03.06.2013, accessed 07.07.2013. Taha Uğur Türkmen, Milletin Adamları, (İstanbul: 
Brifing Yayınları, 2008). Hüseyin Yayman, "Turgut Özal ile Tayyip Erdoğan arasındaki on fark," Vatan, 
06.05.2014, accessed 06.06.2014, http://haber.gazetevatan.com/turgut-ozal-ile-tayyip-erdogan-arasindaki-on-
fark---/634644/4/yazarlar  
3 "Turkey's quiet revolution," Guardian, 14.09.2010, accessed 14.7.2014, 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/sep/14/turkey-quiet-revolution-editorial. Murat Yılmaz and 
Hamit Emrah Beriş, Türkiye'nin Demokratik Dönüşümü 2002-2012 [Turkey's Democratic Transformation 2002-
2012], Institute of Strategic Thinking, (Ankara: Başak Matbaacılık, 2012). "Erdoğan: Sessiz devrim yaptık" 
(Erdoğan: We have accomplished a silent revolution), Hürriyet, 06.10.2004 accessed 13.07.2014, 
http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=262910  
4 "Output&Growth," Association of Treasury Controllers, accessed 26.02.2013, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3432.htm  
5 "Dünya büyüme rekoru," Sabah, 01.04.2005, accessed 14.07.2014, 
http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2005/04/01/eko106.html.   
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world and attracts attention of international capital as an emerging and developing market. 
Besides domestic policy and economy, foreign policy field also constitutes another important 
side of the transformation process in Turkey.  
 
Unlike its traditional “reactive” foreign policy line shaped traditionally and basically 
around three principles; namely, westernization, maintaining the status quo and legality,6 
Turkey has been pursuing a relatively more active and diversified foreign policy in the recent 
decade. In this respect, AK Party's foreign policy in the 2000s has been regarded by a number 
of observers as a "new" policy line.7 Despite the serious novelties in the AK Party foreign 
policy however, the situation must be judged carefully. If someone qualifies it "new" by 
considering the Kemalist era8 of Turkish foreign policy (TFP) as a point of reference, this can 
be a consistent argument. However, since there are serious similarities of Özal and Erdoğan 
leaderships'9 foreign policy understandings, it seems hard to make the same assessment, if one 
takes the Özal era as a reference point. Moreover, one might judge that foreign policy 
approach of the Erdoğan leadership seems in a great sense the extension of the Turgut Özal 
period. Undoubtedly, it is not possible to claim that both leaderships pursued exactly the same 
foreign policy. Yet, considering their paradigms, foreign policy principles, their strong 
leaderships and even their foreign policy practices, there are a number of commonalities 
leading to the perception that they both are nourished from the same source, namely similar 
identity definitions. Hence, it seems in this sense difficult to describe the current TFP "new." 
Consequently, today's multidimensional and active foreign policy reminds the foreign policy 
characteristics of the Turgut Özal's era, who played essential roles in the foreign policy 
making process of Turkey as Prime Minister between 1983 and 1989 and particularly as 
President between 1989 and 1993.  
 
The AK Party government, which has been pursuing a policy to improve the 
collaboration, first with the neighboring states and with the states with which it has regionally, 
economically, and historically important connections, considers that Turkey’s economic and 
political problems can be tackled by following a reconciliation oriented multidimensional 
                                               
6 Baskın Oran, “Türkiye Kabuk Değiştirirken AKP'nin Dış Politikası” (AK Party’s foreign policy while Turkey 
alters her crust) Birikim 184-185 (2004), accessed 14.07.2014, 
http://www.birikimdergisi.com/birikim///dergiyazi.aspx?did=1&dsid=167&dyid=2865 
7 Graham E.Fuller, The New Turkish Republic: Turkey As A Pivotal State in The Muslim World, (Washington: 
United States Institute of Peace, 2008). Mesut Özcan and Ali Resul Usul, " Understanding The ‘New’ Turkish 
Foreign Policy: Changes Within Continuity, Is Turkey Departing From The West?" USAK Yearbook of 
International Politics and Law 4 (2011): 159-185. 
8 The term "Kemalists" in this study is used for the elite groups of Turkey who place Atatürk's, the founder of the 
Republic of Turkey, principles and reforms in the center of their state philosophy and who ideologically adopt 
Atatürk's principles such as Westernization, secularism and peace at home, peace in the world (non-
interferenism) also in the field of foreign policy. Represented predominantly by the bureaucracy, the military, the 
judiciary and the Republican People‘s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), this group sees secular nationalism 
as the main vehicle for Turkey‘s modernization. See Hakan Yavuz, "Turkish-Israeli Relations through the Lens 
of the Turkish Identity Debate,"  Journal of Palestine Studies,  XXVII/1 (1997):  23 
9 The concepts of "Özal leadership" and "Erdoğan leadership" refer not only to the personal foreign policy 
understandings of Turgut Özal and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Even though both leaders have played major roles in 
determining TFP in their respective periods due to their strong leaderships and their special interest in the foreign 
policy field, their foreign policy approach and practices have been affected by their close political environment 
as well as by their advisors. For instance, in shaping and practicing the foreign policy of the Erdoğan leadership, 
the Davutoğlu factor has had an undeniable role. Likewise, Özal preferred to work with a group of advisors in 
defining and applying his foreign policy approach. Therefore, the "leadership" concept refers in this dissertation 
to the leader and his close working group regarding the FP field, such as FM, advisors, the close associates in 
politics and the chief of intelligence. 
 
 12  
foreign policy and by opening Turkey to the world.10 Whereas, due to fundamentally security 
concerns and the threat perceptions stemming especially from the neighboring countries, TFP 
was security oriented and conflictive in the 1990s,11 the AK Party government has endeavored 
in the new millennium to develop its relations with neighbors both economically and 
politically (which was condensed in the slogan of “Zero Problem Policy with Neighbors”).12 
Moreover, the AK Party government demonstrates an effort to cooperate more closely with 
China, Russia and Japan, which have important places in the world regarding their economic 
and military powers, first in economy and in every field within the framework of 
multidimensional foreign policy. Additionally, with new foreign policy openings, there have 
been endeavors to improve and deepen the relations with the countries in the Black Africa and 
South Asia, which had been neglected before by Turkish diplomacy.13 
 
Even though it has been occasionally stalled, European Union (EU) membership 
perspective still remains at the top of the TFP priorities.14 Furthermore, the EU membership 
perspective had strong influences on the foreign policy behaviors of Turkey until recently. 
The EU process which encourages the “good neighborhood” perspective to solve the 
problems with neighbors in peaceful ways played a crucial role in Turkey’s behavior to stay 
away from conflictive policies and normalize its relations with neighbors. In addition, Turkey 
strove to fix its image in the international arena as a “solution” producing country, but not 
crisis.15 Signs of this policy were simply visible in the attitudes of Turkey towards the Cyprus 
issue. Despite the strong impact of the EU norms on TFP making until recently, how they 
began to be eroded will be in this dissertation's concern. 
 
On the other hand, Turkey experienced tension in its relations with the US. While 
Turkey had strong relations with the US and Israel in 1990s, bilateral ties deteriorated after 
the Turkish Parliament's refusal in 2003 to allow American troops to pass through its territory 
for the invasion of Iraq and the intensity of the relations has weakened. This occasion showed 
that assumptions about Turkey should have been reevaluated and Turkey’s assumed role as 
anchor of NATO’s southern flank cannot be taken for granted any longer.16 Furthermore, 
                                               
10 Kemal İnat and Burhanettin Duran “AKP Dış Politikası: Teori ve Uygulama” (AKP Foreign Policy: Theory 
and Practice,” in Doğudan Batıya Dış Politika AK Parti’li Yıllar, (Foreign policy from the West to the East: AK 
Party years) ed. by Zeynep Dağı, (Ankara: Pozitif Matbaacılık, 2006), 15-16. 
11 In the most part of 1990s, Turkish foreign policy was dominated by the military and civil bureaucracy, namely 
Generals and the bureaucrats of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They were viewing Turkey’s foreign relations 
through the lenses of national security and perceiving threats to Turkey’s territorial integrity and unity emanating 
from neighboring regions, including Northern Iraq. “During this period, Turkey came close to a military 
confrontation with Greece in 1996, as well as with Syria in 1998. Furthermore, Turkey threatened Cyprus in 
1997 with military action if Russian S-300 missiles were to be deployed on the island. There were also threats of 
use of force made against Iran, and relations with Russia were particularly strained. Relations with an important 
part of the Arab world were foul, aggravated by an exceptionally intimate military relationship with Israel.” 
Kemal Kirişçi, “The transformation of Turkish foreign policy: The rise of the trading state,” New Perspectives on 
Turkey 40, (2009): 31. 
12 Oleg Svet, “Turkey’s “Zero Problem” Foreign Policy: An Untenable Balancing Act,”  The Institute for Global 
Leadership, Tufts University, NIMEP Insights. Vol.2. (Spring 2006), accessed 09.10.2010, 
http://www.tuftsgloballeadership.org/NIMEP/insights/II/INSIGHTS06_Svet.pdf.  
13 İnat and Duran, AKP Dış politikası, 16. For a short review of recent developments in Turkish foreign policy 
see also: The Economist “Turkey: International relations and defense,” last modified June 8, 2005. 
14 Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Turkish Foreign Policy and the EU in 2010," Turkish Policy Quarterly, Volume 8, 
Number 3, (Fall 2009): 11-17. 
15 Dağı, Doğudan Batıya, 9. İnat and Duran, AKP Dış Politikası, 16. 
16 For detailed information concerning Turkey’s foreign policy opportunities and their risks see: F. Stephen 
Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, “Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty,” Santa Monica, CA, RAND 
National Security Research Division, (2003). 
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strategic partnership was questioned in Ankara and Washington and both sides embarked on a 
new process to define mutually the meaning both allies have for each other.17 Fight against 
the separatist terrorist organization PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party), the northern Iraq 
problem, and the civil war in Syria as well as the so-called “Armenian genocide” issue in the 
American Congress seems the most influential factors on the Turkish-US relations in the mid-
term. 
 
Today, one of the major figures concerning TFP making, Ahmet Davutoğlu18 gives 
some clues with regard to the paradigm change in TFP. He gathers the new strategy on 
foreign policy under two titles19. Firstly, he defines Turkey as a “Central State” which is 
neither in the periphery of the European Union nor in the periphery of the Middle East. 
Accordingly, Turkey is in the crossroads of the continents, but it is also a centre mainly due to 
its geographical and historical links (stemming from basically its Ottoman heritage).20 
Contrary to other states in the region, Turkey is Middle Eastern and Balkan, Caucasus, Black 
See and Mediterranean state.  For instance, Greece’s history or Serbia’s history or Iraq’s 
history cannot be written without Turkey. Moreover, anything around Turkey cannot be 
understood without it.21 Its cultural, political and economic borders are far wider than its 
political borders and it cannot be confined to its current political boundaries. Therefore, it has 
to develop transfrontier policies.22  
 
Secondly, today, Turkey cannot be defined any more with the regional power 
discourse of the Cold War era. It is a “central state” and moving forward on the way of 
becoming a global power. Globalization and external factors have changed Turkey’s position 
so dramatically that Turkey cannot survive any longer with the status quo. It cannot follow an 
isolation policy. This is why Turkey has to follow an active and multidimensional foreign 
policy. If it tries to isolate itself, it might encounter the danger of separation with internal 
discussions and tensions.23 
 
                                               
17 Michel Rubin, “Shifting Sides? The problems of neo-Ottomanism,” National Review online, August 10, 2004 
accessed 14.07.2014, http://www.meforum.org/628/shifting-sides.  
18 Formerly the chief foreign policy advisor to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and today the 
Foreign Minister of Turkey 
19 Speech of Ahmet Davutoğlu “New Horizons and New Opportunities in Turkish Foreign Policy, Industrialists 
and Businessmen’s Association (MÜSİAD), Istanbul,  accessed 06.05.2011, 
http://www.musiad.org.tr/detay.asp?id=156 
20 Some sport events provide good examples with respect to the historical ties between Turkey and some Balkan 
nations which remained under Ottoman governance for centuries. For instance, when Turkey beat Croatia in 
Euro 2008 quarter-finals, conflicts occurred in the city of Mostar (Bosnia and Herzegovina) between Croatians 
and Bosnians who supported Turkey. "Bosna'da Hırvatlar Türkleri tutan Müslümanlara Saldırdı," Sabah, 
22.06.2008, accessed 23.06.2008, 
http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2008/06/22/haber,D35C05255273436D91BCA024A115813C.html. Likewise, when 
Turkey beat Serbia in 2010 World Basketball Championship, this time conflicts took place in Kosovo between 
Serbians and Albanians who favored Turks against Serbians. “Ethnic clash in Kosovo after Serb basketball 
defeat,” BBC, 12.09.2010, accessed 13.09.2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11274357. In fact, 
these two and other similar examples are interestingly illustrating the historical and cultural ties between Turkey 
and Bosnians, Albanians and Kosovans who favors Turkish national teams in international sports events 
passionately.  
21 Ahmet Davutoğlu Küresel Bunalım (Global Depression), (Istanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2002), 191. For more 
detailed information on the paradigm change in Turkish foreign policy see also: Ahmet Davutoğlu Stratejik 
Derinlik (Strategic Depth), (Istanbul: Küre yayınları, 2001). 
22 Ibid., 178-179. 
23 Ibid., 156 
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In fact, the "central state" concept and Ahmet Davutoğlu's vision which have been 
adopted by the AK Party government to a great extent reveal a paradigm shift in TFP 
understanding in comparison to the Kemalist era. One of the basic aims of this dissertation is 
to explain the reason of this change in Ankara's foreign policy approach with a constructivist 
approach. In doing this, while not denying the importance of the external factors, such as 
international political context and norms, it is argued with a constructivist approach that AK 
Party's identity definition as well as its definition of interest which is described in conformity 
with identity definition has a very decisive role in the definition of the course of current TFP. 
 
On the other hand, considering the history of Turkish diplomacy, one would realize 
that the foreign policy of the AK Party government is quite analogous to the foreign policy 
pursued during the Turgut Özal era. Özal followed also a rather active and diversified foreign 
policy, despite the established foreign policy practices of his predecessors to the contrary. His 
approach to foreign relations was characterized by his willingness to depart from traditional 
policies, to take calculated risks and to search for new alternatives and options.24 Unlike his 
predecessors, he followed a peaceful policy with Turkey’s historical, geographical and 
cultural connections. A considerable part of ethnic elements composing the Ottoman Empire 
and their connections abroad returned to the TFP. Thus, his special interest to the territories 
formerly ruled by Ottomans reminded “neo-Ottomanism.”25   
 
Furthermore, just like the AK Party leadership, he was the first Turkish statesman who 
did not hesitate to stress the “Islamic” dimension of the Turkish national identity. He 
evaluated Turkey, besides European, as a Middle Eastern country and tried to improve 
relations with the Muslim world as well as with the Middle Eastern states. Özal sought to 
improve relations with, as the AK Party government has been doing recently, the neighboring 
countries mostly out of economic concerns. In this respect, despite the strong objections from 
opposition groups, he started a dialogue with Greece in Davos, in 1989. Moreover, he pursued 
a very active and pro-US foreign policy during the Gulf War in 199126, and did not hesitate to 
take initiative and use Turkey’s influence so as to reshape the Middle Eastern politics.27 
 
One should also note that economic concerns played a crucial role in the foreign 
policy decisions of Özal who adopted liberal foreign trade and aimed at opening Turkey to the 
world. He viewed the foreign policy as an element serving to the economic interests. Hence, 
his attempts to pursue an active and multidimensional foreign policy and efforts to improve 
relations with neighboring states and other states ranging from the US to the EC/EU as well as 
to the Muslim countries can be judged, in part, within this context. Besides, according to the 
foreign policy paradigm of Özal, Turkey should have firstly enhanced the economic 
cooperation in its region, increased “the mutual dependence” and in this way minimized the 
risks of conflict. Within that framework, he pioneered some regional economic cooperation 
                                               
24 Sabri Sayari, “Turkey: The Changing European Security Environment and the Gulf Crisis,”The Middle East 
Journal 46/1 (Winter 1992): 18. 
25 Sedat Laçiner “Özal Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası,” The journal of Turkish Weekly, January 2011, accessed 
11.09.2012,  http://www.turkishweekly.net/turkce/makale.php?id=7. 
26 With "Gulf Crisis" and "Gulf War," I mean throughout the study the crisis and the subsequent war between the 
US-led coalition forces and Iraq. The crisis started in August 1990 with the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and 
ended on 28 February 1991 with the liberation of Kuwait by coalition forces. The term should not be mixed with 
another war took place also in the Persian Gulf region between Iraq and Iran and lasted from September 1980 to 
August 1988. 
27 Berdal Aral, “Dispensing with tradition? Turkish politics and international society during the Özal decade, 
1983-93,” Middle Eastern Studies 37/1, (Jan 2001): 84. 
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organizations such as Black sea Economic Collaboration Organization (BSEC).28 Likewise, 
AK Party government set also the economic concerns at the top of its foreign policy priorities. 
Therefore, it has been a significant common point for Özal and Erdoğan leaderships that they 
both attach great importance to the economic concerns in foreign relations.29 Consequently, in 
view of these and other qualities of Özal leadership's foreign policy approach, Erdoğan 
leadership's foreign policy seems an extension of the Özal era.  
 
In sum, contributing to an understanding of current TFP, which has been recently 
shaped in accordance with the “Central State” concept, “multidimensional-diversified foreign 
policy”, “zero problem”, active versus passive foreign policy, reconciliation oriented versus 
conflict oriented foreign policy and “win-win” concepts, is an important concern of this 
dissertation. It is argued at this point that the transformation viewed in TFP in the last decade 
can be more easily comprehended with constructivism, particularly with its identity-oriented 
brand. Besides, as I argue that foreign policy understandings of Özal and Erdoğan eras seem 
quite analogues, a comparison of current foreign policy with Özal’s period will provide a 
good chance for better understanding of the prevailing foreign policy of Turkey as to whether 
AK Party foreign policy is really new or in the quality of being an extension of the Özal's 
foreign policy approach. In doing this, I also hope to show the explanatory power of 
constructivist arguments in foreign policy making.   
 
Assumptions 
I assume in this study that TFP makers' foreign policy paradigms and their policy 
practices are deeply influenced how they see the world through their lenses. One cannot 
understand properly the new Turkish government’s foreign policy choices without examining 
its identity and the process of identity construction which provides the lenses to the 
government executive through which they are seeing the world. From a constructivist point of 
view, while their identities and their corresponding interests are constructed by social 
structures, they reproduce also those structures with their interactions.  
Some scholars, such as Hüseyin Bağcı and Ahmet Davutoğlu, persuasively suggest 
that transformation of international diplomacy, globalized world and the changes in the 
international structure have a primary role in the “active” foreign policy practices of current 
Turkish government. Accordingly, the unusual activity in the Turkish diplomacy stems from 
the international conjuncture and Turkey has had to adapt itself to the new conditions in the 
international environment. In the face of the accelerated world diplomacy, Turkey would not 
be able to pursue its usual ‘passivist’ and status quo oriented foreign policy.30 Though this 
might explain the issue in part, it fails to see the whole picture.  
At this stage, one should not forget that in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, 
Turkey initially tried to adapt itself to the post-Cold War international structure mostly with 
the efforts of President Turgut Özal. However, when he died in 1993, Turkey came once 
again under the influence of a reactive political understanding instead of a "visionary" one 
owing to, along with other domestic economic and political problems, the new Turkish policy 
                                               
28 Laçiner, "Özal Dönemi," see the title of “Ekonomi Merkezli Dış Politika.” 
29 Kirişçi describes Turkish foreign policy in both Özal and Erdoğan eras with the concept of “trading state." 
Kemal Kirişçi, “The transformation of Turkish foreign policy: The rise of the trading state,” New Perspectives on 
Turkey 40, (2009): 29-57.   
30 Hüseyin Bağcı, “Dünya Gündemi Programı” (Worl Agenda Program), TV5, 30.3.2007. See Davutoglu, 
Küresel Bunalım. 
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makers' "weltanschauung"31 who received their trainings under the circumstances of the Cold 
War. Here the main thing to be considered, in spite of the changes in the international 
conjuncture, how the ruling elite perceive and interpret the world is quite significant in the 
definition of foreign policy of a country. 
Therefore, one should not neglect the effect of TFP makers’ identity, its construction 
process and its impacts on Turkey's foreign policy. One should count on the identity 
formation process of the AK Party leadership, whose origins lie mostly in the Islamist 
Welfare Party. Notwithstanding the transformation process they went through, in which they 
"have taken off their National Outlook hat"32 and adopted western values such as democracy 
and free market economy as an integral part of their identity, I still propose that their 
“Weltanschauung” is not totally value free from their past. In contrast, it is to a certain extent 
influential, and their view towards the Islamic world as well as the Middle Eastern countries 
is not the same as the Kemalist TFP makers.  Actually, it is hard to claim that they clearly 
prioritize the Islamic world in TFP, however, they contact with them at least without 
prejudices.33 Therefore, without examining the lenses through which the Turkish government 
see the world and perceive it, one cannot grasp the whole issue.  
To illustrate the point with an example, whereas there is no significant change in one 
of the main principles of TFP, westernism, to observe, there is a clear shift in the meaning 
attributed to it. For instance, while the AK Party government has not stepped back from 
Turkey's westernization project, it has not perceived westernization project as turning its back 
to the Muslim and Middle Eastern countries as it was mostly the case in the periods when the 
Kemalist foreign policy understanding was dominant in Ankara. Instead, while maintaining 
Turkey's westernization, it has sought to foster Turkey's ties with Muslim and Middle Eastern 
countries by pursuing a multidimensional foreign policy. Looking from a different angle 
actually, in terms of material elements, neither Turkey's neighbors, nor the Muslim world 
have changed. However, along with the change in the international conjuncture, the ruling AK 
Party's identity definition and its lenses through which it has been seeing the world has 
brought about the consequence of regarding these countries with a different paradigm. For 
instance, whereas Iran had been a neighbor to be distanced from in the Kemalist era owing to 
its potential regime export to Turkey, it has been regarded by the AK Party government yet as 
a neighbor with which the Turks has been sharing a common border and cultural elements for 
several centuries. Moreover, rewards of a potential cooperation for both countries have been 
appraised well and with this understanding a significant progress has been achieved in 
bilateral relations of Turkey and Iran particularly in the economic field. From a constructivist 
point of view, while Iran has remained nearly the same considering its material power, the 
ideational meaning attached to it has changed. The main reason of this change lies mostly in 
the new identity definition of the new foreign policy makers and the new interest perceptions 
described in accordance with their identities.  
Regarding the question of why I have chosen as the time frame Erdoğan and Özal 
leaderships' eras, in fact, it is evident that there were in Özal leadership's era as well as 
Erdoğan government's time some deviations from traditional “passivist” (status quo oriented) 
TFP. With respect to the AK Party foreign policy approach, as noted above, although some 
                                               
31 This originally German word is substituted for "world-view" in English. 
32 Yusuf Kanli, "AKP puts on the 'national shirt," Hürriyet Daily News, 03.05.2009, accessed 05.04.2010, 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/opinion/11568446.asp?yazarid=311&gid=260 . Ekrem Dumanlı, "Is the AKP 
a follower of (Erbakan's) National View?" Today's Zaman, 23.08.2007, accessed 25.08.2009, 
http://www.todayszaman.com/columnistDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=120138.  
33 Bülent Aras and Pınar Akpınar, "Türk Dış Politikasında Davutoğlu Dönemi: 2009 Değerlendirmesi," in Türk 
Dış Politikası Yıllığı 2009, ed. Burhanettin Duran et.al, (Ankara: SETA Yayınları XIII, Mart 2011): 24. 
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claim that it is highly relevant to the structure; I assume that besides structure, it is also 
heavily influenced by AK Party executive's identity and interest definitions which has been 
shaped throughout their interactions with national and international society.  
Furthermore, those who follow Turkish media and public discussions might easily see 
that analogies are commonly drawn between the Özal and Erdoğan eras, including the foreign 
policy field. Their common points might be summarized as follows: 
 Özal and Erdoğan are both known as “devout Muslims.”  
 Turkey experienced substantial reforms in the Özal’s era and 
similarly has been experiencing considerable reforms in the Erdoğan’s era too. 
For instance, liberalization of Turkish foreign trade, opening to the world and 
export oriented development model were initiated by Özal and they have been 
increasingly adopted by the Erdoğan leadership. Likewise, both leaderships 
have advocated the boldest democratic arguments that Turkish history ever 
witnessed on the Kurdish question. 
 It seems that there is certain continuity between Özal’s and 
Erdoğan’s foreign policy approaches. For instance, they both share 
multidimensional-diversified and proactive foreign policy understanding,34 and 
aim to establish good relations with the neighboring states.35 Furthermore, both 
leaders aimed to make Turkey first a regional and later a global actor. In order 
to achieve this goal, both leaderships have pragmatically evaluated Turkey's 
potential in accordance with their identity definitions and shaped their foreign 
policy approaches and practices accordingly. In this respect, they have sought 
pragmatically to utilize Turkey’s geopolitical, cultural and historical affinities 
as well as its existing ties with the west to make Turkey a global player. 
 During both leaderships' eras, Turkish economy indicated 
considerable growths and TFP was characterized in both eras as a policy of a 
"trading state".36 Furthermore, there is a very important common point in the 
foreign policy vision of both leaderships: creating a welfare circle by 
strengthening the economic ties in the region and thereby contributing to the 
peace and stability in the region. In this manner, they both aim to provide 
assistance to the economic development of Turkey and having a voice in world 
politics.37 
                                               
34 As it will be discussed in the coming chapters, just like for Erdoğan leadership, multi-dimensional foreign 
policy lies at the heart of Özal leadership's foreign policy understanding. Özal articulated this fact while he was 
reading the 45th governmental program in the Turkish Parliament in 1983: "We regard our existing ties with the 
West and our close relations with the Middle East and the Muslim World as complementary elements of our 
foreign policy. Turkey's geographical location which forms a natural bridge between the West and the Middle 
East on the one hand and its common historical and cultural legacy on the other, requires it to attach a great 
importance to the Islamic world. In this respect, we will demonstrate a special effort to develop good relations 
with the Muslim world based on reciprocity and further enhance an efficient cooperation." (T.b.A.) 45th 
Government Program headed by Prime Minister Turgut Özal, T.B.M.M.gov.tr., 13.12.1983, accessed 
18.09.2010, http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kutuphane/e_kaynaklar_kutuphane_hukumetler.html   
35 Kirişçi argues that one of the reasons behind Turkey’s foreign policy change during the 2000s was “The 
legacy of Turgut Özal’s policies, which emphasized the importance of interdependence and economic relations 
as well as the interests of a growing vibrant export-oriented sector in Turkey…” Kemal Kirişçi, "Turkey’s 
Foreign Policy in Turbulent Times," European Union Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper: 92, (Paris, 
September 2006): 29., accessed 29.10.2010,  http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp092.pdf   
36 Kirişçi, “The transformation” 
37 Özdem Sanberk, retired ambassador and the Director of International Strategic Research Organization 
(USAK), articulated a common point of Özal and Davutoğlu visions in a TV program with these sentences: 
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 Both leaders attached a great importance to personal 
relationships as it was materialized in the relations between Turgut Özal-
George W. Bush (the father) and R. Tayyip Erdoğan-Barack Obama.38   
 Both Özal and Erdoğan are the leaders with high self 
confidence. With respect to this self confidence, the common point of 
reference for both leaders is largely Turkey's history, particularly the glorious 
periods of Ottomans-Seljuks. As a matter of fact, this self-confidence has 
reflected to their foreign as well as internal political understandings. In terms 
of domestic politics, both leaders have viewed Turkey's Ottoman past as a 
point of reference for the settlement of internal troubles, the Kurdish question 
and the minority rights in particular. Accordingly, neither the Kurds nor the 
other minority groups were faced with a problem or blockade while they learn 
and teach their mother tongue and cultures.39 As the descendants of such a 
nation, Turkey should also enjoy the self confidence that the Ottomans carried 
and should not abstain from granting their cultural rights to the ethnic and 
minority groups living in the country.40 In terms of foreign policy, due to the 
common history with the nations which live in the territories once dominated 
                                                                                                                                                   
"Year 1985, 1986. What (Turgut Özal) himself said and I personally witnessed was entirely the same what today 
foreign minister (Ahmet Davutoğlu) says. He (Özal) said that political borders did not matter much; the matter is 
removing the economic borders. Then Turkey had not yet applied for the EU membership. The Soviet Union had 
not been dissolved and the Cold War had been continuing. This removal of borders issue is actually a vision and 
this vision has been existing in Turkey for a long time..." (T.b.A.)  İskele Sancak TV Program, Kanal7 (Channel 
7), 29.03.2013. On the other hand, Ahmet Davutoğlu articulated Turkey's historical ties and what they mean 
today with these words: "If we are going to be among the first 10 economies of the world in 2023, we must 
overcome the border walls around us. Why is it necessary to meet with those that we share a common history? If 
we are going to be among the top 10 economies of the world and the remaining nine countries are 7-10 times 
bigger than Turkey, how are we going to get out of them? What we need to do is to remove the borders around 
Turkey. Turkey should integrate with its own hinterland."( T.b.A.) "Ahmet Davutoğlu ‘nun büyük hayali" [The 
big dream of Ahmet Davutoğlu], Haber7, 31.03.2013, accessed 14.07.2014, http://www.haber7.com/ic-
politika/haber/1008559-ahmet-davutoglunun-buyuk-hayali   
38 Bülent Aliriza and Bülent Aras, “U.S.-Turkish Relations, a Review at the Beginning of the Third Decade of 
the Post-Cold War Era,” A Joint Report by Center for Strategic Research (SAM) and Center for 
Strategic&International Studies (CSIS), (November 2012): 7. 
39 For detailed information about the Ottoman Nation System see, İlber Ortaylı, Osmanlı Barışı (Pax Ottomana), 
(Istanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2007) 
40 A widely used expression by Prime Minister Erdoğan on this subject is "those who are confident of their belief 
would not be afraid of freedom of religion." In this context, PM Erdoğan has made a call for return to the 
minority groups such as Greeks, Assyrians and Armenians who were forced to live Turkey through the ways like 
population exchange in the aftermath of the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. This call gets its reference 
from the "Ottoman tolerance." PM Erdoğan explains his self-confidence with these sentences: "We are a great 
nation... And a great nation should easily do the honorable thing itself. I always say. In terms of freedoms, we 
will not be afraid of freedom of religion, if we trust our belief. If we trust our thought, we won't be afraid of 
freedom of thought.... We are on a good track. Whatever they say, we are a big country. We must read the 
history well. And we (will) stand up with the vigour given to us, to our mental roots by our history from the 
same point where we fell." (T.b.A.) Interview with R.Tayyip Erdoğan by Taha Akyol et al. in Turkish TV 
Channel CNNTÜRK, 29.03.2013, "Erdoğan son noktayı koydu: 'Silahsız çekil', CNNTÜRK, 30.03.2013, 
accessed 01.04.2013, 
http://www.cnnturk.com/2013/guncel/03/29/erdogan.noktayi.koydu.silahsiz.cekil/702199.0/index.html. PM 
Erdoğan expresses in his address of "on the way of serving the nation" the motive of the self-esteem that Turkey 
should possess with the following words: "We are not an ordinary nation. We are the citizens of the Republic of 
Turkey which was established on the remnants of the Great Seljuk as well as the Ottoman World Empires, which 
carry the legacy and experience of Seljuks and Ottomans, and most importantly carry their soul and excitement 
in the hearts." (T.b.A.) "Erdoğan: Serimden dahi geçmeye hazırım," CNNTÜRK, 31.03.2013, accessed 
01.04.2013,  
http://www.cnnturk.com/2013/turkiye/03/31/erdogan.serimden.dahi.gecmeye.hazirim/702388.0/index.html  
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by the Ottoman Empire, Turkey carries a responsibility towards these nations 
and thus it is obliged to take care of their troubles.41  
 In order to solve some of the chronic problems of Turkey, both 
leaders took 'bold' steps and took big risks. This actually indicates that neither 
Özal nor Erdoğan hesitate to assume risk if they deem it necessary with regards 
to deviating from the accustomed/tabooed policies.42 For instance, considering 
Turgut Özal's era, he was the person who started the controversial 'Davos spirit' 
with Greece, who displayed a strong pro-United States approach in the Gulf 
War, who was eager to "liberate" Turkey from the Cyprus question 
"impediment" in foreign relations and who wanted to use hard-power 
instruments in the Armenian-Azerbaijani war. Considering Erdoğan's era on 
the other hand, the Annan Plan which was prepared with the aim of solving the 
Cyprus question, Erdoğan leadership's pro-U.S. attitude when Washington 
demanded to use Turkish territory to invade Iraq and the "Armenian opening" 
were the politically risky steps taken by the Erdoğan leadership. Last but not 
least, the most radical steps with respect to the settlement of the Kurdish 
question were taken under the administration of these leaders. Both leaders' 
personal traits in question reflected also to their political approaches and their 
words. Özal’s foreign policy understanding was based on his determination “to 
depart from established policies, to take calculated risks, and to search for new 
alternatives...”43 Erdoğan, on the other hand, says: "Doing politics is taking 
risk. I go even further, life itself is a risk. Unless you take this risk, it is not 
possible to reach a conclusion."44 
Theoretical framework 
This study argues that constructivism and its arguments are considerably explanatory 
for the comprehension and explanation of Turkish FP in 1980s and 2000s. Throughout the 
study, constructivism and its arguments will be utilized to explain the developments in TFP 
more generally and in the relations between Turkey and the United States of America more 
specifically. Therefore, in order to provide a theoretical frame, while leaving the details of it 
to the next chapter, a brief introduction to constructivism would be useful for the progress of 
the study. In doing this, I hope also to provide a basis why I have chosen constructivism for 
my study. 
Since the end of the Cold War, the debates in the international relations field45 have 
                                               
41 See Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik. For Özal's feelings of responsibility towards the nations which share a 
common Ottoman history with Turkey, e.g. Bosnians, see: Cengiz Çandar,  Kentler ve Gölgeler Belgeseli, 
TRTTÜRK, 14.03.2013, accessed 05.06.2013, http://kentlervegolgeler.tumblr.com/page/5 
42 When Hüsnü Doğan, who served as a close colleague of Turgut Özal and worked as Minister in Özal 
governments, was asked to draw a comparison between Turgut Özal and R. Tayyip Erdoğan, he answers: "Özal 
was bold. So is Mr. Tayyip. They both do whatever they set their mind on. Yet Özal used to give more initiative-
authority to his colleagues. Mr. Tayyip on the other hand exhibits a "one-man" image more than Özal." (T.b.A) 
Yavuz Donat, "Özal ve Tayyip Bey," Sabah, 18.04.2011, accessed 01.04.2013, 
http://www.sabah.com.tr/Yazarlar/donat/2011/04/18/ozal-ve-tayyip-bey.   
43 Sayari, "Turkey," 18. Mehmet Barlas, Turgut Özal’ın Anıları (Turgut Özal’s Memories), (İstanbul: Birey 
Yayıncılık, 4.Baskı, 2001), 128-130. 
44“Erdoğan’dan önemli açıklamalar,” Hürriyet, 25.02.2013, accessed 26.02.2013, 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/22680640.asp 
45 For the general lines of the debates among the IR theorists see: Junita Elias and Peter Sutch, International 
Relations: The Basics, (New York: Routledge, 2007), 7-21. Yosef Lapid, “The third debate: on the prospects of 
international theory in post-positivist era,” International Studies Quarterly 33 (3) (1989), 235-254. 
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been replaced by two novel debates: between rationalists and constructivists, and between 
constructivists and critical theorists. In the end, Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane and 
Stephen Krasner suggested that the main division in the field of international relations is 
likely to be between rationalists and constructivists.46 The reason for that shift was the strong 
ascendance of constructivist approach (whose basic concern was about how world politics is 
socially constructed) to international relations theory.47 Eventually, in the constructivist sense, 
the centre of discussions shifted from objects to meanings. That is, on behalf of discussing 
states and interstate structures, debates commenced to focus on how key concepts such as 
‘states’, ‘structures’, and ‘patterns’ are constructed.48 
Constructivism as a term was initially introduced in the international relations 
literature by Nicholas Onuf in his work of “World of our making” (1989). In fact, 
constructivists do not define constructivism as a new theory trying to understand international 
relations; instead, it is called a new approach to the description of the world. It is simply a re-
description of the world, an alternative ontology.49 As Onuf puts it50: “Constructivism does 
not offer general explanations for what people do, why societies differ, how the world 
changes. Instead, constructivism makes it feasible to theorize about matters that seem to be 
unrelated because the concepts and propositions normally used to talk about such matters are 
also unrelated”. 
Constructivists focus basically on the issue of human consciousness in international 
life: the role it plays and the implications for the logic and methods of inquiry of taking it 
seriously. They consider that international reality is both material and ideational; that 
ideational factors have both normative and instrumental dimensions; that ideational factors 
depict not only individual but also collective intentionality; and that the meaning and 
significance of ideational factors are not independent of time and place.51  
The following “rock-bird” metaphor provides an excellent framework with respect to 
the utility of constructivism which defines things neither fixed nor given, but views them 
changeable according to their intersubjective formation. Throwing a rock and a bird into the 
air will have distinctive implications. Whereas the rock will make only a simple response to 
the external physical forces acting on it, the bird’s behavior (where it flies) will, despite the 
same physical forces acting on the bird as on the rock, will be dependent on the internal 
information processing which takes place inside the bird. As such, if a nation or a group of 
people, metaphorically, tossed in to the air, where they go, why, how and when will be neither 
just a result of physical forces or constraints; nor an outcome of individual preferences. Their 
behavior will be also determined by their shared knowledge, the collective meanings, norms, 
rules and so forth.52 
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Thus, the main divergent features of constructivism seem in the realm of ontology 
(what is that we know?), the real-world phenomena. Constructivists deal first with the 
identities and interests of states and endeavor to show how they have been socially 
constructed. They argue that identities and, consequently, interests are constituted in part by 
international interaction-both the generic identities of states qua states and their specific 
identities.53  
 
In a nutshell, in terms of the structures of the states system, there are both material and 
cultural elements. In very general terms, constructivists give priority to cultural over material 
structures on the grounds that actors act on the basis of meanings that objects have for them, 
and meanings are socially constructed. For instance, a gun in the hands of a friend would have 
a divergent meaning from a gun in the hands of an enemy and enmity is a social relation, not 
material.54 
Hypotheses and focus of the research  
Considering the foregoing theoretical framework, it is argued in this dissertation that 
identity is a significant point of reference to comprehend the foreign policy of a country 
appropriately. It is suggested in this connection that in order to fully understand the 
transformation of TFP in the last decades, an analysis of the changes in the identity definition 
of the governments is also necessary as it is closely related to the formulation of interest and 
foreign policy. In doing this, the role of the ideational and material change of international 
structure, such as the end of Cold War, the reconfiguration of domestic politics and 
correspondingly changing norms influencing TFP has not been denied. However, this study 
attaches a particular importance to how the agents see and perceive the structure as well as 
other determining factors of FP which is considerably important in the definition of the course 
of foreign policy. 
This dissertation comparatively analyzes the ruling Erdoğan leadership's foreign 
policy from 2002 up to 2012 and the Turgut Özal leadership's FP from 1983 until early 1990s. 
Therefore, while the impact of identity on foreign policy is analyzed, identities of the Turgut 
Özal and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan leaderships, both of whom come from Islamist backgrounds, 
are analyzed and the "middle way" they have developed in their political lives with respect to 
Islamist and Western values and the reflection of these "middle ways" to the TFP are 
discussed. It is argued in this context that AK Party foreign policy in the 2000s is the 
extension of Özal leadership's foreign policy in the 1980s and early 1990s. This hypothesis is 
explained with the similar identity definitions of both leaderships which combine Islamic-
conservative values and the values of Western origin. Considering their common goals to 
make Turkey first a regional and later a global actor, it is hypothesized that both leaderships 
have pragmatically evaluated Turkey's potential in accordance with their identity definitions 
and shaped their foreign policy approaches and practices according to their identity 
perceptions and paradigms. It is also hypothesized in this respect that similar identities bring 
about similar FP understandings and practices.  
As it is argued that foreign policy of Özal and Erdoğan leaderships pursued a different 
path from the Kemalist era, with a view to analyzing and explaining the reasons of this 
difference, the determinants of TFP are also discussed with special references to Özal and 
Erdoğan eras. Subsequently, foreign policy paradigms of both leaderships and their common 
and different points are studied. In the end, examining Turkey-United States relations during 
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both leaderships in detail, how these similar foreign policy approaches of Özal and Erdoğan 
leaderships reflected to the policy field are analyzed, and finally the causes of differences are 
handled.  
At this point, one should note that I distance myself from numerous other writers who 
emphasize Erdoğan leadership’s Islamist identity for an ideological explanation of the recent 
TFP.55 Instead, I underline that Erdoğan leadership's identity incorporates both Islamic and 
modern values such as democracy and market economy and present a unique identity 
definition. Thus, I regard Erdoğan leadership's Islamist identity as a facilitator with regard to 
its booming relations with the Middle East and Islamic world in general. As it will be 
explained in the next chapters, this Islamist identity paves the way for improving economic as 
well as political relations with the Muslim countries. By the same token, as the architect of 
AK Party foreign policy, Ahmet Davutoğlu’s identity definition of Turkey as a “central 
country” which highlights Turkey’s historical and geographical assets and regards them 
significant and presenting Turkey opportunities, are of great importance. Likewise, the other 
part of Erdoğan leadership's identity, composed of basically modern European values play a 
central role in its several foreign policy principles as well as in its foreign policy practices, 
such as “zero-problem with neighbors” policy and Turkey's pro-democracy and human rights 
policy during the Arab spring. 
In this connection, the main research question of this study is "is the Erdoğan 
leadership's foreign policy seriously "new" as it is discussed by several authors56or it 
represents a continuity considering a foreign policy line which already exists in the past of the 
Turkish Republic57 and how could it be explained with an identity based approach. To find an 
answer to these questions, some complementary questions will be also in the concern of this 
study: Which determinant factors do lie at the root of the shift of new government's foreign 
policy paradigm (identity, economy, domestic factors, international structure or personality of 
leaders)? While searching for answers to these questions, foreign policy paradigms as well as 
principles of Özal and Erdoğan terms will be compared at theoretical level by emphasizing 
the impact of the identities of both Özal and Erdoğan leaderships. Finally, Turkish-U.S. 
relations will be in the concern of this study in order to see how the foreign policy paradigms 
of both leaderships have reflected to the policy field at the practical level. As Ankara-
Washington relations cover a wide area and similar subjects retain their places in Turkish-
U.S. agenda in both Özal and Erdoğan eras, this long-standing alliance relationship offers a 
good opportunity for comparison. Hence, Turkish-U.S. relations have been selected as the 
case study.  
In a nutshell, it is aimed to prove the thesis that the distinctive policy line observed in 
the AK Party era, albeit it was conceptualized and described more systematically, is actually 
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an extension of the foreign policy line of the Özal era. It is also intended to prove that just like 
in the Özal period, along with exogenous reasons, indigenous factors like the identity of the 
groups coming to power in the country and their identity and interest perceptions have an 
essentially explanatory power for someone who seeks to comprehend the current distinctive 
foreign policy understanding and practice of Turkey.  
Methodology 
In order to investigate my propositions, I rely on an empirical method in respect of the 
related developments and their analysis under the light of existing literature on TFP. Special 
attention will be paid to the relevant texts and discourses. The data to be involved in this study 
will be derived from a historical case study. In this respect, an empirical analysis of the 
present TFP, from November 2002 general elections up to 2012, and the foreign policy of the 
Özal era, roughly from 1983 to 1993, will be in my concern. Özal’s period has been chosen 
because his foreign policy attempts and practices bear a considerable analogy to the AK Party 
government’s foreign policy principles as well as practices.  
Discourse analysis, which is a quite popular method of analysis among constructivist 
analysts many of whom reached their findings within the scope of discourse analysis,58 is a 
general term for a number of approaches to analyze, roughly, signed, written or spoken 
language use.59 Discourses are examined mainly on two levels. First, they are examined on 
the level of speech and conversation (as humanitarian) practices in which fundamental rules 
and patterns of linguistical communication and linguistically communicated interactions are 
in the centre of analyses. Second, they are investigated on thematically certain, 
institutionalized form of text production. This might be either public discourse of some 
certain themes mediated by media or some specific, socially differentiated forms of 
knowledge production in certain negotiation contexts. Discourse analyses are often carried out 
simultaneously on these two levels. On each level, analysis is not directed at an individual 
speaking event, rather at the paradigm behind it, which is realized in the speaking act and at 
discovering its rules. The focus is not (only) on the level of linguistical systems, but on the 
level of speaking acts in concrete speaking actions. Moreover, discourses include the 
speakers, their assertion as well as relevant audience. Main concern of discourse analysis is to 
analyze the social construction process of reality, to construct their communication and 
legitimation on distinctive levels (individual and collective actors, institutions) as well as to 
analyze the effect of this process on society.60 
Discourse analysis focuses on talk and texts as social practices, and on the sources that 
are drawn on to enable those practices. The concern of discourse analysis is based on the turn 
towards stronger interpretative action, upon which the meaning of linguistically and 
symbolically mediated construction of reality is detected with the linguistic turn in social 
sciences.61 Fairclough advocates that discourse analysis concerns with the properties of texts, 
the production, distribution, and consumption of texts, sociocognitive processes of producing 
and interpreting texts, social practice in various institutions, the relationship of social practice 
to power relations, and hegemonic projects at the societal level.62  Furthermore, discourse 
analysts’ interest has been in how mentalist notions are constructed and used in interaction, 
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rather than try to explain actions as an outcome of mental processes or entities.63 
One ought to notice that, taking into account of the special emphasis of constructivists, 
such as Onuf who stresses64: “saying is doing”, on the significance of linguistic practices, 
discourse analysis seems the most appropriate method for this research. Since language is 
action -that is “it does not reflect meaning but is in fact practice and behavior.”-they attach a 
particular importance to language. For instance, threatening statement of a state another one 
involves also an act, because it is not only using words but also committing an act.65 
Considering the wide spectrum of data, another question arises with respect to source 
selection and determination of texts which is one of the basic problems of discourse analysis. 
At this point, a significant primary source for the study is governmental and AK Party 
documents including the protocols of the TBMM and news. A second source of data is 
contained in PM’s and his foreign policy advisers’ statements, statements of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and its officials, as well as the statements of some influential figures from the 
AK Party executive on the foreign policy making contained in the public record. In line with 
that, the foreign political developments of the periods in my concern will be reviewed by 
using Turkish and foreign press including daily newspapers Milliyet, Hürriyet, Radikal, 
Zaman and Yeni Safak, along with Turkey's two English daily newspapers, Hürriyet Daily 
News and Today's Zaman. Furthermore, valuable secondary data is available in a variety of 
published studies and journals as well.  In addition to these written sources of data, I have 
arranged a few expert interviews with scholars who are expert on TFP as well as with the 
influential names of the AK Party on foreign policy making. 
In addition to the selection of speakers, selection of time period emerges as another 
important issue. The reconstruction of processes of meaning allocation and the pervasion 
(Durchdringung) of complex relationships between actors and structures make a process 
analysis necessary. A process analysis will help to discover the causal mechanisms in certain 
events. Thereby, the probable explanation factors will be both inductively revealed (process 
induction) and also their explanation power will be verified (process verification).66 Though it 
is possible to choose relatively longer or shorter time periods or even some certain time points 
in discourse analysis for investigation, in this dissertation two relatively longer periods were 
chosen, namely Özal and Erdoğan eras. 
On the other hand, among international relations and foreign policy theories, 
constructivism described in very general terms as ‘lenses’ which enable studying any kind of 
social relation seems the most appropriate tool in explaining the foreign policy behavior of the 
Erdoğan leadership. As also emphasized above, according to constructivism, there is a mutual 
construction relationship between social structures and actors. While social structures build 
actors by giving them social identity, actors can reproduce and change those structures with 
their daily lives and interactive actions.67 Constructivist approach pays significant attention to 
the norms and emphasizes the mutual construction process between the norms and actors. 
Within that context, it can be suggested that in the construction of the Erdoğan leadership's 
political identity and formation of its foreign policy, social and international norms have a 
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significant role.68 Hence, for further explanation efforts of AK Party foreign policy, 
constructivist approach might be guiding to a large extent.  
Review of chapters 
In the first chapter, constructivism which has been briefly introduced above will be 
examined in detail. In doing this, the constructivist critiques about the mainstream 
international relations theories will be also outlined. After summarizing the variants of 
constructivism and discussing their common points, the focus will be on Wendt’s 
constructivism. As a core constructivist, Alexander Wendt differs from other forms of 
constructivism at some points. After elaborating “Wendtian” constructivism, I will seek to 
establish a connection between constructivism and the foreign policy paradigms/practices of 
Özal and Erdoğan leaderships.  
The second chapter will focus on the determinants of TFP from a constructivist point 
of view. While repeating the traditional determinants such as geographical location, historical, 
cultural and external factors, special effort will be demonstrated to show how these 
determinants are perceived and interpreted by Özal and Erdoğan leaderships. In other words, 
while some of the determinants of TFP remain constant such as geography, history and the 
westernization project of Turkey, they have been interpreted by Özal and Erdoğan leaderships 
differently from the Kemalist establishment and this has brought about distinctive FP 
principles and practices. Moreover, indicating the "new" or the "transformed" determinants of 
recent TFP is also in my concern. As it is widely known, Turkey has gone through a 
substantial transformation process both in social and political terms. Here, the another goal of 
this chapter is to try to manifest the changing dynamics of foreign policy in parallel with the 
changing social and political structure of Turkey, and to stress the role of identity and 
psychological factors on the behaviors of the new actors.   
The third chapter analyzes TFP during the Özal and Erdoğan eras at paradigm and 
principles levels and consists of two main parts. In the first part, considering their substantial 
contribution to the formation of Özal's identity, initially Turgut Özal's family structure, his 
social environment in which he grew up and the socialization processes he went through as 
well as his psychological features are mentioned. Subsequently, considering Özal’s separate 
roles in TFP as PM and President, Özal leadership’s foreign policy paradigm and principles 
which were developed with a significant contribution of identity are discussed. The second 
main part focuses on the Erdoğan era and suggests that Erdoğan's foreign policy line is 
actually an extension of the Özal era. In order to stress the role of Erdoğan's social identity on 
his foreign policy paradigm, a comprehensive analysis of the roots of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's 
identity is also included to this part. Additionally, while foreign policy paradigm of the 
Erdoğan leadership is discussed, ideas of very prominent figures who contributed to the 
foreign policy understanding of the Erdoğan leadership, such as Ahmet Davutoğlu, are also 
not disregarded. After explaining the foreign policy principles of the AK Party government, 
the last part concludes with the question of to what extent is the foreign policy of Erdoğan era 
an extension of the Özal period.  
 
In the fourth and fifth chapters, implementation of Özal and Erdoğan governments' 
foreign policy approaches are empirically analyzed and the theses of this dissertation are 
tested. In this connection, Turkey-United States relations which have a deep and 
comprehensive network of relationship are studied. Ankara-Washington relations have been 
selected for a case study as bilateral diplomacy revolved both in Özal and Erdoğan terms 
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around similar titles, such as Iraq, Iran, Syria and so forth. Thus they provide a good basis for 
comparison.  
Final chapter includes a general appraisal of the dissertation. In doing this, the 
strengths as well as the weaknesses of the constructivist approach in explaining TFP will be 
also in my concern. In this chapter, along with identity, I will highlight also the 
material/structural factors and the ideational meanings attached to them with a view to 
bringing an overall explanation to some different policy practices of Özal and Erdoğan 
leaderships. Eventually, I will put an end to the study with a comprehensive conclusion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
1.1. Constructivist critiques of Mainstream1IR Theories 
Despite their assertive arguments, failure of the mainstream theories to predict the end 
of Cold War and their trouble to explain the changes in the international system intensified the 
critiques against them. Constructivism might be counted inter alia one of the most important 
critical approaches to the mainstream theories. At this point, constructivists criticize 
neorealism2 and neoliberal institutionalism3 for overemphasizing anarchy and power and 
referring solely to material factors- power, interest and sometimes even institutions- and 
ignoring other variables, like ideas, which might be more crucial than power and anarchy to 
explain state behaviors. They claim that focusing mainly on interests and the material 
distribution of power does not lead to a sufficient explanation of international phenomena and 
that social construction of state identities must be added to the analyses which might even 
explain the inception of state interests.4 The materialist approach of neorealism defines the 
international system as the distribution of material capabilities in terms of anarchy and 
excludes the ideational properties or relationships that may constitute a social structure, e.g. 
enmity or friendship.5 On the other hand, neoliberals have shown that international outcomes 
cannot be explained solely by material base and added the ideational base in a cooperative 
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sense to their analysis. However, since neoliberals conceded the base to neorealists, they 
accepted the “materialist” nature of power and interest; and are-with Wendt’s words, “caught 
in a realist trap.”6 
Wendt argues that to what extent is the “material base” is constituted by ideas is a 
significant issue in international relations and this question was ignored by mainstream 
theories.7 However, he stresses several times in his writings that he does not deny the impact 
of brute material forces on the constitution of power and interest, and his thesis is not that 
ideas are all the way down. Rather, he claims that behaviors of actors are built on the 
meanings that objects have for them and meanings are socially constructed.8 Of course, in a 
confrontational system, power and interest are of importance, but “what makes a system 
confrontational is an underlying structure of common knowledge.” For instance, British and 
Korean nuclear weapons do not have the same meaning for the United States, since one is a 
friend and the other is an enemy, and enmity and amity are social, not material.9 In other 
words, Wendt views material forces less important and interesting than the contexts of 
meaning that human beings construct around them.10 This implies that the material forces do 
have some effects in state action but this is a result of the meaning of the material forces -like 
human nature, technology, geography etc. - referred to them.  
Furthermore, Wendt argues that Waltz’s definition of political structure -based on 
mainly three dimensions; namely, ordering principles (anarchic nature of international 
system), the character of the units (sameness of functions performed by states: internal order 
and external defense) and the distribution of capabilities- says little about state behavior.11 It 
does not take into consideration of intersubjective factors. For instance, it does not imply how 
states will treat each other, as friends or enemies. It is also not clear whether they recognize 
each other’s sovereignty, they will have dynastic ties, and they will be revisionist or status 
quo powers. Contrary to neorealist understanding, states sharing similar security interests 
would not regard each other as a militarily potential threat even if one is militarily hopeless 
against the other.12 These intersubjective factors are deeply related to the security interests of 
states and the character of their relations in an anarchical environment. Developing the 
concept of a “structure of identity and interest”, Wendt claims that Waltz makes insufficient 
assumptions with respect to interests of states. Therefore, “without assumptions about the 
structure of identities and interests in the system, Waltz’s definition of structure cannot 
predict the content or the dynamics of anarchy.”13  
In this context, constructivists do not agree with the neorealist assumption that 
structure is an unintended by-product of rational, self interested efforts to survive. They argue 
that structure is not a constant factor; rather, some part of it will be reproduced or transformed 
by any given action. They further claim that preexistence of rules and norms becomes the 
indispensable prerequisite for social action even in an anarchical environment. Structure is not 
alone a sufficient factor to direct the behavior. Hence, a link between environment and action 
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is necessary. While this link is formed through the rationality conjecture in neorealist thinking 
as well as in the rationalist theories of IR, constructivists contend that even the rationality 
conjecture of neorealism presumes the existence of rules, norms and practices in IR. Because, 
it involves not only the “manner” in which nations calculate and act, but also means (media of 
norms and practices) through which those actions are performed. Hence, structure must have 
means through which rational action is affected.14 
Actors administer their relation with others through the means of norms and practices. 
Since structure is meaningless without some intersubjective set of norms and practices, the 
most significant element of mainstream theories is senseless. This point leads us to a 
substantial distinction between constructivists and mainstream theories. Neorealists do not 
refer any causal force to norms in international relations. Neoliberals grant some roles to 
norms only in certain issue areas. Constructivists, on the contrary, claim that norms have 
impacts on the behaviors of states to a great extent. “They constitute actor identities and 
interests, and do not simply regulate behavior.” In other words, institutions can constitute the 
identities of actors and hence shape their interests.15 
Constructivists criticize neorealists and neoliberals also due to their neglect of social 
construction and identity formation of actors which is one of the most significant factors to 
explain a structure16 and offer a sociological approach versus economic approach of 
neorealism to systemic theory. As such, they object also that rationalists neglect the formation 
of state interests. National interest and its formation process matter for constructivists to a 
great extent, however, unlike rationalists, they do not take “national interest something 
materially or inevitably defined by objective conditions”; alternatively, they take it a product 
of socially constructed identity forms. This implies that national interest should not be taken 
for granted, “It must be studied as part of a more broadly socially constructed world.” It also 
implies that just like agents and structures intermingle in social constructivism, identity and 
interest are closely linked.17 
Neorealists define the international system structures in terms of the observable 
properties of their member states and refer these structures a constraining role for the choices 
of preexisting state actors.18 Besides, they treat the attributes of state actors exogenously given 
to the system. By contrast, constructivists have argued that “states are not structurally or 
exogenously given but constructed by historically contingent interactions."19 On the other 
hand, constructivists highlight a mutual constitution between agents and structures and point 
out that neither agent (e.g. states) nor structure (e.g. international system) can be reduced to 
other, and one cannot be fully comprehended without invoking the other. While the structure 
of the states system influences and in a sense constitutes the properties of states, states affect 
the structure with their actions.20 
Wendt criticizes neorealism on three basic points: its weakness in explaining structural 
change, its imperfection to generate falsifiable hypotheses, and the uncertainty that neorealism 
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explicates sufficiently even some of the basic issues referred to it21.  
First, neorealism regards the changes in structure purely material, that is, transitions 
from one distribution of power to another. However, structural change in international politics 
is social rather than material: the transition from feudalism to sovereign states and the end of 
the Cold War are results of social dynamics rather than material. For neorealists, since such 
changes do not shift the distribution of power or transcend anarchy, they do not recognize 
them as “structural” change and the logic of anarchy remains for them constant. 
Another weak side of neorealism is that “neorealism’s theory of structure is too 
underspecified to generate falsifiable hypotheses”. For instance, there is an ambiguity with 
respect to the balancing behavior of states. Accordingly, any foreign policy can be interpreted 
as evidence of balancing. Neorealists might argue that Soviets balanced the West through 
confrontational policies during the Cold War, but they did so after the Cold War by means of 
conciliatory policies. Likewise, while in the past states balanced each other militarily, today 
they do so through economic means. In short, “if any policy short of national suicide is 
compatible with balancing, then it is not clear in what sense “states balance” is a scientific 
claim.”22 
Moreover, there is doubt that neorealism can explain some crucial things like power 
politics and balancing, which are explained merely by the structural fact of anarchy alone. 
However, Wendt highlights at this point the assumption that anarchy is a self help system 
which is a result of states being egoists about their security and not of anarchy. Since states 
are not necessarily constantly egoist, this variation might change the logic of anarchy. 
Therefore, though Wendt acknowledges the accuracy of neorealist predictions regarding the 
character of international system, he does not agree with them with respect to the reasoning.23 
It should also be noted that critics of constructivists are not limited what we mentioned 
above. Constructivists invoke rationalist theories in a number of issues and, they develop their 
own approach mostly by criticizing rationalist theories. Therefore, whenever necessary, the 
critics of constructivists on rationalist mainstream theories will be mentioned in the next 
section as well. Given the different forms of constructivism, in what follows I firstly outline 
the forms of constructivism, summarize the common points of constructivists and focus on the 
constructivism in a “Wendtian” sense. 
1.2. Constructivism 
 1.2.1. Introduction and variants of constructivism 
 
Failure of neo-realism and neo-liberalism to predict the end of the Cold War, 
weaknesses of mainstream theories to comprehend the systemic transformations reshaping the 
global order, and globalization were among the influential factors prompting the ascendancy 
of constructivism. While the end of Cold War gave rise to new questions regarding world 
politics, such as the dynamics of international change, the nature of basic institutional 
practices, the role of non-state actors and the issue of human rights, the failure of rationalist 
theories to illuminate recent systemic transformations encouraged new generation scholars to 
re-read the old questions and re-assert the old issues which had been grasped through neo-
realist and neo-liberalist paradigms.24 At this point, the role of ideas acquired an exclusive 
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significance in international relations. The recent scholarship commenced a theoretical debate 
between rationalists and the followers of interpretive epistemology concerning the nature of 
international reality and how should it be explained. Constructivist approach ascended here 
and influenced the debates considerably.25 
Constructivism cannot be regarded as a counter approach aiming to undercut existing 
approaches and methods of study of international relations, nor do constructivists completely 
strive to form an emancipatory theory.26 Instead, they are concerned what neorealist and 
neoliberal scholars neglect, for instance, the content and sources of state interests and social 
construction of world politics, but not what the scholars do and say.27 They point out that 
there are more possibilities for change in world politics than more state-centered perspectives 
contend on IR.28 Constructivism is not a fully fledged theory, and it does not advance 
generalized explanations about the world. Rather, it is a way of studying any kind of social 
relation29 and in terms of international relations; it is a theoretically informed approach.30 
Therefore, constructivist thinking in IR forms a bridge between those who take international 
relations as a set of facts (i.e. exogenously given) and those who claim that social and political 
life in international domain is totally constructed,31 that is, between the majority of IR 
theorists and postmodernists. From this aspect, evaluating constructivism as a middle-ground 
between strictly rationalist, material-individualist approaches and strictly structural-ideational, 
reflectivist approaches seems a more appropriate understanding. 
On the other hand, constructivism has a more strict connection with the developments 
in sociology and as many of constructivists drew explicitly on employing the insights of 
critical theory to illuminate the distinctive aspects of world politics, some scholars claim that 
constructivism should be seen as an outgrowth of critical theory.32 Despite the fact that 
constructivism is regarded as a part of critical theory,33 as Adler (2002) puts, it has its own 
qualities granting it a particular place in international relations theories.34 
Indeed, though, as Krell points it out, constructivist thinking existed also before, yet it 
was not labeled as “constructivism”. For instance, it could be said that the “English school” 
anticipated constructivism, or if normative institutionalist Hedley Bull lived today, he would 
be called constructivist.35 Examples in this respect might be extended. As J. Checkel states;36 
“reaching back to earlier traditions (the English school, some versions of liberalism) and 
reaching out to new disciplinary foundations (sociology) constructivists seek to expand 
theoretical discourse.” However, constructivist approach became popular only towards the 
end of 1980s; and, starting from the construction of social world, concerned mainly with the 
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ontological issues. On the other hand, epistemologically, constructivism is based on the idea 
that not only world but also knowledge about world is socially constructed. Some 
constructivists admit that there is a world out of cognition. However, they highlight the reality 
that this world is not accessible, not knowable as long as it is not symbolically and 
linguistically mediated through discursive practices.37  
Constructivists utilize social theory, and do not attack the foundations of mainstream 
international relations theories. However, for instance, they oppose the rationalist proposition 
that identity and interest formation are taken as exogenously given and their constitution 
processes are ignored.38 Furthermore, though Wendt agrees with rationalists that states system 
is anarchical and self-help, he does not share the rationalist explanation as to why states 
system is anarchical.39 Constructivists agree that world politics occur not only in an 
international system but also in an international society which is constituted by rules and 
norms. By examining the rules and norms, constructivists seek to grasp how social and 
political worlds of international relations are constructed.40  
 
Constructivists problematize state identity and thus structural change, and 
constructivism has a more sociological approach to systemic theorizing rather than 
economic.41 The core assumption of constructivists is that our understanding of the world and 
the intellectual tools utilized to view the world are not objectively acquired, instead they are 
the result of socially constructed concepts.42 That is, how we see and perceive the world is 
influenced by the lenses through which we see the world, and these lenses are not derived 
objectively but as a result of social interactions. In other words, conceptualization precedes 
observation and the meaning of empirical facts heavily depends on the conceptions that frame 
them.43 The proponents of constructivism advance that “the world is in the eye of the 
beholder” and try to figure out where these interpretations stem from and how they affect the 
acts of actors, i.e. states and individuals.44 As Wendt points it out, besides other factors, 
people treat objects on the basis of the meanings that objects have for them. For instance, 
since enemies threat and friends do not, states act differently towards enemies than they do 
towards friends. Self and other conceptions constituted by intersubjective understandings and 
expectations gain a particular meaning at this point. If society forgets ontological meaning of 
university, powers and practices of professors and students can no longer exist. Hence, “it is 
collective meanings that constitute the structures which organize our actions.”45  
At this stage, before elaborating the ontological and epistemological premises of 
constructivism in detail, reviewing relatively different forms of constructivism existing in the 
literature seems useful. In IR literature, there are a number of classification efforts of 
relatively distinctive constructivisms. There exist state centric and non-state centric 
approaches, second image and third image theories, pessimistic and optimistic theories. 
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Furthermore, there is no agreement among constructivists on substantive issues.46 The 
difference between them lies basically on their distance or closeness from/to critical 
approaches or from/to mainstream approaches methodologically and epistemologically as 
well as on their levels of analysis. 
J. G. Ruggie gathers constructivists under three main titles: 1) neo-classical 
constructivism; rooted in the classical tradition of Durkheim and Weber and based on the 
intersubjective meanings,47 2) postmodernist constructivism; whose intellectual roots go back 
to Nietzsche, Foccault and Derrida, points out an epistemological break with the modernist 
principles and practices, and where linguistic construction of subjects are emphasized, 3) the 
one between the former two, so called naturalistic constructivism, which is based on the 
philosophical doctrine of scientific realism. Alexander Wendt and David Dessler are two 
major figures of that art of constructivism.48 
On the other hand, Reus-Smit’ argues on the ground of analysis level that three 
distinctive forms of constructivism evolved during 1990s: systemic, unit-level and holistic 
constructivism. Accordingly, in the systemic level constructivism, focus is directed only to the 
interactions between unitary state actors, the most prominent representative of it is Alexander 
Wendt.49 Unit-level constructivism, unlike the systemic one, focuses on the relationship 
between domestic social and legal norms and the identities as well as interests of states and it 
is represented prominently by Katzenstein.50 The last form, holistic constructivism, seeks to 
mediate the former forms of constructivism. Holistic constructivists hold the domestic and 
international as two faces of a single social order and engage in accommodating all factors 
affecting the identities and interests of state.51  
Wendt describes three mainstreams of constructivist international relations theory; 
namely, modernist stream, whose major representatives are John Ruggie and Friedrich 
Kratochwil, postmodernist stream represented by Richard Ashley and Rob Walker, and 
finally, feminist stream associated with Spike Peterson and Ann Tickner.52 Epistemologically, 
Wendt speaks of three positions: ‘positivist’, ‘interpretativist’ and ‘postmodern’ moving on a 
line from the point of a conventional towards a radical stand point.53 
E.Adler, on the other hand, divides constructivists into four groups based on their 
methodological disagreements.54 The first group is modernists (Wendt) who focus essentially 
on ontology and see no reason not to use the standard positivist methods along with 
interpretive methods. The second group (Onuf and Kratochwil) tends to invoke a non-
positivist epistemology and highlights that historical change cannot be grasped through one or 
several causes but through an analysis of conjectures. The third group stresses narrative 
knowing and the fourth group utilizes the techniques developed by post-modernists. 
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Leaving aside this ‘classification bombardment’, Checkel makes a useful distinction 
between conventional, interpretative and critical/radical variants of constructivism.55 Whereas 
conventional constructivism is popular in the US and explores the role of norms and identity 
in shaping international political outcomes, the interpretative and critical/radical variants are 
dominant in Europe.56  
Their convergences notwithstanding, -e.g. mutual constitution of actors and structures, 
anarchy as a social construct, power as both material and ideational, and state identities and 
interests as variables- conventional constructivism arises in the realm of methodology and 
epistemology.57 Critical constructivists seek to uncover the meaning of state action, thereby 
advance an interpretivist epistemology, generally, utilizes discourse method techniques58 and 
criticize positivist social science. On the other hand, conventional constructivists adopted 
many of the methodological assumptions of positivist social science, and hypothesis testing, 
process tracing, and stressed the significance of interpretivism, causality and constitutive 
theorizing.59 Consequently, conventional constructivists are close to positivist mainstream 
theories with respect to epistemology, whereas they are close to postmodern critical theories 
regarding many substantive concerns –e.g. discourse and role of identity- and a similar 
ontological stance.60 Furthermore, unlike critical constructivists, conventional constructivists 
neither intend to reconstruct the world nor seek to replace one reality with another. Instead, 
they investigate how the current reality evolved.61 
Albeit the distinctive approaches to constructivism, there are some basic common 
points as to which most of constructivists converge. In what follows, first, the main lines of 
constructivism will be repeated, and subsequently, given the lack of an agreement among 
constructivists concerning a common comprehensive constructivist approach and even about a 
common definition of constructivism,62 approach of a modern non-radical constructivist 
author, Alexander Wendt, whose arguments widely used in empirical studies,63 will be 
reviewed. It must be noted that in this dissertation, rather than focusing on a radical 
constructivist approach, which regards the outer reality only as construction,64 a moderate 
constructivism will be in concern. 
 
1.2.2. Common characteristics of constructivists 
Constructivism might be regarded as a new form of “idealism”. However, one should 
not be confused about the famous and well-known idealist theory in international relations 
that emerged as the first theoretical approach among other traditional theories. Idealism means 
here that constructivism grants explicitly more value to ideas in international relations than 
rational theories do.65 Idealism in social theory is not normative and is not interested in how 
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world ought to be, but interested in how the world is. It does not assume that human nature is 
inherently good or bad, or social life inherently cooperative. Rather, there are pessimistic as 
well as optimistic idealist theories. It does not presume that social change is easy or even 
possible in a socially constructed context. Actors have the obligation to overcome 
institutionalization and power asymmetries to realize social change and this is actually even 
more difficult in social structures than material structures. Moreover, it does not contend that 
power and interest are insignificant, but claim that ‘their meaning and effects depend on 
actors’ ideas’. For instance, material power of a state does not have the same meaning for an 
ally and enemy. Idealist social theory’s basic claim is that ‘the deep structure of a society is 
constituted by ideas rather than material forces’. Therefore, most modern social theory is 
idealist in this respect, contrary to materialist mainstream IR theories.66 
Furthermore, constructivism is classified by some scholars67 as a structural theory of 
international politics. The underlying reasons promoting this suggestion are that 
constructivists stress the effect of non-material structures on identities and interests and the 
role of practices of actors in maintaining as well as transforming these structures.68 In the end, 
constructivism is ‘one form of structural idealism or idea-ism.’69 In sum, constructivism is 
“idealist” in the sense that it highlights the ideal factors in international relations, and it is 
“structuralist” in the sense that it is interested in the impacts of structure on agents and vice-
versa. 
Constructivism objects neorealism particularly on an ontological ground.70 It claims to 
provide a more comprehensive ontology than rational mainstream theories and also claims to 
provide a more promising basis for progressive theoretical research.71 Neorealism identifies 
“structure” as the unintended, by-product arrangement of system actors/units. In constructivist 
ontology, however, structure refers to the social forms that pre-exist action. Whereas the basic 
entities comprising neorealist ontology are actors, action and the arrangement of actors, in 
constructivist ontology, they are actors, actions and the materials for action. Two important 
assumptions of constructivists with respect to the connection between action and materials 
(structure) are: 1) structure both enables and constraints action and 2) structure is the result 
and the medium of action.72  An actor can act socially merely via a social structure pre-
existing action and in turn, social structure is reproduced solely through the actions of agent. 
In sum, “all social action presupposes social structure, and vice versa.”73 
Before starting to elaborate the common characteristics of constructivists, providing a 
definition of constructivism may be useful. E. Adler describes constructivism as follows: 
“Constructivism is the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped 
by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations 
of the material world.”74 Constructivists assume that world is accessible to the actors only 
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through cognition and meaning that this world is shaped on the basis of ideas (generally as 
collective knowledge and institutionalized practices) and interpretations. In constructivism, 
ideas enable and exculpate the actions and provide room for maneuver. Interests will be 
defined in accordance with ideas, i.e. actors construct themselves and their interests with and 
through ideas. Ideas might be understood as knowledge about reality. That includes not only 
“hard data” but also norms, esthetic opinions and ideas about identity of an actor in relation to 
other actors.75 Stated differently, main constructivist assumption contends that there is a 
material world ‘out there’ (free from our knowledge) which is not completely determined by 
physical reality76 and that our understanding of the world and the intellectual means through 
which the world is viewed are not objectively derived, but instead are the outcome of socially 
constructed concepts. Proponent constructivists inquire the sources of those interpretations 
and how they affect the behavior of individual state actors.77 Hence, a great deal significance 
is attached to the “lenses” through which actors see the world, to their perceptions about the 
world as well as to the influences of those perceptions on actors’ behaviors. 
 In spite of the fact that there is little agreement among constructivists, they converge 
in some basic points. Constructivists are interested in how the objects and practices of social 
life are constructed.78 Thus, unlike rationalists who concern with ‘why’ question, 
constructivists deal with ‘how’ question. Biersteker and Weber (1996) summarize the 
common points of constructivists as follows:79 “They (constructivists) all agree that the 
structures of international politics are outcomes of social interaction; that states are not static 
subjects, dynamic agents; that states identities are not given, but (re)constituted through 
complex, historical, overlapping practices- and therefore volatile, unstable, constantly 
changing; that the distinction between domestic politics and international relations is 
tenuous.”  
In this context, constructivists all strive to explore three main ontological propositions 
on social life. These propositions were claiming to illuminate more on world politics than 
rationalist assumptions. They hold the following ontological propositions: emphasis on 
normative structures besides material structures, on socially constructed nature of agents, on 
the role of identity in shaping political action and the mutually constitutive relationship 
between agents and structures. 
First (1), normative or ideational structures are as important as material structures in 
shaping the behaviors of social and political actors, e.g. individuals or states.80 While 
acknowledging the importance of material resources in international politics, constructivists 
put special emphasis on social structures, i.e. intersubjectively shared ideas, norms, and values 
held by actors in global politics. Since they want to stress the social side of human existence, 
and ‘the role of shared ideas as an ideational structure constraining and shaping behavior’, 
constructivists highlight the intersubjective dimension of knowledge.81 However, this does not 
mean that material sources are entirely excluded by constructivists. Instead, impact of 
material sources is always mediated by the ideas that give them meaning.82 
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According to constructivists, a comprehensible conduct of IR is not possible ‘without 
mutually recognized constitutive rules, resting on collective intentionality.’ Depending on the 
issue field, these rules/norms might be relatively ‘thick’ or ‘thin’. But, in any issue field, 
‘these constitutive rules pre-structure the domains of action within which regulative rules take 
effect.’83 
Rules/norms refer to collective understandings, “intersubjective beliefs about the 
social world that define actors, situations and the possibilities of action.”84 They are collective 
understandings that are rooted in social practice and they are reproduced through social 
practices. In terms of international relations, the practice of diplomacy constitutes and 
reproduces accepted international norms. By placing actors and meaningful action in social 
roles such as modern state and social environment like modern world system, norms 
constitute actors. Furthermore; norms have impacts on the behaviors of actors. They define 
what appropriate is (logic of appropriateness) given the social rules and what effective is 
given the rules of law.85 Whereas realists refer no causal force to norms and neoliberals view 
them just as regulative in certain issue areas, constructivists regard them as collective 
understandings having behavioral influences on actors.86 However, the effects of norms are 
not restricted to regulative terms, rather they reach deeper. Namely, in addition to regulation 
of behavior, norms constitute actors’ identities and interests.87 For example, “international law 
not only defines legitimate state practice, it also legitimates state and allows them to behave in 
ways that have meaning for other international actors."88  
Constructivists advocate that actors would act in accordance with their identities and 
their status, and they would perform the behaviors that their social environment and their 
cultural structure approve. Put it differently, constructivist subjects search for answers to the 
questions of “what would and should a person in my position do under the current social 
circumstances?” According to constructivists, individuals seek compliance with social values 
and norms (logic of appropriateness).89 Logic of appropriateness constitutes in the 
constructivist foreign policy theory the basic link between the independent variable norms and 
the foreign policy behaviors of states. The impact of norms on foreign policy is related to the 
number of actors who share them. Attaching a considerable significance to norms, unlike the 
rationalist-utilitarian institutionalism, constructivism argues that norms are constitutive, not 
regulative.90 
Second (2), state identities and interests are constructed to a great extent by social 
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structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic 
politics.91 In the socialization process of actors (process of interacting), actors are led to 
redefine their interests and identities. Hence, contrary to rationalist theories which take 
interests and identities exogenously given and fixed so as to isolate the causal roles of power 
and international institutions, constructivism focuses on how ideational structures shape 
actors’ identities (how actors define themselves), their goals, and the roles they believe they 
should play in international politics.92 Besides, identities inform interests and, in turn, actions. 
Unlike rationalists, who hold actors’ interests as exogenously determined and are not 
interested in where these interests/preferences come from but how they are followed 
strategically, constructivists contend that understanding how actors develop their interests (the 
process of developing interest) is substantial to explain a great part of international political 
phenomenon. In order to explain the interest formation, constructivists refer a very significant 
role to the social identities of individuals or states.93 For instance, Turkey is defined and also 
defines itself as a regional power and it adopts this identity. This definition has some certain 
effects on the interests of Turkish Republic, e.g. Turkey cannot turn its back on the issues 
occurring in its region. Hence, as a regional power, it is encouraged to interfere in the issues 
happening in its region.  
Finally (3), agents and structures are mutually constituted.94 Constructivist concerns 
about norms led constructivists to reach substantially different results in comparison with 
rationalist mainstream theories of international relations. Whilst realism and neoliberalism 
describe a world where unified, undifferentiated rational actors whose relations are structured 
by the balance of material power; constructivists highlight the social structure which 
constitutes the actors and is constituted by their interactions.95 Put it differently, ‘structures 
constitute actors (states) in terms of their interests and identities; however, discourse practices 
of actors also shape, reproduce and modify structures (global norms). Structures are not fixed; 
they can be altered through the acts of agents. They do exist only through the reciprocal 
interactions of actors and open to the effects of actors.96 
Along with these arguments, two concepts employed by some constructivists, societal 
socialization and transnational socialization, provide a very useful tool for the explanation of 
foreign policy behaviors of actors. Unlike the process of an individual’s socialization into his 
social environment, socialization processes of foreign policy decision makers occur at two 
different levels. The first level, societal socialization, is associated with the domestic society 
of the decision makers, whereas the second level, transnational socialization, is associated 
with the international society. With the words of Boekle, Rittberger and Wagner:  
 
“Transnational socialization signifies a process whereby government's decision 
makers internalize international norms, i.e. value-based expectations of appropriate behavior 
that are shared among states. Societal socialization refers to a process whereby government 
decision makers internalize societal norms, i.e. value based expectations of appropriate 
behavior that are shared by the citizens of their state.”97  
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Should these international and societal norms converge, they would be more 
influential. In this case, the converging international and societal expectations of appropriate 
behavior would be more strongly internalized by foreign policy decision makers, and thus the 
degree of influence on the behavior of decision makers would be wider.98  
With the above mentioned core assumptions, constructivism contrasts with the 
rationalist assumptions in three respects. Firstly, while constructivism takes actors as deeply 
social in the sense that their identities are constituted by the institutionalized norms, values 
and ideas of the social environment in which they act, rationalists hold that actors are 
atomistic egoists in the sense that their identities and interests are autogenous. Secondly, 
constructivists hold actors’ interests as endogenous to social interaction, as a consequence of 
identity acquisition. By contrast, realists treat interests as exogenously determined, as given 
before social interaction. Finally, whilst realists characterize society as a ‘strategic realm’, a 
site where actors behave rationally and pursue their interests, constructivists view it as a 
‘constitutive realm’. Accordingly, it generates actors as knowledgeable social and political 
agents and makes them who they are.99  
 
1.2.3. A "Wendtian" approach to constructivism 
 
Alexander Wendt’s work has been tremendously influential in the field of 
international relations theories and gained a particular and prominent place among 
constructivist approaches.100 He drew particularly on the work of Antony Giddens and Roy 
Bhaskar and utilized an epistemology of scientific realism.101 He also sought to apply the 
claims made by integration theorists as well as the general tenets of identity formation in 
"structurationist" and symbolic interactionist social theory. Though he agreed with scientific 
realists,102 he wrestled with rationalist theories, in particular with neorealism in his works in 
terms of ontology (especially throughout his book of Social Theory of International Politics, 
1999). In this respect, it is regarded that whereas he is closer to critical theories ontologically, 
he drew on epistemological and methodological insights of scientific realism to a large extent. 
 
Given the prominence of meta-theoretical matters in Wendt’s form of constructivism, 
it is viewed as one of the most abstract version of constructivism which concerned little with 
empirics or politics.103 He takes Waltz’s neorealism as a starting point and deals with it in his 
works. The reason is not the “great” explanation power of neorealism, but from the ‘political 
effects of providing common language in which world politics takes place. Realism is a social 
fact in world politics’. These shared understandings in IR and their connection with practice 
led Wendt to reconsider about the basic assumptions of power politics.104 While realists 
highlight anarchy and the distribution of power as the driving forces behind international 
politics (material sources), constructivists, and also Wendt, challenge realist ignorance of the 
social structures and intersubjectively shared ideas which, accordingly, play crucial roles in 
shaping the behaviors of actors by constituting identities and interests. 
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Among other versions of constructivism, Wendt develops a modernist constructivism. 
Accordingly, whereas radical constructivists contend that ‘all aspects of human reality are 
shaped by socialization through discursive practices’, Wendt finds this view too extreme and 
objects the idea of “ideas all the way down.”105 Instead, he suggests that material forces do 
exist and might have causal impacts on the behaviors of actors. Besides, prior to interaction 
with other states, the state has already some certain interests. According to Wendt, 
constructivism is too extreme if it claims that “ideas all the way down” as well as too limited 
if it only tests ideas as causal forces against realist variables like power and interest without 
examining to what extent these material variables are constituted by ideational structures.106 
 
Following Waltz, Wendt adopts a “system theory” approach to international relations. 
He stresses the structure and the effects of states system.107  Furthermore, he accepts the 
reality that state identities are not constructed primarily by international structures but by 
domestic factors; and for a complete theory of state identity, a domestic research is 
considerably needed. However, ‘these identities are made possible by and embedded in a 
systemic context’108 therefore, Wendt’s focus lies at the systemic level. 
 
On the other hand, Wendt agrees with positivists with respect to epistemology and 
with post-positivism concerning ontology.109 With this approach, he tries to build a via-media 
between positivist epistemology, which argues that ‘science is an epistemically privileged 
discourse through which we can gain a progressively truer understanding of the world’110, and 
post-positivist ontology, which contends that what we see out there depends on our lenses, -
how we see it- and that constitutive as well as interpretative process matter in social life.  
 
Hereafter, I will attempt to elaborate some points which grant Wendt a significant 
place among other constructivists. In this respect, I will focus first on the structure and 
subsequently on agent in a Wendtian sense. 
 
 1.2.3.1. Wendt’s approach to structure 
 
In a re-conceptualization effort regarding the components of international structure, 
Wendt grants nearly a priority to social over material. The following statement summarizes 
his position in relation to international structure:111 
 
“The character of international life is determined by the beliefs and expectations that 
states have about each other and these are constituted largely by social rather than material 
structures. This does not mean that material power and interests are unimportant, but rather 
that their meaning and effects depend on the social structure of the system, and specifically on 
which of three “cultures” of anarchy is dominant – Hobbesian, Lockean, or Kantian. 
Bipolarity in a Hobbesian culture is one thing, in a Lockean or a Kantian culture quite 
another. On a social definition of structure, the concept of structural change refers to changes 
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in these cultures – like the end of the Cold War in 1989 – and not to changes in material 
polarity – like the end of bipolarity in 1991.” 
 
In this context, Wendt does not neglect the material structure as the post-positivists do, 
but he disagrees with rationalist mainstream theorists concerning the weight of material power 
and interest in international arena. Wendt argues that since the meaning and impacts of 
material structure is deeply bound up in the social structure of the system, social structure is 
relatively more important. 
 
Wendt postulates that any social structure will consist of three elements:112 namely, 
ideas - which ‘constitute the actors in a situation and the nature of their relationships, whether 
cooperative or conflictual,’113 material conditions – in which ‘actors act on the basis of the 
socially constructed meanings that objects have for them-’114 and interests. The point is that 
these elements are significantly interrelated and equally necessary to explain social outcomes. 
"Without ideas there are no interests, without interests there are no meaningful material 
conditions, without material conditions, there is no reality at all."115 
 
Distribution of interests: Contrary to explicit explanatory factors of neorealism, i.e. 
anarchy and distribution of power, Wendt argues that neorealism is underspecified and the 
conclusions in Waltz’s neorealism depend on the “distribution of interests.”116 That is, 
assumptions of neorealism with respect to the motivations of states acting in the system are 
not stated explicitly.117 Accordingly, Waltz would not be able to explain variations in 
international outcomes without keeping in mind distinctive types of states, i.e. pro-status-quo 
states and revisionist ones.118 The extent of anarchy constituted by pro-status-quo states and 
revisionist states are different. Pro-status-quo states make up a relatively more stable and 
peaceful system in comparison to revisionist states which seek to change the system by means 
of force.119  Therefore, anarchy in international relations does not have just one underlying 
principle. As Wendt concludes; “the effect of anarchy and material structure depend on what 
states want. The logic of anarchy among revisionist states takes the form of a fight to the 
death; among status-quo states, arms racing and some brawls; among collectivist states, 
perhaps heated but ultimately non-violent arguments about burden sharing.”120  
 
Therefore, describing Waltz’s neorealism underspecified, Wendt highlights the 
distribution of interests. Accordingly, distribution of interests, a hidden variable, is most 
crucial to explain international politics. Material structure would be meaningful only if it 
interacts with the ideational structure.121 “The distribution of power in international politics is 
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constituted in important part by the distribution of interests, and the content of interests is in 
turn constituted in important part by ideas.”122 Furthermore, concrete interests are not 
exogenously given; rather, they are shaped by norms as to what sort of goals are worth 
pursuing or avoiding. Hence, though individuals and states might have some basic needs (e.g. 
security, esteem and so on which will be elaborated below), their manifestation in certain 
actors will be a product of social discursive practices.123 
 
Anarchy: For Wendt, anarchy -i.e. absence of a hierarchical government- is not 
something given in nature but a social conception that constructs reality. His focus lies in the 
analysis of how anarchy is constructed and how power politics arises.124 For him, “anarchy is 
an empty vessel without meaning. What gives anarchy meaning is the kinds of people who 
live there and the structure of their relationships.”125 So Wendt characterizes anarchic 
structures as a function of social structures. Unlike Waltz’s claim that power politics and the 
self help system are the result of the structure of anarchy, Wendt argues that power politics 
and self-help are products of state actions.126 In this respect, power politics and self help are 
not automatic system effects, but consequence of how states interact with each other. At this 
stage, attacking Waltz’s “logic of anarchy”, he claims that how states interact with each other 
depend on the type of international political culture under which states live.127 For instance, if 
states are revisionists and do not hesitate to use power to achieve their goals, then we get 
power politics. Therefore, power politics is not a function of anarchic structure; instead, it is a 
function of process of learning,128 which constitutes identity and interest of states. Behavior in 
anarchy is not predetermined and the dominant roles in the system –enemy, rival and friend- 
determine the kind of structure at the macro-level.129 In this sense, based on different role 
relationships, Wendt describes three kinds of cultures (shared ideas), namely Hobbesian, 
Lockean and Kantian, which define for states what their social identity or role should be. 
 
International structures: These macro-level structures are developed primarily out of 
“self” and “other” conceptualizations (role identities) and ensuing practices.130 These three 
cultures of anarchy have characterized the past two thousand years of international relations at 
different times. Roles performed by states have a crucial structural significance for Wendt. In 
a Hobbesian culture, which, according to Wendt, lasted until the seventeenth century, states 
attribute each other the role of “enemy” and view no limits to use violence. Therefore, 
violence is the basic tool for survival in this culture. In a Lockean culture, which refers to the 
modern states system since the treaty of Westphalia in 1648, states see each other as “rivals” 
and use violence to advance their interests without intending to eliminate each other. In a 
Kantian culture, however, which has appeared in relations between democracies, the role 
performed by states is a “friendly” one. They prefer peaceful methods to settle disputes and 
work together against security threats.131 
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For each culture the behavioral norms are known by the actors and are “shared” at 
least to a minimal degree. To what extent are these norms internalized is of importance for 
any given structure.  For Wendt, norms can be internalized to three degrees.132 Accordingly, 
in a Hobbesian world norms are to be followed since they are coerced by a credible enforcer 
(first degree, ‘Coercion’). If norms are better internalized, the system turns into a Lockean 
structure in which “rivalry” and “calculations” channel conflicts (second degree, ‘self-
interest’). In the highest degree of internalization of norms, “legitimacy” of norms is the 
dominant motive not force or price calculations (third degree, ‘legitimacy’). This culture is 
named as Kantian by Wendt133. At this level, in accordance with constructivist thinking, 
‘states have internalized the behavioral norms as legitimate, as part of who they are’. Norms 
“construct” the actors only at this level by shaping their identities and interests.134 Though 
Wendt writes that a transformation of those cultures is difficult and does not concede that a 
progressive evolution in the political culture of the international system will necessarily occur, 
he argues that it will not move backward unless a big exogenous shock happens. So, if a 
Lockean culture internalized, it is hard to see that it degenerates into a Hobbesian one.135 
 
For Wendt, crucial for any cultural form is its role structure, ‘the configuration of 
subject positions that shared ideas make available to its holders.136 In the constitution of 
subject positions, Self and Other perceptions play a significant role and constitute first the 
logics and later reproduction requirements of different cultural forms. Therefore, a subject 
position lies at the centre of each kind of anarchy: while the subject position is “enemy” in a 
Hobbesian culture and “rival” in a Lockean culture, it is “friend” in Kantian cultures. Each 
culture contends different stand of Self towards Other concerning the use of power. In a 
Hobbesian culture no limits is observed regarding the use of violence; in a Lockean culture 
actors use violence to acquire their interests but avoid eliminating each other; in a Kantian 
structure, on the other hand, actors use no violence to settle their disputes.137 In this respect, a 
macro level change depend above all on a redefinition of the posture of the Self to the Other 
regarding the use of violence as a strategy of following one’s goals.138 
 
Consequently, in addition to constitutive attribute of social structure, in parallel with 
neoliberals, Wendt accepts the regulative quality of it. Here, he refers to the ‘logic of 
appropriateness’. Accordingly, agents are “rule-followers” “who act out of habit or decides 
what to do by posing the question ‘how is a person in my role (or with my identity) supposed 
to act in this circumstance?”139 But Wendt highlights also a constitutive relationship since he 
believes and seeks to show that the agents’ identities and interests are product of social 
structure (except for corporate identities and basic interests of states which will be elaborated 
below); “and because for his purpose, it is imperative that the relationship could be 
demonstrated to be of a constitutive kind as he defines it.”140 
 
In short, social structures/cultures (either Hobbesian, Lockean or Kantian) not only 
causally influence the lives of states and regulate their behaviors, which live under them or 
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come into contact with them, but also that they each constitute the identities and interests of 
states or their roles. Therefore, for Wendt, whereas the Hobbesian culture constitute states as 
‘enemies’, Lockean culture as rivals and the Kantian culture as friends.141  
 
 1.2.3.2. Wendt’s approach to Agent  
 
Wendt’s approach is state centric like Waltz’s neorealism; he views states as the 
primary actors and basic units of analysis in international politics.142 Whilst Wendt believes 
that the identity of the state informs its interests and, in turn, its actions, he ignores everything 
that exists or happens in the domestic realm, and seeks to illuminate the world politics simply 
by theorizing how states relate to one another in the international arena.143 Since Wendt 
focuses on the system level and how the states system functions, he takes the existence of 
states as given and neglects the domestic construction of states. In this sense, Wendt comes 
closer to rationalist theories by assuming state identities and interests partly exogenous to the 
system. However, he argues that state identities and interests are still constructed by system 
structures to a great extent contrary to rationalist mainstream theories which assume ‘all’ state 
identities and interests are exogenously given.144 
 
For Wendt, states are self organized units which are constructed from within by the 
discursive practices of individuals as well as groups.145 As a self-organized entity, some 
properties of states are intrinsic and exogenous, whereas others dependent on cultural 
structures at the systemic level. Wendt draws here a distinction between the corporate and 
social identities of the state.146 Corporate identity is a ‘site’ or ‘platform’ for other identities, 
such as type, role and collective identities and pre-exists the social interaction of states.147 
This corporate identity and its implications cause a major difference between Wendt and other 
extreme constructivists. “Corporate identity refers to the intrinsic, self-organizing qualities 
that constitute actor individuality…for organizations, it means their constituent individuals, 
physical resources, and the shared beliefs and institutions in virtue of which individuals 
function as a "we."148   
 
Unlike other constructivists, Wendt postulates that states have some basic needs 
emanating from their nature as self-organized political units: needs for physical survival, 
autonomy, economic well-being, and collective self esteem.149 These needs are evaluated 
under the framework of corporate identity which is always related to material base (e.g. 
territory or people of a state). Besides, a perception of Self as a ‘separate locus of thought and 
activity’ has a distinguished place in corporate identity,150 whose roots are in domestic politics 
and which is ontologically prior to the states system and provides motivational energy for 
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interaction.151 In short, corporate identity of the state refers to the factors constituting a state 
what it is.152  
 
Social identity, on the other hand, concerns the status, role or personality that 
international society ascribes to a state.153 Social identity arises only through interaction. 
Wendt utilizes here the concept of “I” and “me” in symbolic interactionism. That is, the 
process of definition of an interest and its application depends in part on the notion of self vis-
à-vis others, that is, on social identities or roles.154 These are sets of meanings that an actor 
attributes to itself while taking the perspective of others-that is, as a social object. Unlike 
corporate identity’s singular character, actors have many social identities changing in 
salience. “Social identities have both unit-level and social structural properties, being at once 
cognitive schemas that enable an actor to determine “who I am/we are” in a situation, and 
positions in a social structure of shared understandings and expectations.”155 Finally, social 
identities are dependent on interaction with others and always in process. Therefore, they are 
a key link in the mutual constitution of agent and structure.156 Identities lead actors to view 
situations and redefine their interests in certain ways.157 In other words, social identities 
provide for lenses to agents through which they see the world and hence define their interests 
in certain ways.158 What Wendt concerns in terms of identity is indeed social identity rather 
than corporate identity. 
 
At this point, highlighting the concept of 'identity' in Wendt's approach would provide 
a valuable content to proceed the argumentation of the dissertation. Following Zehfuss, I also 
consider that identity has a particular place in Wendt’s approach,159 and as such, I attribute it 
an essential role in international politics as well as in foreign policy making. 
 
“Identities refer to who or what actors are. They designate social kinds or states of 
being.”160 Actors gain their identities through interaction and participating in collective 
meanings, that is, “relatively stable, role specific understandings and expectations about 
self.”161 Individuals and also states have many identities which are constructed to different 
degrees by cultural forms as to who individuals or states are and how they act in a certain 
context, and salience of an identity hinges on the specific social context.162 For instance, in a 
class environment, students and professor have different roles but outside of this exclusive 
institutional environment, these roles have no meaning. Likewise, sovereignty of a state 
makes sense solely in a system of mutual recognition from other states with certain 
competencies.163 
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Identities provide the basis for interests. Whereas they refer to who or what actors are, 
interests refer to what actions they want. Identities precede interests, since one has to know 
first who he is in order to determine about his interests. However, identities alone do not 
explain action. “Without interests identities have no motivational force, without identities 
interests have no direction. Identities belong to the belief side of the intentional equation 
(desire+belief = action).164 Having an identity means having certain ideas who an actor is in a 
given situation, and likewise “the concept of identity fits squarely into the belief side of the 
desire plus belief equation. These beliefs in turn help constitute interests.165 For example, 
politicians have an interest in their re-elections because they view themselves as 
“politicians.”166 
 
This powerful role of identity in the definition of states’ interests grants it a great deal 
of explanatory power in foreign policy analysis.167 States, as individuals, have not a set of 
interests (a ‘portfolio’ of interests) that they play accordingly, independent of social context. 
Rather, “they define their interests in the process of defining situations.”168 If actors face an 
unprecedented situation, institutionally defined roles come into issue and actors define these 
kinds of situations as well as their interests according to these defined roles. Lack of role or its 
failure leads either to difficulty in defining situations and interests or to an identity 
confusion.169 
 
As mentioned above, identities are not given but constituted, sustained and 
transformed by interaction.170 Here, Wendt defines a simple model as to the acquisition of 
identities by “imitation” and “social learning (two mechanisms of cultural selection or 
socialization) with a particular emphasis of the latter.171 Through imitation, actors gain 
identities and interests when they “adopt the self-understandings of those whom they perceive 
as “successful”…”172 Social learning, the second mechanism, is stressed in terms of its 
constitutive effects on identities and interests (complex learning).173 
 
Wendt writes that “self” and “other” conceptions arise from interaction between states. 
State actors already possess certain qualities prior to interaction such as territory, people, 
sovereignty and so forth.174 Besides, once state actors encounter, “they are not blank slates 
and what they bring to their interaction will affect its evolution.”175 This argument points out 
the corporate and personal identities of states. These identities, on the other hand, have some 
basic needs that actors (states) must satisfy if they want to survive: namely, physical security, 
autonomy, economic well-being and collective self-esteem.176 In order to grasp the quality of 
identities (egoistic or collective), one has to look, beyond basic needs, at social interaction. 
Identities and interests are learned and reinforced in response to how actors are treated by 
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significant others.177 This principle is called as “reflected appraisals” or “mirror” because it 
hypothesizes that actors come to see themselves as a reflection of how they think others see or 
“appraise” them, in the “mirror” of other’s representations of the Self.”178 For instance, if the 
other characterizes self as an enemy, in accordance with the principle of reflected appraisals, 
self will probably internalize that characteristic in its respective role identity vis-à-vis the 
other. However, significance of all others is not equal but related to power and dependency 
relations.179  
 
Identities and interests are not only constituted but also sustained in interactions.180 
Stable identities and expectations concerning each other are created through repeated 
interactive processes. Process develops as follows: “initially forming shared ideas about self 
and other through a learning process, and subsequently reinforcing these ideas causally 
through repeated interaction. Ego and Alter181 are at each stage jointly defining who each of 
them is.”182 In this way, social structures are produced and maintained by actors and in turn, 
structures confine actors’ choices.183  
 
When structures of identity and interests are developed, their transformation is not 
easy since the social system becomes an objective social fact to the actors.184 Actors might 
have an interest in sustaining stable identities because of external factors like the motives 
caused by existing structures and also internal sources such as commitment to constructed 
identities.185 Concerning this process, Wendt invokes the “logic of self-fulfilling prophecy” 
which proposes that once a culture is produced, it will tend to reproduce itself which 
maintains also the identities and interests produced in interaction.186 Nonetheless, identity 
transformation is probable not only in first encounters but also possible when a culture 
already exists. Its transformation requires social learning. Thus, the interaction between Ego 
and Alter again carries the transformative potential for an identity change.187 
 
Constructivism takes identities and interests as endogenous to interaction, i.e. defined 
in social processes.188 While states tend to define their interests in egoistic terms,189 whether 
they adopt “selfish” or “collective” identities hinge on the self-other dichotomy, i.e. on 
“manner in which social identities involve identification with the fate of other. Identification 
is a continuum from negative to positive-from conceiving the other as anathema to the self to 
conceiving it as an extension of the self.”190 Whereas a negative identification will result in a 
competitive security system, in a positive identification, states will view each other’s security 
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“as responsibility of all.” Rather than self-help, interests of the community will be prevailing 
and in a sense national interests will transform into international interests.191 
 
Given the interaction-dependent quality of state identity and interests, and states’ 
tendency to define their interests in egoistic terms, states might define their interests in 
collectivist terms by creating new definitions of self and other during interaction.192 At this 
point, Wendt introduces three familiar factors: interdependence, common fate, homogeneity, 
which would help a more individualistic culture transform into a collectivist one.193 
 
Interdependence means that “the outcome of an interaction for each depends on the 
choices of the others.”194 It would probably result in forming a collective identity, if someone 
had the ‘bright’ idea of characterizing the situation as interdependence. This idea might be 
followed by a discourse of what “we” should do.195 Density of interaction will affect the 
likelihood of transformation of interdependence into collective identity. Where 
interdependence highest is, “concentric circles of identification might then develop.”196 For 
instance, in terms of security issues, these may be named as “primary” security dilemmas like 
France-Germany and India-Pakistan.197 However, the potential of interdependence to induce 
cooperation and collective identity formation is limited where a fear of exploitation exists. 
Fear of exploitation constraints interdependence to be an adequate condition for collective 
identity formation among states in anarchy.198 However; given the cooperation level of 
modern states, Wendt claims that today’s Lockean culture reduces the self-help character of 
the system and creates a more appropriate environment for cooperation.199 
 
“Common fate” arises mostly against a third actor or actors who threaten others as a 
whole in terms of survival, fitness or welfare.200 Wendt notes on this issue that where the 
threat is not so acute, to induce a common fate perception, much more ideological labor might 
be necessary.201 Here, the “entrepreneurs” and /or “epistemic communities” step in the issue 
who take the initiative to reframe how actors understand themselves, as in the case of global 
warming.202 
 
With respect to “homogeneity” as another factor promoting collective identity, Wendt 
hypothesizes that “objective “homogeneity (being democratic state etc.) pushes actors to re-
categorize others as being like themselves. Though he acknowledges that homogeneity does 
not always lead to collective identity (as in the case of European states until near history) and 
juxtaposes a number of reasons to depict why it is not by itself adequate to develop collective 
identity, he writes that homogeneity reduces conflict and increase the potential “to see Self 
and Other as members of the same group.”203 
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These efficient causes of collective identity formation and structural change increases 
actors’ incentive to engage in social behavior.204 When cooperation and collective identity 
begin to prevail in interactions of state, they will be regarded as the feature of the system over 
time. This process points out the way how Kantian culture arises.205 
 
However, these master variables are conditioned by a “reciprocity” problem. The 
process of collective identity formation would fail if a prosocial behavior would not be 
reciprocated by others. Self-restraint, i.e. “knowledge that the other is not to resort force”206 is 
crucial for collective identity formation. Wendt introduces here three scenarios as to how 
states come to know that others will be self-restraining.207 The first scenario is if through 
repeated compliance with the norms states gradually internalize the institution of the 
pluralistic security community. By observing each other’s habitual compliance, states will 
acquire over time the knowledge that others can be trusted. The second scenario is associated 
with domestic politics and its reflections to foreign policy. Accordingly, some states –
particularly democratic ones- tend to settle their disputes with each other by peaceful means 
and become self-restraining. The final pathway to self-restraint might be self-binding. A state 
might conclude that the reason why others treat it in a hostile manner lies in its respective 
hostile attitudes towards others. As a result, the state at issue might unilaterally resort to 
policies of self-binding or sacrificing and succeed to persuade the others that it could be 
trusted. The Soviet New Thinkers’ engagements in unilateral peace initiatives might be 
regarded in this context. 
 
Wendt describes one of the mechanisms of identity transformation based on conscious 
efforts to change identity. Accordingly, actors can involve in critical self-reflection and 
transform or transcend role. Ego might involve in new actions. The new behavior of Ego will 
have certain influences on the practices of Alter. This process includes changing identity in 
addition to changing behavior. Since Alter’s identity reflects Ego’s practices, any change in 
Ego’s practices will affect Alter’s conception of self.208 Ego’s ideas about Alter are not 
passive perceptions existing independent of Ego, rather, they are actively and continuously 
“constitutive” of Alter’s role against Ego.209 In this respect, when Ego represents itself with a 
new role definition to Alter, this behavior of Ego is also an attempt to induce Alter to adopt a 
new identity by treating Alter as if it already had that identity.210 However, this process will 
be meaningful only if Alter confirms the new role. For instance, if one presents his identity as 
“the president”, this will have no meaning until others share this idea.211 
 1.2.3.3. Critique of Wendt's Constructivism: Identity and domestic politics in 
Wendt’s analysis and the insufficient emphasis of psychological qualities of policy 
makers  
 
Notwithstanding the fact that Wendt stresses several times that “domestic” politics 
matters and points out that states are self-organized entities which are constructed from within 
by the discourse practices of individuals as well as groups,212 he excludes it from his analysis 
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out of systemic concerns. However, since this study is not a systemic analysis but an attempt 
of foreign policy analysis which aims to analyze Turkey’s foreign policy, Wendt’s systemic 
approach remains insufficient to explain the reorientation of TFP. Indeed, foreign political 
orientation of a country is seriously influenced by a country’s political system, the dynamics 
inherent to competition for domestic political power as well as the changes of governments (e. 
g. level of democracy, participation of interest groups and civil society actors in decision 
making processes, and institutionalized power relations).213 Therefore, excluding domestic 
politics from the analysis would hinder to see the whole image and would prevent to account 
for the transformation in the foreign political behaviors of states. 
 
One of the main arguments of this dissertation is that identity-based explanations offer 
a better understanding of states’ foreign policy behaviors. Therefore, my concentration will be 
on the identity and on foreign policy preferences and interests of Turkey. Yet, unlike Wendt, I 
do not restrict the study to the international realm with regards to the constitution processes of 
state identities. Wendt aims to develop a theory of the states system, not a theory of the state 
and therefore he treats states’ identities and interests to a certain degree exogenous to the 
system. Thereby, in parallel with rationalist thinking, he takes the existence of states as 
given.214 Here, “the state itself is treated as a ‘black box’ the internal workings of which are 
irrelevant to the construction of state identities and interests.”215 Hence, Wendt has explicitly 
bracketed state identities and interests to be explained by mutual constitution,216 that is, 
identities and interests of states are assumed to be formed through inter-state interaction. 
Consequently, “social construction at the level of individual agents, or more generally, at any 
domestic level is neglected.”217 
 
However, neither the political and historical context in which national interests are 
shaped nor the intersubjective meanings which define state identities and interests can be 
limited to those meanings constructed solely in inter-state relations. Ultimately, states are, 
only analytically, unitary actors.218 “The meanings which objects, events and actions have for 
‘states’ are necessarily the meanings they have for those individuals who act in the name of 
the state. And these state officials do not approach international politics with a blank slate on 
which meanings are written only as a result of interactions among states. Instead, they 
approach international politics with an already quite comprehensive and elaborate 
appreciation of the world, of the international system and of the place of their state within it. 
This appreciation, in turn, is necessarily rooted in meanings already produced, at least in part, 
in domestic political and cultural contexts.”219  
 
Given the fact that foreign policy makers (individuals, institutions or domestic groups) 
come from varying political and cultural contexts, they will engage in different actions when 
faced with different situations. Culture as socially shared and transmitted ideas and beliefs has 
a decisive role in actors’ perceptions in the process of defining the world around them and in 
their actions.220   
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In pluralistic societies, a state identity and its interests will be a product of a struggle 
among varying domestic groups seeking to affect the state’s foreign policy in accordance with 
their identity conceptions.221 Once an identity is constructed, states institutionalize it at both 
domestic and international levels and form the institutions to protect their identities in the 
domestic realm.222 Simultaneously, when the newly defined identities step in the international 
realm, they are shaped by the international system and as such actor behaviors are also 
affected by it.223 
 
On the other hand, state identities are not constant. “They can change as a result of 
interaction with others due to international developments”224 Domestically, identities might 
transform as a result of several political developments. Firstly, “drastic political developments 
such as revolutions can change a state’s identity and replace it with a new one as happened in 
Iran after the Islamic Revolution in 1979.”225 Secondly, the role of domestic actors in foreign 
policy making (be individuals, groups or institutions) might shift as a result of domestic 
institutional arrangements or elections. “In this case, the foreign policy discourse can be 
dominated by entirely new organizations or individuals with different identity conceptions 
that may perceive the national interest in a different way.”226  
 
Identities are sustained in interaction with others.227 However, depending on its nature, 
systemic interaction might be transformative or confirmative in relation to the already held 
identities. The point here is that since identities are also relevant to domestic politics, systemic 
interactions will be interpreted differently by varying domestic actors with different cultural 
backgrounds and identities, and consequently, systemic interaction will be either confirmative 
or transformative concerning the identity.228 
 
In systemic interaction, “identities and interests are learned and then reinforced in 
response to how actors are treated by significant others.”229 This is the so called “reflected 
appraisals.” Accordingly, it is hypothesized that actors come to see themselves as a reflection 
of how they think others see or ‘appraise’ them in the ‘mirror’ of Others’ representations of 
the Self.”230 Here the significant others do not encompass all others; power and dependency 
play an important role. However, if as a result of a change in a state’s internal or external 
environments, a state’s identity is disconfirmed by significant others, lack of a clearly defined 
role may culminate with an identity crisis.231  For instance, rejection of Turkey’s bid for a full 
EU membership in 1997 led Turkey to an identity crisis. 
 
Another point attracting attention is the prominent role of individuals in foreign policy 
making. At this point, psychological factors influencing foreign policy decisions might be 
complementary to the constructivist thinking. Although Wendt and more generally 
constructivists are not interested in the personalities of decision makers, they play a 
determining role in foreign policy making processes. Decisions at the highest levels of 
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government are usually made either by small groups or powerful individuals. Other foreign 
policy determinants (such as international material or social structure or domestic balances) 
are mediated by the images, attitudes, values, beliefs, doctrines and ideologies of policy 
makers. Thus their personalities play essential role in the definition of FP.232  Here, the 
personality refers to a combination of agent leadership traits and perceptions that mediate the 
ultimate role of power and material aspects of international relations as well as the role of 
global norms in shaping state behavior.233 In addition to their paradigms, perceptions or 
images of the real world, their personal characteristics would be crucial in understanding 
foreign policy preferences. Especially, if the decision making occurs during a crisis or under 
certain conditions such as high stress and high uncertainty the impact of psychological factors 
would be greater.234 For example, Winston Churchill had a dominant position as a decision 
maker during World War II.235 Likewise, President Özal also played a dominant role during 
the First Gulf War who virtually dominated the TFP. PM Erdoğan’s reaction in the Davos 
Forum in January 2009, which will be elaborated in the next chapter, might be also associated 
with psychological factors. Consequently, without taking the psychological qualities of the 
decision makers into consideration, it would be misleading to consider the identities of the 
actors entirely constructed  
 
At this stage, touching on the socialization processes of individuals, which were 
neglected by Wendt, would provide considerably explanatory tools to account for current 
TFP. In fact, it is socialization processes which render norms effective on foreign policy. In 
sociological terminology, ‘socialization is a process in which a person grows into the society 
and culture surrounding him and, by learning social norms and roles, becomes an 
independent, competent social being.’236 In this process, individuals internalize the modes of 
thought and behavior of their social environment, and shape their interests and preferences 
accordingly. However, socialization process is not a one-way process in which the actor being 
socialized assumes a completely passive role. ‘Rather, the actor being socialized may well 
reflect on what he internalizes during the socialization process and may even modify its 
content.’ Thus, socialization is a process which is never complete but a continuous one.237  
 
 In short, while acknowledging and appreciating the usefulness of Wendt's systemic 
constructivism in analyzing TFP, in view of foreign policy making processes and the issues 
studied in this dissertation, a holistic approach to TFP which seeks to take the domestic and 
international as two faces of a single social order and engages in accommodating all factors 
affecting the identities and interests of state seems a more useful method to make a 
comprehensive foreign policy analysis. Moreover, considering the qualities of TFP in the 
1980s and 2000s and the considerable role of individuals in foreign policy making processes, 
an exclusion of the psychological features of the policy makers from the analysis seems not as 
a reasonable option. 
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1.3. Constructivism and foreign policy of Özal and Erdoğan leaderships  
This dissertation suggests that the theses of constructivist thinking have a significant 
explanatory power in terms of TFP conducted during the Özal and Erdoğan eras. In this 
respect, the common points of constructivism have been introduced. Additionally, given the 
multi-forms of constructivist approaches, Alexander Wendt’s constructivism has been 
specified. Yet, whereas he does not take into account the domestic politics on behalf of a 
systemic approach, this study attributes it a considerable significance. Therefore it is argued 
that a holistic approach for the purpose of this work would provide more consistent 
conclusions. Within the constructivist approach, the terms of identity in explaining foreign 
policy are highlighted. As I have attempted to demonstrate in figure 1 very simply, identity is 
a function of domestic politics as well as international politics. Though the roots of state 
identity lie at domestic politics, it engages in international politics and is shaped by it. 
However, by contrast with Wendt, I see a considerable necessity to highlight the changes in 
domestic politics along with the changes in international politics.                    
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Figure 1: Identity formation 
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new Turkish identity definition, and they have followed a relatively more multidimensional 
policy in accordance with their own identity perceptions.238 This mechanism of identity 
change in domestic politics and its reflection on foreign policy might be illustrated as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2: Identity change and its reflection to the FP practices 
 
 
Considering the importance the constructivists attach to the role of identity in the 
formation of interests, it seems at this stage necessary to handle the construction process of 
Özal and Erdoğan leaderships briefly. Here, two constructivist concepts which were not 
emphasized by Alexander Wendt, societal socialization and transnational socialization, seem 
considerably explanatory. Accordingly, individuals internalize norms as a result of 
socialization processes both domestically and internationally. These norms become an integral 
part of their identities and they are advocated in various platforms by these individuals. Once 
a connection is established between the concepts of socialization and Turkish policy makers, 
such as Özal and Erdoğan, one might conclude that they have gone through a two-
dimensional socialization process. 
 
In terms of societal socialization process of current Turkish PM Erdoğan, it should be 
noted that he comes from a religious-conservative family and social environment with a 
strong religious tradition. He graduated from a religious high school. He had been one of the 
most popular students of Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the Islamist National Outlook 
movement. However, when the political parties coming from the National Outlook tradition 
were closed several times and this tradition faced a strong resistance from the Kemalist 
establishment, some prominent figures in the National Outlook, such as Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül and Bülent Arınç, experienced a transformation process. The most 
recent chain of this transformation was the February 28 process.239 After Erdoğan was 
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sentenced to jail, because he publicly read a poem and served a ten months sentence, his 
world view has changed substantially and this has been clearly articulated by him. Erdoğan 
declared repeatedly that he took off his "National Outlook hat" and his political priorities have 
changed.240 Consequently, as a result of their experiences throughout their political lives, 
Erdoğan and his colleagues have made the norms like democracy, free market economy and 
human rights an integral part of their political identity. With this new identity definition, they 
have founded the Justice and Development Party (or AK Party) in August 2001 and have 
arisen as a strong political actor in the Turkish political landscape.  
 
Similar to Erdoğan, Turgut Özal comes also from an Islamic-conservative family 
structure.241 He joined also the National Outlook (NO) movement in the early years of his 
political career, yet his NO adventure did not last as much as Erdoğan's. Özal witnessed 
several military interventions into Turkish politics as well and these interventions have had a 
significant role on his socialization process as well as on the configuration of his political 
identity. Both Özal and Erdoğan grew up in social environments with strong religious 
references and adopted similar values in consequence of societal socialization processes.  
 
Secondly, considering the issue from the transnational socialization perspective, one 
might comment that Erdoğan and his close circle were under strong influence of the soft 
power oriented norms advocated by the European Union especially until 2006. Because, 
whenever the Turkish army intervened in politics, contrary to the United States, Europe 
defined its attitude in favor of the re-establishment of democracy as soon as possible. In the 
face of the pressure stemming from the Kemalist establishment against the Islamists in the 
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country, Erdoğan and his colleagues on the other hand did not have much choice to survive 
politically, but clinging to the western values such as democracy and human rights which 
have been advocated by Europe more strongly. Though the density of the relationship 
between Turkey and the EU has shifted over time, Erdoğan leadership continues to define 
norms like democracy and human rights as integral parts of its political identity.  
 
As a person coming from the Islamist political line who also suffered from the military 
pressure on the occasion of military interventions into politics, a similar comment can be 
made for Turgut Özal as well. Additionally, Özal was educated in the United States and 
worked in the World Bank, thereby had a closer contact with the western society as well as 
with the western values. Therefore, one might conclude that Özal's transnational socialization 
process had a different path from Erdoğan's, but their outcomes seem similar. Both 
leaderships have attached a considerable importance to both Turkey’s cultural and historical 
assets as well as the western oriented norms such as democracy, respect for human rights and 
free market.  
 
Furthermore, both leaderships have similar civilization understandings, that is, they 
represent an analogous line which does not deny Turkey’s historical legacy stemming from 
the Ottoman past and share a similar, self-confident point of view vis-à-vis the West. They are 
westernist indeed, yet in a different sense. Both consider that just as the Eastern, the Western 
civilization has positive as well as negative sides. This distinctive standing signifies also a 
self-confident attitude towards the world rooted in Turkish history and culture.242 Therefore, 
without ignoring the “virtues” of their respective civilization, they adopt the modern/western 
values. Furthermore, a combination of their self-confident stances towards the West and their 
Muslim identities pave the way for a multidimensional foreign policy, i.e. without changing 
the conventional direction of Turkey; they develop alternative relations with the Islamic world 
and other countries. Consequently, their common Muslim identities as well as their unique 
self-confident posture bring them to a distinctive position in the history of TFP.  
 
In short, as a result of their socialization processes, Özal and Erdoğan have made 
conservatism and modern western values an integral part of their identities. Hence, when Özal 
and Erdoğan came to power, they had a conservative/liberal-democrat identity which takes 
Turkey's historical, cultural and religious ties into account in foreign policy making along 
with Turkey's existing ties with the West, and this has had significant reflections on their 
foreign policy approaches and practices.  
 
Özal and Erdoğan leaderships have adopted a proactive and -albeit to different 
degrees- multi-dimensional foreign policy and associated it also to Turkey's historical, 
cultural and geographical responsibilities. One of the main foreign policy elements of the 
Erdoğan era is that Turkey carries a responsibility in its region stemming from the Turkish 
history. That is, AK Party leadership is of the opining that Turkey has had responsibilities in 
its region owing to its historical (the Ottoman history in particular) and cultural ties. It regards 
this opinion as one the basic reference points for its proactive foreign policy approach that 
Turkey has been supposed to pursue in its region. This view in fact seems to a considerable 
extent in parallel with one of the basic arguments that Özal was advocating in the aftermath of 
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the Cold War in the face of the emerging conflicts in Turkey’s region.243 It is easily realizable 
at this point the value of identity on the foreign policy approaches and practices of Özal and 
Erdoğan leaderships.  
 
The identity definition taking Turkey's historical and cultural ties into consideration 
and the corresponding active and multidimensional foreign policy understanding of both 
leaderships is also in line with the role that constructivists refer to the identities of individuals 
and states to explain interest formation. As constructivists argue, identities inform interests 
and, in turn, actions. In this context, TFP makers' decisions are deeply influenced how they 
see the world through their lenses which is closely connected to their identity definitions. Özal 
leadership defined Turkey as a bridge between the east and west, and believed that its weigh 
in the west would be proportional to its weigh in the east. Ahmet Davutoğlu (ambassador and 
former head of the Prime Minister’s advisers on foreign affairs and currently Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of Turkey) defines Turkey as a ‘central state’ which is neither in the periphery 
of the European Union nor in the periphery of the Middle East.244 Accordingly, Turkey is in 
the crossroads of the continents, but it is also a centre mainly due to its geographical and 
historical links (stemming from basically its Ottoman heritage). Contrary to other states in the 
region, Turkey is simultaneously Middle Eastern and Balkan, Caucasian, Black See and 
Mediterranean state.245 In other words, Turkey is a multi-dimensional state in terms of its 
foreign policy agenda and its responsibilities246 as well as its identities. The Erdoğan 
leadership seems to have adopted ‘central state’ concept and this new definition of Turkey 
requires a multi-dimensional foreign policy.247 Pursuant to multi-dimensional foreign policy, 
rather than choosing one big actor or axis against others, Ankara seeks to establish friendly 
and balanced relations with all parties.248 This new definition of Turkey brings about new 
interests and preferences.249 Accordingly, instead of a defensive foreign policy line which 
adopts a reactionary approach, the Erdoğan leadership aims to make Turkey an actor which is 
capable of directing the developments with its regional as well as global vision. In this 
direction, it embraces a pro-active and dynamic foreign policy.250 With this attitude, in 
accordance with the mutual constitution thesis of constructivism, the Erdoğan leadership aims 
to increase Turkey’s influence as a regional power in the constitution of international system 
and its norms, and to make it a global player. Consequently, considering Turkey’s identities 
and its geopolitical location, both Özal and Erdoğan leaderships have advocated a 
multidimensional foreign policy for Turkey. Nonetheless, they do not consider developing 
relations with the east as an alternative to the west, yet as complementary to Turkey’s 
traditional foreign policy orientation. As such, they have regarded the end of Cold War as a 
chance for Turkey and agree that isolation is not a policy option for Ankara. 
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 Considering another connection between identity and interest formation, the "logic of 
appropriateness” thesis of constructivism seems explanatory. Accordingly, it has been argued 
that a central country attaching a significant role to its historical, cultural and geographical 
assets does not have the luxury to remain indifferent about the events in the former Ottoman 
geography on which Turkish Republic was built. Thus, a proactive foreign policy is inevitable 
for Turkey.251 In other words, the new identity definitions of Özal and Erdoğan leaderships 
and their foreign political aspirations have constituted the main reason of the argument that 
Turkey should not remain indifferent to the developments around it; instead it should follow 
an initiative taking foreign policy. In a nutshell, the legacy of the Ottoman past has provided 
both responsibilities and opportunities from the Turkish rulers’ perspective.252 
 
Identity definitions of Özal and Erdoğan leaderships and their corresponding foreign 
policy goals and practices have been influential on Turkey-United States relations as well. Yet 
this influence has not been independent from the norms as well as the domestic and external 
circumstances of the day. In this connection, aiming to pursue an active policy in the region, 
Özal placed gaining the backup of the United States, which had been the leader of the western 
block during the Cold War and became the unipolar of the world after the dissolution of the 
blocks, at the center of his foreign policy approach. Intending to increase firstly Turkey’s 
influence in its region and subsequently to make it a global player, AK Party leadership on the 
other hand has built its foreign policy on establishing a balanced relationship with all global 
actors instead of regarding them alternative to each other. In this context, while establishing 
relations with Washington whose position as the only super power of the world began to be 
eroded as of 2000s, it has sought to defend Turkey’s interests and responsibilities in its region 
more strongly and not to disregard other global actors such as European Union, Russia and 
China. Stated differently, instead of strictly following a block or an actor and indexing its 
foreign policy to it, Erdoğan leadership has aimed to follow a foreign policy approach which 
gives priority to its own interests and places Ankara at the center of its foreign policy 
understanding. This approach might be interpreted also as a demand for a more equal 
relationship model with the U.S. instead of the hierarchical one during the Cold War. This 
demand however has brought about a fluctuating relationship model which has included from 
time to time very well going relations and hitting the bottom when it is deemed that the 
mutual interests do not overlap. 
 
On the other hand, as the constructivist theory argues, ideas are as important as 
material structures in shaping the behaviors of social and political actors, e.g. individuals or 
states. As mentioned above, Özal and Erdoğan leaderships stressed the common historical and 
cultural past with the nations from the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East with whom the 
Turks lived together for centuries under the Ottoman rule. Both of them have regarded this 
shared history and culture both as a ground for cooperation and as a reason to deal with the 
problems of the former Ottoman subjects. This approach has signaled an active foreign policy 
approach by contrast with the traditional reactive and non-interference oriented diplomatic 
strategy of Turkey. Therefore, the ideational change in the perception of "friend" occurred in 
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the wake of Özal and Erdoğan leaderships' rise to power has paved the way for a multi-
dimensional foreign policy understanding. Additionally, this ideational shift led also to the 
rise of a new foreign policy understanding which has sought to become a global power by 
settling its chronic problems with the countries in the region like the Cyprus question as well 
as to contribute to the solution of chronic problems in the surrounding regions such as Arab-
Israel question. Consequently, as the constructivists underline, one should note at this point 
the importance of ideas and its effects on the new and multidimensional orientation of TFP.  
 
In accordance with Wendt’s approach, the self and other perceptions ought to be 
stressed here. As noted also above, the AK Party government has come to power with its 
different identity conceptions and has perceived Turkey's national interest in a different 
manner. Moreover, its administrative elite have assumed exclusive roles both in the definition 
of “new” Turkish foreign political identity and national interests as well as in the definition of 
new direction of Turkey’s foreign policy. This has had reflections on Turkey’s self-other 
understandings in some certain issue areas and subsequently affected its interests and foreign 
policy preferences. For instance, while Iran had been perceived by conventional TFP makers 
with suspicion and as a neighbor to be distanced, Erdoğan leadership has regarded it as a 
significant neighbor to cooperate in economy and security issues.  
 
It has been an important foreign policy priority for Özal and Erdoğan leaderships to 
get rid of the impediments narrowing Turkey's field for maneuver in diplomacy with a view to 
paving the way for multi-dimensional foreign policy and to augment foreign policy 
alternatives. Their main credential at this point has been their self-confidence based on the 
brilliant past of Turkey. By solving the chronic problems, Özal and Erdoğan leaderships have 
aimed to facilitate Turkey's attempt on the way of being a global power. To this end, both 
leaderships have sought to bring peace and stability to the region by increasing 
interdependencies and, with Wendt's words, they have aimed to create a Kantian culture. 
Likewise both leaderships have demonstrated a considerable effort to solve Turkey's chronic 
problems. Turgut Özal tried to settle the problems with Greece with the "spirit of Davos" in 
the 1980s. He took initiatives also in the Cyprus question, sought to solve the water question 
with Syria, signed protocols with the Damascus regime and pledged to release 500m3 per 
second water to Syria. He desired to be a mediator in the Arab-Israel question and even 
suggested to this end the "peace water pipeline project." It was also PM Özal who applied to 
the European Community for full membership with a view to fostering the relations with 
Europe and to diversify Turkey's alternatives in foreign policy making. Considering that 
developing trade and economic ties would contribute to the peace and stability, Özal 
leadership tried to a considerable extent to increase the interdependencies with neighbors. In 
this framework, it was again the Özal leadership who firstly attempted to solve the visa 
problems with other countries and concluded agreements to this end.  
 
Coming to the Erdoğan leadership's era, one would realize that foreign policy practices 
are predominantly reminiscent of the Özal era. The relations with Greece have continued to 
develop in the AK Party era as well, which had been entered into a détente process in the 
wake of the earthquakes in 1999 both in Turkey and Greece respectively. Erdoğan leadership 
showed a considerable effort for the solution of the Cyprus question by providing a serious 
support for the "Annan Plan." Relations with Syria reached until 2011 to an unprecedented 
level and the relations with Iran gained momentum particularly in the economy field. 
Additionally, protocols were signed with Armenia with a view to settling the problems with it.  
Turkey assumed also a mediator role in the problems between Arabs and Israelis, Pakistan- 
and Afghanistan and in the ethnic conflicts in Iraq. Erdoğan leadership shared Özal's view 
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that developing interdependencies in the region would both contribute to the peace and 
stability of the region and provide new markets for the emerging Turkish industry. In this 
connection, economy and trade have secured their places at the top of TFP agenda. Again in 
this context, Erdoğan leadership has also attached a great importance to lifting visas between 
Turkey and other countries mutually and has taken giant steps to this end. Similarly, it has 
given weigh to developing relations with the European Union. As a matter of fact, the 
negotiations for the full EU membership between Ankara and Brussels could begin in 2005 
upon the AK Party government's intensive efforts.  
 
Again in this context, just like the Özal leadership, the Erdoğan leadership views 
strengthening the economic, cultural and political ties with the neighboring countries and 
constituting a welfare circle as the precondition of Turkey's economic and political 
development and its ascendancy as a global player.253 In this respect, these endeavors of 
government might be evaluated in terms of collective identity formation in the region which 
would contribute to a possible emergence of a Kantian culture. By improving interdependence 
with the neighboring countries, the AK Party government seeks to establish a collective 
identity with them particularly in security issues. Once the cultural and especially economic 
ties are developed, actors in the region are expected to define themselves in a number of 
issues collectively. Furthermore, with the beginning of the Arab Spring and the civil war in 
Syria in 2011, the structural culture has begun to shift and this has forced Ankara to review its 
foreign policy. This time, along with economic concerns, with Wendt's conceptualization, a 
possible "homogeneity" of political regimes has been regarded useful for the construction of 
collective identity. As a matter of fact, Turkey has defined its policy together with the United 
States in favor of the democratic demands of the Arab peoples and supported the emergence 
of democratic regimes around Turkey. In doing this, it has considered that democratic regimes 
would pave the way for the construction of a new collective identity in its neighborhood.  
  
Considering the TFP in the context of another basic argument of constructivism that 
agents and structures are mutually constituted, it might be argued that the Erdoğan leadership 
has been seeking to play a more active role than the Özal leadership did. In fact, both Özal 
and Erdoğan leaderships have demonstrated effort to spread the values such as democracy, 
human rights and free market economy model all over the world that they have adopted as a 
result of their socialization processes. In this respect, while Özal leadership closely 
cooperated with the United States for the establishment of these values in the Turkic republics 
emerged in the Central Asia and Caucasus after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Erdoğan 
leadership defined its attitude together with Washington in favor of the demands of the Arab 
peoples during the Arab Spring and tried to make democracy, human rights and free market 
economy more commonly shared norms in the Middle East too.  
 
However, the Erdoğan leadership has gone one step further in terms of contributing to 
the constitution of international norms. It has sought to contribute to the constitution of 
international norms through the vision it has specified for TFP. Considering the post-
September 11 world, North-South, East-West and Muslim-Christian tensions attract attention. 
Turkey stands out at this point as a unique actor which might contribute to the global peace 
and ease these tensions. Considering its geographical position and historical depth, Ankara 
has been endeavoring to assume an "order establishing" role in the formation of the new 
world order.254 Furthermore, on the global scale, Turkish government’s efforts concerning the 
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“Alliance of Civilizations” project might be assessed also in this regard.255 With this project -
which was established in 2005 at the initiative of the governments of Spain and Turkey under 
the auspices of the United Nations256- the AK Party government objects the “clash of 
civilizations” thesis represented by Samuel Huntington. As such, by utilizing Turkey’s 
position in the meeting point of the West and East, the government has been endeavoring to 
contribute to the constitution of cooperation and reconciliation oriented norms. While the 
Erdoğan leadership contends that the world does not have to conflict as realist/neorealist 
tradition claims, it nearly confirms Wendt’s “anarchy is what states make of it” thesis.257 As 
such, AK Party government's efforts to make "Islamophobia" recognized at the global scale as 
a crime against humanity might be regarded in the context of its efforts to constitute 
international norms as well.258 
 
In addition to the domestic factors, international norms have also had influence on 
foreign policy of Turkey. In this regard, it might be suggested that EU membership 
perspective has a particular influential role on TFP. Once the membership of Turkey to the 
EU gained a more serious perspective, this has given Turkey a stronger incentive to define its 
interests in line with the EU. Hence, it might be claimed that reconciliation and cooperation 
oriented “soft power policy” of the EU has had a constitutive influence in the constitution of 
Erdoğan leadership's identity. Therefore, in terms of foreign policy, Turkey has adopted a 
relatively more EU norms oriented foreign policy until 2007 particularly regarding the 
relations with its neighbors. In this respect, there are some analogies and parallelism in 
neighborhood cooperation paradigms of Turkey and the EU.259 Thus, it seems that 
international norms represented by the EU have had a certain impact on the constitution of 
Erdoğan leadership's identity and, indirectly, on its foreign policy preferences.  
 
Together with domestic and external factors, international social environment was also 
appropriate to a great extent for new policy goals of the government especially until the 
beginning of the Arab spring. As mentioned above, reciprocity matters for Wendtian 
constructivist approach. In this sense, Turkey’s good neighborhood and zero-problems policy 
attempts received positive response out of distinctive reasons like the political conjuncture in 
the region (e.g. the existence of the USA in Iraq pushed Syria and Iran to have good relations 
with Turkey). For instance, when Syria deported Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the terrorist PKK 
organization, and Turkey-Syria signed the Adana agreement, October 1998, their relations 
gained a new momentum. After the agreement, the enmity between the two states began 
gradually to disappear which stemmed mostly from Syria’s support for the outlawed PKK. 
Consequently, a Syrian president, Bashir al-Assad, visited Turkey in 2004 for the first time 
since 1946 and the high level relations with Syria was depicted as the cornerstone of Turkey’s 
zero-problems policy. Concerning the relations with Iran, similar things might be said also 
due to the common threat of the PKK until the eruption of the Syrian civil war. The bottom 
line is that whereas Turkey commenced a new policy, it could not have been successful 
without a positive response from its neighboring countries, and the international social 
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environment as well as political conjuncture was suitable for new peaceful policies of Turkey. 
As a matter of fact, Arab spring has changed the composition of the Middle East so 
substantially that Turkey's zero problems policy has received severe injuries.  
 
After summarizing TFP in the Özal and Erdoğan eras from a constructivist point of 
view, in the following chapters, first the determinants of TFP will be discussed from a 
constructivist point of view with special focus on 1980s and 2000s. Subsequently, foreign 
policy paradigms of Özal and Erdoğan leaderships will be analyzed comparatively and most 
of the arguments introduced above will be elaborated. In order to analyze the practical level of 
foreign policy approaches of both eras, the last chapters are devoted to the detailed analysis of 
Turkey-United States relations.  
CHAPTER 2: A CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH TO THE 
DETERMINANTS OF TFP AND THEIR TRANSFORMATION/RE-
INTERPRETATION IN ÖZAL/ ERDOĞAN ERAS 
2.1. Geographical location 
As Wendt highlights it, geopolitical location is one of the most important elements of 
the corporate identity of a country whose change is not within the bounds of possibility 
through usual ways. However, geopolitics might be interpreted ideationally differently by 
individuals in accordance with their foreign policy paradigms. Considering Turkey's political 
history, this can easily be observed. The prevailing foreign policy paradigm which was 
dominant among the Turkish bureaucracy and elites for decades was based on non-
interference principle as to especially the conflicts between the Middle Eastern nations.1 In 
addition to the structural reasons like the Soviet threat during the Cold War, this case might be 
regarded as result of an identity definition which adopts the Kemalist ideology and stipulates 
a strict westernization effort at the expense of the relations with the eastern countries. The 
advocates of this identity viewed Turkey’s geopolitical location as a risk generating factor and 
tried to avoid the vortexes of the region, of the Middle East in particular. However, in 
accordance with their identity definitions, Özal and Erdoğan leaderships which came to power 
in 1983 and 2002 respectively interpreted Turkey’s geographical location differently from the 
traditional foreign policy line. Hereafter the impact of geopolitics on Turkish foreign policy 
(TFP) will be retrospectively analyzed and subsequently the approaches of Özal and Erdoğan 
leaderships will be summarized on this subject.  
 
In fact, Turkey’s unique geographical position has been one of the most decisive 
factors in the formulation of its foreign policy. Turkey lies at the crossroads of two continents, 
Europe and Asia, and borders the Balkans, Caucasus, Middle East and Central Asia. It is also 
at the crossroads of major air, land, and sea routes of modern times joining the industrialized 
European countries with the oil/natural gas-rich regions of the Middle East as well as the 
Central Asia. Moreover, Turkey stands at a critical juncture where various cultures, 
civilizations and religions meet. This multifaceted position of Turkey gives it European, 
Balkan, Mediterranean, Middle Eastern, Caucasian and Asian identities all at the same time. 
This critical position has both positive and negative implications for Turkey. While it has 
been able to play a role in world politics far greater than its size, population and economic 
power would indicate, its geography makes Turkey two-fold sensitive to international 
developments near and far and, thus, greatly susceptible to changes in the international and 
regional political balance.2  
 
The fact that Turkish territory lies at the traditional and current migration channel 
brings about the sense of insecurity and urges Turkish policy makers to attach an exceeding 
importance to the security factor. Additionally, it has been proved by the quantitative analyses 
that there is a strong link between the number and quality of neighbors and security of a 
country. The more borders a country has, the more likely that it would be attacked or 
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threatened or it enters into war in many fronts.3 Turkey has bordered many neighbors with 
different characteristics, ideologies and regimes. Whereas Turkey bordered seven states in the 
early years of the Republic (namely Greece, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, Iran, Great Britain -
mandatory in Iraq and possessor of Cyprus-, France -mandatory in Syria- and Italy -possessor 
of the Dodecanese Islands-), in the wake of the Second World War this number dropped to six 
(Greece, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, Iran, Iraq, Syria and the Republic of Cyprus after 1960) 
and in the aftermath of the Cold War the Soviet Union was replaced by three Caucasian states 
(Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan).4 This composition of neighbors has intensified the sense 
of insecurity and this fact has had repercussions on TFP. In view of historical and self-interest 
related controversies with most of these neighbors, Turkey has sought alliances with both 
regional states and outside powers. 
 
Turkey’s control of the Straits of the Dardanelles and Bosporus has been another 
significant factor for TFP. Dependence of Russia on these straits for direct maritime access to 
the Mediterranean Sea, the fact that they are the only waterways that Russia could be 
challenged by other major actors and the reality that they are the sole waterways connecting 
the Black sea and the Mediterranean enhance the Straits to an extraordinary status.5 Whereas 
the Straits grant Turkey great potential to exert influence on international issues, 
simultaneously, they pose a threat to the security of Turkey by opening it to the effects of 
international developments as well as by attracting potential aggressors.6 Traditionally, 
Russians always aimed at having their outlet to the Mediterranean unimpeded and the 
Ottoman Empire, predecessor of the Turkish Republic, had been the main obstacle before 
them. Therefore, the history witnessed many conflicts between the Russians and the Turks.7  
During the first two decades of the Republic, Turkish-Soviet relations were positive 
and the Soviet Union did not deprive Turkey of its political and material support. Relations 
between the two countries were strengthened by the Treaty of Neutrality and Nonaggression 
of 1925.8 However, in the wake of the Second World War, the Soviet Union which emerged 
as a new world power wanted to utilize its power to implement its plans with respect to 
Turkey. Thus, Moscow refused Turkey’s bid to extend the Treaty of Non-Aggression and 
Neutrality, delivered an ultimatum and demanded territorial concessions in the northeast of 
Turkey, military bases on the Bosporus as well as some changes of the Montreux Strait 
Convention.9 These Soviet demands strongly concerned Turkish policy-makers and caused 
substantial changes on TFP attitudes. Since Turkey was able to resist these demands only with 
the backing of the United States, it turned its face entirely to the West.10 The geographical 
location of Turkey played the most important role in its post-World War II foreign policy and 
had had a direct impact for several decades on the orientation of TFP. It might be also 
concluded at this point that as it was explained in the mutual constitution thesis of the 
constructivists, the hostile attitude of the Soviets consolidated Turkey's already existing 
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identity which had already been inclined to be on the western side and constituted one of the 
main reasons to define its foreign policy for decades in line with the west. 
 
The fact that Turkey stands at the nexus of three conflict regions, namely the Balkans, 
the Caspian region and the Middle East, has had a considerable influence on the course of 
TFP as well. Contemplating these regions together, Turkey is located at the center and since 
the early years of the Republic, it has always tried to stay away from the constant conflicts of 
these three regions.11 This situation led Turkey to follow a traditional passive foreign policy 
which continued until 1980s with some exceptional deviations. As such, roots of Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk’s famous motto for TFP ‘peace at home, peace in the world’ deeply embedded 
in this stance of Turkey. In order to ensure its security in an instable geopolitical environment, 
it sought alliances with regional states as well as outside powers. Between 1920 and 1955, 
Turkey joined several pacts and alliances, signed friendship declarations and bilateral security 
treaties with the neighboring countries as well as other states. Participation into the NATO in 
1952, the Balkan Pact of 1953 and Alliance of 1954 and the Baghdad Pact of 1955 might be 
assessed in this context.12 Furthermore, in addition to cultural aspirations and ideological, 
economic and political factors, lack of stability in the Middle East encouraged Turkey to 
remain in the Western camp.13 In other words, Turkish policy makers regarded at the 
ideational level Turkey's geopolitical location as risk generating factor and tried to stay away 
from this risk as much as possible, and this understanding has underlay the reactive policy of 
Turkey towards the region until recent decades.    
 
This understanding has constituted also one of the main reasons of Turkey's aspiration 
for the EU membership, which has been one of the primary foreign policy goals of Turkish 
policy makers. Firstly, need for stability in its instable region has been one of the driving 
forces behind Turkey’s desire to join the European Union.14 On the other hand, whereas 
Turkey has always claimed to be considered part of Europe both geographically and 
politically, opponents of Turkey’s EU membership do not share this view and claim that only 
3% of Turkish territory lies within the geographical boundary of transcontinental Europe. 
Moreover, they contend that EU membership of Turkey would make the EU neighbor to the 
instable regions of the Middle East and the Caucasus. This would mean an incalculable threat 
to the security of the EU.15 
 
2.1.1. Re-interpretation of geopolitical location by Özal and Erdoğan leaderships 
 
In view of the above noted facts, whereas Turkey’s geographical location interpreted 
by some Turkish policy makers as a disadvantage in terms of security and foreign policy, this 
critical geographical environment is considered as an advantage by others, like Turgut Özal 
and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Özal, who enjoyed a considerable weight in the direction of TFP 
until his death in 1993 first as a Prime Minister and then as a President, viewed Turkey’s 
                                               
11 Inat, "Türkische Nahostpolitik," 21. 
12 Mustafa Aydın, “Turkish Foreign Policy Framework and Analysis,” Center for Strategic Research of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, (Ankara: December 2004): 25, accessed 01.03.2009, 
http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/sampapers/mustafaaydin.pdf . 
13 Aydın, “Turkish Foreign Policy Framework and Analysis," 30. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Kemal Inat, “Republic of Turkey,” in Foreign Policy of States, Wolfgang Gieler et al., (İstanbul: Tasam 
Publications, 2005), 501. See also, Berit Rinke, "Gehört die Türkei zu Europa," POLITICS-Working paper, 
University of Oldenburg, No.5, (2006), accessed 11.04.2012, http://www.politis-europe.uni-
oldenburg.de/download/WP5_Rinke_Turkey2006fin.pdf  
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geographical location no longer as a disadvantage for the security of the country, but as a 
chance to be a regional power. Geographically, he viewed Turkey as a country in the midst of 
Pacific-Atlantic axis and equidistant between both the Atlantic and Pacific basins.16 
Furthermore, according to Özal, Turkey was located at the centre of East-West and North-
South axes, and with this pivotal position, it should have been an active and decisive actor, 
not a passive one.17 Therefore, he left aside the traditional passive foreign policy of Turkey 
and aimed at utilizing some features of Turkey on the purpose of an active foreign policy, 
such as ethnic and religious identities of Turkey which had been considerably ignored by that 
time.18 In this context, PM Özal assumed initiatives to solve Turkey's chronic problems with 
Greece and Syria and developed projects to find a solution to the Arab-Israel problem through 
"peace water project." Thereby, he aimed to decrease the risks that geopolitical location posed 
to Turkey and increase the possibilities of cooperation with the neighboring countries. 
Furthermore, having defined Turkey as a “bridge country”, Özal argued that with its historical 
and cultural responsibilities, Turkey was supposed to establish relations with the Western as 
well as with the Eastern Worlds simultaneously.19 As a result, in compliance with the 
“bridge” definition, Özal prescribed a “balanced relationship” between the East and the 
West.20 
 
Similarly, President Özal red the geostrategic structure emerged after the end of Cold 
War as a positive development for TFP and ‘saw the emergence of a Turkic world and the 
developments in the Balkans as an opportunity to expand the Turkish influence in 
international politics.’21 He developed the slogan ‘From Adriatic to the Chinese Wall’ 
(Adriyatikten Çin Seddi’ne) and claimed that the 21st century would be a ‘Turkish century.’ 
Özal's policies, which carried Turkist, Islamist and Westernist features all at the same time,22 
did not aim at an aggressive or expansionist policy, but cooperation with the newly 
established Turkic republics, above all, on economic domain but also on cultural and political 
fields. He wanted to replace the security oriented and passive foreign policy with an active 
one, to make Turkey a ‘big Brother’ for the new Turkic states of the Caspian region and to 
make it a political Mecca. From Özal’s aspect, the new post-Cold War geostrategic 
environment offered a good opportunity to realize his vision.23 
 
                                               
16 Gülistan Gürbey, “Özal’ın Dış Politika Anlayışı” (Özal’s Foreign Policy Understanding), in Kim Bu Özal, 
Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet (Who is this Özal, Politics, Economy, Mentality), eds. İhsan Dağı and İhsan Sezal,  
(İstanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 2. Baskı, 2003), 291. 
17 Ramazan Gözen, “Turgut Özal ve Körfez Savaşı: İdealler ve Gerçekler Açmazında Dış politika” (Turgut Özal 
and the Gulf War: Foreign Policy in the Dilemmas of Ideals and Realities), in Kim Bu Özal, Siyaset, İktisat, 
Zihniyet (Who is this Özal, Politics, Economy, Mentality), eds. İhsan Dağı and İhsan Sezal,  (İstanbul: Boyut 
Kitapları, 2. Baskı, 2003), 314. 
18 Burak Başkan, “Turgut Özal gerçeğini yeniden okumalıyız,” Yeni Şafak, 19 April 2009, accessed 10.16.2011, 
http://yenisafak.com.tr/yorum-haber/turgut-ozal-gercegini-yeniden-okumaliyiz-19.05.2009-181659.   
19 Hasan Mor, "Türk dış politikasında belirleyici faktörler ekseninde Özal`ın dış politika konsepti" [Özal`s 
foreign policy concept on the axis of determinants in Turkish foreign policy], (PhD diss., Selçuk Üniversitesi, 
Konya 2002), 187. 
20 Ibid., 182, 180-188. 
21 Berdal Aral, "Dispensing with tradition? Turkish Politics and International Society During the Özal Decade 
1983-93" Middle Eastern Studies  37, 1 (Jan 2001): 77-78. 
22 Sedat Laçiner, "Özalism (Neo-Ottomanism): An Alternative in Turkish Foreign Policy?" Journal of 
Administrative Sciences, Vol. 1, No.1-2, (2003): 185-186. 
23Inat, “Türkische Nahostpolitik," 23. 
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On the other hand, Ahmet Davutoğlu,24 foreign minister of the AK Party government, 
argues that Turkey’s geography gives it a specific central country status. Accordingly: 
 
 “In terms of geography, Turkey occupies a unique space. As a large country in 
the midst of Afro-Eurasia’s vast landmass, it may be defined as a central country with 
multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced to one unified character. Like 
Russia, Germany, Iran, and Egypt, Turkey cannot be explained geographically or 
culturally by associating it with one single region. Turkey’s diverse regional 
composition lends it the capability of maneuvering in several regions simultaneously; 
in this sense, it controls an area of influence in its immediate environs…. Taking a 
broader, global view, Turkey holds an optimal place in the sense that it is both an 
Asian and European country and is also close to Africa through the Eastern 
Mediterranean. A central country with such an optimal geographic location cannot 
define itself in a defensive manner. It should be seen neither as a bridge country which 
only connects two points, nor a frontier country, nor indeed as an ordinary country, 
which sits at the edge of the Muslim world or the West.”25  
 
In other words, by emphasizing Turkey’s geographical and historical identities 
Davutoğlu advocates an active policy to take advantage of these identities.26 Turkey should 
act like a central state rather than a peripheral one and provide security and stability not only 
for itself, but also for its neighboring regions.27 Davutoğlu’s vision has been shared by 
Erdoğan leadership. For instance, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Prime Minister of Turkey, 
articulated that “Istanbul is not only a center combining the continents but also a central 
symbol combining and synthesizing the civilizations.” By placing Istanbul in the center of a 
vast geography, Erdoğan attach importance to Turkey’s geography and cultural heritage.28  
 
To sum up, even though geographical location might be viewed positively or 
negatively by FP makers, it has been virtually the most significant factor influencing the 
foreign policy course of Ankara. This has been the fact from the past to the present. However, 
while it was perceived in a big part of Turkish history as a burden on Turkey jeopardizing its 
security, some policy makers regarded it in a different manner. As Özal and Erdoğan 
leaderships did, some Turkish actors viewed it ideationally as an important asset both offering 
great opportunities as well as responsibilities to Turkey. Therefore, while the geographical 
location had constituted the most important reason of traditional reactive foreign policy 
approach, the same factor constituted one of the most significant motivations for an active 
foreign policy for Özal and Erdoğan leaderships. These distinctive approaches have also 
reflected to the policy field and replaced the traditional defensive/passivist foreign policy with 
a more active one.  
 
 
                                               
24 Ahmet Davutoğlu was the chief advisor to the Prime Minister between 2002 and 2009 and has been foreign 
minister since May 1, 2009. He is known as the intellectual architect of Turkish foreign policy under the AK 
party government.  
25 Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s New Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007,” Insight Turkey 10, No.1 
(2008): 78. 
26 Nicholas Danforth, “Ideology and Pragmatism in Turkish Foreign Policy: From Atatürk to the AKP,” Turkish 
Policy Quarterly, (Fall 2008): 90-91. 
27 Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s New Foreign Policy Vision,” 79. 
28 Bülent Aras, “Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy,” SETA (Foundation for Political, Economic and 
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2.2. Historical and cultural dimensions 
 
“Despite the republican leaders’ contention that Turkey was a “new” country that 
had nothing to do with the Ottoman Empire and its history, the truth is that the 
republic is heir to Ottoman cultural, strategic, historical, and religious legacies, both 
negative and positive, and these have haunted the country’s culture, its policies, and 
its people to a much degree than its leaders’ prescription for the republic.”29 
 
As it was implied under the preceding title, having formed a new state on the ashes of 
the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish elites preferred to isolate TFP agenda from historical and 
cultural bonds of the Turks by following a strict westernization policy. Having constructed 
their identities on "Kemalism" and "Westernization" principles, these Kemalist elite regarded 
Turkey's Ottoman past as a burden on the young Republic and sought to disregard it as much 
as possible. This ideational approach reflected to the policy field as a reactive and non-
interventionist foreign policy understanding. However, Özal and Erdoğan leaderships have 
interpreted Turkey's historical and cultural ties not as burden, but as factors presenting 
opportunities as well as saddling with responsibilities. They have also viewed Turkey's 
Ottoman past as a point of reference for Turkey's domestic and foreign political troubles and 
attached it significance for the re-calibration of foreign policy. In the following paragraphs, 
after summarizing the historical origins of the Kemalist foreign policy approach and touching 
from a general perspective on the role of historical and cultural ties on TFP, the importance 
attached to these factors by Özal and Erdoğan leaderships in terms of their foreign policy 
understandings will be briefly explained.  
 
Even though the leaders and the ruling elite of the young Turkish republic rejected the 
Ottoman legacy and did not want to hear anything about the past, the Ottoman legacy has 
been one the most important factors influencing TFP. The fact that the Turks constantly 
advanced towards the West and dominated the Christian nations brought about negative and 
unfriendly attitudes of their western neighbors. This unfriendly stance exists, albeit to a lesser 
degree, among some Muslim nations too.30 Undoubtedly, while inheriting a six-hundred-year, 
huge and multi-national empire has granted Turkey great potentials to be used, Ottoman 
legacy carried security risks with it for Ankara due to wrong policies and disuse of potentials,. 
For instance, until nearly a decade ago, Turkey was at loggerheads with virtually all of its 
neighbors. To account for this situation, it is important to keep in mind the fact that all of 
Turkey’s neighbors, except for Russia and Iran, lived under the rule of Ottoman Empire. For 
instance, as a consequence of the reality that these countries struggled for independence 
against the Ottomans, these countries reveal them as the source of most of their problems, 
even in their school textbooks. Turkish Republic did not take the necessary measures to 
counter these mental blocs and this anti-Turk-Ottoman tendency continues to exist 
particularly in the educational systems of these countries, such as Greece, Bulgaria, Syria, 
Iraq, Armenia and recently Egypt.31  
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On the other hand, struggles of these countries for independence and nation building 
and especially their cooperation with the enemies of Ottomans are largely perceived by the 
Turks as disloyalty and example of betrayal.32 This prevailing viewpoint among the Turks 
particularly against Arabs33 constructed a tendency to regard its former subject people as 
“other.” Furthermore, belonging to a nation which has a historical depth, had established 
empires, won great victories and had been master of a world empire brought with it a sense of 
greatness and pride in the common Turkish mind. Even though these brilliant days are matters 
of the past, the Turks have been immensely sensitive about their independence and it is 
frustrating for them to be regarded as a second-rate power which is dependent on great 
powers.34 This pride was one of the reasons launched Turkish war of independence. The fact 
that Izmir was invaded by a state in 1919 which had been ‘subject people’ who lived under 
the rule of Ottomans for centuries triggered a great reaction among the Turks and started the 
national struggle.35 In this context, in the definition of TFP, these senses originating from the 
history have played an essential role.  
 
It will be useful at this point to make a reference to the historical construction process 
of Turkey's traditional status quo oriented reactive foreign policy paradigm. With the treaty of 
Karlowitz (1699), the Ottoman Empire experienced for the first time a large scale territorial 
loss and the decline stage began in the Ottoman history. In the wake of this treaty, Ottoman 
statesmen changed the foreign policy strategy from advancing into Europe to retrieval of the 
lost territories and defending the current borders.36 Later on, this strategy shift gave rise to 
domination of balance and status quo oriented foreign policy approach in Turkish diplomacy. 
In order to realize this strategy, the most influential and practical policy choice was playing 
great powers off against each other. Consequently, from a constructivist point of view, 
historical experiences imposed a balance oriented, skeptical, passive and defensive foreign 
policy tradition for the Ottomans. Republic of Turkey was also founded by the Ottoman 
statesmen and Ottoman general staff out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. Even though the 
ruling elite denied it, Republic of Turkey is substantially a continuation of the Ottoman 
                                                                                                                                                   
changes in the school textbooks. Accordingly, the Ottoman advancement into Egypt was called “ghazw,” 
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34 Aydın, “Turkish Foreign Policy Framework and Analysis,” 21-22. 
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Empire37 and took over naturally most of its features from its predecessor. Diplomatic 
tradition is also one of them, i.e. Turkish diplomacy is a natural extension of the Ottoman 
diplomacy. Therefore, TFP did not experience any verdancy and trouble that newly formed 
states do.38  
 
After centuries-long hostilities and a number of wars with their neighbors as well as 
with other powers, Ottoman FP makers became extraordinarily wary about their environment 
and suspicious about other states’ intentions. Therefore, relying on another state became an 
exceptional case for the Turks and this reality reflected in the common Turkish saying “water 
sleeps, the enemy never sleeps”.39 Moreover signs of previous traumas, such as the Ottoman - 
Russian War of 1877 - 1878 (the infamous 93 War), the first Balkan War of 1912 and Sèvres 
syndrome,40 have always existed somewhere in the minds of Turkish statesmen of the new 
Republic. These and other similar traumas have had a considerable influence on the decisions 
of Turkish diplomats and foreign policy makers41 who focused, virtually after every loss of 
territory, on building new defense lines and defending them. Moreover, owing to such 
traumas, a number of prominent statesmen and intellectuals lost their self-confidence vis-à-vis 
the West and became the pure admirer of it. Thus, Turkish policy makers who has been in the 
dilemma of ‘absolute sovereignty or absolute abandoning’,42 (with some exceptions e.g. the 
joint of the Province of Hatay to the mainland in 1939 and the Cyprus Peace Operation of 
1974) followed a status quo and balance oriented foreign policy as well. As a matter of fact, 
Turkish diplomacy has always been considerably successful in preserving the status quo. The 
situation in Cyprus, where the status quo has not changed for over 30 years is a proof of this 
fact.43 As a result, Turkish diplomacy has always carried the historical fear of partition as well 
as the historical anxiety of protecting the existing territories to a certain extent and refrained 
from aggressive and adventurist policies.44 After all, as from the Treaty of Karlowitz until 
their independence, the Turks continuously had lost territory, had been invaded and tried to be 
                                               
37 İlber Ortaylı, Osmanlı Barışı (Pax Ottomana), (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2007), 63. 
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partitioned. This is why security became the most primary element of TFP.45 In other words, 
the foreign policy paradigm which was based on not loosing territory and securing the future 
of the regime dominated the last two centuries of the Ottoman Empire and brought about a 
timid and defensive paradigm among the state elites. This situation continued also during the 
republican era. The foreign policy paradigm of the Ottomans based on the defensive and 
reactionary reflexes was sustained by the republican elite as well.46 This fact has constituted 
one of the reasons why the Turkish Republic followed a passive and defensive foreign policy 
for a long time and focused on protecting the status quo. 
 
Another source of this diplomatic tradition constructed as a result of the centuries long 
historical interactions and experiences is the approach aiming to get rid of the foreign political 
problems rooted in the Ottoman history. As a matter of fact, the problems with Greece are 
closely connected to the historical traumas,47 mutual mistrust,48 and "other" perceptions of 
both nations as well as the minorities residing in both countries as the legacy of Ottoman 
Empire.49 Turkish-Bulgarian relations tensed also at most because of Turkish Minority in 
Bulgaria which is also a legacy of the Ottoman history.50 The Ottoman past has been decisive 
on Turkish-Arab relations too. The fact that a considerable part of the Arabs see the Turks as 
imperialists due to the Ottoman past affected Turkey-Syria and Turkey-Iraq relations 
negatively and brought about these countries to approach each other skeptically.51 Another 
major problem between Turkey and Syria in connection with history was on Hatay province 
(Formerly Alexandretta). Joining of Hatay to Turkey in 1938 rankled in Damascus until a few 
years ago.52 Syrians depicted Hatay in their official maps within their borders53 and this 
problem constituted one of the most important reasons for mutual mistrust and prevented the 
improvement of bilateral relations until the end of 20th century. Additionally, as a result of the 
borders drawn after the First World War irrespective of the historical, sociological, religious 
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and political features of the region, the Kurdish population remained within the borders of 
Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria pushed these four countries to cooperate at least until recently 
against a potential Kurdish state and has influenced TFP from a different perspective.54     
 
It would not be an overstatement to express that Turkey has been feeling the burden of 
history utmost on the Armenian problem. Armenian claims that genocide was committed 
against the Ottoman Armenians in the course of the First World War and their efforts for 
international recognition of these claims across the world are today two significant obstacles 
in front of good neighborly relations between Turkey and Armenia.55 The dispute on the 
verity of these claims burden not only Turkish-Armenian relations but also relations of 
Turkey with the USA, France and several other western countries.56 Furthermore, in the eye 
of many Europeans, history plays a significant role with respect to the EU prospect of 
Turkey.57 As Mayer and Palmowski connote, historical experiences of Europeans with the 
Muslim world (i.e. the two sieges of Vienna by Ottomans, crusades-confrontation of 
Christians with the Muslims) still have contemporary influence in the minds and hearts of the 
peoples of Europe. For more than five centuries Europe defined itself partially in opposition 
to the Ottoman Empire and they have been the dominant ‘other’ in the constitution of 
European identities.58 
 
2.2.1. Re-interpretation of history by Özal and Erdoğan leaderships 
 
Advocating that Turkish Republic was a new country, the Turkish ruling elite desired 
to eliminate the above introduced problems rooted in the Ottoman past. In doing this however, 
they adopted a holistic approach and while trying to avoid the problems stemming from the 
Ottoman history, they neglected also the opportunities as well as responsibilities offered by 
Turkey's historical connections. Özal and Erdoğan leaderships on the other hand have begun 
to take into account of the other side of the medallion as well. That is, despite the challenges 
rooted in the Ottoman past; this historical heritage offers also a variety of opportunities for 
cooperation. Hence, albeit to varying degrees, Turkey's historical and cultural assets returned 
to the TFP agenda to a large extent in comparison with the past.  
 
 In the face of Kemalist policy line which rejected Turkey’s Ottoman legacy and 
embraced a firmly nationalist and westernist attitude, Özal developed his own approach, 
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which has been later named by some as neo-Ottomanism,59 and directed TFP in accordance 
with it.60 Özal regarded Turkey’s historical, cultural and geographical assets not as a burden 
but as assets presenting opportunities, particularly in economic terms. In this respect, unlike 
his predecessors, Özal tried to capitalize on Turkey’s historical and cultural “depth” in favor 
of Turkey’s interests. For instance, by making use of Turkey's historical and cultural ties, he 
wanted to open to the Middle East and the Balkans, and by employing Turkish identity, he 
wanted to open to the Central Asia.61 Likewise, Özal's interest in the Arab-Israel question and 
his projects to find a solution for this problem should be viewed in this context.  His great 
endeavour to end the persecution that the former Ottoman subject nation, Bosnians, suffered 
from and Özal's strong backup for the Azerbaijanis throughout the Nagorno-Karabakh war 
cannot be fully comprehended without understanding the value that Özal attached to Turkey's 
historical and cultural ties. 
 
In this respect, Turkey’s historical and cultural links played a remarkable role after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. The cultural, ethnic and linguistic affinity with the Central 
Asian successor states of the Soviet Union was in 1990s one of the most important landmarks 
of TFP. After the end of Cold War, owing to its cultural, religious and ethnic affinity with the 
newly established states of the Caspian region, Ankara assumed a new role and it was seen as 
a bridge between the Western countries and the Turkic republics in the Caspian region.62  
 
In the current foreign policy, Turkey’s cultural and historical ties are frequently 
stressed by the Turkish government as well. For instance, PM Erdoğan highlighted the 
cultural and historical ties in regard to Turkish stance towards Palestine.63 Likewise, current 
foreign minister of Turkey, Davutoğlu also stresses historical assets with respect to new 
foreign policy understanding of the AK Party government.64 Accordingly, due to its 
geographical and historical depth, Turkey has both responsibilities and rights, and has to 
follow a proactive foreign policy.65 PM Erdoğan agrees with the proactive policy approach of 
his foreign minister and states that “the real hazard for the countries like Turkey which have 
cultural and political depth and have historical relations with many regions of the world is 
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remaining indifferent to the developments.”66 Consequently, historical and cultural ties of 
Turkey have been re-interpreted by the Erdoğan leadership distinctively and have constituted 
one of the most important motivations of proactive foreign policy paradigm.  
 
To sum up, historical and cultural factors have so far played a considerably 
determining role in the formulation and implementation of TFP. Enormous historical and 
cultural legacy of the Ottoman Empire, which controlled over 20 million square kilometers 
acreage and dominated over numerous peoples, was interpreted by Turkish elites negatively 
and it was regarded as a burden on TFP. Therefore, while seeking to refrain from intervening 
in the problems of the nations ruled formerly by the Ottoman Empire, they tried to turn 
Turkey's face to the West. However, Özal leadership during 1980s and early 1990s and 
Erdoğan leadership during 2000s have re-evaluated Turkish history from a different 
perspective and regarded it as one of the most important motivations of their active and multi-
dimensional foreign policy approaches. This case demonstrates how the re-interpretation of 
the history factor can at the ideational level influence and transform the main FP line of a 
country, even if the history is an unchanging factor in the short run. 
2.3. Ideological and internal factors 
 2.3.1. Kemalism 
 
Kemalist ideology designated by the founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk, during the war of independence and constituted the main building blocks of modern 
Turkey’s foreign policy. According to Atatürk, the main goal of TFP should have been 
assuring “the continuation of welfare, happiness and presence of the Turkish nation and 
state.”67 In relations with other international actors, Kemalism stipulated that Turkey was to 
seek recognition as a sovereign entity and seek to be an equal member of international 
society. The famous slogan of Atatürk “peace at home peace in the world” pointed to 
‘Atatürk’s rejection of the pursuit of power and glory as distinct from security.’68 Hence, in 
regard to the foreign policy understanding of Atatürk two principles come into prominence: 1) 
priority of peace and sovereignty over all expansionist-revisionist aims and adventurist 
policies (in implication noninterventionism), and 2) western orientation.69 TFP developed in 
line with the changes in the world but has remained remarkably committed to these principles 
since its foundation, at least until recent decades. Handling these two principles and their 
historical construction processes:  
 
1) In the wake of the war of independence, Turkish nation was tired of interminable 
wars. As the founder and the leader of the Republic of Turkey, Kemal Atatürk intended to 
embark upon radical reforms in administrative, social and cultural domains. Achieving these 
reforms required a peaceful internal as well as international environment. Moreover, since 
Turkish statesmen considered that they managed to realize the National Pact substantially, in 
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the period after the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey was largely satisfied with the status quo and 
(unlike the other losers of the World War I like Germany) opted for staying away from 
revisionist and adventurist policies.70 After all, Atatürk had established a nation state out of 
the ashes of the multi-religious and multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire, made nationalism and 
secularism an integral part of his ideology and thereby left aside ideologies such as pan-
Islamism or pan-Turkism. This realist view of Atatürk was also a result of limited power of 
Turkey which exhausted its resources after long wars. Thus, it might be noted that the 
Kemalist ideology is closely relevant to real politics. Expressed another way, priority of peace 
and sovereignty over all expansionist-revisionist aims was also a requirement of real politics 
and this was adopted by Atatürk as a political choice. Long and exhausting war experiences of 
the last century and the regime change in the country brought about the dominance of a shared 
idea encouraging for staying away from taking risks. Subsequently, this noninterventionist 
approach maintained its characteristic to be one of the basic elements directing TFP until the 
end of 1980s. As a matter of fact, since the foundation of the Republic in 1923, (apart from 
Hatay’s annexation in 1939 and Cyprus Peace Operation of 1974) TFP had remained loyal to 
this noninterventionist and pro-status quo norms of Kemalist ideology.71 However, as Turkey 
enters the 21st century, nonintervention is no longer a meaningful description of Turkish 
policy. Despite the fact that Ankara is still a relatively cautious player on the international 
scene and preserves a strong preference for multilateral action in most areas, it has become a 
far more assertive actor in the new millennium with respect to its foreign and security 
policies.72   
 
2) Even though Turkey fought against the western powers during the First World War, 
after independence Atatürk made westernization one of the components of his ideology.73 In 
the Republic of Turkey, westernization began at first in cultural and, after World War II, in 
political and military areas. However, thinking of Turkish westernization separately from 
history would be misleading. In the face of a series of Ottoman defeats at the hands of the 
western powers, modernization in western sense had already started.74 When the Ottoman 
Empire began to decline and retreat against Russia and Austria, it was obliged to search for 
the support of the western powers and pursue a balance policy. As the Ottoman administration 
intensified its relations with the western states; western culture and European way of thinking 
spread gradually in intellectual and bureaucratic circles of Ottoman society. Pro-Western 
groups such as the Yung Turks advocated westernization of the Empire in political, cultural 
and economic domains.75 Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti) 
which left its mark on the recent history of the Ottoman Empire in a most powerful manner 
was also pro-Western and nationalist. It is a fact that Turkish Republic was essentially 
founded by those people who were sympathizer of the westernist ideas of the Unionists and 
the country basically maintained in a sense the same westernism applications of the 
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Unionists.76 However, the distinction between the Ottoman period westernization movements 
and the Republican western orientation was that the purpose of Ottoman reforms was to 
vitalize the empire without altering it politically and to return it to its powerful and glorious 
days.77  Atatürk, on the other hand, aimed at founding a strong and secular nation state in 
western sense. To this end, starting from the constitutional structure of the state, many state 
institutions and laws were re-arranged by following western counterparts, and the Ottoman 
sultanate and caliphate were abolished.78 The ‘West’ became a target to be achieved and a 
party to be cooperated. After the establishment of the Republic, Westernization became an 
integral part of the identity of the newly founded state.79  
 
As of the initial days of the Republic, the most fundamental feature of Turkey in 
connection with foreign politics has been its western orientation.80 Since its decision makers 
viewed the western values as the key of development and modernization, the new Turkish 
Republic adopted a westward-looking foreign policy.81 Though it tried to follow a neutral 
foreign policy against the big powers of that time throughout the first 20 years of the 
Republic, it became a member of Europe even in this era in both political and economic 
terms. After the WW II, this basic orientation unchangingly and even more strongly continued 
and Turkey soon became not only a sympathizer of the western states but also a strict ally of 
them. However, as Karpat argues “…as Turkey entered increasingly into the western sphere 
after the end of World War II, it began to distance itself more and more from its Muslim 
neighbors –except in those cases when its NATO membership dictated that greater contact be 
maintained (e.g., the CENTO alliance with Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan).82 
 
Laicism/secularism, one of the main principles of Kemalism, was also decisive in the 
orientation of TFP. Turkish elite interpreted this principle radically and disregarded a 
common ground for cooperation with other Muslim nations. Thus, Ankara refrained 
conventionally from establishing an Islam-oriented foreign policy. Therefore, for example, 
Turkey sustained a low profile relationship with the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO) 
and never participated in the summits of it at the presidential level until 1984 Casablanca 
Islamic Summit.83  
  2.3.1.1. Re-interpretation of the principles of Kemalist ideology by Özal 
and Erdoğan leaderships 
 
Having influenced TFP for decades, the impact of the Kemalist ideology on FP makers 
began relatively to decline in the 1980s and 2000s. The basic principles of Kemalism which 
have been reflected to the policy field as non-interventionism, westernization and secularism 
re-interpreted in different ways by Özal and Erdoğan leaderships. Being the first statesman 
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who acknowledged that Islam is a significant part of Turkish identity and developed policies 
accordingly,84 Turgut Özal re-interpreted secularism differently from the Kemalists. Having 
not defined secularism as strictly as the Kemalists did, Özal leadership attached importance 
for example to the ICO, made contributions to its activities and sought pragmatically to make 
use of this organization for Turkey's interests. As a matter of fact, Turkey attended for the first 
time the meeting of the ICO in 1984 at Presidential level during the Özal era.85 
 
Similarly, constructing an alternative identity structure by combining the Islamic-
conservative values of his society with the values of the West, Özal leadership interpreted the 
westernization principle also in a different manner. Accordingly, westernization should not 
have been perceived as turning its back on the east. In this regard, Turgut Özal sustained close 
relations with the West and he was aware of the differences between Turkey and the West 
saying:  
“We are an Islamic country. We have differences from the West. (…) We are the 
 bridge between the West and the East. We need to take the science, technology, 
 thinking, understanding, and compromise of the West. But we have also our own 
 values that the West does not have.”86  
  
As a matter of fact, Turkey is a bridge between the east and the west and its efficiency 
in the west is a positive function of its efficiency in the east. Therefore, instead of a unilateral 
westernist foreign policy approach just like during the Cold War, Özal adopted a multilateral 
foreign policy.87 
 
Another principle of Kemalism, non-interventionism, began to cease to be a FP option 
for the Özal leadership as well. As noted above, along with his identity and corresponding 
interest definitions, Özal's expectation to increase Turkey's importance in the eyes of the west 
through proactive policy in its region was a significant factor to leave non-interventionism 
principle aside. Moreover, Turkey’s export oriented economic model was also a significant 
motivation for Ankara to cooperate with the neighboring countries more closely.88 The need 
for peace and stability for the economic development of the country was also another factor 
pushing Özal to take initiatives to form a peaceful international environment. Additionally, 
the new international structure arose in the wake of the end of Cold War opened a new 
horizon for the Özal leadership to make Turkey a global actor by cooperating with the 
emerging Turkic republics in the Central Asia. In short, Özal leadership re-interpreted the 
norms of the Kemalist ideology and gave them new senses. Accordingly, it preferred a 
multilateral and proactive policy instead of a unilateral and non-interference oriented one 
which implied taking foreign policy initiatives and giving weigh to the east and the west 
simultaneously not at the expense of one of them.  
 
Similar arguments might be suggested for the Erdoğan era as well. Erdoğan leadership 
has also re-interpreted the principles of Kemalism like non-interventionism, westernization 
and secularism differently from his predecessors and has driven the TFP out of its traditional 
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line. In this context, Islam has been regarded once again an important part of Turkish identity 
and the secularism principle has not been considered as strictly as the Kemalist establishment 
did. Turkey assumed for example an active role in the OIC during the Erdoğan era too and 
even a Turkish bureaucrat, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, took the helm of the Organization with the 
assistance of the Turkish government for the term of 2004-2013.89 On the other hand, being 
aware of the disastrous consequences of possible sectarian conflicts in the region, the AK 
Party government considered in the face of rising sectarian conflicts in the 2000s that a 
possible Shiite-Sunni conflict would be very dangerous and declared that it would not be a 
part of such conflicts.90  
 
Interpreting also westernization in parallel with Özal's line, Erdoğan leadership has 
advocated that Turkey's historical and cultural connections would not be ignored in foreign 
policy making. As Turkey has been directly affected from the crises occurring around it and 
in the former Ottoman territories, in the Balkans or Caucasus for example, Erdoğan leadership 
has argued that Turkey could not escape from its own history. Thus it has to take the historical 
and cultural ties into consideration in foreign policy strategies.91 Additionally, Erdoğan 
leadership also claimed that there was a positive correlation between Turkey's weigh in the 
east and the west which was accordingly imposing strategically to adopt a multi-dimensional 
approach. Briefly, believing that non-interventionism ceased to be an option for Turkey in 
view of Turkey's historical and geographical depth, just like Özal, Erdoğan leadership 
preferred also an active and multidimensional foreign policy approach.  
All in all, the principles of the traditional foreign policy line have been re-interpreted 
by both leaderships differently from the traditional TFP makers and this has led to an active 
and multi-dimensional foreign policy understanding which is closely associated with their 
distinctive identity definitions. Consequently, it would not be wrong to state at this stage that 
albeit in a different sense, the determining role of Kemalist ideology on TFP still continues, 
particularly in terms of westernization. On the other hand, today, a non-interventionist 
approach in TFP is a matter of past. Turkish policy makers indicate a great interest in the 
issues around Turkey and seek to conduct an active foreign policy in the region.92  
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 2.3.2.  Internal politics 
  2.3.2.1. Socially constructed ideas about the role of military in Turkish 
Politics and its transformation in the 1980s and 2000s 
 
Undoubtedly, there are several internal actors influencing TFP. Turkish military has 
always had a prominent position among them and it has had a considerably decisive role in 
Turkish politics, particularly as of 1960s.93 Until recently, a military intervention into politics 
had been perceived among the Turkish elite and the Kemalist circles as a normal and even 
sometimes as a necessary norm when it became a widespread conviction that the governments 
moved away from secularism.94 This norm had been historically explained with the role of 
military in Turkish political history and in Turkish traditions. As a matter of fact, Turkish 
army was the most invested and the best trained institution in the decline stage of the Ottoman 
Empire with a view to preventing the dissolution of it. The founders of the Republic of 
Turkey, including Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and İsmet İnönü, are also of military origin,95 and 
six out of ten presidents of the Turkish Republic were high-ranking military officers.96 
Furthermore, some of the military officers openly express that the military founded the 
republic. Thus it is an important institution in the Turkish political landscape.97 The impact of 
the army on foreign policy has been associated with its exclusive place in domestic politics.98 
Traditionally, it has always been one of the most influential actors of Turkish politics.  
 
After the ten-year Democrat Party government, the Turkish army intervened in politics 
on different excuses in nearly every ten years as of 1960. The army has regarded itself as the 
guardian of the unitary Republic and viewed its mission as not only to defend the territorial 
integrity of the state against external threats but also to protect it against internal challenges.99 
Moreover, it has seen itself superior to the civilians,100 and did not abstain from intervening in 
politics when it deemed it necessary (i.e. when it considered that the Republican regime was 
in danger). This happened several times either by way of traditional and direct methods (e.g. 
coup d'états of 1960, 1971 and 1980) or of indirect and postmodern methods such as the 
February 28, 1997 post-modern putsch. The latest military attempt in this respect took place 
on 27 April 2007 by posting a digital memorandum in the process of presidential election.  
 
As it happened during the 28 February 1997 process, the military sought also civil 
society support in recent decades and did not hesitate to resort to manipulative vehicles to 
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affect Turkish politics.101 These direct or indirect interventions of the military in politics gave 
rise to the construction of a norm which has been shared mostly among Kemalist/elitist 
groups and indicate the central role the army plays in Turkish political life.102 Even though 
these interventions were against a number of circles in the country and were unwelcome for 
them, such undemocratic activities of Turkish generals have found a certain support among 
the Kemalist elite. Owing to the norms constructed especially as a result of the process began 
with the military putsch in 1960 and gained a certain acceptance among the Kemalists, some 
groups have indirectly encouraged the Turkish army to intervene the administration once they 
did not like the direction of the country.103 
 
Following the 1980 coup d'état, the putschist generals stayed in power from 1980 until 
1983 without a parliament. Originally, today’s Turkish constitution came into existence with 
the initiative of these generals in 1982. Since these generals wanted to exert influence in 
politics also through legal mechanisms, they had formed a high Security Council with the new 
constitution through which they could intervene in the politics statutorily.104 As a matter of 
fact, even though the elections were held in 1983 and a civilian government was established 
by Turgut Özal, the military retained its impact on overall matters relating to Turkey’s 
internal and external security and foreign affairs matters through the constitutional powers of 
President Kenan Evren and the National Security Council (NSC).105  
 
As a democrat and Muslim leader who had personally suffered from military 
interventions and realized their negative impacts on both Turkish democracy and Turkish 
economy, Özal always favored the prominence of politics over all kinds of tutelages, be 
military or bureaucratic ones. As the supremacy of any kind of tutelage over national will is 
unacceptable in democracies, Özal’s stance was also a requirement of a democrat identity. He 
was of the opinion that it was politicians who were carrying the political responsibility, thus 
the decision-making authority should have been in their hand. Özal objected the decisive 
position of the bureaucracy in the state affairs which carried neither economic nor political 
responsibility.106 Therefore, he struggled with the military tutelage and sought to increase the 
weight of politics in Turkey. In parallel with the democratization of the country, Özal 
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accomplished a certain success too.107 For instance, he ignored the military customs, which 
have been conventionally very strong, and appointed Necip Torumtay as the Chief of Military 
Staff instead of Necdet Öztorun in 1987. This kind of interventions of the civilians into the 
promotion procedures of the military occurred considerably rarely in Turkish history.108 
Furthermore, President Turgut Özal was the primary Turkish actor during the First Gulf Crisis 
who was able to steer TFP which caused the resignation of the Chief of Staff in 1990.  
 
However, Turgut Özal's considerable success in curbing the military tutelage fell short 
of constructing a strong enough norm to prevent the generals from dealing with the political 
issues.  As a matter of fact, in the course of the 1990s, along with the Kurdish separatism; the 
rise of the political Islam, the fragmented political structure and the coalition governments 
provided again an appropriate ground for the dominance of the military in Turkish politics.109 
Though the NSC has been composed of military and cabinet members and its resolutions 
have, according to the constitution, only a consultative character, the armed forces used it as a 
means of intervention in the politics and consequently the NSC was de facto the highest 
decision mechanism in Turkey.110 
 
The Kurdish separatism and the activities of the terrorist organization of the PKK 
(Kurdistan Workers' Party) contributed to the dominance of the military in foreign political 
issues as well. After 1984, as the PKK began to operate more effectively within and outside of 
Turkey, the military’s role in curbing armed insurgence gradually increased and the armed 
forces played a central role over this issue until a few years ago. Moreover, along with many 
politicians, the military was inclined to see this matter as a military problem, rather than a 
political one. In view of some neighboring states’ support for the PKK, the problem was often 
“portrayed as conspiracy of hostile states that aim to disintegrate Turkey. Therefore, the issue 
is transformed into a national security problem that increases the military’s influence on 
foreign policy.”111 After all, the issue was military in nature; hence the military naturally 
came to the forefront as the key player.112 For instance, in order to cut the support of some 
neighboring countries, Turkey followed an aggressive policy during 1990s in particular. In 
order to stop Syrian support for the PKK, Turkey threatened the Syrian government with 
waging a war. It is known today that the plans had been made by soldiers to put pressure on 
Syria and interestingly these plans had contained not only military measures but also political 
and economic measures. Profoundly booming relations with Israel had also something to do 
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with the Turkish generals. “Ankara gave further momentum to its alignment with Israel, and 
the military played a key role in the forging of intimate military cooperation with the Israeli 
Defense Forces.”113 
 
Just like the Özal leadership, the Erdoğan leadership has also been a victim of military 
coups and these putsches have played significant roles in the construction processes of its 
identity. Thus, Erdoğan leadership also embarked on a struggle with the military tutelage and 
took significant steps to eliminate it. Undoubtedly, Erdoğan leadership has enjoyed in its 
struggle an anchor that the Özal leadership did not: the European Union and Turkey's 
membership perspective to it. In fact, the privileged position of the armed forces in Turkish 
politics affected until recently Turkey’s dialogue with Europe and with the U.S. on a series of 
issues. It was a major subject of criticism by many EU officials until a few years ago who 
“have consistently stressed that the military’s prominent role in Turkish politics casts doubts 
on Turkey’s democratic credentials and demanded a host of legal and political reforms from 
Turkey to bring it in line with Western Europe’s democratic standards, which include an 
empirical separation between civil and military authorities.”114 In conformity with these 
demands, several judicial as well as constitutional reforms were undertaken to fulfill the 
standards of the western European democracies.115 Through these reforms, the NSC was 
transformed into an advisory body with no executive powers and with a majority of civilians. 
Furthermore, NSC representatives were removed from the civilian boards, the military 
became fully accountable to the parliament and the competency of military courts was 
limited.116 Eventually, owing to these reforms and the changing structure of Turkish politics, 
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influence of the armed forces over the formulation of domestic as well as foreign policy has 
largely been limited.117 
 
It might be argued that whereas the military was considerably decisive in TFP until 
early 2000s, the influence of generals on Turkish politics has been diminished to a large 
extent as a result of a range of reforms. However, by no means the military influence on 
Turkish politics entirely disappeared in the first decade of the new millennium. The military 
continued to intervene in politics by resorting to new techniques.118 It preferred to make 
recommendations and convince the governments so as to implement policies in line with its 
security concerns. For instance, “in areas where the military plays a key role in the 
formulation of policy, i.e. the Kurdish issue and political Islam, the military tend(ed) to use 
both official instruments like the NSC, and informal channels such as behind-the-scenes 
influence on politicians and bureaucrats. These informal mechanisms range(d) from public 
pronouncements and briefings to journalists, to informal contacts with bureaucrats and 
politicians. Statements by the military (were) perceived as warnings to the civilian 
government; as such, they pressur(ed) the public to take necessary action against the 
government.”119 However, in the wake of the referendum held in September 2010, the impact 
of Turkish army on Turkish politics and by implication on foreign policy has visibly 
decreased. 
 
 Consequently, Özal and Erdoğan, whose identities have been shaped also as a result of 
the military coups and the practices of the tutelage regimes, are known as two important 
leaders who fought at most with the military and the bureaucratic tutelages in the Turkish 
political history and made the most important contributions to the construction of norms 
directed to hinder the intervention of bureaucrats and generals into politics. This case seems in 
parallel with the mutual construction thesis of the constructivists. In other words, as the 
victims of military coups and tutelages, Özal and Erdoğan leaderships which aimed to sustain 
their existences within the political system found the remedy to make the western values such 
as democracy and human rights integral parts of their identities. Their Islamic-conservative 
and democrat identities influenced and shaped their interest perceptions both in domestic and 
foreign politics. For example, while they have made a considerable contribution to the norms 
against the military tutelages in domestic politics, they have added Turkey's historical and 
cultural ties to TFP agenda.   
 
 However, Özal leadership's success against the military regime was eroded due to the 
chaotic political and economic structure of 1990s and provided space for the military 
members to intervene again in politics. In the new millennium on the other hand, Erdoğan 
leadership has accomplished a serious success in limiting the military interventions by making 
use of the EU membership anchor and has made significant contributions to the construction 
of norms against military tutelages. In comparison to 1990s when Turkey followed a 
relatively conflict oriented foreign policy,120 today Turkish army’s effect on foreign political 
issues has relatively been undermined. In this case, democratization process of the country, 
harmonization process with the EU, one party government with a large majority in the 
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parliament since 2002 and its new foreign policy understanding (i.e. establishing a welfare 
circle around Turkey and pursuing a zero-problem policy with neighbors instead of a conflict 
oriented foreign policy of 1990s) have significant roles.121 However, the weight of the Turkish 
armed forces on foreign political decisions has continued for many decades.122 Nevertheless, 
even though since 2011 the Turkish army has been careful not to interfere into political issues 
and displayed a relatively more democratic image, it might be concluded that Turkey has still 
been undergoing a transformation process in terms of civil-military relations, there is still 
need for time until the reforms would fully put into practice, and until civil-military relations 
come in line with the contemporary democratic standards.  
 
  2.3.2.2. Evolving role of non-governmental organizations and civil society 
 
In recent decades, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have increased their weigh 
on TFP making in parallel with the democratization process in the country. As a result of the 
export-oriented economic model introduced in early 1980s, Turkish/Anatolian people began 
to open up to the world and started so to speak to undergo a transnational socialization 
process. They have begun to learn the world and the internationally shared norms have 
exerted influence on the construction of their identities. Through the NGOs, this new and 
economically stronger social class has vocally started to demand more saying in the 
administration of the country. Additionally, this Muslim-conservative social class attached 
importance also to the education of their youth. Thanks to the mounting educational level of 
these conservative people, they have increased their capacity to affect the foreign policy 
makers.123 This situation was a result of the economic and social transformation of the 
Turkish society that it has undergone in the recent decades. In terms of economic structure, a 
very dynamic and diverse private sector, with a range of perceptions about politics and 
foreign affairs, has emerged in Turkey and it has constituted further “power centers” outside 
the military and outside the state.124 These power centers have played crucial roles in the 
process of the re-definition of the country's identity; they have become a leading vehicle for 
change in Turkey and have contributed to the definition of foreign policy. Moreover, the non-
governmental organizations such as business associations, human rights organizations, think 
thanks and trade unions have increased the participation in the political processes and have 
supported or criticized the decision makers at the intellectual level. While this process began 
in the Özal era, it has more intensively continued during the 2000s. 
 
In parallel with the improvement of Turkish economy and the democratization 
process, other civil society groups also gradually consolidated their place and alongside 
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national security interests, commercial, economic and other more technical interests rose to 
prominence in Turkish policy-making.125 Since Turkey has adopted a semi-export-oriented 
economy and a special significance is referred to the private sector in this system, it began to 
acquire a growing say in addition to the traditional foreign policy actors such as the military 
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.126 Through the institutions such as business associations 
and a small number of independent “think tanks,” private sector began to engage in 
discussions, analyses and ultimately lobbying on questions of concern. “These institutions are 
beginning to play a role in articulating the policy interests of particular circles, and they are 
among the most interested in building international ties and tend towards a liberal, reformist 
outlook, and encourage a more activist but multilateral approach to Turkey’s foreign policy 
interests.”127 For instance, NGOs such as the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s 
Association (TUSIAD) and the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) 
strongly backed the government regarding its anti-status quo-oriented Cyprus policy by 
organizing brain-storming sessions, publishing regular reports and by organizing meetings.128 
Furthermore, the media, which had come under the direct control of industrialist and financial 
circles, also sided with the government and espoused an anti status quo stance on Cyprus.129 
Accompanied by the support of many NGOs and the media, the government enabled to 
succeed “in persuading both the President as well as the NSC to unequivocally support a 
solution on the island based on the Annan Plan” which was initially contested by the military 
and pro-status-quo powers in Turkey. 
 
An unprecedented instance with regard to the impact of NGOs on Ankara’s foreign 
policy occurred on May 31, 2010. The Free Gaza Movement and the Turkish Foundation for 
Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (IHH) organized an aid flotilla for 
Gaza which has been suffering from the Israeli blockade. The flotilla was carrying 
humanitarian relief to the people of Gaza and also aiming to break the siege of Gaza by the 
sea. However, the Israeli raid in the Gaza Flotilla paved the way for a serious tension between 
Turkey and Israel. This incident has set one of the most striking and actual instances of how 
an NGO could exert influence on the foreign policy of a country.  This six-ship freedom 
flotilla consisted of the Mavi Marmara, along with two other vessels from Turkey, two from 
Greece, and individual ships from Ireland and Algeria which were carrying solely 
humanitarian aid.130 “The participants on the flotilla included artists, academics, doctors, 
lawyers, journalists, and lawmakers from dozens of countries, including parliamentarians 
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from Israel, Egypt, Sweden, and two members of the German Bundestag.”131 Additionally, 
there were passengers from 32 countries in the vessels. However, despite the fact that the 
flotilla posed no security threat to Israel, it was stormed by Israeli commandos about 72 miles 
away from Israel, in international waters.   
 
Though there could be some other ways to prevent those ships, Israel opted for 
assaulting the civilian ships in international waters and killed 9 civilian activists (eight Turks 
and one American of Turkish descent) whereas wounded 60 of them. The Turkish 
government, all political parties, and people were shocked by the Israeli attack. Over the 
assault, mass demonstrations occurred in Ankara and Istanbul, and officials made repeated 
statements about the Israel’s actions.132 Foreign Minister of Turkey, Ahmet Davutoğlu, noted 
that "psychologically, this attack is like 9/11 for Turkey." He demanded from Israel a "clear 
and formal apology," to accept an independent investigation, to release all passengers 
immediately, to return the bodies of all dead passengers, to lift what he called the "siege of 
Gaza and to pay compensation to the victims."133 FM Davutoğlu also pointed out that citizens 
of the Republic of Turkey were for the first time killed by the soldiers of another country.134 
Furthermore, Turkish President Abdullah Gül declared after the Israeli attack that, “Turkish-
Israeli relations can never be as before...”135  
 
In fact, relations between Turkey and Israel were strained over the Israeli offensive on 
Gaza in early 2009 and further deteriorated when Israel's deputy FM, Danny Ayalon, 
humiliated the Turkish ambassador by deliberately placing him in a low seat and told the TV 
cameramen in Hebrew that it was important that people saw the ambassador lower "while 
we're up high". Subsequently, upon Turkey’s harsh reaction, Ayalon sent an initial apology 
but Ankara threatened to recall ambassador Celikkol if no second, formal apology would be 
issued. Eventually, the deputy minister was obliged to declare a formal apology for his 
inappropriate behavior.136 Against this background, however, the Mavi Marmara raid was, so 
to say, the straw that broke the camel's back in Turkish-Israeli relations and signaled the end 
of a period of almost 20 years close relationship.137 Turkey recalled its ambassador from Tel 
Aviv, scrapped plans for joint military exercises, barred Israeli military aircraft from Turkish 
airspace after the incident,138 and several agreements between the two countries in the field of 
                                               
131 Bayoumi, Midnight on the Mavi Marmara, 2. 
132 Carol Migdalovitz, “Israel’s Blockade of Gaza, the Mavi Marmara Incident, and Its Aftermath,” 
Congressional Research Service, (23.06.2010): 5, accessed 26.11.2011, 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41275_20100623.pdf.  
133 “Turkish foreign minister: Israeli raid on Gaza aid flotilla ‘like 9/11’ for his country,” The Washington Post, 
1.June.2010, accessed 26.11.2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/06/01/AR2010060101506.html. “Gizli görüşmede 5 talep,” Hürriyet.com, 02.07.2010, 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/15200286.asp.  
134 “Davutoğlu: İsrail baskını 11 Eylül’ümüz,” Haber7.com, 06.06.2010, accessed 26.11.2011, 
http://www.haber7.com/haber/20100606/Davutoglu-Israil-baskini-11-Eylulumuz.php.  
135“President Abdullah Gül: Israel making a big mistake,” Todayszaman.com, 04.06.2010, accessed 26.11.2011, 
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-212084-100-president-abdullah-gul-israel-making-a-big-mistake.html.  
136 “Peres: Humiliation of Turkey envoy does not reflect Israel’s diplomacy,” haaretz.com, 14.01.2010, 
accessed 26.11.2011,  http://www.haaretz.com/news/peres-humiliation-of-turkey-envoy-does-not-reflect-israel-
s-diplomacy-1.261381  
137 “Gaza flotilla raid draws furious response from Turkey’s prime minister,” guardian.co.uk. 01.06.2010, 
accessed 26.11.2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jun/01/gaza-flotilla-raid-turkey-prime-minister-
israel  
138 “Turkey wants Israel Apology,” Reuters.com, 05.07.2010, accessed 26.11.2011,  
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE66415S20100705  
 87  
military training and cooperation were shelved.139 All this process ignited by NGOs provides 
a unique example as to the influence of civil society on TFP. 
 
 To sum up, in parallel with the opening-up policy introduced during the Özal era, the 
Islamic-conservative circles whose education, economic power and interest in politics 
increased to a considerable extent have demanded more word on foreign policy making 
especially in the 2000s. With the help of the democratization process of Turkey, the 
conservative circles have had a significant impact on foreign policy together with other 
NGOs. While this impact has surfaced in the form of backing the foreign policy of the AK 
Party government at the intellectual level, it has turned occasionally into a critical stance. As 
it was seen in the Mavi Marmara event more clearly, the activities of the NGO's have 
sometimes directly influenced TFP. What interesting in terms of this study is the argument 
that the lack of civil society support that the Özal leadership sensed closely in finding 
intellectual backup for its foreign policy vision was felt to a lesser extent by the Erdoğan 
administration. This civil society infrastructure has both supported the Erdoğan leadership 
intellectually through think thanks and has played a significant role in consolidating and 
spreading the identity definition of the Erdoğan leadership in the society which takes Turkey's 
historical and cultural ties into account.  
 
  2.3.2.3. Developments in domestic politics 
 
As Inan points it out, domestic politics and foreign policy are interactive, and it is hard 
to separate them from each other.140 Like in other countries, the structures and actors of 
domestic politics have a significant impact on the formation of TFP as well.141 Particularly, 
considering the periods of Özal and Erdoğan, this fact might be observed more closely. After 
Özal and Erdoğan came to power, unlike traditional foreign political approaches, they opted 
for more proactive foreign policies. Alongside of security concerns, they have added the 
economic interests to the top priorities of foreign political agenda, and they accelerated the 
relations with the Muslim world as well as with the nations that Turkey has cultural and 
historical ties.142 Furthermore, they embraced new visions on foreign policy, adopted foreign 
political approaches in conformity with these visions, and caused Turkish foreign political 
literature gain new concepts (e.g. ‘From Adriatic to the Chinese Wall’, ‘Central State’, ‘zero-
problem policy with neighbors’, ‘multilateral foreign policy’). In a nutshell, developments 
that occurred in domestic politics, such as the change of power, affected also the TFP closely.  
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On the other hand, whereas the Kurdish question is a matter of domestic politics, 
owing to the PKK terror, it has increasingly influenced Ankara’s foreign policy concerns for 
approximately two decades, ranging from relations with the European Union and the U.S. to 
its nearest neighboring countries.143 Turkey has failed to accommodate Kurdish ethnicity and 
culture, and this, in conjunction with other factors, has paved the way for the deaths of 
thousands of civilians and the displacement of masses of people, as well as severe human 
rights violations. This failure has also prepared the ground for the intervention of many 
countries and international political actors into the conflict between Turkey and the Kurdish 
groups.144 While some governments and political actors have sought to exploit the Kurdish 
question for their own interests, some others have seen the issue from a human rights point of 
view. Consequently, the Kurdish question has become internationalized and begun to occupy 
a significant place in TFP. Turkey had to face this question in many issues ranging from its 
membership of the EU to getting the support of the international community to transport 
Caspian and Central Asian oil through Turkey.145 Additionally, Özal and Erdoğan have been 
two distinctive leaders who took giant steps for the solution of this problem and sought to 
decontaminate TFP from this trouble. 
 
For instance, the Syrian and Greek support for the PKK as a foreign policy tool against 
Turkey146 and Turkey’s efforts to preclude these and such backings dominated a significant 
proportion of Ankara’s foreign policy until recently. Turkey and Syria came to the brink of 
war in October 1998. The PKK presence in northern Iraq has been one the most current 
agendas in Turkey’s relations with the U.S., Iraq, Iran and Syria. Furthermore, Turkey has 
sought to get the international community to recognize the PKK as a terrorist organization and 
has also tried to cut logistics and financial supports of the PKK in other countries, particularly 
in Europe. In this respect, Turkish policy makers have repeatedly warned their American and 
European allies that it was not sufficient only to add the PKK to the list of terrorist 
organizations. They articulated that in accordance with the requirements of being friend and 
ally, they expect the Europeans and Americans to struggle against the PKK more actively.147 
Briefly, though the Kurdish question is a matter of internal affair, because of the PKK terror, 
it has become a foreign political agenda of Ankara and played a decisive role in Turkey’s 
relations with neighbors, with the EU and the U.S. The most striking example of this fact was 
viewed in 1998, when Turkey and Syria had almost gone to a war. 
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  2.3.2.4. Rising role of public opinion on the re-construction of Turkish 
identity and its impact on TFP 
 
It might be argued that there has been a positive correlation between the influence of 
the public opinion in Turkish politics and the democratization of the country. During the 
military regime between 1980 and 1983, the role of public opinion in 
foreign policy-making was minimal. Even after the return of the civilian government in 1983, 
owing to the impediments restricting the democratic participation in the governance created 
by the new constitution and other related laws, the impact of the public opinion on foreign 
policy issues was considerably limited and “the governments had an “easy-ride” in foreign 
policy as far as public pressure was concerned”.148 However, in parallel with the 
democratization of Turkish politics and with the emergence of private TV channels as of 
1989, public opinion began to be progressively more important factor in the policy-making 
processes.  
 
 On the other hand, in the wake of the Cold War, ethnic and religious identities began 
to come more into prominence. The globalization phenomenon has created a new 
environment where ethnicity and religion based commonalities and differences began to 
crystallize with the developments in transportation and communication technologies.149 In 
such a world, owing to the Turkish media which diversified and strengthened with private TV 
channels, people have begun to get more information about the developments in the world. 
This rising flow of information has facilitated the recall of the forgotten cultural and historical 
bonds and contributed to the re-construction of identity perception in Turkey. Turkish public 
opinion and its strong pressure on the government in regard to the Karabakh, Palestinian and 
Bosnian conflicts provide good instances as to how the public opinion exerted influence on 
the shaping of TFP during the 1990s,150 and on re-construction of Turkish identity.  
 
One of the most significant features of the Turkish society is that 98 percent of it is 
Muslim and this religious identity plays an important role on public opinion’s approach to 
foreign political issues. This religious identity gives rise to galvanization of sympathy in the 
public opinion when Muslim Bosnians or Palestinians or Azerbaijanis are exposed to a 
pressure.151 Since the events in Bosnia and Nagorno-Karabakh threatened neither directly 
Turkey’s security nor its national interest directly, at the outset, these were no-win situations 
from the government’s point of view.152 However, in the Karabakh war, Turkish public 
regarded Azerbaijanis -who are ethnic Turks and Muslim- as victims of Armenian aggression, 
and as long as the fighting continued, Turkish public opinion sided heavily with Azerbaijan. 
The government remained under pressure and was forced to leave its non-interventionist 
attitude. Concerning the Bosnian conflict on the other hand, notwithstanding the fact that “the 
Bosnian Muslims are not ethnic Turks, it seemed that the Turkish public had developed a 
kinship and  responsibility  for  the Muslims  left  behind  by  the retreat  of  the  Ottoman  
Empire  from  the  Balkans,  after  around  five  hundred  years  of domination.”153 Moreover, 
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Turkish citizens of Bosnian origin which amounted around four-five millions further 
increased the pressure on the government.154 Consequently, the events in Bosnia and 
Karabakh caused a deep affliction and reaction in Turkish society and encouraged the 
government to embrace a more active, albeit multilateral, approach to these issues.155 In other 
words, Turkey’s historical, religious and ethnic links forced it to take a more active attitude. 
At this point, President Turgut Özal advocated also that Ankara should have followed a more 
active and hawkish policy in the Bosnia and Azerbaijan crises.156 In doing this, his main point 
of reference was Turkey’s historical and cultural connections. Even though President Özal 
lost his influence on the government as of October 1991 and he did not possess the authority 
to give a direction to the foreign policy of the government directly, he contributed with his 
pro-Bosnia and Azerbaijan discourse and activities to the recall of the Turkish public its 
historical and cultural ties.157 
 
 More importantly, thanks to the increasing communication facilities, public opinion 
has gained also a constructive role. More precisely, the Bosnian crisis which covered 
significantly in the Turkish media reminded the Turkish people their Ottoman identity. 
Azerbaijan crisis on the other hand contributed to the revival of Turkish ethnic identity 
between the two countries in addition to their historical and cultural bonds. Therefore, the 
mounting communication facilities have played an important role in the transformation of 
ideas about the Turkish identity in Turkey and the pressure arose through the media had a 
determining role on the decisions of the policy makers. As a matter of fact, such instances 
have left important traces on the identity and interest perceptions of both Özal and Erdoğan 
leaderships. 
 
Additionally, there are also several further instances demonstrating Turkish public’s 
increasing interest and influence on Turkey’s identity and foreign policy in the 2000s as well. 
Events in Palestine galvanize Turkish public opinion too and this brings about some 
reflections on foreign political decisions of Ankara. Israeli attack on Gaza during the winter of 
2008-2009 engendered mass protests and rallies across Turkey. The strong public opinion and 
its anger against Israel played a role in shaping Turkey's Israel policy in 2009 and the 
Palestinian problem became one of the top issues in foreign policy agenda.158 Besides, the 
spectacular welcome-home ceremony following the event that Turkey’s PM Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan walked out of a panel in World Economic Forum, in Davos, in protest the 
moderator’s and Israeli President Peres’ attitude also proves Turkish public interest in foreign 
political issues as well as its re-constructing role of "new" Turkish identity.159 Indeed, this 
kind of examples might be extended. However, the bottom line here is the fact that in parallel 
with the democratization of Turkey as well as with the rise of the means of communication, 
the public opinion has become a more significant factor on foreign political issues and has 
played a more active role in shaping Turkish identity and foreign policy. 
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  2.3.2.5. Economy as a determining factor of foreign policy 
 
In fact, along with the opening up of Turkish economy to the global markets and the 
adoption of export oriented development model, economy became one of the significant 
factors that define foreign policy in the Turgut Özal era. As an economist, Özal strove to 
increase interdependence in Turkey’s surrounding region with a view both to ensure peace 
and stability and to find new markets for the bourgeoning Turkish exporters. To this end, Özal 
sought to make use of foreign policy instruments to the maximum extent. He tried to solve the 
long-standing problems with neighbors and to utilize Turkey's historical, religious and 
cultural assets pragmatically which had been ignored until then. In this context, as a PM and 
later President, Özal developed several projects and took important steps. His failed "spirit of 
Davos" initiative which aimed to resolve major issues of conflict in Greek-Turkish relations 
in the late 1980s might be regarded in this framework. Özal developed also a water pipeline 
project in 1986 which envisaged the construction of a pipeline to carry Turkish water to the 
Gulf countries as well as to Israel. The aim of this project was to promote interdependency as 
a step towards peace-building, yet it fell short of reaching a positive conclusion as well. Özal 
demonstrated a great effort to address the Arab-Israeli conflict after the end of the first Gulf 
crisis over the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and pioneered the establishment of the BSEC in 1992. 
He initiated the practice of taking ever larger delegations of business people to state visits and 
worked hard to lift visas to enter Turkey. Despite the resistance of the security and foreign 
policy establishment, he succeeded to lift visa requirements for Greek nationals and later 
Soviet nationals. All of these efforts of Özal directed to consolidate commercial ties, supply 
peace and stability and form an environment of interdependency in the region.160  
 
At this point, adopting a similar attitude to Özal's, Erdoğan leadership has also 
regarded Turkey's foreign trade and the activities of Turkish businessmen abroad as a 
significant parameter of TFP. Whilst the economy factor became of secondary importance in 
the 1990s on account of the rising security-oriented foreign policy understanding, it has 
gained again a higher place in TFP agenda. Having come to power in 2002, the Erdoğan 
leadership has sought to utilize Turkey's historical and cultural values to a larger extent with a 
view to increasing foreign trade. Considering that the rising interdependence in the region 
would be useful both as a functionalist tool for peace building and for opening new markets 
for Turkish export, Erdoğan leadership viewed economy as one of the most basic parameters 
of TFP.161 However, the distinction between Özal and Erdoğan periods in this context is the 
mounting number of actors in the economy field within the country and their increasing 
interest in foreign policy making due to their commercial ties with foreign companies. New 
actors such as the "Anatolian Tigers" which burgeoned mostly as a consequence of the 
reforms introduced by Turgut Özal in early 1980s completed their institutionalization until the 
AK Party era and have begun to demand more say in TFP making through associations like 
MÜSİAD (The Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association), TÜSİAD (the 
Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association), TOBB (the Turkish Union of 
Chambers and Commodity Exchanges), TİM (the Turkish Exporters Assembly) and 
TUSCON (Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists).162 
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The Erdoğan government paid attention to the activities of Turkish business people 
abroad and tried to support them in many sectors, in the construction sector particularly. 
Protection of the interests of these business people has also become a significant factor in the 
definition of AK Party foreign policy. In the course of the events in Libya during the Arab 
Spring, for instance, while Libya leader Colonel Gaddafi was strongly criticized and was 
called for to step back, in view of the interests of Turkish business people who invested in this 
country billions of dollars especially in the construction sector, Turkish government remained 
silent for a certain period of time. Ankara called for the Gaddafi regime to withdraw only after 
it planned how to save Turkish firms and citizens from the civil war with a minimum loss. 
 
On the other hand, Turkey's developing economic ties with neighbors pushed the 
Erdoğan leadership to handle political and economic relations virtually at different levels. In 
this manner, it was aimed to hinder repercussions of political disputes on commercial links 
and on the flow of tourists from neighboring countries towards Turkey. As a matter of fact, as 
it will be elaborated in the following chapters, Turkey's trade volume with neighbors 
increased nearly six fold and reached from USD 9.6 billion in 1995 to USD 67.7 billion in 
2007.163 This rising economic relationship has urged the Turkish government to be careful not 
to damage the commercial ties with the neighboring and other countries even though there 
have been tensions in the political plane. In this context, though the AK Party government 
harshly criticized the Israeli attacks to Palestine in 2008-2009,164 it sought to sustain the trade 
relations at a certain level and hinder the repercussions of the political tensions between 
Ankara and Tel Aviv. Likewise, despite the disputes during the Russia-Georgia war of 2008 
and the Syrian civil war as of 2011, Ankara spent considerable effort to avoid repercussions 
emanating from these crises on commercial ties. Syrian crisis caused disputes many times 
between Turkey and Iran as well, however such disagreements have remained again at 
political level and their reflection on economic links have remained limited again.   
 
PM Erdoğan sustained to implement several political practices launched by Özal to a 
large extent. Just like Özal, Erdoğan took crowded groups of business people from the above 
noted NGOs to state visits and regarded the trade volume in his diplomatic contacts as a 
significant parameter of relations with the countries in question. Such travels have given 
business circles the opportunity to interact directly and exert influence on the decisions and 
policies of TFP makers. Furthermore, the practice of lifting visa requirements that AK Party 
governments boast about a lot165 is actually also a practice which was initially introduced by 
the Özal government.  
 
In a nutshell, Özal and Erdoğan are economists and both have regarded the economic 
development of the country as the catalyst for their aspirations to make Turkey a global 
player, just like the Ottomans. Thus, as in the Özal period, Turkey’s increasing foreign trade 
volume and foreign economic ties occupied a considerable place in the TFP agenda 
throughout the Erdoğan era as well. Above all, this attracts attention as one of the most 
important common points of Özal and Erdoğan eras.   
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  2.3.2.6. Other Factors: Personality of the leaders 
  
Foreign policy making approaches suggest that personalities and psychological 
qualities of the leaders and other foreign policy makers play a determining role in foreign 
policy making processes. Scholars attempting to introduce and apply decision making 
analyses in the field of foreign policy, such as Snyder, Frankel, Rosenau and Brecher,166 
highlight the role of individuals in foreign policy making. For instance, Snyder stresses the 
role of decision makers in foreign policy making saying that “state action is the action taken 
by those acting in the name of the state.”167  
 
Policy makers’ personalities matter because other foreign policy determinants are 
mediated by their images, attitudes, values, beliefs, doctrines and ideologies.168 Stated 
differently, personality is the name for a combination of agent leadership traits and 
perceptions that mediate the ultimate role of power and material aspects of international 
relations as well as the role of global norms in shaping state behavior.169 Therefore, their 
paradigms, perceptions or images of the real world are of great importance, and their personal 
characteristics would be crucial in understanding foreign policy choice, particularly, under 
certain conditions such as high stress, high uncertainty, and dominant position of the head of 
state in foreign policy decision making.170 Furthermore, should a political leader is interested 
in foreign affairs, his/her participation in making a foreign policy decision would be more 
potent and he/she would be more predisposed to take the initiative in foreign policy. Some 
other stimuli such as valuing good external relations or regarding foreign policy as a way to 
gain re-election may also play a profound role in the active involvement of a leader in foreign 
policy making.171 Moreover, the more sensitive a leader is to his environment, more likely 
he/she is to accommodate himself/herself to new information and to the necessity for change 
suggested by the environment. Hence, sensitivity to environment matters. Consequently, these 
two prepositions, interest in foreign affairs and sensitivity to the environment are determinant 
in the relationship between four other personal characteristics (i.e. beliefs, motives, decision 
style and interpersonal style) and foreign policy.172 Finally, it should be noted that though 
Brecher and Frankel accept the role of other agencies in the policy-making process, they give 
priority to the heads of the governments and the foreign ministers as the core decision-making 
group.173 
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In developing countries such as Turkey, ideologies, ideals and perceptions of state 
elites who control the decision mechanisms have a great impact on domestic and foreign 
policies of the country. Rulers define the interests of the country and, by implication, the 
policies to be followed in conformity with their own perceptions.174 In the Turkish case, two 
main figures have attracted attention in foreign policy making since 2002.175 The first one is 
Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu who has been regarded as the intellectual architect of TFP under 
the Erdoğan leadership, first as the chief advisor to the Prime Minister (2002-2009) and as the 
Foreign Minister since May 2009.176 In his influential book, ‘the Strategic Depth’ (Stratejik 
Derinlik), he developed a vision for TFP in 2001.  When the Erdoğan leadership came to the 
power in 2002, he enjoyed an unprecedented opportunity to influence TFP in accordance with 
his own vision. Subsequently, he has become one of the exceptional figures in the field of 
international relations who could practice his theoretical approach to a considerable extent. 
Therefore he has been the centre of attraction for the domestic as well as foreign observers 
who try to understand the new dynamics of TFP.177  A prominent Turkish scholar, Bülent 
Aras, introduces Davutoğlu as follows:  
 
 “Davutoğlu … has been influential in a number of major foreign policy developments. There 
 is a consensus that it was Davutoğlu who largely changed the rhetoric and practice of Turkish 
 foreign policy, bringing to it a dynamic and multi-dimensional orientation. He set the vision 
 and the style of the new foreign policy line and provided a framework for pursuing it. At first, 
 Davutoğlu’s new vision and style were subject to much discussion and criticism; many 
 wondered whether it would be suitable for Turkish foreign policy. After seven years, the 
 discussion has mainly shifted to whether his policy would be sustainable without the AK Party 
 and himself in the advisor’s chair.”178 
 
Davutoğlu’s place in recent TFP decision making is so unique that he was compared 
by many observers to Henry Kissenger.179 In essence, he had been employed until 2009 only 
as an advisor to decision makers and had not been a decision maker himself. However, his 
influence on foreign political issues had been far more than an ordinary advisor’s. He had 
performed executive-like functions on Turkey’s foreign policy and possessed influence over 
operational functions. The main reason for the impact of Davutoğlu on the formulation of 
foreign policy is the willingness of Turkish decision makers such as former Foreign Minister 
and current President Abdullah Gül and Prime Minister Erdoğan to appropriate his vision in 
the implementation of foreign policy.180 
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The main figure and decision maker of TFP has been Prime Minister (PM) Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan who has been serving as PM since 2003 and enjoys a great popularity among 
the Turkish electorate. He is charismatic, authoritarian, self confident, emotional, interested in 
foreign political issues and, as noted above, appraises the vision of Davutoğlu. Furthermore, 
he attaches a great significance to personal contact with foreign leaders and he is aware of the 
value of having good and sincere personal relations in the diplomacy field.181 Besides, he does 
not hesitate to take the initiative under certain conditions. The most striking example of this 
fact was viewed in Davos, on January 29, 2009. PM Erdoğan stormed out of a heated debate 
on the Gaza war with Israel’s President Shimon Peres at the Davos forum. During the forum, 
Peres raised his voice and jabbed his finger while he was defending Israel’s attacks. As 
Erdoğan attempted to respond to the strong words of Peres, he was cut off by the moderator. 
When he was later given a minute to reply, Erdoğan criticized Peres heavily and said “When 
it comes to killing, you know well how to kill.” Subsequently, he left the forum saying that 
Davos was over for him.182 Erdoğan complained that he had been allowed to speak for 12 
minutes compared with 25 for Peres.183 Apparently, Erdoğan’s Davos reaction was 
spontaneous and unplanned. Along with his senses, values and paradigm, his personal 
emotional character played a significant role in his behavior.184  
 
Erdoğan’s reaction might be compared to another similar case in the Turkish political 
history in order to illustrate the uniqueness of his political behavior.185 During the visit of 
former Turkish PM Necmettin Erbakan to Libya in 1996, Libyan leader Colonel Gaddafi 
stunned Erbakan undiplomatically by criticizing Turkey’s treatment of Kurds and calling for a 
Kurdish homeland. The Turkish PM, in return, responded diplomatically and underlined the 
friendship between Turkey and Libya by saying that Libya and Turkey were sister 
countries.186 He also added that there was no racism or gender discrimination in Turkey. 
However, although Gaddafi’s remarks were bothersome even for an ordinary Turkish citizen, 
PM Erbakan’s reaction to Gaddafi was rather moderate and did not meet the expectations of 
the Turkish public opinion. This event caused indignation in Turkey.187 Thus, whereas PM 
Erbakan’s reaction against Gaddafi’s remarks had a limited impact on TFP, it exerted a great 
influence on domestic politics of Turkey. In other words, if Erbakan had shown a stronger 
response, as PM Erdoğan did against Israeli President Peres, and stormed off the tent of 
Gaddafi, the effect of this incident would have been much more different on TFP. On the 
other hand, Erdoğan’s reaction in a similar situation became far sharper than Erbakan’s and 
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this gave rise to the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations. Simultaneously, the Davos event 
increased Erdoğan’s popularity seriously both in the domestic domain and in the international 
arena, particularly in the Muslim world and in the Middle East.188 
 
Turgut Özal assumed also a substantial role in foreign policy making of Turkey until 
his death in 1993. Abramowitz points out that Turgut Özal’s charismatic personality and 
leadership was the primary factor influencing the changes in TFP during 1980s and early 
1990s.189 Özal was interested in foreign political issues, sensitive to his environment, to new 
information and to the need for change. Additionally, he was willing to take the initiative on 
his own (e.g. despite the intensive domestic opposition, he realized the Davos Summit on his 
own initiative with the Greek Prime Minister Papandreou in 1988)190 and he was decisive to 
reduce the weight of bureaucracy and the military in the state management.191 Thus, in his 
tenure, he was commonly criticized for attempting directly in the field of foreign policy and 
disregarding the bureaucracy of ministry of foreign affairs.192 This fact was clearly evident 
during the Persian Gulf crisis. When the Crisis initially erupted in 1990, Turkey’s reaction 
remained within the traditional approach, i.e. it was loyal to the principles of non-interference 
and maintaining the status-quo. However, Özal saw the crisis as an opportunity for Turkey to 
show Turkey’s value to the West, particularly to the United States. Özal believed that the US-
led anti-Iraq grouping was right and Turkey had to give a boost to the Alliance. He wanted to 
be on the winning side and to benefit from the post-war situation.193 Özal was also eager to 
take foreign policy decision-making away from the military establishment. Contrary to Özal’s 
determined stance, the government, the parliament and the military seemed timid in taking the 
initiative in accordance with President Özal’s view. Consequently, with the intention of 
giving full support to the U.S.-led Alliance, Özal bypassed the government and the parliament 
by engaging in personal, secret diplomacy mostly in the form of direct telephone 
conversations with the White House.194 Then–National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft 
confirmed the impact of the personal relationship between Bush and Özal on Turkish-U.S. 
relations. He described Bush and Özal’s dialogue as having produced an “intimate, personal” 
bond “where the relationship really became…very close and in a sense less military and more 
political than it had ever been before,” while “demonstrating the indisputable strategic 
importance of Turkey to the United States.195 
 
Under Özal’s influence, Turkey rushed to cut the oil pipelines between Turkey and 
Iraq and the government’s request was approved by the parliament to send troops to the Gulf. 
Özal’s active involvement in foreign policy making process was evaluated as a sign of 
deviation from Kemalism. Many prominent politicians as well as bureaucrats were 
dissatisfied with Özal’s activism in foreign policy and this situation engendered the 
resignations both from the government and the bureaucracy. It was the Foreign Minister Ali 
Bozer who resigned first and later Defense Minister Sefa Giray followed Bozer in October 
1990. The Turkish Army was also dissatisfied with Özal’s foreign policy. Eventually, Chief 
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of the Staff Necip Torumtay criticized Özal’s foreign policy as ‘adventurist’ and implied that 
the army was against to such a foreign policy. When Torumtay realized that he could not 
persuade the civilians, he felt obliged to resign in December 1990.196 It is worthy of noting 
that such resignations from the military camp occurred rarely in Turkish history.  
 
In a nutshell, these examples illustrate how the personality of a decision maker, his 
character, his values, his point of view, his beliefs as well as his psychological features can 
shape the foreign policy of a country and change its direction substantially. By the same 
token, they also prove that the terms of Wendt’s systemic constructivist thinking and its terms 
such as international structure and international norms fall short of accounting for the change 
in TFP, and for this reason, further factors like domestic dynamics as well as leaders’ 
personalities must be taken into consideration as well. More precisely, personal and 
psychological traits of both Özal and Erdoğan as leaders have placed these leaders to a 
distinctive position in Turkish political history. Erdoğan’s emotional, charismatic and strong 
leadership as well as Özal’s charismatic and strong leadership might be regarded in this 
respect. Moreover, the importance that they attach to personal dialog and friendship in 
diplomacy, their common personal characteristics not afraid to take risk and initiative are 
further common personal qualities of Özal and Erdoğan which have had significant 
implications for TFP.  
 2.4. External Factors 
As a developing country, in Turkey’s foreign policy, external factors have always 
played an important role. In this case, Turkey’s strategically important geopolitical location, 
less developed economy, its need for foreign capital and investment, dependent structure of its 
defense industry have loomed large.197 With respect to the external factors, from the point of a 
constructivist approach, two basic structures are to be mentioned: the material structure and 
the social structure both of which are significant for Turkey’s foreign policy. In the initial 
years, Turkish policy makers viewed the international material structure (i.e. balance of power 
and power of neighboring countries such as the Great Britain and France) not convenient to 
pursue an expansionist or adventurist foreign policy and decided to pursue a realist, passive 
foreign policy. Otherwise, Turkey’s political existence could have been jeopardized. 
Additionally, Turkey’s domestic structure was also inducing Turkey’s passive stance in 
foreign political issues. Mustafa Kemal had established a new nation state and the substantial 
reforms that Turkey underwent required a peaceful international environment. In the first 
decades of the Republic, these domestic as well as international structures were the prominent 
factors for Turkish policy makers to adopt the motto of “peace at home, peace in the world.”  
 
Furthermore, in terms of international social structure, Turkey was trying to be a 
member of new international community and to get its independence and sovereignty 
recognized by other actors. Thus, it preferred to act respectfully to international norms such as 
sovereignty and non-interference to the domestic issues of other countries. It abstained from 
revisionist movements and aimed to be a respected member of international society. Stated 
differently, the external social and material structure as well as the domestic structure of 
Turkey played a determining role on the foreign policy of the young Turkish republic. 
 
In the course of the Cold War, Turkey defined its security identity collectively with 
NATO, and this definition was decisive for the direction of TFP. In the wake of the Second 
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World War, the Soviet threat was the crucial element directing Turkey’s foreign policy. The 
Soviet Union emerged as a super power after the WWII, and its material power as well as its 
attitude towards Turkey was threatening. The attitude of the Soviets, along with other factors 
such as Turkey’s economic needs and its westernist state ideology, resulted in Turkey’s strict 
pro-western foreign policy. During the Cold War, Turkey was a "wing country" under NATO's 
strategic framework and it conducted its foreign policy in a westward-looking manner,198 
except for a few occasions, such as the Cyprus crisis and the following Cyprus Peace 
Operation.  
 
Accompanied by the end of Cold War, radical changes took place in the international 
structure and Turkey was obliged to reassess its regional role as well as its relations with the 
power centers of the world. In the post-Cold War period, the existing material power began to 
be perceived at the ideational level differently. In this respect, when the Soviet threat 
disappeared, a more suitable environment has emerged for the rulers of Turkey for the 
implementation of their interests. However, a unipolar world system was dominant in the 
wake of the Cold War. Therefore, Özal leadership realized that it was beyond the power of a 
country on the scale of a regional power like Turkey to materialize its ambitious foreign 
policy goals only with its own power. Stated differently, the post-Cold war system and its 
ideational perception by the Özal leadership was a serious reality which could not be ignored 
while defining foreign policy interests.  
 
Moreover, once the communism threat suddenly lost its meaning for the West, the 
collective identifications of the Cold War weakened, and statesmen as well as the intellectual 
circles in Turkey entered into a faltering period considering Turkey's new position in the new 
world. In this period, Özal leadership assumed a set of initiatives in order to demonstrate 
Turkey's value for the west. Additionally, emergence of the new countries in the Caucasus 
region and in the Central Asia which share common linguistic, cultural and historical ties with 
Turkey opened up new horizons for TFP.199 Özal’s concept of ‘From Adriatic to the Chinese 
Wall’ reveals the foreign political approach of Turkey during the post-Cold War period. 
However, the foreign policy goals of the Özal leadership towards the Central Asia, Balkans 
and the Middle East were only consolidating the need for the support of the sole super power 
of the world.  
 
Coming to 2000s, despite the fact that the United States sustained its super power 
position also in the Erdoğan era, the unipolar structure of the world has not been as clear as in 
the Özal era. Big actors such as the European Union, Russia and China have increased their 
power and a judgment began to be prevailing in the world that a transition from a unipolar 
world towards a multipolar one has been occurring. Additionally, the norm legitimizing the 
military intervention into another country like in 1990 has begun to be eroded. As a matter of 
fact, while Washington did not have difficulty in constituting a coalition against Iraq in 1990 
and gained the support of the majority of world public opinion as well as the backup of the 
global actors for the military operation, it was not able to form a consensus in the UN Security 
Council in 2003 due to the French, German, Chinese and Russian opposition.   
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On the other hand, the European Union and the United States have nearly always had a 
certain influence on TFP both in Özal and Erdoğan eras.200 While the US influence has 
increased on Turkey whenever it distanced itself from democracy, it has been replaced by the 
EU when the EU membership process of Turkey has gained seriousness. While the US had 
been more influential on TFP as of early 1980s until early 2000s, its role began to erode as a 
result of the declaration of the EU membership candidacy status of Turkey in 1999. As a 
result of Turkey's candidacy, the EU oriented norms began to play a more determinant role on 
Turkish foreign policy makers especially until 2007.201 Moreover, the Erdoğan leadership 
underwent its transnational socialization process under the influence of the EU norms and this 
case has consolidated the influence of the EU and its norms on the Turkish policy makers 
particularly in the initial years of the AK Party governments. The most important example on 
this issue is the March 1 motion event of 2003.202  
 
This case was an outcome of a set of factors. Firstly, the EU membership perspective 
and the following EU reforms contributed greatly to the democratization of Turkey and 
thereby while the weight of the military in both domestic and foreign political issues has been 
curtailed, political and societal actors have been empowered. Consequently, these political 
and societal actors (e.g. political parties, public opinion, NGOs and civil society) have greatly 
extended the space for political action in domestic as well as in foreign politics.203 Secondly, 
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in contrast to 1990s, when Ankara followed a conflict oriented foreign policy, the use of 
military instruments was prevailing and arguably, the main axis of TFP was the Turkey-US-
Israel triangle. However, as of 1999, the EU and its norms have become the principal 
reference point of Ankara’s foreign policy204 and the use of diplomatic and economic 
instruments in TFP making has increased.  
 
 In short, there have always been external factors influencing TFP to certain degrees. 
However, the meaning attached to the external factors by policy makers might be different. 
For instance, while some viewed the post-Cold War world structure posing security risks to 
Turkey, Özal leadership regarded it as a great opportunity to realize its aspirations. In this 
respect, it followed an active policy and sought to use Turkey's alternatives pragmatically. 
However, the perception of a unipolar world right after the dissolution of the Cold War blocks 
forced it to seek the American backup more ambitiously. However, in the 2000s, the 
perceptions about a unipolar world began to be eroded. Furthermore, the Erdoğan leadership 
shared also this perception about the rising multi-polar structure of the world. This perception 
resulted in the new route of Turkish foreign policy which brought about the fluctuating 
Turkish-American relations. Consequently, although both leaderships share the same vision to 
make Turkey a global player and share similar identity definitions, they have had relatively 
different approaches with respect to the meaning they have attached to Turkey-U.S. relations. 
This case emanates basically from the political structure of the world as well as the ideas that 
the policy makers have had about it.      
  
2.5. Concluding Remarks 
Wendt's theory suggests that every state has some characteristics associated with its 
corporate identity such as geography and population which exist prior to the interaction with 
other states. At the ideational level, Özal and Erdoğan leaderships have added in accordance 
with their identity definitions new meanings to two important determinants of TFP, the 
geography and history which are simultaneously significant elements of Turkey's corporate 
identity. In this context, while the history and geography had largely been interpreted 
negatively and regarded as burden and risk factor on Turkey, the Özal and Erdoğan 
leaderships re-interpreted them positively and considered them as the basic reasons of their 
active and multi-dimensional foreign policy understandings. 
 
On the other hand, Özal and Erdoğan leaderships re-interpreted and even totally 
changed some elements of the traditional foreign policy ideology of Turkey. In this respect for 
instance both leaderships' foreign policy paradigm has not regarded non-interventionism as an 
option for Turkey on the ground that a big country like Turkey with its deep historical and 
cultural ties has carried responsibilities. Moreover, its importance in the eyes of the west 
would be in parallel with its efficiency in the east and in its region. Thus, it should not be 
expected it to remain indifferent in the face of the events in its neighborhood and in the 
surrounding regions. They have also re-interpreted further elements of Kemalism like 
westernization and secularism in line with their identity perceptions. Enjoying a serious self-
confidence rooted in the brilliant days of the Turkish history, both leaderships have sought to 
strengthen Turkey's relations with the east while sustaining the existing strong relationship 
with the west.  In other words, with their self confident attitude, instead of turning their back 
to the east and westernizing the country at the expense of the relations with the eastern 
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countries, they have aimed to develop a multi-dimensional foreign policy model. Özal and 
Erdoğan leaderships have also not interpreted secularism as strictly as the Kemalists did. They 
have recognized Turkey's Muslim identity in foreign policy making and have not hesitated to 
actively participate into organizations like the OIC actively. 
 
In essence, identities of Özal and Erdoğan leaderships have been initially constructed 
by the domestic political factors and they have simultaneously contributed to the re-
construction of the internal norms. In the struggle against the undemocratic practices imposed 
on the Muslim-conservative Turkish people, Özal and Erdoğan leaderships have regarded 
democracy and human rights as liberator. Moreover, the military and bureaucratic tutelary 
regimes have played significant roles in the construction process of democratic identities of 
both leaderships. On the other hand, both leaderships have made contributions to the 
development and consolidation of the norms refusing the tutelary regimes and advocating the 
supremacy of people's will. Even though Özal's success against the military tutelage lost its 
impact due to the chaotic political structure of 1990s and left space for the military to 
intervene into politics, Erdoğan leadership has achieved a considerable success in the 2000s in 
his struggle against the tutelary regime with the backing of the European Union. Thereby, he 
has made a serious contribution to the construction of norms to prevent the generals from 
interfering into political processes. This case has had important impact on both the foreign 
policy making processes and on the efficacy of the actors in these processes.  
 
In parallel with the policy of integration into the world introduced during the Özal era, 
the highly educated Islamic-conservative circles have begun in the new millennium to 
demand more saying in the political processes. With the effect of the democratization in the 
country, they have had a considerable impact on TFP along with other NGOs. Whilst this 
impact has been sometimes in the form of providing intellectual backup for the foreign policy 
of the government, it has turned other times into criticizing it. This impact has become now 
and then so direct, as it was seen in the Mavi Marmara event of 2010. Furthermore, whereas 
the Özal leadership closely sensed the lack of civil society support particularly in finding 
intellectual backup for his foreign policy vision, the Erdoğan administration was luckier in 
this respect. Furthermore, the effect of the public opinion on TFP which had been relatively 
limited in the first half of the Özal era increased in parallel with the democratization, 
development as well as dissemination of mass media. Thereby, the public opinion has become 
a more significant factor on foreign political issues and has played a more active role in 
shaping Turkish identity and foreign policy. 
 
Özal and Erdoğan leaderships have also regarded the economic development of the 
country as a catalyst for their aspirations to make Turkey a global player, like in the Ottoman 
era. Thus, just like in the Özal period, Turkey’s increasing foreign trade volume and foreign 
economic ties occupied a considerable place in the TFP agenda throughout the Erdoğan era as 
well. Above all, this attracts attention as one of the most important commonalities in the Özal 
and Erdoğan eras.  
 
At this point, one has to note a further factor influencing TFP to a considerable extent 
which is disregarded by the constructivists considering especially Özal and Erdoğan periods. 
As it was elaborated above, personal and psychological traits of both Özal and Erdoğan as 
leaders have placed them to distinctive positions in Turkish political history. Erdoğan’s 
emotional, charismatic and strong leadership as well as Özal’s charismatic and strong 
leadership might be regarded in this respect. Moreover, the importance that they attach to 
personal dialog and friendship in diplomacy, their common personal characteristics not afraid 
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to take risk and initiative are further common personality traits of Özal and Erdoğan which 
have had significant implications for the TFP.  
 
All in all, analyzing the determining factors of TFP, one might come to the conclusion 
that the above mentioned determinants have affected TFP in various dimensions and 
measures. Yet the bottom line here is that the influence of these factors is also closely related 
to the lenses of the foreign policy makers. At this point, as the main point of reference of the 
lenses, identity is of crucial importance to interpret the determinants of FP and their reflection 
to the foreign policy field. For example, different political leaders in Turkey have interpreted 
Turkey's geopolitical location differently and this has had reflections on their policy principles 
and practices.  
CHAPTER 3: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN 
POLICY APPROACHES OF ÖZAL AND ERDOĞAN 
LEADERSHİPS  
 
This chapter consists of two parts. In the first part, the foreign policy approach of the 
Özal era will be discussed in general terms. Subsequently, AK Party foreign policy 
understanding will be theoretically analyzed with the analysis framework built in the first 
part. As noted before, it is hypothesized that even though these two periods differ from the 
traditional Turkish foreign policy (TFP) line, they present considerable analogies and in this 
respect, AK Party foreign policy represents in a sense an extension of the Özal's foreign 
policy approach. It is further hypothesized that identity-based explanations of foreign policy 
offer a good analysis framework to comprehend and explain foreign policy periods in 
question. Thus, after summarizing the foreign policy paradigms of both terms, in the next 
chapter, I will focus on how the theory has been reflected to the policy field. In other words, 
in order to verify my theses empirically, I will analyze Turkish-U.S. relations during both 
Özal and Erdoğan eras. I will then seek to explain the differences by means of a constructivist 
approach.  
 
3.1. Turkish Foreign Policy during the Özal Era: A Paradigm-shift?  
 3.1.1. Introduction 
 
Turgut Özal, the architect of the transition to a liberal economic order in the early 
1980s, was, first as a Prime Minister and subsequently as a President the most influential and 
decisive person of Turkish politics throughout 1980s and early 1990s. As of mid-1980s, until 
his death in 1993, Turkey's agenda, particularly in the field of economy and politics, was set 
primarily by Özal, and his policy choices and suggestions were of central importance in the 
country. During the Özal era, Turkey witnessed transformation in many spheres.1 There is no 
doubt that Turgut Özal left his mark on Turkish politics in many respects, and among others, 
on foreign policy as well. His political identity was rather different than his predecessors 
which led to a distinctive foreign policy line.  
 
It might be argued that foundations of today’s economically and politically dynamic 
Turkey were laid to a large extent in the Özal era. For example, Turkey’s export oriented 
economic model was first advocated and implemented in his period. He took significant steps 
in terms of democratization and freedoms, and became virtually the first statesman who 
reevaluated Turkey’s historical and cultural legacy in accordance with Turkey's interests and 
sought considerably to make use of them. In fact, in view of foreign policy principles and 
applications of Özal, several authors conclude that the Justice and Development Party (Adalet 
ve Kalkınma Partisi, hereinafter, the AK Party) foreign policy line represents a continuity 
with Turkey’s gradually developing activism in the era of former PM and President Turgut 
Özal.2  
                                               
1 İhsan Dağı and İhsan Sezal (eds), Kim Bu Özal, Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet (Who is this Özal, Politics, Economy, 
Mentality), (İstanbul, Boyut Kitapları, 2. Baskı 2003), 7 
2 Bülent Aras, “Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy,” Foundation for Political, Economic and Social 
Research (SETA), Brief No: 32, (May 2009): 6. Gülistan Gürbey, “Wandel in der Türkischen Aussenpolitik 
unter der AKP-Regierung?, Südosteuropa Mitteilungen, (02/2010). My interview with Muhittin Ataman, March 
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Before starting to discuss this argument, it would be useful to analyze the roots of 
Özal’s identity, the socialization processes that he went through and subsequently his foreign 
policy approach. This is important, because in developing countries such as Turkey, 
ideologies, ideals and perceptions of state elites who control the decision mechanisms have a 
serious impact on domestic and foreign policies of countries. Rulers define the interests of the 
country and, by implication, the policies to be followed in conformity with their respective 
perceptions. In this context, it is highly relevant to know Özal’s personality and 
weltanschauung so as to grasp the foreign policy of his era.3 
 3.1.2. Özal’s Personality: Muslim-conservative, devout Muslim, nationalist, 
democrat, liberal and westernist 
 
Along with others, Özal’s identity played a crucial role in his policy choices. In his 
identity, two key features were striking which were constructed through long socialization 
processes. First, Özal became a religious conservative person as a result of his societal 
socialization process. He was coming from an Anatolian, devout family and he acquired his 
basic religious sensitiveness in his family. His father was educated in an Ottoman madrasah 
for sixteen years, mastered both Arabic and Farsi languages and was carrying the qualities of 
a Muslim cleric. His mother, on the other hand, was a teacher with a good religious 
knowledge and ambitious to raise her children as faithful and believing Muslims.4 Özal 
carried always religious identity in his life and did not feel the need to hide it.5 For example, it 
was known that he was connected with the Nakshibandi order of dervishes. He made his first 
attempt to enter into politics in the Islamist NSP (National Salvation Party).6  Özal did not 
                                                                                                                                                   
2011, Ahmet Sözen, “A Paradigm Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy: Transition and Challenges,” Turkish Studies, 
11:1, (2010):103-123. A.Evin, K.Kirişçi, R.Linden, T.Straubhaar, N.Tocci, J. Tolay, J.Walker, “Getting to Zero, 
Turkey, Its Neighbors and the West,” Transatlantic Academy, (2010): 25 accessed 04.02.2011, 
http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/publications/getting-zero-turkey-its-neighbors-and-west. Ziya Öniş, 
“Multiple Faces of the “New” Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique,” Insight Turkey 
Vol. 13, No.1, (2001):.49, 58. Former PM Yıldırım Akbulut who was successor to Özal in the Motherland Party 
and was in office during the presidency of Özal, between 1989 and 1991 concludes as to the policies of PM 
Erdoğan that “He is following the policies of the Motherland Party. He wants to advance these policies and he 
does.” “Eski başbakandan ‘Nereden nereye’ dedirten açıklamalar,” zaman.com.tr, 05.02.2011, accessed 
07.02.2011, 
http://www.zaman.com.tr/multimedya.do?tur=video&aktifgaleri=9598&aktifsayfa=0&bolumno=4&aktifsayfaD
etay=0&galeriDetayNo=9598&title=genelkurmay-basbakana-bagli-oldugunu-ogrendi. Soli Özel, Şuhnaz 
Yılmaz, Abdullah Akyüz, “Rebuilding a Partnership: Turkish-American Relations for a New Era, A Turkish 
Perspective,” Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association, TÜSİAD Publication No-T/2009-04/490,  
(April 2009): 47. Şaban Kardaş, “Turkish-American Relations in the 2000s: Revisiting the Basic Parameters of 
Partnership?” Perceptions, Volume XVI, Number 3, (Autumn 2011): 34-35. Bülent Aras and Pınar Akpınar, 
Türk Dış Politikasında Davutoğlu Dönemi: 2009 Değerlendirmesi, in Türk Dış Politikası Yıllığı 2009, 
Burhanettin Duran, et al., (Ankara: SETA Yayınları XIII, Mart 2011), 27. 
3 Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, “Dış Politika Kararlarını Belirlemede Psikolojik Etkenler ve Türkiye” (Psychological 
Factors in Foreign Policy Decision Making and Turkey), in Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi (Analysis of Turkish 
Foreign Policy), ed. Faruk Sönmezoğlu, (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1998), 535-542. For the influence of 
psychological factors on foreign policy, see also Şenay Yıldız’s interview with Robi Friedman, chairman of the 
International Group Psychotherapy Union, Akşam, 27.09.2011, accessed 01.10.2011, 
http://www.aksam.com.tr/israille-kriz-kisisel-incinmeyle-basladi--69664h.html  
4 Korkut Özal, Devlet Sırrı (State Secret), (İstanbul: Yakın Plan Yayınları, Ekim 2010), 13-15. 
5 Muhittin Ataman, “Özal ve İslam Dünyası: İnanç ve Pragmatizm” (Özal and the Islamic World: Belief and 
Pragmatism), in Kim Bu Özal, Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet (Who is this Özal, Politics, Economy, Mentality, eds. 
İhsan Dağı and İhsan Sezal, (Istanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 2. Baskı 2003), 357. 
6 Sedat Laçiner, Turgut Özal Period in Turkish Foreign Policy: Özalism,” the Journal of Turkish Weekly, 
09.03.2009, accessed 01.10.2011, http://www.turkishweekly.net/print.asp?type=2&id=333   
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give up performing his ritual prayers even when he became President. When he was PM, he 
visited Mecca with the intention of making a pilgrimage, one of the five pillars of Islam.7  He 
usually used to quote in his addresses from Islamic resources, namely from Quran and 
Hadith.8 Given his religious identity, one should not be surprised that he was the first Turkish 
Prime Minister who laid emphasis on Islam as a part of Turkish national identity.9 In his 
political career, Özal’s decisions and policies were always under the influence of history, 
religion and his personal social adventure.10 
 
On the other hand, Özal had internalized western values, such as democracy and 
liberalism, and he had acquired these values mainly, from a constructivist point of view, 
through societal socialization and transnational socialization processes. In terms of societal 
socialization, he had worked both in private and public sectors and witnessed several military 
putsches. Until Özal took his place in the political scene in 1980s, the country had 
experienced serious political and economic problems which led to recurrent military 
interventions into politics. These military interventions incurred Turkish people’s displeasure 
and along with others; Özal was also pushed to demand more democracy with higher 
standards. From a transnational socialization perspective, two experiences were crucial, 
namely his study in the U.S. and his employment in the World Bank as advisor.  With respect 
to the former experience, as Laçiner points it out,  
 
“having graduated from Istanbul Technical University in 1950 as an electrical  engineer, Özal 
studied in the United States, and during these years became an admirer  of the United States. In his 
view, the United States owed its success to its liberalism.  Özal further argued that the United 
States and the Ottoman Empire were similar  political structures: Both allowed different cultures 
and gave people freedom to  exercise their religion, nationality and economic preferences. From 
this perspective,  Turkey had to desert its authoritarian official understanding, namely the 
Kemalist state  ideology.”11 
 
 As regards the latter experience, Turgut Özal was adviser to the World Bank on 
special projects between 1971 and 1973 and enjoyed an opportunity to make observations 
from an international perspective and developed very good relations with the IMF, the World 
Bank and the US administration.12 At this point, one ought to take into account that in the 
socialization processes of Özal, the transnational socialization was more in the fore front and 
international norms occupied a wider space in his identity. Consequently, his socialization 
processes both at societal and transnational levels resulted in his internalization of modern 
values such as democracy, liberal economy, freedom of thought, freedom of religion and 
conscious in a universal sense and freedom of enterprise. Along with traditional and religious 
values, Özal made all these modern values integral part of his identity.   
                                               
7 For instance, Özal’s Picture was published in an internet news site, Haber7.com, when he was performing his 
ritual pray as Imam in 1988 in Medina. This Picture of Ozal as an Imam is most probably the first picture of a 
Prime Minister in Turkish Republic’s political history. “İşte Turgut Özal’ın ‘imamlık’ yaptığı o an!” (Here is the 
moment of Turgut Ozal as Imam), Haber7.com, 14.01.2013, accessed 16.01.2013, http://www.haber7.com/ic-
politika/haber/976897-iste-turgut-ozalin-imamlik-yaptigi-o-an  
8 Ataman, "Özal ve İslam Dünyası: İnanç ve Pragmatizm," 356. 
9 Berdal Aral, “Özal Döneminde İç ve Dış Siyaset: Süreklilik ya da Kopuş” (Domestic and Foreign Policy in 
Özal Era: Continuity or Rupture in Kim Bu Özal, Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet (Who is this Özal, Politics, Economy, 
Mentality, eds. İhsan Dağı and İhsan Sezal, (Istanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 2. Baskı 2003), 244. 
10 Şaban Çalış, “Hayaletbilimi ve Hayali Kimlikler: Özal, Balkanlar ve Neo-Osmanlıcılık!” in Kim Bu Özal, 
Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet (Who is this Özal, Politics, Economy, Mentality, eds. İhsan Dağı and İhsan Sezal, 
(Istanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 2. Baskı 2003), 394. 
11 Laçiner, "Turgut Özal Period in Turkish Foreign Policy: Özalism" 
12 Ibid. 
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Thus, as Gözen accurately notes, Özal’s life philosophy put forward a “mixed” 
identity. This “mixed identity” was composed of both Western philosophy and Islamic 
philosophy, and Özal’s political life was full of with behaviors in accordance with this 
identity.13 In fact, it was one of Özal’s characters to reconcile contradictory elements and to 
establish a harmonious relationship between them.14 In this framework, he was eager to 
reconcile the western values and Islamic values with a pragmatic approach.15 Paradoxically, 
he was, for instance, neither an absolute Islamist nor a secularist, but accepted both of them; 
he was neither an absolute traditionalist nor a modernist, but internalized both of them; he was 
neither the admirer of exclusively Quran nor computer/technology, but carried in one hand the 
Quran and in the other a computer.16 In substance, he was a religious conservative, nationalist, 
liberal and democrat politician,17 and these personal features reflected also on his political 
apprehension and political life.18 Here, one should mention his efforts to find a middle way 
between Islamism and Turkish nationalism, his goal of formulating a religious understanding 
suitable for democracy, liberalism and capitalism. His conclusion was a Turkish-Islamic 
Synthesis which represented an official re-evaluation of Islam as part of Turkish identity with 
the aim of promoting national solidarity and integration.19  
 
It should be lastly noted that along with his other personal aforementioned features, he 
had a brilliant and ambitious character with an ability to adjust the changes, and he was a 
strong leader who was not hesitating to take initiatives.20 For instance, as it was seen in the 
neo-Ottomanism discussions, he was successful to bring several issues to the public agenda 
which were widely regarded as taboo in the Turkish society.21 In fact, by taking personal 
initiatives, Özal sometimes tended to exclude other organs of foreign policy making. This 
personal character of him peaked especially during his presidency. In addition to bureaucracy, 
Özal by-passed in some cases, particularly in the course of the Gulf War, even the 
government from policy-making processes, whereupon two foreign ministers resigned. While 
he enjoyed being ‘one man’ in the foreign policy realm during the Motherland Party (MP) 
government, which was established and headed by Özal and remained until 1991 under the 
strong influence of him, Özal did not hesitate to conflict with the True Path Party (TPP) 
government on foreign political issues as well. The Bosnia meeting organized by Özal 
without government’s involvement sets an important example in this regard.22 As a result, it 
                                               
13 Ramazan Gözen, “Turgut Özal ve Körfez Savaşı: İdealler ve Gerçekler Açmazında Dış politika” (Turgut Özal 
and the Gulf War: Foreign Policy in the Dilemmas of Ideals and Realities), in Kim Bu Özal, Siyaset, İktisat, 
Zihniyet (Who is this Özal, Politics, Economy, Mentality, eds. İhsan Dağı and İhsan Sezal, (Istanbul: Boyut 
Kitapları, 2. Baskı 2003), 312. 
14 Aral, "Özal Döneminde İç ve Dış Siyaset: Süreklilik ya da Kopuş," 223. 
15 Ibid., 228 
16 Gözen, "Turgut Özal ve Körfez Savaşı," 312-313. 
17 Laçiner, "Turgut Özal Period in Turkish Foreign Policy: Özalism" 
18 Gözen, "Turgut Özal ve Körfez Savaşı," 313. 
19 Laçiner, "Turgut Özal Period in Turkish Foreign Policy: Özalism,"10-11 
20 Aral, "Özal Döneminde İç ve Dış Siyaset: Süreklilik ya da Kopuş," 242-243. 
21 Çalış, “Hayaletbilimi ve Hayali Kimlikler,” 396. Cengiz Çandar, “20. Yüzyı’lın ‘put kırıcısı’; 21.Yüzyıl’ın 
‘özgür bireyi,’” Hürriyet, 18.04.2008, accessed 11.07.2011, 
http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=8729602  
22 Gencer Özcan, “Türkiye’de Siyasal Rejim ve Dış Politika: 1983-1993” (Political Regime and Foreign Policy 
in Turkey:1983-1993), in Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi (Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy), ed. Faruk 
Sönmezoğlu, (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1998), 528-533. 
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might be claimed that Özal’s personality and leadership was a significant determining factor 
of TFP from early 1980s until his death in 1993.23  
 3.1.3. Foreign policy paradigm of the Özal era 
  3.1.3.1. Intellectual roots of Özal’s foreign policy approach 
 
With an overriding economist point of view, Özal’s approach to foreign policy was 
also economy-centered.24 Özal’s ultimate goal was to make Turkey one of the developed 10-
15 countries of the world. To this end, he espoused democracy and liberal economic system as 
crucial and highlighted three freedoms as vital to reach this goal, namely freedom of thought, 
freedom of religion and conscious in a universal sense and freedom of enterprise.25 Turkey’s 
geography, population, opportunities offered by international conjuncture as well as its newly 
liberalized economic structure was all regarded as means to achieve this goal.26 In other 
words, Turgut Özal, who played a primary role in the opening of Turkish economy to the 
world, aimed pragmatically at utilizing Turkey’s historical, cultural and geopolitical assets, 
and intended to pave the way for Turkey’s economic development as well as to augment 
Turkey’s political weight and efficiency in its region.27 In essence, this approach signaled a 
paradigm shift in Turkey’s traditional status-quo-oriented, passivist and reactionary foreign 
policy and no doubt, in this new foreign political approach of him, his aforementioned 
identity, who denied neither the Western nor Eastern values but adopted both of them, played 
a determining role. 
 
Özal’s foreign policy understanding was based on his determination “to depart from 
established policies, to take calculated risks, and to search for new alternatives and options.”28 
When he was in office, Turkey followed a diversified, active, daring and outward-oriented 
foreign policy and was very willing to improve multilateral cooperation in its region.29 In the 
face of Kemalist policy line which rejected Turkey’s Ottoman legacy and embraced a firmly 
nationalist and westernist concept, Özal developed his own concept, some refer to as neo-
Ottomanism,30 and directed TFP in accordance with it.31 Özal regarded Turkey’s historical, 
                                               
23 Muhittin Ataman, “Özalist Dış Politika: Aktif ve Rasyonel Bir Anlayış” (Özalist Foreign Policy: An Active 
and Rational Understanding), Bilgi, Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, No:7,  (2003/2): 50. For a detailed analysis of ‘Özal 
factor’ regarding Turkish foreign policy during the Gulf War, see also Ramazan Gözen, “Türkiye’nin II. Körfez 
Savaşı Politikası: Aktif Politika ve Sonuçları” (Turkey’s II. Golf War Policy: Active Policy and its results), in 
21.Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikası (Turkish Foreign Policy in the 21.Century), ed. İdris Bal, (Ankara: Lalezar 
Kitabevi, 2006), 753-776. 
24 Sabri Sayari, "Turkey: The Changing European Security Environment and the Gulf Crisis," Middle East 
Journal, v. 46, n. 1, (Winter 1992), 18. For example, for Özal, Turkey’s export-import capacity was far more 
important than military capacity. Hasan Cemal, Özal Hikayesi (Özal Story), (Ankara: Bilgi, 1990), 294. 
25 Turgut Özal’s speech at the 3. İzmir Economic Congress held in 4-7.6.1992, in Korkut Özal, Devlet Sırrı, 234-
236 
26 Ibid., 231. 
27 Hasan Mor, "Türk dış politikasında belirleyici faktörler ekseninde Özal`ın dış politika konsepti" [Özal`s 
foreign policy concept on the axis of determinants in Turkish foreign policy], (PhD diss., Selçuk Üniversitesi, 
Konya 2002), 203. 
28 Sayari, Turkey: The Changing European Security Environment,"18. Mehmet Barlas, Turgut Özal’ın Anıları 
(Turgut Özal’s Memories), (İstanbul, Birey Yayıncılık, 4.Baskı, 2001), 128-130.  
29 Muhittin Ataman, “Leadership Change: Özal Leadership and Restructuring in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 
Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Volume 1, Number1, (Spring 2002), 120-153, accessed 
11.12.2012, http://www.alternativesjournal.net/volume1/number1/ataman.htm  
30 Mehmet Gönlübol et al., “Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası,” 1919-1995 (Turkish Foreign Policy with Events, 
1919-1995), (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1996), 650-653. Hakan M. Yavuz, ‘Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy 
in Flux: The Rise of Neo-Ottomanism’, Critique, (Spring 1998): 19-41. Originally, founders of the Republic of 
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cultural and geographical assets not as a burden but as assets presenting opportunities, 
particularly in economic terms. Geographically, he viewed Turkey as a country in the midst of 
Pacific-Atlantic axis and equidistant between both the Atlantic and Pacific basins.32 
Furthermore, according to Özal, Turkey was located at the centre of East-West and North-
South axes, and with this pivotal position, it should have been an active and decisive actor, 
not a passive one.33 In this respect, unlike his predecessors, Özal tried to capitalize on 
Turkey’s historical and cultural “depth” in favor of Turkey’s interests. For instance, by 
making use of Ottoman identity, he wanted to open to the Middle East and the Balkans, and 
by employing Turkish identity, he wanted to open to the Central Asia.34 
 
Having defined Turkey as a “bridge country”, Özal argued that with its historical and 
cultural responsibilities, Turkey was supposed to establish relations with the Western as well 
as with the Eastern Worlds simultaneously.35 Essentially, his foreign policy perspective was 
based on the rejection of the assumption that there would be an indispensible hostility 
between the East and the West.36 As a result, in compliance with the “bridge” definition, Özal 
prescribed a “balanced relationship” between the East and the West.37 With Özal’s words:  
 
“A bridge stands between two places… So, in order to be a bridge, you need to have good 
association with both sides. That is, Turkey must be an indispensible country for both the 
West and the East. And this would be exclusively possible with the application of a dynamic, 
active and honest foreign policy. A policy with well-defined targets which does not change its 
direction at any moment and does not zigzag… ”38 (T.b.A) 
 
 In this context; by contrast to the strict pro-Western foreign policy of Kemalist elites, 
Özal’s concept stipulated an active and dynamic policy in Turkey’s region and, along with 
strong association with the West, developing relations with the eastern world, especially with 
the Middle Eastern and Central Asian countries.39 However, Özal did not view the advancing 
association with the East as an alternative to the West, but complementary to it. According to 
Özal, Turkey’s weight in the West was a positive function of its weight in the East.40  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
Turkey had rejected Ottoman legacy and traditional Kemalist policy line consciously abstained from seeing 
Ottomans as a reference point. Towards the end of 1980s, Ottomans returned to Turkey’s and Özal’s agenda in 
the face of discussions on two distinctive subjects. The former discussion related to a national identity crisis and 
forms of social belonging which had emerged as a result of “Kurdish question”. In order to ensure the social 
consensus, Özal and some other Turkish intellectuals suggested Ottomans as a point of reference. The latter 
discussion stemmed from the oppression and assimilation problem against the Turks in Bulgaria. But the real 
return of Ottomans to Turkey’s agenda in the form of “neo-Ottomanism” occurred in the wake of developments 
such as the dissolution of Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia. Çalış, “Hayaletbilimi ve Hayali Kimlikler,” 395-
397, 400. 
31 Ataman, "Özalist Dış Politika: Aktif ve Rasyonel Bir Anlayış," 50. 
32 Gülistan Gürbey, “Özal’ın Dış Politika Anlayışı” (Özal’s Foreign Policy Understanding), in Kim Bu Özal, 
Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet (Who is this Özal, Politics, Economy, Mentality, eds. İhsan Dağı and İhsan Sezal, 
(Istanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 2. Baskı 2003), 291. 
33 Gözen, "Turgut Özal ve Körfez Savaşı," 314. 
34 Gürbey, "Özal’ın Dış Politika Anlayışı," 291-292. 
35 Mor, "Özal`ın dış politika konsepti,"187. 
36 Berdal Aral, “Dispensing with tradition? Turkish Politics and International Society during the Özal Decade, 
1983-93,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.37, No.1, (Jan.2001): 75 
37 Mor, "Özal`ın dış politika konsepti," 182, 180-188. 
38 Barlas, Turgut Özal’ın Anıları, 128. 
39 Gürbey, "Özal’ın Dış Politika Anlayışı," 300 
40 Mor, "Özal`ın dış politika konsepti," 182. 
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In view of Turkey’s traditional uni-dimensional (i.e. strictly westward-looking) 
foreign policy, Özal’s multi-dimensional approach to foreign policy was novel. He declared 
this new policy paradigm in the governmental program in 1983 as follows:  
 
“We regard our existing ties with the Western World and close association with the 
 Middle East and Islamic World as complementary elements of our foreign policy. 
 Turkey’s geographical location forming a natural bridge between the East and the  West 
 on the one hand and its common historical and cultural legacy on the other,  require 
 Turkey to attach importance to the Islamic World.” 41 (T.b.A.) 
 
Furthermore, after the end of Cold War, Özal strongly advocated that Turkey’s 
position must have been reevaluated in the post-Cold War conjuncture, and Turkey’s 
conventional passive and prudent foreign policy approach must have been replaced by an 
active one, that is a non-reactive but initiative-taking foreign policy.42 By seizing every 
opportunity, Turkey should have exerted influence upon a vast region stretching from Balkans 
to the Central Asia and increased its political weight as the strongest power of its region.  At 
the same time, this was its intrinsic right as heir to a civilization which made its mark on the 
longest peaceful term of this region which still witness bloody struggles from place to place. 
In the context of its historical mission, should Turkey not be able to achieve again to be a 
powerful actor and obtain a privileged place in international politics, it would have been faced 
with the danger of partition.43  
 
Consequently, Özal argued that pursuing an active and dynamic foreign policy was 
inevitable, and in addition to the existing alliances with the West, relations with other 
countries in the region must have been developed on the basis of interdependence.44 Having 
touched on the foreign policy approach of Özal in general terms, in the following pages, I will 
concentrate more systematically on the foreign policy principles followed during his tenure in 
office, namely, economy-centered foreign policy, multidimensionality and developing 
alternatives, proactive foreign policy and balance between democracy and security in terms of 
internal politics. 
 
  3.1.3.2. Foreign policy principles of the Özal era 
   3.1.3.2.1 Economy-centered foreign policy 
 
 As noted earlier, Özal perceived foreign policy through the lenses of economy. 
Turkey’s economic situation played certainly a great role in that, however, his economist 
                                               
41 Ibid., 184. Whereas several academicians regarded economic pragmatism as the main driving force behind 
Özal’s interest in the Islamic world, Ataman underlines his religious identity, in addition to economic 
pragmatism. Accordingly, Özal’s pragmatism reconciled Islamic cultural tendency and the needs of economy. 
Consequently, Özal wanted to establish close relations with the Islamic world due to economic, historical, 
cultural and religious reasons. Ataman, "Özal ve İslam Dünyası: İnanç ve Pragmatizm," 361, 378. See also İhsan 
Dağı, “Özal’lı Yıllarda Türk Siyaseti: İnsan Hakları, Demokrasi ve Avrupa Birliği” (Turkish Politics in Özal 
Years: Human Rights, Democracy and the European Union), in Kim Bu Özal, Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet (Who is 
this Özal, Politics, Economy, Mentality, eds. İhsan Dağı and İhsan Sezal, (Istanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 2. Baskı 
2003), 76. 
42 Aral, "Özal Döneminde İç ve Dış Siyaset: Süreklilik ya da Kopuş," 231. Gürbey, "Özal’ın Dış Politika 
Anlayışı," 294. Ataman, "Özal ve İslam Dünyası: İnanç ve Pragmatizm," 380. Gürbey, "Özal’ın Dış Politika 
Anlayışı," 292. 
43 Gönlübol et al., “Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası,” 651. 
44 Ataman, "Özalist Dış Politika: Aktif ve Rasyonel Bir Anlayış," 51. 
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identity was also largely decisive in his economy-centered point of view. He had worked both 
in the private and public sectors and gave significant weight to economic instruments in the 
solution of political problems. As an economist, Özal regarded economic instruments more 
important than political and social instruments both in domestic and foreign policy and in this 
respect saw foreign policy always an instrument serving to his economic goals.45 
 
According to Özal, who expressed often his goal of making Turkey a regional power, 
a powerful economy and intensive trade relations provide the most important instruments to 
reach political targets.46 In terms of a strong economy, Özal was considering that economic 
development would bring about increasing political weight, and he also argued that economy 
occupies a considerable space in a country’s foreign policy agenda.47 Therefore, it might be 
claimed that economy was always one of the main motives behind Özal’s foreign policy 
understanding.48 Moreover, Özal saw economic development as a key for Turkey’s main 
domestic problems, (such as the Kurdish question); therefore he considered an economic 
transformation in the country indispensible.49 Since Özal believed in liberalism and viewed it 
as the best way for Turkey’s economic development, he saw an economic transformation of 
Turkey inevitable and to this end he took giant steps to open Turkish economy to the world.50 
Vast legal arrangements were introduced for the sake of economic liberalism. Moreover, Özal 
leadership completed the necessary arrangements in foreign trade sphere for the dominance of 
market rules and also liberalized import, the second leg of foreign trade.51 
 
  3.1.3.2.2. Construction of high level economic cooperation / 
interdependence with neighbors 
 
From Özal’s point of view, booming economic relations with neighbors would have 
two interrelated dimensions, namely economic and strategic. With respect to the former, 
increasing economic relations in the region would contribute to Turkey’s economic 
development by opening new markets that emerging Turkish industry needed. This 
perspective lies at the root of Turkey’s orientation during 1980s towards the neighboring 
countries more intensively than before. Ankara which fell short of its expectations in the 
developed markets forced to find new markets, such as Iran and Iraq.52 As a matter of fact, 
under Özal’s leadership, Turkey’s trade partners augmented. In addition to western partners, it 
found new trade partners, especially in the Middle East and North Africa, and concluded 
various trade agreements. Turkey’s export to the Middle East boomed considerably and 
amounted in the mid-1980s virtually the half of total export.53  
 
 From a strategic point of view, Özal regarded economy as an important functionalist 
tool to solve problems with other countries. In this context, Özal was hoping that booming 
economic relations with neighbors was going to bring about the solution of political 
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problems.54 Additionally, increasing economic relations would contribute to a stable and 
secure region that Turkey needed for a sustainable development. According to Özal’s foreign 
policy understanding, Turkey should primarily improve economic relations in its region; 
augment “interdependence”, thereby minimize the risks of conflict. In a sense, “active foreign 
policy”, which developed particularly during Özal’s presidency and named by some as “neo-
Ottomanism”, might be viewed as an extension of this apprehension.55 This understanding 
stipulates that Turkey ought to first accelerate its development through economic instruments 
and subsequently, again by making use of economic instruments, follow an active foreign 
policy and form zones of influence around itself. For example, Özal wanted Turkey to retain 
its influence in northern Iraq and proposed after the Gulf War that Turkey should export 
electricity to this part of Iraq and Turkish currency would be valid there too.56 Moreover, his 
famous water pipeline project of 1986 which had envisaged the construction of a pipeline that 
would carry Turkish water to the Gulf countries as well as Israel; might be regarded in the 
context of promoting interdependency as a step towards peace-building.57 
 
 Additionally, despite harsh criticism from the opposition, Özal took initiatives to solve 
the chronic problems of TFP. In this framework, Özal leadership developed a new approach 
towards Greece and commenced a rapprochement process which culminated in the “spirit of 
Davos.” Moreover, Ankara acquired a leading role in the determination of developments in 
Turkey's region. Özal prepared drafts which stipulated definition and solution of the problems 
as well as the determination and improvement of areas of cooperation.58 Özal aimed to find a 
solution to the Cyprus problem too, another chronic problem of Turkey. He viewed it as an 
impediment to the relations with the West and sought to get back the most important trump 
card that western powers had been playing against Ankara. Despite the opposition of Turkish 
diplomats, he wanted to solve the problem by means of mutual concessions. However, his 
main goal was, rather than solving the problem, to display the Greek side to international 
actors as the source of the problem.59      
  3.1.3.2.3. Multidimensionality and developing alternatives 
 
Turgut Özal went to the United States for the purpose of studying economics in 1952, 
profoundly impressed by its economic and political system, advocated liberalism in economy 
as well as in politics and championed the coexistence of differences. He argued that Turkey 
would gain advantage from pursuing a compatible foreign policy with the American 
policies.60 Therefore, he deemed an alliance with the US as the main axis of foreign policy.61 
In addition to his own paradigm, there were also other reasons in his pro-American foreign 
policy. Accordingly, Özal’s belief that Turkish national interests were generally overlapping 
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with those of the USA in the Middle East, Caucasia and Central Asia,62 and that Turkey did 
not possess the necessary instruments and resources to follow an entirely ‘independent’ 
strategy which could be against the U.S. interests pushed him to espouse a pro-American 
foreign policy.63 Meanwhile, the rejection of Turkey’s application for a full-membership by 
the European Community in 1989 also pushed Özal towards Washington.64 In a nutshell, 
Özal’s ultimate objective was to install Turkey as an influential regional power under the 
protective umbrella of the USA.65 
 
Analyzing Özal’s European policy, he might be called in a sense as the strongest 
advocate of the westernization in the republican history. Nonetheless, his distinctive self-
confidence which based Turkish-western relations on a more equal ground was salient. 
Whereas he was giving to the internal public the message that “Turkey had to join the 
European Community (EC),” Özal delivered to the EC the message of “you have to admit 
Turkey to the EC.”66 He viewed the full-membership application as a significant means for 
the perpetuation and consolidation of democracy and liberal economy, as well as for the 
institutionalization of association with the EC. With these considerations, he became the first 
leader who took a major step and applied officially to the EC for a full-membership. If 
Laçiner is right, Özal’s Europe policy showed to the future leaders that Turkey could be 
persistent with respect to integration with Europe without following a uni-dimensional foreign 
policy.67 At this point, one should note that though he did continued close relations with the 
West, Özal was aware of differences between Turkey and the West saying that  
 
“We are an Islamic country. We have differences from the West… We are the bridge between 
 the West and the East. We need to take the science, technology, thinking, understanding, and 
 compromise of the West. But we have also our own values that the West does not have.”68  
 
Turgut Özal sought also to develop alternatives and multi-dimensional strategies. His 
apprehension was based on interdependency, mutual interests and the “bridge” role definition 
of Turkey rather than unilaterally westward-looking policy.69 In this respect, he sought to 
diversify relations with the USA, which had revolved up to Özal’s leadership around military 
and strategic considerations. In contrast to his predecessors, he asked for more trade and 
economic concessions from the USA, not more military aid. By deepening the association 
with the EC, he targeted to use the EC as a balancing element against the dependence on the 
USA and vice versa.70 Again in this framework, without changing Turkey’s conventional 
direction, a new policy approach was adopted envisaging close relations with the Turkic 
republics of the Central Asia, with the states of the Eastern Europe and with the Islamic 
countries. In order to balance the association with the West, Özal initiated or revitalized some 
regional organizations such as BSEC, Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and 
Central Asian Common Market. Similarly, Turkey’s role increased in the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC) and during Özal’s leadership, Turkey’s policies in the Middle East 
did not coincide on occasion with those of the West. For example, contrary to the expectations 
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of the West, Turkey did not conduct its policy against Iran, and followed “active neutrality” 
policy during the Iraq-Iran war. Moreover, in order to gain the support of the Arab states, 
Özal pursued a distanced policy towards Israel and made Turkey one of the first countries 
which recognized Palestinian state declared in exile.71 Nonetheless, in spite of the 
diversification efforts of Turgut Özal, given the above mentioned western ties of Turkey; it is 
hardly possible to talk about an “axis-shift” under the Özal leadership as regards the 
traditional western orientation of TFP.  
 
 In short, stressing Turkey’s both western and Eastern identities and its “bridge” role, 
Özal sought to establish balanced relations with all international actors. For example, unlike 
the previous governments, while he developed close relations with the Middle East and 
Islamic world, his approach did not exclude other dimensions of TFP;72 rather he embraced a 
multidimensional and pragmatic approach. However, in accordance with his ideas about the 
structure of the world, while seeking to develop alternatives, he continued to see the 
alignment with the USA as the main axis of TFP. 
 
  3.1.3.2.4. Proactive foreign policy  
 
Turgut Özal rose to power following the 12 September 1980 military coup. Thus, in 
the initial years of his administration, he had to deal mostly with internal political and 
economic issues, and restore the relations with the world which were damaged due to the 
military coup.73 His influence on foreign political issues began to augment exclusively in 
parallel with the democratization of the country, i.e. towards the end of 1980s.74 For instance, 
“Turkey’s application for full European Community membership in 1987 was engineered by 
the then Prime Minister Özal.”75 Although he was elected in 1989 as President, Özal 
increasingly sustained his weight in the foreign policy of the country through his influence in 
the ruling Motherland Party as well as through his personal charisma and initiative-taking 
character. His active foreign policy approach was conspicuous in many fields, yet it was far 
more striking during the Gulf war that the resistance of civil and military bureaucracy 
notwithstanding, Özal directed the foreign policy of the country virtually alone.76  
 
He adopted an active foreign policy appraisal and left the conventional passivist and 
non-interventionist policy aside. He described active policy as the precondition of an assertive 
FP. He deemed the status quo-oriented isolation policy of the Kemalist leadership as the 
biggest obstacle in front of Turkey’s economic development and democratization process, and 
tried to overcome it. In fact, the above mentioned FP principles such as multidimensionality 
and developing alternatives were also the manifestation of Özal’s active foreign policy 
understanding.77 Until the end of Cold War, he sought to deepen the existing relations with 
the USA and the EC and simultaneously tried to improve relations with the Muslim and Arab 
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world mostly on economic grounds. For example, for the first time in the Republican history, 
a Turkish President attended an Islamic summit in Casablanca (1984). In this conference, 
Turkish president assumed the presidency of the Chairman of the Standing Committee on 
Economic and Commercial Co-operation (COMCEC), one of the six specialized OIC 
committees.78 Moreover, Turkish trade with the neighboring and Muslim countries increased 
substantially during the Özal era.  
 
Özal leadership regarded the end of Cold War as a significant event, offering great 
opportunities for Turkey. He argued that an active FP was indispensable in the post-Cold War 
conjuncture, thus adopted an initiative-taking and leading FP instead of the traditional passive 
and prudent one.79 Özal was advocating that the most important thing in a political change 
was to realize it early, take measures accordingly, dispense with conservatism and develop 
forward looking policies. According to Özal, risks of an active FP must have been calculated 
carefully and decisions must have been reached expeditiously.80 Since bureaucracy was slow 
in nature, decisions should have been made by politicians.81 Along with the concept of a 
Turkish World from the “Adriatic to the Chinese Wall”, Turkey’s active involvement in 
Bosnian and Nagorno-Karabakh crises and its initiative-taking to establish the BSEC and 
ECO as well as the active participation in the OIC might be appraised in the framework of an 
active foreign policy. Finally, it should be noted that under the Özal leadership Turkey signed 
more international agreements than all the past republican governments did.  Even this fact 
alone gives a clue as to the dynamic nature of FP during the Özal era.82 
 
  3.1.3.2.5. Balance between democracy and security 
 
Özal argued that in order to be powerful and influential in FP, internal peace was 
essential. This would be possible with the ensuring of a balance between freedom and 
security,83 and with the development of democracy in the country.84 In this context, by 
granting the Kurds more freedom, Özal aimed to weaken the terrorist organization PKK as 
well as to make a contribution to social peace, thereby render Turkey powerful in foreign 
political issues. His most important reference in this regard was the Ottoman legacy. Inspired 
by this legacy, Özal made most of his suggestions such as the adoption of the states system, 
the localization of the administration, and the presidential system.85 Accordingly, 
administrators as heir to an empire which managed to administrate a multi-national, multi-
religious and multi-identity population for centuries together in peace had to comprehend that 
cultural pluralism, and powerful local governments would play a key role in the solution of 
Turkey’s fundamental problems.86 With this understanding, Özal held talks with ethnic groups 
living in the country. This was particularly an important beginning for the Kurds and they 
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were for the first time recognized from the rulers of the country. Moreover, through legal 
arrangements, it was paved the way for the use of Kurdish language in the media.87  
 
Özal was of the opinion that a probable Kurdish state in northern Iraq was threatening 
the territorial integrity of Turkey. Thus, to address this problem, he pursued a pro-American 
active foreign policy during the Gulf War and chose to be active not reactive. He considered 
that a successful Kurdish policy was closely related with the opening policies towards the 
Kurds in the country. Along with this strategic consideration, in line with his economic and 
political transformation goal, Özal took the attitude that democratic rights should have been 
granted to the Kurds.88 Furthermore, although he advocated that a federative solution was 
inappropriate, he saw no harm in the democratic discussion of it.89  
 
On the other hand, Özal’s ethnic pluralism approach did not remain limited to the 
Kurdish ethnicity; other ethnic groups were also recognized and began to be regarded in the 
foreign policy conducting processes.90 Economic development of Turkey and the democratic 
steps contributed also to the rise of influence of the ethnic groups residing in the country on 
foreign political issues. While Özal viewed the ethnic groups as a ‘chance’ and ‘source of 
power’ in terms of internal and external policies and tried to make use of them, he was 
affected by the goals and regional perceptions of those groups as well. In a sense, a major part 
of the ethnic groups composing Ottoman Empire returned to Turkey’s foreign policy agenda 
and the leader of the country was virtually pleased with that. Turkey’s Bosnia and Azerbaijan 
policies after the Cold War provide examples in this regard. Turkey supported these countries 
to the bitter end in all platforms, especially in the NATO, UN and European organizations.91  
 
In terms of nationalism, by including other Turks living in other countries, Özal 
extended the Kemalist nationalism appraisal which had reduced nationalism to the Turks 
living in Anatolia. Özal’s nationalism stipulated a synthesis of “cultural Turkishness” and 
Islam (Turkish-Islam Synthesis). His apprehension excluded the denial of other Muslim 
elements living in the country. His nationalism was based on good and tolerant governing, 
and accepted cultural values and tradition inherited from the past. Therefore, he was arguing 
that Atatürk’s phrase “Happy is he who calls himself a Turk” should have been perceived as 
“Happy is he who calls himself a Turkish citizen”.92  
 
To conclude, from Özal’s point of view, Turkey’s power in foreign policy was a 
positive function of internal peace and this peace would be provided through equilibrium 
between freedom and security. He underscored Ottoman legacy as the most important 
reference point in this respect and redefined Turkish identity on the basis of “Turkish-Islam 
synthesis”. This new identity definition brought about the return of cultural, historical and 
religious ties to the foreign policy agenda.93  
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  3.1.4. Conclusion 
 
Özal’s vision for Turkey was to make it one of the most developed ten-fifteen 
countries of the world and to make it the most important economic and political actor in its 
region. As an economist, he viewed Turkey’s economic success as the most important 
instrument to attain this vision. Accordingly, Turkey’s economic success was going to make it 
a center of attraction and this would bring about increasing political weight. However, in 
parallel with the needs of outward-oriented economic order, he realized that his vision was not 
achievable with an exclusively westward-looking foreign policy. Defining Turkey as a bridge 
country, along with the West, he sought to improve relations with the eastern countries as 
well. Particularly until the end of Cold War, his interest in the East was rather economy-
oriented and he tried to capitalize on Turkey’s historical, religious and cultural assets with a 
pragmatic approach. On the other hand, contrary to the Kemalist elite, Özal did not view these 
assets, namely Islam, Turkism and Ottomanism as an obstacle to Turkey’s integration to the 
West. Therefore, he never intended to turn Turkey’s face completely to the East. Regarding 
the strong relations with the West as the main axis of foreign policy, he viewed the 
developing relations with the East as complementary to the association with the West. 
Furthermore, with a view to solving Turkey’s security problems as well as to settling the 
existing problems with neighbors, he underlined the importance of forming economic 
cooperation and interdependencies, and took steps to this end.  
 
In essence, what expanded his horizon was his identity which internalized both eastern 
and western values. Özal blended the Turkish, eastern and western values in order to create 
“the great Turkey” once more. The elements of his alternative identity definition were 
intrinsically reflected to his political approach and he defined Turkey's identity in conformity 
with his respective values. He recognized Turkey's historical, cultural and religious identities, 
which were ignored up to that time to a large extent, as part of Turkish identity. His relatively 
more active and internationalist foreign policy was largely connected with this new identity 
definition. Undoubtedly, there were also other internal and external political factors 
encouraging and supporting his new identity definition and foreign policy understanding. The 
revolutionary liberalization and the opening of the Turkish economy to the world are of 
crucial importance in this respect. Furthermore, the emerging alternative power centers (e.g. 
the so called Anatolian capital), the democratization process in the country and the increasing 
weight of the divergent ethnic and religious groups on foreign political issues might be 
viewed further internal factors in this regard. On the other hand, the rejection of Turkey’s 
application for the EC membership, the new international conjuncture in the wake of the Cold 
war, and the Karabakh and Bosnian conflicts might be regarded as external factors 
contributing to the rise of new Turkish identity. All these factors contributed to Özal’s new 
identity definition and made Özal's policies realizable.   
 
Özal's foreign policy represents a deviation from the Republican orthodoxy. His new 
identity definition brought about changes with respect to national interest perceptions.94  For 
instance, while due to its secular state structure, Ankara traditionally had ignored the religious 
identity of the country in foreign political issues, during the Özal era a new identity definition 
based on Turkish-Islamic synthesis dominated TFP. In accordance with this new identity 
definition, Turkey‘s national interests were re-defined and this paved the way for the 
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development of a multi-dimensional foreign policy concept. In fact, this new understanding 
marks the beginning of a new proactive term in TFP.  
 
Finally, the recent TFP cannot be fully understood without referring to Özalism. It 
might even be claimed that roots of current TFP in the new millennium lie to a great extent at 
Özalism. For example, foundations of two important catalysts of today’s foreign policy, civil 
society and emerging Anatolian capital, were largely laid during the Özal era. Additionally, as 
mentioned above, ranging from proactive and multidimensional foreign policy to the 
understanding which made economy one of the most significant components of diplomacy 
and to the roots of most of the AK Party foreign policy principles might be found in Özalism. 
In this context, AK Party foreign policy can be characterized to a large extent as an extension 
of Özal's policies or a more advanced form of them, which will be handled below in detail.  
 
3.2. AK Party foreign policy paradigm: Transformation or continuity? 
 3.2.1. Introduction 
 
With its unique geographical position at the crossroads of the Balkans, Middle East 
and the Caucasus, Turkey was caught unprepared to the post Cold War term. This new age 
forced all actors to reevaluate their international positions as well as their national strategies. 
Turkey, which practically plays a bridge role both geographically and culturally with its 
privileged location where continents meet, felt the same need of reevaluation. The new 
international conjuncture and the developments in the international relations pushed Turkey to 
adapt itself to the new circumstances. However, both Turkish political elite and policy makers 
oscillated in the initial years of the post-Cold War term to keep pace with the new 
developments in the international system. At first, Turgut Özal’s nostalgic and ambitious 
rhetoric of - a Turkish world from the Adriatic Sea to the Chinese Wall- dominated foreign 
policy. Yet, this rather assertive vision of Özal was not compatible with Turkey’s capacity 
and it found neither from the traditional power centers (e.g. military and civil bureaucracy) 
nor from the society adequate support. In the wake of Özal’s death in 1993, this vision lost its 
momentum and an ideological and pro-security understanding gained predominance in 
foreign policy making. Whereas Özal’s vision was excessively over Turkey’s capacity, the 
latter approach ignored the areas of cooperation particularly with neighboring countries and 
did not make use of the potentials provided by Turkey’s geography and history.  
 
Despite that transformation of TFP started before the Justice and Development Party 
(AK Party),95 its rise to power in early years of the new millennium signaled a turning point 
for Turkey in many respects and in terms of foreign policy as well. The AK Party 
government, which defines itself as conservative-democrat, reinterpreted Turkey’s 
international position in accordance with its lenses. AK Party’s Muslim-conservative identity, 
which has been constructed through a long societal and transnational socialization process, 
has enabled it to utilize the historical and geographical assets of Turkey and broadened 
Ankara’s horizons. In other words, conservative-democrat AK Party’s rise to power which is 
able to reconcile Islam and democracy has paved the way for a multi dimensional and 
dynamic foreign policy. As Kirişçi points out “the political development, economic 
capabilities, dynamic social forces, and ability to reconcile Islam and democracy at home are 
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the qualities that offer Turkey the possibility to develop and implement such policies.”96 In 
essence, this new approach which emphasizes the historical and geographical “depth” of 
Turkey might be also assessed as the reflection of a domestic political development to the 
foreign policy landscape through a new identity description.97 
 
In the following sections, I argue that the origins of AK Party foreign policy might be 
found in the Özal's policies outlined in the preceding part. In other words, AK Party foreign 
policy is substantially a kind of advanced and crystallized form of Özal's foreign policy 
understanding. I further argue that, like Özal's foreign policy, AK Party leadership’s foreign 
policy could be also better accounted for by means of an identity-based approach.  In this 
context, for the sake of developing a framework of analysis, it would be highly relevant to 
analyze briefly the personality of Erdoğan, leader of the AK Party and the PM of Turkish 
Republic since 2003, and the socialization processes that he went through. At this point, the 
question arises, why Erdoğan?  In fact, Davutoğlu has an undeniable impact on AK Party 
foreign policy both theoretically and practically. However, as the head of government, PM 
Erdoğan carries the primary responsibility as well as the authority on foreign political issues. 
Considering the interrelated nature of domestic and foreign politics, he is interested in foreign 
political issues to a large extent and plays a substantial role in the FP definition of the country. 
Moreover, it is Erdoğan who employed Davutoğlu first as chief advisor on foreign political 
issues and later as the minister of foreign affairs. The reason for that lies basically in their 
sharing of common weltanschauung and visions. Therefore, one should not underestimate the 
role of Erdoğan on foreign policy of AK Party. As a matter of fact, Erdoğan enjoys a high 
popularity particularly in the Middle East which initially soared in the wake of his sharp 
reaction to Israeli President Peres in the Davos Forum in January 2009 and has increasingly 
continued thanks to Erdoğan’s pro-Palestine and anti-Israel discourse as well as owing to 
Turkey’s success to reconcile Islam and democracy which became more striking in the 
climate of “Arab spring”.98 Additionally, Erdoğan’s foreign policy approach has been 
frequently analyzed by international media institutions, particularly in reference to his 
influence in the Middle East politics.99 Considering all of those points, it would be an 
appropriate step to begin with the personality of Erdoğan, his weltanschauung and the 
socialization processes that he has gone through. Subsequently, foreign policy paradigm of 
the AK Party will be studied under the light of Davutoğlu’s foreign policy approach.    
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 3.2.2. Erdoğan’s Personality: Devout Muslim, conservative, democrat 
 
With family origins in Turkey’s Rize province, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was born in a 
middle-class district of Istanbul, Kasımpaşa, as a child of a religious-conservative family. His 
father was a captain in the state Maritime Agency and his mother a housewife. After 
graduating from Istanbul Religious Vocational High School (İmam Hatip Lisesi), he obtained 
a B.A. degree from the Department of Economics and Trade of Marmara University in 
Istanbul (1980).100  As Heper and Toktaş argue, there were four major influences on his life: 
(1) his father, (2) Kasımpaşa- the neighborhood in Istanbul where he grew up, (3) his teacher 
at the primary school he attended, and (4) Sufism.101 His father was a religious and 
authoritarian personality. Like Özal, Erdoğan received a good religious training in his own 
family. He had learned the rudiments of Islam and had become a devout Muslim even before 
he attended Imam Hatip School. Additionally, he is an authoritarian personality and has strict 
principles in life. These two characteristics of him, religiosity and authoritarianism, may be 
attributed to his father’s influence. Meanwhile, Erdoğan is not an easygoing man which seems 
to be related to the fact that he was brought up in Kasımpaşa, which is well known with its 
bravado culture. Erdoğan underlines its impact on him saying that “my manliness, bluntness, 
and principled conduct derive from my roots [in Kasımpaşa]. Defiance is also observed in 
Erdoğan102 and he is never afraid of a test of strength.103 In this respect, his outbursts in some 
cases, such as the famous one in Davos Economic Forum in 2009, may be closely connected 
with this character of him. Furthermore, his education in the Imam Hatip left also a strong 
impression on Erdoğan, not only in terms of religious education, but also in terms of 
weltanschauung, which was explicitly underscored by Erdoğan in an interview. Finally, he 
attended the Iskenderpaşa Seminary (dergah) of the Nakshibandi Sheikh Mehmet Zahit Kotku 
and Sufi creeds of this seminary had a significant influence on Erdoğan’s personality.104 
Therefore, it is clear that being connected with the Nakshibandi order of dervishes was a 
common point of Erdoğan and Özal.  
 
Islam has always had a significant impact on the identity of Erdoğan which could be 
observed in numerous ways, ranging from his daily life practices to his discourses. Even 
before the years at Imam Hatip School, Erdoğan had become a practicing Muslim, doing his 
prayers on a regular basis which might be viewed as another common point of Özal and 
Erdoğan.105 Taking Islam as a basic reference, he derived from it a set of moral principles for 
his personal and social life. For example, he does not sit cross-legged, as this was perceived 
disrespect for others.106 Moreover, as Özal, Erdoğan also resorts often to terminology 
informed by Islamic themes. For example, he quoted 179. verse of Koran, the Heights (Al-
Aráf) Sura, several times to criticize opposition and judicial bureaucracy107 saying “they have 
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hearts wherewith they understand not, eyes wherewith they see not, and ears wherewith they 
hear not”108 Additionally, when the chairman of the Union of Chambers and Commodity 
Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) submitted a 10 million Turkish Liras donation check to 
Erdoğan in the framework of an aid campaign to Somalia in the Summer of 2011, Erdoğan 
quoted this time a Hadith (the Prophet Muhammad's sayings/deeds), “the upper hand is better 
than the lower hand.” (The upper hand is meant the one which expends, and the lower one is 
the one which asks.)109  All in all, such examples are easy to find in Erdoğan’s daily 
discourses.  
  
 Considering his personal qualities, Erdoğan carries distinctive personal features as 
well. First of all, he attaches a considerable importance to the personal relationships which 
might be observed both in domestic and international politics. In terms of international 
contacts, he developed warm relations, among others, with President Obama, former Italian 
Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and former Greek PM Karamanlis. As a matter of fact, the 
Los Angeles Times reported in October 2011 that Obama has placed more calls to Erdoğan 
than to any other world leader in 2011 next to British Prime Minister David Cameron.110 
However, this personal feature of Eroğan also reminds Turgut Özal and his close relationships 
with foreign leaders. For instance, Özal sought to be influential on the US policy towards Iraq 
in the course of the Gulf crisis through the close relationship that he had developed with 
President George H.W. Bush. Aras and Aliriza underlines in this regard that  
 
 “this special relationship (between Erdoğan and Obama)—akin to the one between 
 former president George H.W. Bush and Özal—mitigated strains in 2010 caused by 
 differences over Iran, Turkish-Israeli tensions, and the reintroduction of a  congressional 
 resolution on the “Armenian Genocide” issue, which had long bedeviled  the 
 relationship.”111 
 
 Erdoğan is known with his emotional, ambitious and indomitable character.112 He does 
not hesitate to fight with those who are willing to conflict with him, to set forth his final 
opinion in scathing terms and to burn the bridges if he deems it necessary. The most well 
known example in this subject is his famous reaction in the Davos forum. Reacting to the 
moderator of the forum and Israeli President Peres harshly, Erdoğan declared that he would 
never attend the Davos forum again.  
 
 Some comment on Erdoğan's personality that he has a strong antipathy against 
impositions. From this point, it is concluded that instead of conflicting, it is a more reasonable 
way to attach him the value that he deserves and get along well with him to reach better 
results. Prominent Turkish journalist, Alper Görmüş's words on this subject offer a good 
example:  
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 "Such people (like Erdoğan) cannot be intimidated with menace and harshness; you  get 
 even the opposite of your expectation. You will see that he gets closer to you when  you 
 say that you respect and like him."113 (T.b.A.) 
 
 This personal quality of Erdoğan has been discovered by both internal and external 
actors. The success of Obama government's foreign policy understanding regarding the 
relations with Turkey lies to a certain extent also in the fact that Obama responded Erdoğan's 
efforts to establish a warm and close relationship positively and he has respected and attached 
Erdoğan a certain value.114 The genuine dialogue developed when President Obama called 
PM Erdoğan on occasion of Erdoğan's mother's death and that President Obama mentioned 
his own sorrow when his mother died are worthy of attention with respect to the warm 
friendship between the two leaders.115  
 
 As far as Erdoğan’s political career concerned, he started his career in the National 
Outlook Movement (NOM or Milli Görüş) in 1969, which advocated the unification of 
Islamic countries under the leadership of Turkey and made anti-westernism an integral part of 
its identity. Erdoğan moved up the political career ladder steadily. Through socialization 
processes, his political identity underwent a certain evolution which was interpreted by him as 
“development.”116 It might be argued that societal and international norms occupied central 
roles in the construction of Erdoğan and his close colleagues' identity as well as in their 
foreign policy understandings. From the perspective of transnational socialization and societal 
socialization concepts of constructivist approach, one might argue that demand of more 
democracy and conservatism which arose as a reaction to the process of 28 February (a post-
modern intervention of military into politics in 1997) formed the basis of societal norms 
which influenced the construction of political identity of Erdoğan leadership. These social 
norms shared by the majority of Turkish people were adopted as the main element of Erdoğan 
leadership's identity and successfully converted into vote in the general elections of 2002. 
However, in the construction of Erdoğan leadership's identity, international norms played a 
more prominent role. Having suffered from the internal threat perceptions and subjected to 
undemocratic practices, Erdoğan leadership embarked on a quest of more democracy and 
freedom. At this point, international norms represented by the European Union played a more 
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significant role in the construction of Erdoğan leadership's identity.117 In the following 
paragraphs, I attempt to elaborate how this socialization process took place.  
 
 Political approach of the Erdoğan leadership, which comes from the anti-western 
Islamic NOM evolved towards the centre of political spectrum owing to its experiences 
throughout its the political life. Political parties of NOM (i.e. National Order Party, National 
Salvation Party, Welfare Party and Virtue Party), frequently subjected to closure and this 
pushed Erdoğan and his friends to review their anti-western stance and their posture vis-à-vis 
the modern/western values such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law which 
eventually resulted in their adoption of these values as integral part of their identities.118 
Erdoğan and his friends, who broke away from NOM political line which was excluded 
several times by the laicist-statist structure from the political landscape, realized that they 
could survive exclusively in a country, where a real democracy functions and human and 
political rights are abided.119 Additionally, non-isolationism or openness to the world and 
integration with the West (i.e. the EU) has been viewed as further preconditions for survival 
in Turkish politics.120 Dağı explains the evolution process of Islamic identity of AK Party 
leadership as follows:  
 
 “… Islamic political identity was traditionally built in opposition to the West, western  values 
 and, equally important, to the history of westernization in Turkey. Yet pro- Islamic 
 politicians of the late 1990s, most of whom have joined the JDP, realized that  they needed 
 the West and modern/western values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law in order 
 to build a broader front against the Kemalist center, and to acquire legitimacy through this new 
 discourse in their confrontation with the secularist establishment. In the face of pressures 
 originating from the military’s adamant opposition to the Islamists, which influences attitudes 
 of the judges, high state bureaucracy as well as mainstream secular media, they realized the 
 legitimizing power and the virtue of democracy which turned out to be a means to highlight 
 “people power” vis-à-vis the state power. They knew that they could survive only in a country 
 that was democratically oriented, respecting civil and political rights, and moreover integrated 
 further into the western world, particularly the EU. This discursive turn, speaking the universal 
 language of political modernity instead of Islam’s particularities, also served to justify the 
 presence of an Islamic political identity.”121  
 
 In other words, as a consequence of their both societal and transnational socialization 
processes, whereas Erdoğan and his associates kept their ties with Islam in the social realm, 
they abandoned it as a political program.122 In the construction of AK Party’s identity, along 
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with societal norms, international norms played central roles and in the end, coupled with 
their traditional values, modern/western values like democracy, human rights, liberalism and 
the rule of law became an integral part of the AK Party identity.123 Therefore, it might be 
claimed that, Erdoğan and AK Party leadership’s identity resembles to Özal’s identity in the 
sense that they both share a pious Muslim identity as well as international norms such as 
democracy, liberalism and respect for human rights acquired as a result of various 
socialization processes.  
 
Erdoğan’s westernism, on the other hand, does not carry an inferiority complex, yet 
rather a unique self confidence. Just like Özal, Erdoğan based Turkey-West relations on a 
more equal ground.124 Being proud of the positive sides of his own civilization, PM Erdoğan 
emphasizes in an interview that Turkey should have taken science as well as other 
developments and beauties of the West saying: 
 
“…everything that the western world does is not necessarily right. We work on 
adopting the science of the west. We work on adopting whatever has been developed and 
whatever is beautiful in the west. But let's not forget there are really beautiful things in the 
east, as well. Do not leave the eastern parts of the world aside. We're always running after 
science, after intellect, we seek out knowledge from whichever part of the world that is most 
of that, then we extract and adopt it.”125  
 
This self-confident stance of Erdoğan vis-à-vis the West facilitated a multidimensional 
foreign policy in the course of the AK Party governments. That is, rather than being a strict 
admirer of the west and focusing on a strictly westward looking FP, Erdoğan leadership 
sought to develop alternatives by employing Turkey’s respective cultural and historical 
assets.126  
 
 In terms of foreign policy, owing to its Islamist identity, Erdoğan leadership first left 
aside the traditional ultra secularist point of view to foreign policy issues and took into 
account of Turkey’s historical and cultural ties. Furthermore, Erdoğan leadership's Islamist 
roots helped it develop closer cultural, diplomatic and economic links with the Arab Middle 
East and the Muslim world in general.127 A conspicuous example which demonstrates the 
reflection of Erdoğan leadership's conservative-democrat identity on the policy field was 
witnessed during a polemic between PM Erdoğan and the leader of the main opposition party 
leader, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. PM Erdoğan replied Kılıçdaroğlu's criticism that "he was 
discriminating Turkey as religious and faithless" with these words:  
 
 "Mr. Kılıçdaroğlu, are you expecting from us, from a party with conservative-democrat party 
 identity, to raise an atheist generation?.. Yet we have no goal of this kind. We are going to 
 raise a conservative-democrat generation which will adopt and back the values and the 
                                                                                                                                                   
almam,” 24.08.2001, Hürriyet, accessed 13.01.2012, 
http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=11836  
123 As Çaha puts it, “the AK Party’s identity was framed by three sources, namely traditional values, 
international norms and the official institutions, particularly secularism, brought to life by the Republican 
regime.” Çaha, "Turkish Election of November 2002 and the Rise of  'Moderate' Political Islam," 108. 
124 See: Heper and Toktaş, "Islam, Modernity, and Democracy in Contemporary Turkey," 163 
125 Interview with PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan by Fareed Zakaria in CNN TV Channel, 25.09.2011, accessed 
27.09.2011, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1109/25/fzgps.01.html  
126 Aras and Akpınar advocate also that a change in the identity of actors and in domestic politics trigger a 
transformation process in the demands and perceptions of policy makers and bring about a new understanding. 
Aras and Akpınar, "Türk Dış Politikasında Davutoğlu Dönemi: 2009 Değerlendirmesi," 16. 
127 Öniş, "Multiple Faces of the “New” Turkish Foreign Policy," 57. 
 124  
 principles stemming from the history of its nation, homeland. We are working for this."128 
 (T.b.A.)  
 
 As it can be comprehended from this statement, AK Party leader Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan publicly uttered the influence of the AK Party identity on party politics. Therefore, 
the reflection of Erdoğan leadership's 'conservative' and 'democratic' identity on its foreign 
policy should be seen as a natural consequence. 
 
Similarly, the Islamist side of Erdoğan leadership's identity has been a considerable 
facilitator to establish close relations with the Arab people and in some cases with Arab 
countries. As Öniş points it out “arguably, a more secular government led by the Republic 
People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, the CHP), for instance, would not have experienced 
the same degree of popularity in the Arab or Muslim worlds.”129 On the other hand, however, 
despite the significant credentials of Erdoğan and AK Party in general, one should not 
perceive their Islamic roots as the main driving force behind their foreign policy.130 Therefore, 
claiming that Erdoğan leadership looks at the foreign political issues solely through religious 
lenses would be misleading and this would be only a little part of the whole story.  
 
In a nutshell, one might conclude that Özal and Erdoğan share the quality of being 
devout Muslims. Moreover, notwithstanding they underwent various socialization processes; 
they acquired similar international norms such as democracy, human rights and liberalism. 
However, the fact that Özal and Erdoğan were nurtured from different sources in the process 
of transnational socialization has significant implications in terms of their foreign policy 
understandings. For example, in the post-cold war period, Özal remained under the influence 
of hard power policy represented by the USA.131 On the contrary, Erdoğan was affected by 
the compromise and cooperation-oriented soft power policy represented by the “core 
Europe.”132 Those norms strongly affected the foreign policy orientations of Özal and 
Erdoğan leaderships especially during the Gulf War in 1991 and in the operation on Iraq in 
2003 respectively. Since this issue will be discussed in the next chapter, I do not elaborate it 
here.   
 
Before starting to deal with the foreign policy paradigm of the Erdoğan leadership, it 
must be underlined that theoretical roots of this new foreign policy understanding of the 
Erdoğan leadership might be found in the ideas of Ahmet Davutoğlu, former chief advisor to 
the Prime Minister (2002-2009) and the foreign minister since May 2009. He is widely known 
as the intellectual architect of the new TFP; therefore, one has to read his ideas correctly with 
respect to Turkey’s geographical and historical “depth” in a post-Cold War environment so as 
to make an accurate analysis of recent TFP. Thus, his ideas will be significantly employed in 
the coming part. 
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 3.2.3. Foreign Policy Paradigm of the Erdoğan Leadership 
  3.2.3.1. Intellectual roots 
 
 There is a consensus that Ahmet Davutoğlu has played a significant role in the new 
orientation of TFP first as the man behind the scenes and as foreign minister since 2009. In 
his major studies,133 Davutoğlu reevaluates the post-Cold War international system, 
underscores the geographical and historical depth of Turkey and sets a new vision for it. Since 
this new vision has been seen as compatible by the AK Party leadership with its own policy 
line, particularly by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül, Davutoğlu enjoyed the chance 
to have a determining role in the AK Party foreign policy.134 Consequently, as Aras notes it, 
 
  “the new foreign policy took form under the impact of Davutoğlu’s re-definition of Turkey’s 
 role in the neighboring regions and in international politics, namely its “strategic depth,” with 
 frontiers that have expanded beyond the homeland in the cognitive map of policymaker’s 
 minds.”135 
 
 The concept of “Strategic Depth” was firstly introduced in 2001 by Professor Ahmet 
Davutoğlu in his seminal book, which was published with the same title. Davutoğlu’s core 
argument is that geopolitical, geo-cultural and geo-economic components form the basis of 
strategic depth and it is these two invariable assets, namely geo-strategic location and 
historical depth, which determines the value of a nation in world politics.136 In this respect, 
Turkey with its unique geographical position and rich historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire 
enjoys a great potential.  
 
With respect to the geographical position of Turkey, Davutoğlu argues that in north-
south direction, two land transition zones (Balkans and the Caucasus) connecting Eurasian 
central land mass to warm seas and Africa, and a sea transition zone (Bosporus and 
Dardanelles) intersect on Turkey and connect these zones to the geo-economic center of 
resources in the Middle East and Caspian region. In the east-west direction, on the other hand, 
the Anatolian peninsula is the most important part of strategic peninsula belts surrounding the 
Eurasian continent. As a result of these geopolitical qualities, the Anatolian peninsula has 
always been a candidate for being a political power center. It is a matter of exception that 
Anatolian/Balkan axis became a peripheral/passive element to another political power 
center.137 Meanwhile, Davutoğlu discusses that Turkey is not an island state, like the USA or 
Japan or England. It cannot withdraw into its own boundaries. Its geography has a depth, for 
example, Turkey’s borders with Syria or Iraq lack of geographical meaning. There is no other 
period in the history that Urfa and Aleppo stayed so far away from each other. Similar 
determinations might be done for the Caucasian and Thracian borders as well.138  
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 In connection with historical legacy, Davutoğlu contends that history and geography 
are two invariables that cannot be changed in the short or middle term. A society cannot 
change its geography when it is troubled by its neighbors. Nor cannot one make a denial of 
historical heritage. Even if one does, it has no meaning in the eyes of others. However, 
invariables are not necessarily static, they can be reevaluated. During the Cold War, the world 
was mainly separated into two camps and countries on Turkey’s scale could not afford to 
develop cross-border policies, because, Turkey’s east borders were also the borders of the 
NATO. The post-Cold War era brought about new opportunities as well as new 
responsibilities. Even though Ankara seeks to build walls between Turkey and the Middle 
East, it cannot completely turn its back on the regions that it has cultural or historical links. 
Any trouble in these geographies concerns Turkey. When Bosnians, for instance, confront a 
problem, they come most intensively to Turkey, but not to another country.139   
 
 In view of Turkey’s geographical and historical characteristics, Davutoğlu defines 
Turkey both geographically and historically as a central country. 
 
“In terms of geography, Turkey occupies a unique space. As a large country 
in the midst of Afro-Eurasia’s vast landmass, it may be defined as a central country 
with multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced to one unified character. Like 
Russia, Germany, Iran, and Egypt, Turkey cannot be explained geographically or 
culturally by associating it with one single region. Turkey’s diverse regional 
composition lends it the capability of maneuvering in several regions simultaneously; 
in this sense, it controls an area of influence in its immediate environs.”140  
 
 Davutoğlu further argues that today Turkey can be viewed neither in the periphery of 
the European Union nor in the periphery of the Middle East. It is a centre mainly due to its 
special geopolitical position and its Ottoman heritage.141 Contrary to other states in the region, 
Turkey is simultaneously Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasus, Black See and Mediterranean 
state. Hence, Turkey has several regional identities which cannot be reduced to a single one. 
Its unique geographic position grants Turkey European, Middle Eastern and Asian identities 
at the same time and the opportunity to be active in all these regions. Moreover, anything 
around Turkey cannot be comprehended without it. History of Turkey’s neighboring countries 
such as Greece or Bulgaria cannot be written without Turkey.142 Its cultural and political 
economic borders are far wider than its political borders and it cannot be confined to its 
political borders. Therefore, it has to develop cross-border policies,143 particularly towards 
Ottoman geography and towards the Muslim societies. 
 
Davutoğlu further claims that Turkey cannot be defined any more with the regional 
power discourse of the Cold War era. It is a “central country” and moving forward on the way 
of becoming a global player. It has to act as its “depth” requires, otherwise it would lose. 
Globalization and external factors have changed Turkey’s position so excessively that Turkey 
cannot survive any longer with the status quo. It cannot follow an isolation policy like the 
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USA or Japan. If it tries to isolate itself, its territorial integrity might fall under threat because 
of internal discussions and tensions.144 This is why; Turkey should re-discover its geographic 
and historical identity, re-gain its self-confidence, recognize its historical and cultural roots in 
the neighboring regions and seek a balanced relationship with all global and regional 
actors.145  
 
It should be noted that whereas Özal defined Turkey as a “bridge”, Davutoğlu defines 
it as a “central” country. In spite of the fact that they have different starting points, their 
conclusions are quite similar. Both argue that Turkey ought to follow an active, 
multidimensional foreign policy due to its unique geographical character. Likewise, Özal and 
Davutoğlu view a positive correlation between Turkey’s weight in the East and the West, thus 
regard developing relations with the East necessary. Nonetheless, they do not consider 
developing relations with the East as an alternative to the West, yet as complementary to 
Turkey’s traditional foreign policy orientation. They both regard the end of Cold War as a 
chance for Turkey and agree that isolation is not an option for Turkey. On the other hand, 
there are also some dissimilarity concerning Özal and Davutoğlu's concepts. For instance, 
while Özal also takes into account of geographical and historical assets of Turkey, he pays 
attention not to run counter to the U.S. on significant issues, that is, he was targeting to be an 
influential actor under the protective umbrella of the U.S. Davutoğlu advocates a relatively 
more “independent” foreign policy by defining Turkey as a central country.  
 
  3.2.3.2. Reflection of Davutoğlu’s ideas to the AK Party Program and 
Government Programs 
 
Before reviewing foreign policy principles of the Erdoğan leadership, one should 
review how Ahmet Davutoğlu’s ideas, reflected to the AK Party program and to the AK Party 
governmental programs.146 In fact, once reading the programs, one can draw many parallels 
between the ideas of Davutoğlu, and party program and governmental programs of the AK 
Party, including the 58th, 59th, 60th and 61st governments. For instance, Davutoğlu’s ideas such 
as the reassessment of the new conjuncture in the post-Cold War World, the need to 
reevaluate Turkey’s position in this new environment and the goal to keep pace with it have 
been included in the programs of the 58th, 59th, 60th and 61st governments as well as in the 
party program of the AK Party. Furthermore, an emphasis on Turkey’s historical and 
geographical depth, a proactive foreign policy need and goal as well as a visional foreign 
policy has been explicitly utilized in the party and governmental programs. Likewise, a multi-
dimensional foreign policy (along with Atlantic and European dimensions of foreign policy, 
increasing efforts to develop a Eurasian oriented policy) might be called as a further point 
underscored in the governmental programs and party program. Historical responsibilities of 
Turkey stemming from historical and cultural ties with the Middle East, Balkans and the 
Caucasus, the aim to develop relations with these regions particularly on economic ground 
and a close interest in the problems of these regions are commonly underlined in the 
governmental programs and in the party program too.  
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Considering the below mentioned foreign policy principles, it ought to be noted that 
these principles were stipulated by Davutoğlu as the foreign minister of Turkey and it can be 
also found out that proactive and pre-emptive foreign policy, rhythmic diplomacy, “zero 
problem policy” and maximum cooperation/economic integration with neighbors, balanced 
relations with all global and regional players (i.e. the EU, US, Russia, China, Muslim World, 
Arab World) are virtually common principles of all governmental programs and the party 
program.147  
 
Therefore, one may conclude that his ideas have been to a large extent adopted by the 
AK Party governments and, that Davutoğlu has left his mark on recent TFP as the prevailing 
conviction proposes. 
 
  3.2.3.3. Principles of the new Turkish foreign policy 
   3.2.3.3.1. Two “balances” 
Considering popular discussions about TFP, Davutoğlu stresses two “balances”. First 
balance refers to the idea that Turkey should develop a balanced relationship with all global 
actors which is relevant to axis shift debates on Turkey’s new foreign policy orientation. The 
second one relates to the balance between democracy and security in terms of internal politics.  
 
1. Davutoğlu’s vision suggests a multidimensional approach to foreign policy. Though 
the recent TFP attracts criticism that Turkey shifts its axis from the West towards the East, 
Davutoğlu views developing relations with the Muslim world and with other regional 
organizations as complementary to the new Turkish strategy, but not an alternative to 
Turkey’s current relations with the EU or the USA.148 As such, improving relations with 
Russia should be viewed neither as an alternative to relations with the EU nor to the relations 
with the United States.149 In this regard, developing relations with the Islamic world and 
assuming an active role in regional organizations such as the BSEC or ECO matter both 
strategically and political economically, which would also strengthen Turkey’s position in the 
eyes of the EU and other power centers.150  
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On the other hand, tense relations with the EU and its negative attitude against 
Turkey’s EU membership rendered developing a comprehensive regional strategy inevitable. 
Since a uni-dimensional foreign policy towards the West would place Turkey in a dilemma, 
Ankara has to augment its alternatives.151 Consequently, Davutoğlu suggests that Turkey 
should replace its strictly pro-western foreign policy with a multi-dimensional one and 
establish balanced relations with all global actors. Similarly, Özal regards a multidimensional 
foreign policy essential and views developing relations with the East not as an alternative but 
as complementary to Turkey’s western connection. Therefore, it might be suggested that roots 
of Davutoğlu’s multidimensional approach are in the Özal era.   
 
2. Like Özal, Davutoğlu establishes a close connection between domestic political 
transformation and foreign policy, and sees a balance between democracy and security as a 
precondition for having a chance to establish a sphere of influence in its environs. He regards 
this balance relevant to internal peace and highlights it as essential in order to eliminate 
internal political threat perceptions and underlines that democracy is Turkey’s most important 
soft power.152 He argues that more democracy would produce more security which would 
emancipate the domestic political landscape increasingly from the enduring dominance of 
security. This case would influence foreign policy positively and strengthen the 
maneuverability of Turkey to a great extent.153 This understanding constituted one of the main 
reasons of AK Party government’s “opening” policies, particularly towards the Kurds. 
Furthermore, in parallel with Özal, Erdoğan defined the supra-identity of Turkish people as 
“Turkish citizenship”.154 
   3.2.3.3.2. “Zero problems policy” and maximum cooperation / 
economic integration with neighbors 
 
Regarding the relations with the neighbors, Davutoğlu had advocated as an 
academician that Turkey could not develop cross-border regional or global policies so long as 
it experiences consistent problems with neighbors.155 Hence, in order to be a player on 
regional and global scale, Turkey has to resolve its problems with the neighboring 
countries.156 This logic has been reflected to the policy field with the slogan of “zero 
problems policy” towards neighbors. It might possibly be the most well known principle of 
recent TFP which envisages maintaining the best possible relationships with all of 
surrounding countries. In addition to the zero problems policy, Davutoğlu advances his 
approach one step further and aims for maximum economic and political cooperation with 
Turkey’s neighbors.157 In other words, cultivating a welfare circle in the region has become 
one of the significant goals of AK Party government’s foreign policy. As Laçiner puts it 
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“Ankara wants well-being of its surrounding countries, this is clear, because well-being of 
them is the well-being of Turkey itself.”158 
 
However, Davutoğlu points out that while he put forward this principle, he never 
imagined that every single problem with neighbors would be solved. He underscores that in 
employing this slogan, their main goal was to achieve a mentality change in Turkey as well as 
to shift Turkey’s international outlook positively. Meanwhile, he makes a distinction between 
the regimes and peoples of neighboring countries and argues that they materialized the “zero-
problems” first among the peoples of the countries not with the regimes of the neighbors. 159 
 
In this context, Turkish diplomacy has witnessed a considerably dynamic process. 
Turkey's trade with its neighbors and nearby regions has substantially increased in recent 
years. In this respect, developing relations with Syria until the beginning of the so called Arab 
Spring in 2011 and Georgia are particularly worthy of mentioning. It might be claimed that 
Turkey’s level of economic relations with Russia, Iran and Georgia reached nearly a certain 
level of economic interdependence. Moreover, Turkey established high-level strategic council 
meetings with Iraq, Syria, Greece and Russia and targets to establish similar mechanisms with 
Bulgaria, Azerbaijan and Ukraine as well as other neighboring countries. Turkey took 
considerable steps in respect of abolishing visa requirements with neighbors and abolished 
visa requirements mutually with Syria, Tajikistan, Albania, Lebanon, Jordan, Libya, Russia 
and Ukraine.160  
 
Moreover, zero problems with neighbors principle of the Erdoğan leadership seems to 
be confirming one of the main theses of the constructivist theory, namely anarchy is what 
states make of it. Erdoğan leadership has put forward a policy and has aimed at the ideational 
level to eliminate the barriers existing and preventing good relations with neighbors. 
Likewise, it has sought to establish closer relations with them and thereby to establish a peace 
and prosperity circle around Turkey. The next step of this policy has been explained by FM 
Davutoğlu as commencing the integration process with the regional countries, i.e. 
constructing a collective identity definition with them.161 In this manner, Erdoğan leadership 
has intended to make a contribution to a peaceful environment in its region instead of an 
anarchic one.    
 
Considering the Özal era, in fact, Özal did not put forward a “zero problems” vision, 
yet he believed that the questions with neighboring countries would be solved in parallel with 
developing economic relations. In this context, he attached great importance especially to 
improving economic relations and establishing interdependencies with neighbors. In this 
respect, one might contend that the Davutoğlu approach with neighbors is a kind of advanced 
form of the Özal's approach which was underpinned by a good theoretical background and a 
striking slogan.   
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   3.2.3.3.3. Economy and civil society as a part of foreign policy 
An assessment of economy and civil society as a part of foreign policy whose support 
is being mobilized and integrated into the process of foreign policy-conducting may be 
envisaged as a further principle of the AK Party foreign policy.162 In parallel with the 
development of economy and democracy, independent industrialists and other Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have increased their weight on foreign policy of Ankara 
to a large extent.163 Additionally, the AK Party government cooperates with NGOs on 
numerous issues and regards them as a part of foreign policy and complementary to its foreign 
policy vision.164 To list a few instances, TUSKON played a considerable role in Turkey’s 
opening policies to Africa. TUSIAD seeks to facilitate Turkey’s EU membership process 
through its lobby activities. MUSIAD is in search for developed relations with the Gulf 
countries.165 Moreover, civil society is integrated into foreign policy processes, along with 
other channels, through think tanks and it is mobilized in international humanitarian aid 
campaigns as it was clearly seen in the famine catastrophe in Somalia, in the summer of 2011.  
On the other hand, economic concerns have been still one of the main drivers of TFP. 
In fact, economy found initially a place at the top of TFP agenda during the Özal leadership. 
In the early 1980s, the economic model of import substitution was replaced with an export-
oriented model and thereby economy became a significant item on TFP agenda. In the wake 
of Özal’s withdrawal from the political scene in 1993, a security-based understanding 
dominated foreign policy and security loomed large in foreign policy-making. When İsmail 
Cem became FM in the second half of 1990s, economy made a comeback to the top of foreign 
policy agenda.166 Under the rule of AK Party, economy continued to be one of the significant 
components of FP. Similar to Özal, Erdoğan attaches a great importance to economy. 
Accordingly, Turkey first needs a strong economy in order to build a robust republic and 
safeguard democracy.167 A strong economy is also a precondition of an assertive foreign 
policy. One has to recognize the close connection between the spectacular economic 
performance of Turkish economy and its recent foreign policy activism.  
 
Being aware of the close connection between the export-oriented development model 
and the pursuit of economic interest, Davutoğlu implies that economic interests are among the 
main foreign policy priorities of those countries which adopt export-oriented economic 
development model.168 Furthermore, in an interview in 2004, he underlines that in order to 
reach the political goals, political authority should cooperate with the private sector and 
concludes that the business world has become a primary driver of foreign policy.169 Thus, 
speaking of economy as a main driver of recent foreign policy activism of Turkey, one should 
not ignore the role of economic actors. In this context, the changing interest perceptions of 
industrialists and the new economic actors such as the so called Anatolian Tigers are worthy 
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of noting.170 Booming trade with neighbors cannot be comprehended without a reference to 
those actors. For instance, in the booming economic relations with Syria, the Anatolian 
industrialists and exporters played a crucial role.171  
Finally, one should note that economic concerns lie at the center of zero-problems 
policy and economic cooperation approaches with neighbors. It might be considered that two 
goals underlie the developing interdependencies approach of the AK Party government. First, 
interdependence is seen as a functionalist tool for conflict resolution and peace building; 
second, interdependence provides markets for Turkish exports and businesses.172 It could be 
argued that as a strategist, Davutoğlu puts relatively more emphasis on the former dimension. 
Accordingly, in the course of AK Party governments, the economy has been seen as a part of 
security and stability policy. By improving interdependencies and a welfare circle around 
Turkey, the government aims for more security and stability in the region. Additionally, since 
Turkey has an export-oriented economy, foreign trade has been a significant component of 
TFP since 1980s. In order to sustain its economic growth, Turkey has needed new markets. 
Therefore, it has pragmatically capitalized on its historical and geographical assets and strove 
for revitalizing its potential in the Middle East, Balkans and Central Asia.  
   3.2.3.3.4. Proactive and pre-emptive peace diplomacy 
 
This principle envisions a proactive and pre-emptive stance towards the crises, that is, 
it implies taking measures before crises emerge and escalate to a critical level. According to 
Davutoğlu, “Turkey's regional policy is based on security for all, high-level political dialogue, 
economic integration and interdependence, and multicultural coexistence.”173 In conformity 
with this principle, Turkey undertook the mediator role between Syria and Israel and 
endeavored to achieve Sunni-Shiite reconciliation in Iraq. Reconciliation efforts in Lebanon 
and Palestine, the Serbia-Bosnia reconciliation in the Balkans, dialogue between Afghanistan 
and Pakistan, and the reconstruction of Darfur and Somalia might be listed as further 
examples of pre-emptive diplomacy.174 Additionally, Ankara’s mediation endeavors can be 
also assessed in the context of AK Party leadership’s sense of responsibility towards the 
territories which were formerly incorporated into the Ottoman imperial realm. As a matter of 
fact, AK Party leadership prefers viewing itself as being not just politically but also morally 
responsible for the events in the former Ottoman territories.175  
Meanwhile, in compliance with a proactive foreign policy understanding, FM 
Davutoğlu underlines a vision-oriented foreign policy as a methodological principle of TFP. 
Accordingly, policies are conducted not with a passive and reactionary approach to 
international developments, but with a visionary approach that already defined before.176  
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Proactive foreign policy is a common point of Özal and Erdoğan eras. Özal advocated 
that active foreign policy was indispensible especially in the wake of the Cold War and in 
accordance with this understanding; he pursued an active policy particularly during the Gulf 
War and sought to avoid the negative implications of a possible Kurdish state in Northern 
Iraq. Furthermore, Özal took serious initiatives in the Bosnian and Nagorno-Karabakh crises 
and maintained an active policy to settle the crises. Given the Erdoğan governments’ 
encompassing and assertive efforts to settle or prevent the crises, Özal leadership’s endeavors 
seem somewhat limited. Nevertheless, considering Özal's attitude in the course of the Gulf 
War and in the Bosnian and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts, one might draw parallels between 
the Özal and Erdoğan eras. 
   3.2.3.3.5. Rhythmic diplomacy 
 
This principle stipulates a more active involvement of Turkey in all international 
relations issues. Accordingly, Turkey should take an active role in all international 
organizations and on issues of international importance. In this framework, after almost fifty 
years, Turkey became once again a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council for 
2009-2010 period and chaired three commissions on the council concerning Afghanistan, 
North Korea, and the fight against terror. By the same token, “Turkey undertook the 
chairmanship-in-office of the South-East European Cooperation Process, a forum for dialogue 
among Balkan states and their immediate neighbors, for 2009 and 2010. Turkey is also a 
member of G-20, maintains observer status in the African Union, has a strategic dialogue 
mechanism with the Gulf Cooperation Council, and actively participates in the Arab League. 
Turkey has also launched new diplomatic initiatives by opening 15 new embassies in Africa 
and two in Latin America, and is a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol.”177 All these examples 
might be appraised in the context of the rhythmic diplomacy principle.  
Indeed, it may be argued that the Davutoğlu vision on this subject is more assertive 
than Özal’s vision. Nonetheless, one might contend that the roots of the rhythmic diplomacy 
principle lie in the Özal era as well. As a matter of fact, under his reign, Turkey assumed an 
increasingly active role in the OIC. Additionally, Özal spearheaded or revitalized some 
regional organizations such as BSEC, ECO and Central Asian Common Market. 
Consequently, rhythmic diplomacy principle may be seen as an advanced extension of a 
policy line commenced in the Özal era too.  
   3.2.3.3.6. Pro-Soft power foreign policy 
 
In addition to these principles, capitalizing on soft power might be regarded as a 
further principle of the Erdoğan leadership's foreign policy.178 Davutoğlu underlines it as a 
significant methodological principle of TFP. At this point, a definition of soft power is 
necessary. Notwithstanding the divergent definitions in the literature, it is defined by Joseph 
S. Nye as the ability to attract others by the legitimacy of a country’s policies and the values 
underlie them.179 In other words, soft power is described as “a country’s ability to obtain the 
outcomes it wants not through coercion or rewards but through its attractiveness – 
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specifically, through the attractiveness of its culture, political values, and policies.”180 This is 
only possible through the ability of persuasion with convincing arguments and rational 
policies. Here, the ability of persuasion and persuasiveness emerge as the component of 
power.181 
In this respect, it is accepted that Turkey’s soft power peaked particularly until the 
beginning of the "Arab spring."182 Along with its historical and cultural depth,183 there were 
three basic reasons for Turkey’s rising soft power.184 Its social and cultural achievements, its 
modernization and economic development and its political and economic stability played 
essential roles for Turkey’s rising soft power. Additionally, Turkey’s democracy coupled with 
its candidate status to the EU membership and reform process was viewed as the most 
important component of its soft power.185  
Lastly, Turkish diplomacy has recently demonstrated an increasing eagerness to 
interfere in the regional conflicts and to play third party roles in the management and, if 
possible, the resolution of them.186 In its mediation endeavors, Turkey has adopted a modest 
and careful diplomacy, targeted to include all related actors and to form a broad coalition to 
solve problems. This has strengthened Turkey’s soft power in international politics. Turkish 
policy-makers’ sensitiveness to keep an equal distance from all actors and to avoid taking part 
in any regional alliances or groupings until the beginning of the Arab spring enhanced its 
credibility and provided Turkey a distinguished place at the international level.187 Along with 
all-inclusive policy and equi-distance policy, its good relations with the conflicting parties in 
the region contributed to the soft power of Turkey.188 These policies were most probably the 
key in Turkey’s success as regards its mediation endeavors in the Balkans (i.e. regarding the 
controversies between Serbs and Bosnians) and in the Middle East (i.e. Syria-Israeli peace 
talks189  facilitated by Turkey which had made a great progress until Israel’s Gaza attack in 
2008). From a constructivist point of view, the change in Turkey's domestic politics, namely 
advancing democratization process, determined steps taken on the way of EU membership as 
well as economic dynamism and development have changed the "Turkey perception" at the 
ideational level in the eyes of the world. Along with its material power, this reality has 
ideationally mounted Turkey's soft power in the world.   
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In comparison to the Özal era, Turkey’s soft power seems one step ahead in the 
Erdoğan era, at least up to 2011. In this case, the dominant norms of both terms play 
considerable role as well. One might argue that owing to the impact of the hard power policy 
represented by the USA, soft power was of secondary importance in the Özal era. Moreover, 
due to Özal’s active support for the USA in the course of the Gulf War, Turkey’s prestige was 
shaken particularly in the Arab world; thereby Turkey’s soft power was adversely affected in 
the region. On the contrary, Erdoğan leadership viewed soft power as a significant component 
of its foreign policy especially until 2011 and aforementioned factors increased Turkey’s soft 
power to a considerable extent. Consequently, it seems that Erdoğan leadership's soft power-
oriented foreign policy presented a sort of novelty.   
 3.2.4. Conclusion 
 
While the Kemalist elite inclined to ignore the Ottoman legacy of Turkey, similar to 
Özal leadership, Erdoğan leadership has brought it once again on the table by arguing that the 
end of Cold War period changed the international conjuncture and brought about new 
opportunities as well as new responsibilities for Turkey. Several incidents in the Balkans and 
in the Middle East showed that Turkey can neither deny nor ignore its history. Regarding 
these facts, Davutoğlu re-defined Turkish identity by taking into account of Turkey’s Ottoman 
history and its geography, and called it as a central country. Subsequently, he defined 
Turkey’s foreign policy principles in compatible with his new identity definition and with his 
perception about the new conditions of the international system. Davutoğlu’s ideas were 
widely acknowledged among the AK Party elite and thereby “new” Turkey’s foreign policy 
has been heavily influenced by him. 
 
Considering the common points of Özal and Erdoğan eras, one would realize that both 
leaders come from religious families and Islam constitutes a significant part of their identities. 
They both perform ritual prayers on a regular basis, their paths intersected at the Nakshibandi 
order of dervishes and their discourses bear the stamp of Islamic sources such as Quran and 
Hadith. They both have similar civilization understandings, that is, they represent an 
analogous line which does not deny Turkey’s historical legacy stemming from the Ottoman 
past and share a similar point of view vis-à-vis the West. They are westernist indeed, yet in a 
different sense. Both consider that just as the East, the West has positive as well as negative 
sides. Therefore, without ignoring the “virtues” of their respective civilization, they adopt the 
modern/western values.  Furthermore, a combination of their self-confident stances towards 
the West with their Islamic identities paves the way for a multidimensional foreign policy, i.e. 
without changing the conventional direction of Turkey; they develop alternative relations with 
the Muslim world and other eastern countries. Consequently, their common Muslim identities 
as well as their unique posture towards the western values bring them to a distinctive position.  
 
Albeit their different socialization processes and non-identically overlapping 
intellectual roots of foreign policy concepts, Erdoğan and Özal leaderships share considerably 
similar points in terms of their foreign policy principles as well as policy practices. For 
example, in both terms Turkey’s historical and cultural values were regarded as parts of 
Turkish identity. Both the responsibilities and opportunities presented by those values were 
taken into consideration in FP conducting, and policy makers sought to make use of them in 
line with their FP principles. Even though Özal defined Turkey rhetorically as a “bridge” and 
Davutoğlu defined it as a “central” country, they drew similar conclusions from these various 
definitions, namely an active and multidimensional foreign policy was indispensible for 
Ankara. Both considered the end of Cold War as a horizon-opening event for TFP and 
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subscribed to the idea that Turkey could not isolate itself from the world. Additionally, it was 
accepted in both eras that Turkey’s weight in the West was a positive function of its weight in 
the east. Thus, in addition to the high profile relations with the West, developing relations 
with the East was viewed essential. With the words of Öniş and Yılmaz, “the Europeanization 
and Euro-Asian elements in Turkish foreign policy coexisted during both periods. What 
seems to be striking is a swing of the pendulum in the direction of Euro-Asianism in periods 
of disappointment and weakening of relations with the European Union.”190 Nevertheless, in 
accordance with multidimensional understanding, relations with the East were not viewed as 
alternative to the relations with the West or vice versa.     
 
Under the stewardship of Özal and Eroğan leaderships, internal peace was regarded as 
a prerequisite of a successful foreign policy and a well functioning democracy was viewed the 
most important instrument to achieve internal peace. Hence, revolutionary steps were taken to 
this end, particularly in terms of the Kurdish question.191 Pursuant to the considerations that 
developing interdependencies in the region matters both in terms of regional peace and 
Turkey’s economic interests, Özal and Erdoğan leaderships attached importance to the 
relations with neighbors. In spite of the fact that Özal did not put forward a “zero problems” 
vision, he was of the opinion that problems with neighbors would be solved in parallel with 
the booming economic relations. In this respect, he put emphasis especially on the importance 
of developing economic relations and establishing interdependencies with the neighboring 
countries. In short, underpinned with good slogans, Davutoğlu’s vision of “zero problems” 
and “maximum cooperation/economic integration” with neighbors might be deemed as an 
advanced and crystallized form of Özal's approach. Additionally, economy occupied a central 
space in both Özal and Erdoğan governments’ agendas. Export-oriented economic model 
commenced by Özal was firmly embraced by Erdoğan as well. With a view to increasing 
export of the country, like Özal, Erdoğan leadership followed active foreign policy. As Kirişçi 
stated,192 in both terms the concept of “trading state” was on the rise.  
 
A proactive foreign policy has been a serious commonality of Özal and Erdoğan 
leaderships, in which the traditional non-interventionist foreign policy was left aside. At this 
point, a parallel may be drawn between Özal and Davutoğlu approaches, which aimed to 
spearhead international politics instead of pursuing a reactive policy line. Özal’s active policy 
was especially in the post-Cold War term conspicuous, i.e. during the Gulf War, Bosnian and 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts. Erdoğan governments carried this proactive policy line further 
and assumed mediator roles in several conflict points. Reconciliation efforts between Syria 
and Israel, Serbians and Bosnians, Shiites and Sunnis in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan might 
be regarded in this respect.  
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Erdoğan government’s rhythmic diplomacy principle can be also traced back to the 
Özal era. As a matter of fact, for the very first time Turkey participated in the activities of 
ICO actively and sought to make use of it under Özal’s reign. This fact materialized 
particularly in Turkey’s endeavors in Bosnian conflict. Furthermore, he initiated or revitalized 
some regional organizations such as BSEC, ECO and Central Asian Common Market. As a 
consequence, rhythmic diplomacy might be also viewed as an extension of Özal's policies.  
Additionally, Davutoğlu vision put forward a balanced approach to all global and 
regional actors. Though Özal envisaged also a balanced relationship with the regional and 
global actors because of Turkey’s “bridge role”, he did not give up regarding the USA as the 
main axis of TFP. As noted above, his ultimate goal was to install Turkey as an influential 
regional power under the protective umbrella of the USA. Stated differently, whilst Özal 
regarded the USA as the main axis of TFP, he sought to decrease Turkish dependency on the 
United States by improving alternative relations with other actors. On the other hand, by 
defining Turkey as a “central country”, Davutoğlu vision has been stricter in terms of 
developing balanced relations with all actors. In this respect, this vision did not see the 
dimensions of “new” foreign policy as alternative to each other; hence, as long as the Turkish 
interests are concerned, it saw no harm in developing closer relations with the Middle Eastern 
neighbors, such as Iran and Syria, increasingly at the expense of its ties with the U.S.193 Of 
course, the ideational change about the structure of international system from one polar in the 
last few years of the Özal era to a multi-polar system in the 2000s as well as the changing 
norms which did not welcome the use of hard power were decisive in the attitude of the AK 
Party leadership. Therefore, one might conclude that a distinctive approach of the Özal and 
Erdoğan leaderships concerning the relations with the United States attract attention and this 
might be partly explained with the diverging ideas about the role and position of Washington 
in world politics as well as with the changing norms of the day. 
 
Before ending this chapter, one should underline two more common points of Erdoğan 
and Özal leaderships, namely their similar attitudes towards the bureaucracy and their struggle 
with the military tutelage. Firstly, Turgut Özal was not satisfied with the state understanding 
and the working tempo of the bureaucracy.  He regarded it as a structure which was not able 
to keep up with his working pace and even being impediment to him. Özal stressed that it was 
politicians who were carrying the political responsibility, thus the decision-making authority 
should have been in their hand. Özal objected the decisive position of the bureaucracy in the 
state affairs which carried neither economic nor political responsibility. In this context, he 
made some interventions to the scope of authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Forming 
the Under secretariat for Treasury and Foreign Trade and linking it directly to the Prime 
Ministry, PM Özal narrowed the scope of authority of the Foreign Ministry and indirectly 
lessened the weight of bureaucrats in foreign policy making. Furthermore, he recruited a 
group of advisors and increased their influence in the foreign policy field. It was even claimed 
that "Özal’s foreign policy advisors, a new generation of younger, educated technocrats such 
as Özdem Sanberk and Cem Duna who were attuned to his dynamic and reformist approach, 
were more influential than even the serving under-secretary in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs."194 A similar conclusion might be reached as to the Erdoğan era as well. It is hard to 
claim that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has very positive ideas about the Turkish bureaucracy. As a 
matter of fact, he put forward the "bureaucratic oligarchy" concept and repeatedly criticized 
bureaucrats as those who were passive, resist every kind of change and could not keep pace 
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with the change in the world. Erdoğan declared his determination to struggle with this 
"bureaucratic oligarchy."195 In order to overcome the bureaucratic structure in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Erdoğan pursued a similar strategy to Özal's.196 
 
Therefore, foreign policy advisors occupied a significant place in the foreign policy 
making processes of the Erdoğan government as well. As noted before, the role of Ahmet 
Davutoğlu who served first as the chief advisor of Erdoğan from 2003 until 2009 has been 
widely acknowledged in the literature in the "new" foreign policy understanding of the AK 
Party governments. This situation continued until 2009 when Davutoğlu became foreign 
minister. As of 2009, however, contrary to the established practices, along with the foreign 
ministry bureaucrats, successful people in different professions such as founders of NGOs and 
academicians began to be appointed as ambassadors as well.197 Therefore, both the structure 
and the role of foreign ministry in foreign policy making have begun to alter. Consequently, 
both Özal and Erdoğan criticized bureaucracy for not being able to keep up with their own 
understanding and with their pace in the foreign policy field. Hence both have sought to give 
a new direction to the TFP by by-passing the foreign policy bureaucrats through an alternative 
"advisors cadre." 
 
Another common point between Özal and Erdoğan eras is the role of these leaders to 
decrease the weight of the army in Turkish politics as well as in the foreign policy making 
field. The rise of Turgut Özal in foreign policy making was in parallel with the re-
democratization of the country, in other words, along with the decline of the army's role in 
Turkish politics. As a matter of fact, Özal took substantial steps on the way of 
democratization of the country, played an essential role in the descending weight of the 
generals in foreign policy making and increased the efficiency of the civil authority in this 
field.198 In doing this, Özal declared his "fearlessness" in the face of the allegations that the 
army could interfere into the government again.199  
                                               
195 “Erdoğan ‘bürokratik oligarşi’ye savaş açtı,” Hürriyet, 10.06.2003, accessed 11.09.2011, 
http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=152343. “Erdoğan’ın bürokratik oligarşi isyanı,” Yeni 
Şafak, 09.05.2009, accessed 11.09.2011, http://yenisafak.com.tr/Politika/?t=10.05.2009&i=185427. “Erdoğan: 
Bürokratik oligarşi bir beladır,” Zaman, 05.04.2010, accessed 11.09.2011,  
http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=969802&title=erdogan-burokratik-oligarsi-bir-beladir. “Erdoğan: 
Bürokratik oligarşi var,” Milliyet,  21.01.2011, accessed 11.09.2011, http://www.milliyet.com.tr/erdogan-
burokratik-oligarsi-var/siyaset/haberdetay/21.01.2011/1342101/default.htm. “Geldiğimden beri en büyük 
kavgam,” Habertürk, 24.09.2011, accessed 26.09.2011, http://www.haberturk.com/dunya/haber/672707-
geldigimden-beri-en-buyuk-kavgam. 
196 Eroğan proclaimed his feelings about the traditional Ministary of Foreign Affairs bureoucracy most explicitly 
in the course of the “monşer polemic”. Erdoğan heavily criticized some former ambassadors by calling them 
“mon cher”. “Erdoğan: Monşer Geldiler, monşer gidiyorlar,” Milliyet, 13.02.2009, accessed 11.09.2011, 
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Siyaset/SonDakika.aspx?aType=SonDakika&ArticleID=1059445&Date=13.02.2009
&Kategori=siyaset&b=Erdogan:%20Monser%20geldiler,%20monser%20gidiyorlar. He implied with this 
“moncher” concept that some diplomats were admirer of the west, they distanced themselves from their 
respective society and from its realities, and they were disdaining their respective people. “Monşer lafını 
üzerlerine aldılar,” Habertürk, 13.09.2011, accessed 21.09.2011, 
http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/669205-monser-lafini-uzerlerine-aldilar. “NATO toplantısında monşer 
polemiği,” Zaman, 01.02.2009, http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=810488  
197 “Davutoğlu to appoint another non-diplomat as ambassador,” Todays Zaman, 11.08.2011, accessed 
11.09.2011, http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=253434. “Endonezya ve 
Myanmar Birliğine Yeni Büyükelçiler,” TRTHaber.com, 14.01.2012, accessed 11.03.2012, 
http://www.trthaber.com/haber/turkiye/endonezya-ve-myanmar-birligine-yeni-buyukelciler-24167.html. “YÖK 
Eski Başkanı Büyükelçi Oldu,” TRTHaber.com, 23.02.2012, accessed 11.03.2012,  
http://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/yok-eski-baskani-buyukelci-oldu-29705.html  
198 Robins, Suits and uniforms, 54-55. 
199 Yasemin Çelik, Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy, (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1999), 87. 
 139  
 
Likewise, along with the democratization of Turkey, the role of the generals in foreign 
policy decision-making process has relatively decreased in the Erdoğan leadership's era as 
well and the civil authority gained prominence once again. Erdoğan leadership has struggled 
also to further downgrade the weight of the military in the political landscape. In this 
connection for instance, unlike the widely accepted practices of the Turkish Armed Forces, 
PM Erdoğan interfered in the High Military Councils (Yüksek Askeri Şura) of 2011 and 2012. 
Consequently, a rare event took place in Turkish politics and the Chief of Staff, Işık Koşaner 
resigned. This was the second resignation of a Chief of Staff in the Turkish Army after Necip 
Torumtay who had resigned in 1990 in protest against the policies of President Turgut Özal 
during the first Gulf War. In a nutshell, both Özal and Erdoğan leaderships took giant steps on 
the way democratization of Turkey and simultaneously on the way of downgrading the weight 
of the Turkish Armed Forces in Turkish politics.  
 
Eventually, one may conclude that foreign policy approaches of Özal and Erdoğan 
leaderships overlap to a large extent. However, it is evident that theory and practice may not 
always overlap owing to the realities on the ground. Though there is a consensus that 
Davutoğlu’s ideational approach made a mark on recent TFP, in order to discover to what 
degree his theoretical approach influenced foreign policy applications of Turkish diplomacy, a 
closer and concrete analysis is necessary. Coupled with this consideration, in order to test the 
coherence of my aforementioned hypotheses, in the following chapters, Turkish-U.S. relations 
will be empirically analyzed as of early 1980s. Special emphasis will be laid on the Özal and 
Erdoğan eras so as to make an accurate comparison between these periods and test the 
hypotheses. Finally, the results of this analysis will be evaluated under the framework of the 
constructivist thinking.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: TURKISH-US RELATIONS: BACKGROUND AND 
THE ÖZAL ERA                                   
 
4.1. Historical background: Outlines of Turkish foreign policy until 1980s: The 
traditional route 
 4.1.1. Intensive cooperation with the US in the security field between 1945 and 
1960s   
 
In this chapter, the roots of Turkey's strict pro-western foreign policy in the aftermath 
of the Second World War are discussed. Thereby, the historical development process of 
Ankara-Washington relations will have been handled. It seems necessary to analyze the strong 
alliance tradition with Washington both at the institutional level and at the practical level in 
order to fully account for the historical roots of Turkey-U.S. relations.       
 
Immediately after the end of the WWII, the biggest problem of Turkish foreign policy 
(TFP) was its solitude. Turkey which abstained meticulously from joining the war was 
concerned to see the negative effects of this stance.1 As a matter of fact, in the immediate 
aftermath of the War, Turkey faced a serious security threat from its northern neighbor, the 
Soviet Union (SU), which had made some unacceptable claims including some territorial 
ones. Ankara had to tackle with these Soviet demands virtually on its own and could not get 
easily the backup of the USA in particular and the West in general.2  
 
The SU sought to expand its sphere of influence to the Mediterranean including 
Turkey.3 To this end, it did not want to extend the Treaty of Non-Aggression and Neutrality 
of 1925 unless its demands were fulfilled. The Soviets demanded a revision of the Soviet-
Turkish border in the northeast of Turkey, permission to establish military bases on the 
Bosporus and Dardanelles as well as some changes of the Montreux Strait Convention.4 
Facing this aggressive and expansionist policies of the SU to its sovereignty, Turkey’s foreign 
policy agenda was completely dominated by this issue and Ankara had no other choice except 
for asking the USA and the UK for protection.5 Thus, the Soviet attitude towards Turkey and 
need for security led to a radical change in TFP in favor of the West. In other words, due to 
the Soviet threat, Turkey was obliged to leave aside its traditional balance and neutrality 
based foreign policy and turned its face to the West.  
 
In addition to the Soviet threat, there were, of course, other reasons with respect to 
Turkey’s strictly pro-western foreign policy. Ideologically, Turkey had seen the West as the 
                                               
1 Nevin Yurdsever Ateş, Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası ve Hükümet Programları, in 21.Yüzyılda Türk 
Dış Politikası (Turkish Foreign Policy in 21.Century), ed.İdris Bal, (Ankara: Ankara Global Araştırmalar 
Merkezi-Lalezar Kitabevi, 2006), 37. 
2 İlay İleri, “Türkiye’nin Dış Politikası”(Foreign Policy of Turkey), Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılâp Tarihi 
Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi, (Mayıs-Kasım 2005): 378. 
3 K. Inat, “Republic of Turkey,” p.499 
4 Hüseyin Bağcı and İdris Bal, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War Era: New Problems and 
Opportunities,” in Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War, ed. İdris Bal, (Florida: Brown Walker Press, 
2004), 97. 
5 Kemal İnat, Republic of Turkey, Foreign Policy of States, in Wolfgang Gieler, Kemal Inat, Claudio Kullmann 
(eds), (İstanbul: Tasam Publications, 2005), 499 
 141  
contemporary civilization and wanted to become an integral part of it.6 Therefore, as 
mentioned above, Westernization has been a significant determining factor of TFP as well. As 
Uslu notes it: 
 
 “Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic, Turkish ruling elite has believed that Turkey 
 can reach the level of advanced countries only if it follows the path of Western countries and 
 joins their political, economic and cultural organizations.”7  
  
Nevertheless, before and during the World War II, it pursued a rather balanced foreign 
policy and followed basically the principle of non-interference rather than alliances. In other 
words, whereas a policy of Westernization in domestic affairs was obvious, its repercussions 
on foreign policy field were relatively limited.8 But, especially after 1945, when the Soviet 
threat arose, TFP behavior changed almost entirely. Turkish rulers turned their face to the 
West and attributed more importance to attaining full participation in all Western 
organizations than they had before attributed.9 Thus, in the aftermath of the WWII, 
Westernization became the leading philosophical principle of Turkey’s foreign policy in real 
terms and the developments since the War confirmed this fact to a great extent.10 
Consequently, ideological aspiration of Turkey also played a determining role in Turkey’s 
decision. Furthermore, Turkey had needed external economic aid in order to realize its 
economic development and the West could meet this need of Turkey. 11 
 
On the other hand, though the USA, at first, was not very willing to support Turkey 
against the Soviet threat, as of the beginning of 1946, the USA embarked on attaching more 
importance to the territorial integrity of Turkey. As the symbol of this situation, the US battle 
ship Missouri transported the dead body of the Turkish ambassador to the USA home to 
Istanbul in April 1946.12 Moreover, “US President Truman announced that the USA would 
provide USD 400 million in aid and military personnel to Turkey and Greece to resist the 
Soviet threat.” This open US support was highly appreciated by Ankara.13 Furthermore, 
within the framework of the Marshall plan, on July 4, 1948, the US signed an agreement with 
Turkey in order to supply economic aid14 and Turkey received almost $140 million economic 
assistance in three years. 
 
Even though the Truman Doctrine showed that the US would not leave Turkey alone 
against the Soviet threat, Turkey needed an actual guarantee and that was vital for its security. 
Thus, when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed on 4 April 1949, 
Turkey expressed its will to join it. Since the early days of the alliance, Turkish policy makers 
demonstrated a great effort to join this alliance system and to acquire the American alliance in 
particular.15 In addition to countering the Soviet threat, being a NATO member would 
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guarantee and institutionalize the Western aid, which was fundamental for both socio-
economic development of Turkey and modernization of its army. Additionally, NATO 
membership would confirm that Turkey was an integral part of the Western world and 
strengthen the organic relations with it.16 
 
In order to be a part of the North Atlantic Pact, Turkey had to comply with the foreign 
policy guidelines of the US-led Western bloc. Thus, Turkey adjusted its Middle East policy to 
the strategies of the USA, altered its pro-Arabic stance, and recognized the state of Israel in 
March 1949.17 By the same token, Turkey sent a brigade to the Korean War in 1950 to assist 
the US forces. With 4,500-man, the Turkish brigade was the third largest contingent after the 
American and South Korean forces. Upon Turkish brigade’s well performance and earning of 
high praise during the war, albeit the general hesitation and opposition within the Pact, NATO 
states approved the membership of Turkey mostly as a result of the US request for it.18 
Eventually, Turkey joined the NATO on 18 February 1952. 
 
During the 1950s, Turkey was inclined to see and evaluate all international events 
through the lenses of this organization and defined its FP in accordance with the western 
alliance. In conformity with the general Western policy, Ankara spearheaded a set of political 
and military organizations in its region.19 In order to close the gap between the NATO and 
CENTO, the USA and the UK wanted to establish a regional alliance in the Middle East. 
Turkey played a major role in the formation of this alliance and eventually the 1955 Baghdad 
Pact was formed between Turkey and Iraq. The UK, Iran and Pakistan joined this alliance 
later on.20 Furthermore, Turkey pioneered another anti-Soviet alliance in the Balkans and 
together with Greece and Yugoslavia; it established the US-sponsored Balkan Pact.21 In 
addition to these regional alliances, Turkey signed 31 bilateral agreements on military support 
and cooperation with the United States between the years of 1950 and 1960.22 Although these 
alliances and bilateral agreements relieved Turkish policy-makers to a great extent against the 
Soviet threat, they resulted in strong dependence on the US. Nonetheless, Turkey sustained its 
efforts also for an economic alignment with the West and became a founding member of the 
Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), which was reformed into the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1961, the organization 
of the Marshall Plan (ERP), and the Council of Europe.23 Moreover, Turkey applied to the 
European Community for membership in 1959 and the Ankara agreement whose objective 
was to make Turkey a full member was signed in this context in 1963.24 
 
Turkey’s strictly pro-Western attitude materialized also in some certain incidents in 
the Middle East. Turkey fully supported the West in the Suez crisis of 1956, in the 
Eisenhower doctrine, in the Syrian crisis of 1957, in the Lebanese and Jordanian crises and in 
the Iraqi revolution of 1958. It acted just like the spokesperson of the West at the Bandung 
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Conference of non-aligned states in 1955.25 This overdrawn pro-Western stance of Turkey 
strained its relations to non-aligned and some Middle Eastern states. The Baghdad Pact, for 
instance, discomforted Egypt and Syria and they took a strong line against it. Turkey and 
other members of the Pact were accused of serving imperialist interests. Egypt which aimed to 
be the leader of the Arab world saw the pact as a Western attempt to split the Arab world.26 
 
Ankara’s attitude in the Bandung Conference is also worthy of attention to 
comprehend its foreign policy approach until early 1960s. Turkish policy-makers did not 
accept the non-alignment as a foreign policy stand and chose the commitment to the West as 
the best way for Turkey’s national interests.27 Thus, it became a promoter of Western foreign 
policy goals. Within this framework, in the Bandung Conference, Turkey sided with the small 
group of states that rejected the idea of non-alignment, acted just like an envoy of the West28 
and requested the non-aligned countries to join the anti-communist alliance. As a result of this 
stance, Turkey was considered by some non-aligned countries as a herald of Western 
colonialism.29 
 4.1.2. Fluctuating relations with the USA and search for new alternatives from 
early 1960s until 1980s 
 
Owing to the Soviet threat during the years of 1945-46, Turkey built its foreign policy 
philosophy upon the principle of full affiliation with the West almost at any price. Hence, 
joining the economic, political as well as the security organizations established in the West 
had been one of the most basic foreign policy priorities of Turkey.30 In the course of 1945-
1960, Turkey experienced very close relations with the West, especially with the United 
States and a positive trend in the relations was obvious. In this term, Turkey adjusted its 
foreign policy to the strategies of the U.S and pursued a firmly pro-Western foreign policy.31 
However, as from 1960s, some fluctuations and crises began to emerge in the relations of 
these two countries. The main reason of these crises and fluctuations in the Turkish-U.S. 
relations between 1960s and 1980s has been the Cyprus issue. In fact, in this term, the Cyprus 
issue constituted the fundamental axis of TFP and its activities on other fields established 
upon it.32  
 
Due to its strictly pro-Western foreign policy, Turkey ignored other policy alternatives 
almost entirely and exaggerated the alignment with the West immoderately. For instance, 
Turkey did not give support to the independence of Algeria at the UN, which had been ruled 
by the Ottomans for several centuries and with whom Ankara enjoys strong historical and 
cultural ties. Instead, it gave a boost to France by declaring that France and Turkey would be 
NATO partners. However, though being NATO partner with France as well, Greece did not 
refrain from voting for Algeria. As a consequence, Turkey experienced difficulty in getting 
the support of Islamic countries on the Cyprus issue at the UN and several of them did not 
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side with Turkey on this issue. The danger of almost total identification with Western policies 
that Turkey had previously displayed became obvious owing to the famous ‘Johnson Letter’ 
of June 5, 1964, which eventually became the cornerstone of TFP.33 In this shocking letter, 
US President Johnson not only warned Ankara not to intervene in Cyprus, but also declared 
that the United States would not permit Turkey to use any U.S.-supplied military equipment 
for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus. Additionally and most importantly, Johnson stated that 
if Turkey takes a step, in case of a Soviet attack, it could not hope for NATO protection. The 
Turks were shocked and disappointed because they had based all their security on the 
guarantee provided by the NATO and had paralleled their foreign policy almost entirely with 
the foreign policy of the U.S. However, now doubts began to emerge as to the credibility of 
the NATO umbrella in case of a Soviet attack.34 
 
Thus, Turkish policy-makers began to demonstrate effort to diversify TFP and reduce 
the dominance of the United States in foreign politics.35 Of course, these efforts were not only 
the result of the Johnson Letter. Relations between Turkey and the United States had already 
been shaken by another crisis. Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and removal of the Jupiter 
missiles from Turkey without consulting Ankara following an agreement between the 
Americans and the Soviets had already led to some doubts among the Turks about the USA.36 
This had signaled that Washington had kept its own security interests over its allies’ and the 
Turks were upset about that.37 The new atmosphere in international relations since the early 
1960s has been also influential in Turkey’s new foreign policy approach. Détente between the 
two superpowers which appeared in the aftermath of the Cuban Missiles Crises and the 
relatively multi-polar structure of the world during the 1960s made a positive contribution to 
the diversification efforts of Turkey regarding its foreign policy. Nevertheless, it must be 
emphasized that the Johnson Letter had a triggering role in this process.38 
 
When Ankara had come to recognize the danger of its overdrawn strategic orientation 
towards the West, in which it sometimes appeared more pro-Western than the West itself, it 
sought for improving its relations with the Middle East, the Soviet Union and the developing 
world. Thereby, Turkish policy-makers hoped to obtain a broader international support for 
their foreign policy goals (e.g. gathering international support for their Cyprus policy) as well 
as to gain more economic benefits.39 Accordingly, Ankara substantially intensified its 
economic ties with both the SU and the other members of the Eastern bloc.40 Simultaneously, 
it abstained from blindly supporting U.S. policies in the Middle East unless it was vital to the 
North Atlantic Pact or had a clear humanitarian purpose. Therefore, during the 1967 Arab-
Israel war, Ankara sided with the Arab countries and refused the U.S. to use Turkish bases to 
support Israel.41 Likewise, Turkey maintained its support for the Arab side in the course of the 
1973 Arab-Israeli war and voted for the 1975 UN General Assembly resolution, which 
condemned Zionism as a form of racism.42 
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Turkish intervention in Cyprus on 20 July 1974 marked another significant stage in the 
Turkish-U.S. relations. When the Greek junta-backed EOKA, the Greek-Cypriot terror group, 
carried out a coup d'état and a puppet government was installed, disregarding the strong US 
urgings not to intervene, Ankara conducted a military intervention in the island.43 This act of 
Turkey culminated in a considerable tension in the Turkish-U.S. relations. In December 1974, 
the US Congress imposed a weapons embargo on Turkey by February 1975 in case that it 
would continue to refuse the UN resolution on a cease-fire.44 This embargo considerably 
damaged Turkish-US relations which had been relatively stabilized in the wake of 1969 US-
Turkish treaty on military cooperation. Eventually, Ankara announced to abolish this military 
cooperation agreement and put all American bases under its control.45 Briefly saying, 1974 
Cyprus intervention of Turkey and the consequent US embargo on Turkey constitutes another 
cornerstone which strengthened the searches of the Turks to diversify their foreign policy and 
distanced Turkey somewhat from the US.46 Furthermore, the question of Peace Corps and of 
poppy cultivation as well as the problems arising from the US military personnel in Turkey 
constituted the main outlook of bilateral relations up to 1980s.47 Nonetheless, all these 
problematic issues notwithstanding, Turkey’s disengagement from the Western alliance did 
not encompass the institutional/structural relations and remained very partial and uncertain 
during the 1970s.48 
 4.1.3. Conclusion 
 
Foreign policy behavior of Turkey in the aftermath of the WWII parallels with the self 
and other perceptions. Once the Soviet Union began to threaten the sovereignty of its 
neighbor, Turkey changed its self-other perceptions and began to define its security policy 
with the West collectively. As mentioned in the Chapter 1, reciprocity matters in terms of 
collective identity formation. Turkey’s attempts reciprocated by the West and thereby, the 
process completed successfully. Besides, as constructivists put it, actors, i.e. Turkey and the 
SU, constructed each other mutually. Notwithstanding the fact that the Turks and Russians 
had been in struggle for centuries, immediately after the formation of Turkish Republic, they 
established good relations and maintained it for a few decades. However, these good relations 
are dependent on the steps that actors take against each other. In our case, the Soviets 
embraced a threatening stance against Turkey as of the end of the Second World War. In 
retaliation, Ankara adopted a defensive strategy and asked the USA and the UK for help. 
Thereby, mutual construction process was completed for that time. As a result, as 
constructivists discuss, Turkey and the Soviet Union constructed each other mutually. 
 
On the other hand, Turkey was firmly loyal to its alliance with the West and ignored 
other foreign policy alternatives. However, as of the beginning of the 1960s, because of some 
events that had taken place in the international field, such as the Cyprus issue and Jupiter 
missiles crisis, Turkey gradually realized that the West and particularly the United States was 
not so enthusiastic to reciprocate Turkey’s attempts to define its foreign policy in line with its 
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alliances. This is why Turkey began to search for other alternatives –or at least 
counterweights- and slight changes in TFP occurred. 
 
 
4.2. Turkey-U.S. relations during the Özal era 
 4.2.1. Introduction 
Since the end of the World War II, Turkish-U.S. relations have always been special. 
Soviet demands from Turkey right after the WWII forced Ankara to search for an alignment 
with the U.S.-led counter block. Along with security needs, pro-western ideological stance of 
the state elite and Turkey’s need for the economic and military aid of the Western Block 
might be regarded as further reasons pushing Turkey towards the West. On the other hand, 
Turkey’s significant strategic importance to the US strategic interests in the Middle East, its 
contribution to the NATO at global level and the western willingness to keep Ankara in the 
Western Block with the intention of not losing prestige against the Soviet camp were the 
reasons why the US has been eager to forge close relations with Turkey.49 In this context, 
whereas Turkey opened its territory for the American and NATO military bases which 
provided major strategic advantage against the communist bloc, the U.S. provided economic 
and military aid for its strategically pivotal ally. 
Attempting to constitute an analysis framework for the Turkish-American relations, 
Gözen argues that two major factors have always been decisive.50 Generally speaking, the set 
of structural and institutional factors form the first part which can be viewed as the 
fundamental dynamic of bilateral relations. At the institutional level, Turkish-American 
relations have depicted a strong continuity. Turkey’s NATO membership, its relations with 
the IMF and the World Bank, its political and diplomatic role stemming from the United 
Nations membership and lastly the US sphere of influence policy in the regions around 
Turkey constitute the most important elements of these determinants which served to the 
continuity of the relations. Secondly, those national and international cyclical/periodical 
developments have been determinant on bilateral relations. Periodic developments at national 
and international levels, governmental changes in Ankara and Washington and the new 
foreign policy approaches of those governments might be regarded in this context. Whereas 
changing conjunctures have brought about sometimes an overlap of interests and policies of 
the two countries, they have caused at other times tensions and conflicts.51 
It should be underscored that in spite of the fluctuating relations because of periodical 
developments especially as of early 1960s, Turkey-US relations have remained considerably 
stable and have not experienced serious zigzags in the institutional dimension. For example, 
Ankara’s Cyprus policy was not approved by the White House and its reaction to Turkey’s 
policies and initiatives was considerably sharp. However, while bilateral relations fluctuated 
from time to time seriously (as it was seen in the Cyprus dispute), these actions and reactions 
have not brought about alterations in bilateral relations at the institutional/structural level. As 
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such, since the concern of the Cold War calculations was in the forefront, the U.S. did not 
care about undemocratic developments in Turkey’s domestic politics as long as these 
developments did not threat to alter Turkey’s foreign policy course substantially. This fact 
was seen in one way or another in the military coups of 1960, 1971 and 1980. In August1960 
for example, a few weeks after the military takeover of the 27th May, U.S. ambassador Avra 
M. Warren evaluated in a cable that the United States “intend[ed] to work with [the military 
government] just as loyally and faithfully as [the United States] did during the Menderes 
government” and that it would work with any future government to ensure Turkey’s 
commitment to the West, “unless it is commie.” Likewise, U.S. priorities were revealed in a 
memorandum from Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff of President 
Richard M. Nixon on March 25, 1971. Disregarding the oscillating Turkish democracy, 
Saunders focused solely on the balance of power and who possess the final word in Turkish 
politics. Saunders merely noted that the military leaders “[were] the final arbiters” and that the 
United States should now be open “to convincing the military decision makers of the urgency 
of the opium problem,” the primary issue of concern to the United States at the time.52 
Someone might conclude at this point from a constructivist point of view that during the Cold 
War the valid norm for the United States to be on the Western camp. Practicing the West 
oriented norms such as democracy and human rights were of secondary importance. But this 
situation began to change after the end of Cold War.  
Gözen underlines that “Turkey’s policy towards the USA was shaped more by the 
situations in the third countries or regions which were related to the interests of both countries 
than by the issues directly related to bilateral relations.”53 With other words, Turkey’s 
geostrategic position compels the US to take it into account as regards the policies in the 
Middle East, the Caucasus, the Central Asia and Balkans. On the other hand, the direct or 
indirect influence of the US on these regions compels Ankara to consider and to seek the 
support of this super power on the regional policies.54 Yet perspectives and foreign policy 
approaches of the primary actors at power in both countries have had a strong impact on the 
converging or diverging policy lines. For instance, during the Özal period, in addition to other 
factors, resemblances of policy understandings of Özal and father Bush gave rise to close 
cooperation in the Gulf War. Turkish-American relations experienced one of the golden ages 
in this period.55   
Considering the relations between Ankara and Washington as of early 1980s, 
transition process to multidimensionality in foreign relations of Ankara began to lose 
momentum and Turkish-American relations entered into a new period of reengagement. Both 
internal and international factors played significant roles in this reengagement process. In 
terms of international conjuncture, “at the end of the 1970s, global developments heightened 
                                               
52 Bülent Aliriza and Bülent Aras, “U.S.-Turkish Relations, a Review at the Beginning of the Third Decade of 
the Post-Cold War Era,” A Joint Report by Center for Strategic Research (SAM) and Center for 
Strategic&International Studies (CSIS), (November 2012): 3.  
53 Gözen, “Turkish-American Relations in 2009,” 51. F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, “Turkish Foreign 
Policy in an Age of Uncertainty,” Santa Monica, CA, RAND (National Security Research Division), (2003): 
165. 
54 Kardaş, "Turkish-American Relations in the 2000s," 25-26. 
55 It is possible to make similar findings for the AK Party term as well. When the son Bush’s hard power policy 
did not overlap with the soft power oriented approach of the AK Party government, the relations strained. 
However, Obama administration decreased relatively the weight of hard power policy in American foreign 
policy and so to say opened a new page in relations with Turkey. Consequently, along with other factors, Obama 
administration’s new foreign policy understanding brought about the augmentation of cooperation areas between 
the two countries and the relations gained a new momentum.   
 148  
tensions between the super powers, and re-established the importance of Turkey’s role in the 
Western alliance, as well as the Turks’ attachment to the West.”56  The Iranian Revolution of 
1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979 re-enhanced Turkey to an 
indispensably important position for the western alliance.57 Additionally, Iraq-Iran War of 
September 1980 and the Green Belt Project of the USA are further cyclical factors 
augmenting Turkey’s weight in the region during 1980s. Finally, aggressive policy of the 
Soviets engendered security concerns in Ankara and pushed it to review its relations with this 
super power. Consequently Turkish policy makers felt the need to reengage with the West.58  
Domestic political circumstances, on the other hand, were also pushing Ankara 
towards Washington. As a matter of fact, the military putsch on September 12, 1980 
destroyed the relations with the European Community due to the violation of democracy, rule 
of law and human rights principles. Thus, the military rule sought for legitimacy in the 
international arena and the US, which has not been as strict as the Europeans on democracy 
and human rights issues did not refrain from providing political and economic support to the 
putschist generals.59 After all, unlike the Europeans, Americans has attached more importance 
to Turkeys’ strategic contribution to the western interests than its democratic development.60 
Therefore, the relevant norm for the Americans to keep Turkey on the path was not a working 
democratic regime in its strategically important ally. In this framework, after the coup d’état, 
Washington tolerated the military administration, declared the decision that American aid to 
its ally would not be interrupted and consequently Turkish-American relations entered into a 
new path.  To give a few examples, before the putsch, Turkish civilian governments had not 
given their consent to the return of Greece to the military command of NATO. Yet solely one 
month after the takeover of the military regime, generals accepted NATO’s American 
commander General Roger’s proposal of lifting the veto on Greece’s return to the NATO 
military structure.61 Likewise, prior to the putsch, Turkey was not an ally to be taken for 
granted just as it was seen during the Hostage Crisis. Ankara had resisted to American 
demands to form a multilateral reactionary block against Iran and had not applied some 
malpractices suggested by America against Teheran. Conversely, it had been eager to play a 
mediator role between Iran and the USA. However, in the wake of the September 12 military 
putsch, the alliance relationship between Ankara and Washington gained a new momentum 
and “two countries have often initiated and reacted together with respect to the various 
problems and issues of world politics. From that time on, America looked up Turkey as ‘a 
reliable ally in a problematic region’.”62 
 
Despite the relatively stable and smooth relations during the 1980s, Turkish-American 
relations experienced periodic fluctuations on some occasions as well. In the following pages, 
Turkish-American relations will be analyzed by concentrating on significant themes. In doing 
this, the special emphasis will be laid certainly on the Özal era and Özal’s impact on TFP.  
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 4.2.2. A Constructivist approach to the Turkish-U.S. relations during the Özal 
era, 1980s 
 
 To begin with, one has to clarify what is meant with the Özal era. The Özal era refers 
to the time period which started in 1983, when Turgut Özal's Motherland Party (MP) came to 
power and ended in October 1991 when the intra-party opposition of the MP defeated the 
general chairman candidate backed by President Özal and put an end to the Özal dominance 
in the governmental party. As a matter of fact, in the wake of this date, first Özal's influence 
on the governing MP decreased and even frictions appeared between the MP and President 
Özal after the party lost the elections in 1992. Consequently, even though President Özal tried 
to give a direction to the government's foreign policy, he fell short of this and his influence on 
the foreign policy of the country decreased to a significant extent. Considering this fact, as 
Özal's policy principles and goals lost their weight on TFP as of October 1991 to a large 
extent, it is hardly possible to evaluate the post-October 1991 period within the Özal era, even 
though President Özal continued to stay in office until his death in 1993. Aware of this case, 
Özal desired to re-enter politics and to be as active and influential as before, yet his life was 
not long enough to materialize his objective.63  
Considering the relations with the U.S, Özal argued that Turkey would gain advantage 
from pursuing a compatible foreign policy with the American policies.64 Hence, an alliance 
with the US as the main axis of foreign policy was essential for him.65 In his pro-American 
approach, along with the realities of the day, Turgut Özal’s years in the USA and its strong 
impact on his transnational socialization process had a considerable impact. As mentioned in 
the Chapter 3, Turgut Ozal’s way of thinking and ideas have many sources. The most 
influential determinants of his political ideas have been fed by free markets, economic 
liberalism, cooperation with the world hegemon with pragmatic gains.   
 
 
  Turgut Ozal’s political philosophy regarding economic development and 
modernization has strongly been affected by American tradition of public choice. According 
to this perspective, political development could be possible as long as human agency and his 
free will are cleared from pressures from structures including the state itself. Every individual 
including ordinary citizens, bureaucrats and politicians is self-interested. If people are let 
alone to make their preferences within a healthy institutional environment, they will maximize 
their benefits and the liberalization of human choice would bring about public improvements 
and modernization. This idea of Özal might be closely associated with his transnational 
socialization process in the United States. In this context for example, Fehmi Koru, a 
prominent columnist in Turkey, “interprets Özal’s ‘pro-American’ policy as a result of his 
reading of American society, leadership and administration.”66 In this manner, Koru 
establishes in a sense a connection between Özal’s close acquaintance with the US system and 
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culture, and Özal's political identity.67 Furthermore, Özal considered that Americans were 
more pragmatic, whereas Europeans had obsessions and tendentiousness stemming from their 
long history. Thereby, he implied that there was a more appropriate ground for cooperation 
with the Americans on some foreign political issues, the Cyprus issue in particular.  
 
Along with his own paradigm, some further factors were decisive in his pro-American 
foreign policy as well. Above all, it did not seem possible for Turkey under the circumstances 
of the Cold War to follow a foreign policy entirely independent from the United States. In the 
wake of the Cold War, the United States remained as the only super power of the world and 
even a unipolar world system was a matter of discussion.68 However, considering Turkey's 
limited power, it seemed hard for the Özal leadership to seize the opportunities by relying 
solely on the country's resources. Furthermore, Özal leadership believed in the common 
interests of Turkey and the USA in the Middle East, Caucasia and Central Asia, and was 
aware of the fact that Turkey did not possess the necessary instruments and resources to 
follow an ‘independent’ strategy which could be against the U.S. interests. Thus, a pro-
American foreign policy was inevitable from his point of view.69  
 
In addition, Özal leadership was aware of the US influence as the leader of the western 
camp on Turkish politics. Hence, Özal felt obliged to bandwagon with the US in order to 
avoid Kemalist threats. In domestic politics, the American support consolidated his status 
particularly against the Kemalist establishment.70 For instance, among others, it was the US 
support which enabled President Özal to direct Turkey’s Gulf War policy with his personal 
initiatives.71 He benefited from the US support on many problems, the Cyprus issue in 
particular. Whereas the EU overwhelmingly lent its support in favor of Greeks, Özal 
leadership made use of the American support to counterbalance the European influence. For 
instance, with the help of the US, Turkey was able to persuade the UN to support the Security 
Council Resolution 649 regarding Cyprus.  
 
Likewise, the US leverage was important in connection with Turkey-EC/EU relations 
too. The rejection of Turkey’s application for a full-membership by the European Community 
in 1989 also pushed Turkey to the US.72 Additionally, the US put pressure on the EU in favor 
of Turkey vis-à-vis many problems between Turkey and the EU, and encouraged Turkey’s 
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EU membership. Hence, the US backing was crucial for the Özal leadership to balance the 
European pressure.73 In a nutshell, as noted before, Özal’s ultimate objective was to make 
Turkey an influential regional power under the protective umbrella of the USA.74 Therefore, 
considering the structure of his identity as well as his ideas about the circumstances of the 
day, it should not be surprising that, as Barkey points out, “despite his traditional upbringing 
and religious roots, Özal was by far the most pro-American leader Turkey has ever had.”75 
 
However, the relations with the US did not always at the same level during the Özal 
era. Turgut Özal, who had initially served in the military government as the chosen person of 
the US and IMF to implement the Washington consensus in Turkey and accomplished to 
come to the power subsequent to the first free elections after the 1980 military putsch, had to 
deal predominantly with internal political issues.76 In the initial years, the first priority of Özal 
government in the foreign policy field was to restore Ankara’s relations with the world, which 
had been simply isolated from the international community, and to support Turkey’s 
economic program through foreign political means.77 Especially in view of the first Özal 
government, as an economist, the most important contribution of Özal on the relations with 
the USA was to include a strong economic dimension to the relationship.78 Özal’s 
predominance in foreign policy was witnessed only towards the end of 1980s in parallel with 
the democratization process in the country.  
 
  4.2.2.1. Military relations 
A Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) was signed between 
Turkey and the U.S. on 29 March 1980 and the framework of Turkish-American military 
relations in the course of 1980s were defined with this agreement. Essentially, the first DECA 
had been signed in 1969 and periodically revised. It had established a quid pro quo between 
US access to Turkish defense facilities and in return, U.S. security assistance to Turkey. In 
practice yet this linkage has never been stable or predictable and has become a source of 
considerable resentment for the Turks and frustration for the Americans.79 
The DECA of 1980 was a five year, annually renewable executive agreement. It 
stipulated that the United States would provide defense equipment, services, and training to 
Turkish forces. In return, Turkey authorized the USA to maintain forces and exercise military 
activities at specified installations. Though the agreement was signed before the coup d’état, 
as touched on above, the military rule remained committed to the agreement and showed its 
willingness to improve bilateral relations with the aim of gaining the American support to the 
undemocratic regime. In accordance with the prevailing norms of the Cold War, Washington 
put more emphasis on the stability of its ally and its place on the Western camp. Therefore, it 
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demonstrated its “friendship”, did not criticize the Turkish military coup and did not cut the 
military and economic aid to Turkey.80 
When Turgut Özal came to power in November 1983, despite his some reservations on 
the implementation and the content of the DECA, he strongly desired this agreement to 
continue. Main complaints with regard the agreement were as follows: (1) The 7:10 ratio 
exercised by Washington in determining aid to Greece and Turkey was unfair. (2) The efforts 
to make the American aid conditional on the Cyprus question, human rights and the claim that 
Ottoman Empire massacred the Armenians during the World War I.(3) The discussion of 
these matters by the American Congress during aid bill negotiations was giving rise in 
Turkish public opinion to a reaction against the USA. (4) Last but not least, the DECA’s 
inclusion of economic cooperation notwithstanding, the United States had not provided 
sufficient trade facilities, particularly to Turkish textile products.81 
Towards the end of the first five-year period of the DECA, the Özal government called 
Washington to negotiate changes in the agreement. Negotiations lasted from 1985 until March 
1987, yet, despite Turkish leaders’ radical change demands, no major revision was introduced 
in the DECA.82 However, Ankara’s discontent did not engender any major change in the 
institutional dimension regarding the relations with the United States. Instead of a new 
agreement, the DECA, including U.S. base rights, was extended through supplementary 
letters which were exchanged on 16 March 1987. Terms of these letters stipulated neither 
radical change nor any new commitment to the United States. Congress’ cutting of military 
aid to Turkey from $ 913 million to $ 525 million caused the Özal government to suspend the 
ratification of the letters. But this suspension ended on the eve of President Evren’s visit to the 
USA, which would have been the first by a Turkish President in twenty-five years and the 
letters were eventually ratified by the government.83 
Under normal conditions, the DECA was supposed to expire at the end of December 
1990 and its terms should have been negotiated between the two countries before September 
17. However, thanks to Turkey’s close cooperation with the U.S. in the aftermath of Iraqi 
occupation of Kuwait, the DECA was extended for five years quietly and automatically. 
Consequently, in spite of Turkish rulers’ resentment towards the American indifference to 
Turkish worries and complaints about the DECA, Turkish-American relations were stable and 
displayed a significant continuity throughout 1980s.84 In the initial years of 1990s, the 
relations peaked once again on occasion of the Gulf War, which will be elaborated below in 
another section. 
  4.2.2.2. American aid question 
 
In view of Turkey’s strategically pivotal location, the American policy-makers 
attached a great importance to a strong and stable Turkey, and therefore it was crucial for 
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them to provide economic and security assistance to their ally. These assistances were also 
crucial to keep Turkey on the western camp. On the ground of the Cyprus Peace Operation of 
1974, the United States had imposed arms embargo on Turkey, because of which Turkish 
armed forces, the second largest standing army in the NATO, was deprived of modern 
weapons. However, coupled with the changing circumstances in the region, modernization of 
Turkish army became a primary objective of the American leaders in the course of 1980s. In 
this respect, the Reagan administration took the lead and doubled the U.S. security assistance 
to Turkey; thereby showed the seriousness of American rulers on their security relationship 
with Turkey. Reagan’s successors continued to give weight to the modernization of Turkish 
army as well. In fact, American aids fell considerably short of Turkey’s needs and 
expectations. Notwithstanding Turkish leaders’ efforts to increase the amount of the aid, 
Americans resisted the excessive Turkish demands. This resulted in difficult and bitter 
negotiations, which often ended in disappointment and resentment in both sides.85 
 
Additionally, there were two more matters of tension with respect to the American 
assistance issue, which were negatively influencing the American aid to Ankara in this term. 
The former was the 7:10 ratio exercised by the American Congress on the aids to Turkey and 
Greece, and the latter one was the efforts of the US Congress to lay down the Cyprus and 
Armenian issues as a condition of American aid to Turkey.  
 
In 1978, the US Congress had voted a policy with the aim of achieving a 'balance of 
military strength' between Turkey and Greece. Accordingly, in order to maintain the present 
balance of military strength in the Aegean Sea, a '7:10 ratio' was stipulated for the aids; for 
every $7 of military aid to Greece, Turkey received $10.Yet, this ratio took into consideration 
neither the territories nor the populations to be defended and this was harshly criticized by the 
Turkish side. In spite of Turkish governments’ efforts to receive more aid, Washington did 
not alter its stance and continued to stick to this ratio during the 1980s as well.86 Even though 
the White House seemed to share similar views with Ankara, it “chose the easy way by 
blaming Congress on the non-realization of the projected amounts of aid for Turkey.” In 
return, Turkish rulers used this unchanging posture of the U.S. to justify tight control of 
American military activities on the Turkish territory.87  
 
Another question was the pro-Greek attitude of the American Congress on the Cyprus 
issue and its efforts to make the American aid conditional on Turkish soldiers’ withdrawal 
from the Island. The attitude of the Congress on this issue became a source of discomfort for 
Ankara every year when the American aid bill was in question.88 At this point, one should 
note the role of lobbying activities in the Congress. The U.S. conditioning of aid on Cyprus 
and Armenian issues might be partly explained with the considerable lobbying of Armenian 
and Greek Diaspora. Furthermore, conflicting interests with Israel urged sometimes the 
Jewish lobbies to adopt an anti-Turkey position. For instance, when the Özal government 
opted to support the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s (PLO) statehood against Israel, this 
resulted in steadily decrease of the US military and economic aid.89 
 
As a result, the U.S. allocated to Turkey annually around $ 700 million through its 
Military Assistance Program, Economic Support Fund and International Educational Training 
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Program. However, as noted above, the Congress continued to play a decisive and 
“restrictive” role concerning the amount of the aid. For example, the American government 
asked for a total package of $ 930 million for Turkey from the Congress for the fiscal year of 
1984. Despite this open challenge to the 7:10 formula, the result did not change and $ 930 
million for Turkey was reduced to $ 715 million, whereas the initial request for Greece was 
amended to $ 500 million. The American aid reached the peak in 1985 with $878 million, yet 
in the following years it amounted about $ 500 million. Once the request of the American 
administration was reduced from $913.5 million to $ 525.3 million for the fiscal year 1988, 
this led to a disappointment in the Özal government and to temporarily suspension of 
ratification of the letters extending the DECA.90 Finally, even the booming relations during 
the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991 were not sufficient to augment the aid substantially. The last aid 
request of the Bush administration was reduced from $ 543 million to $ 450 million as credits 
by Congress.91    
 
  4.2.2.3. The Economic aspect 
Özal’s answer to Turkey’s economic problems was under the strong influence of the 
US system. As mentioned above, Özal had studied in the USA, worked in the World Bank 
and had been profoundly impressed by the American system and consequently adopted the 
American liberalism as a recipe for Turkey’s economic problems.92 Hence one might come to 
the conclusion that Özal's economist identity was pushing him to put more emphasis on 
economy with respect to Turkey's foreign relations.  
In the early 1980s, there were two major economic development models in the 
world.1) Import substitution model which was adopted in Turkey between 1960 and 1980. 2) 
Export-oriented development strategy. In accordance with his weltanschauung, Özal adopted 
the latter model and introduced reforms accordingly. His market-oriented economic reforms 
were naturally welcomed in Washington and these reforms made Turkey in the 1980s 
particularly attractive for the American and European investments in several sectors.93 
Furthermore, Özal enjoyed good relations with the United States as well as with the 
institutions of western origin such as IMF and the World Bank. 
The most important novelty that Özal added to Ankara-Washington relations was his 
emphasis on economic relations.94 Özal leadership aspired to diversify Turkish-United States 
relations by adding it an economic dimension in addition to the strong security ties He 
regarded a strong economy as the most important condition of providing national security. 
Thus, stressing the economy side of the DECA, he gave more weight to trade with the US and 
to receive more economic concessions rather than merely receiving military aid from it. His 
slogan in this respect was “trade not aid”. He aimed in this context opening the U.S. market to 
Turkish products, textile in particular, and having advantageous partnership arrangements 
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with the American industry.95 This approach of Özal seems also to include Özal’s self-
confident and assertive political approach. Accordingly, in order to make Turkey one of 10-15 
economies of the world, Turkey should trust itself, work hard and should not be afraid of 
economic rivalry.  
Despite the remarkable performance of Turkey’s new export-oriented economic 
model, the trade imbalance between Turkey and the United States continued. For instance, 
whereas Turkish export to the US in 1980 amounted $ 127 million, Turkish imports from it 
was $ 442 million. By 1990, the figures were $971 million and $2.1 billion, respectively.96 
Thus, the Özal government sought to raise the textile quota and equalize the trade imbalance, 
and brought these issues in the negotiations of the DECA agreement. However, the American 
authorities were quite conservative in conjunction with the quotas established for the Turkish 
textile imports to the United States. Consequently, while the US did not grant any concession 
on the textile quota issue and did not take any significant step to abolish the trade inequality, 
it pledged the American support for Turkey’s future membership in the European 
Community, which was regarded as a positive development by the Turkish leaders.97  
  4.2.2.4. Greek-Turkish differences and the Cyprus issue 
Even though the United States tried to avoid involvement in the disputes between 
Turkey and Greece such as the boundaries of territorial waters and continental shelf, the 
control of airspace, surface navigation and oil rights in the Aegean sea, these questions 
inevitably affected both Turkish-American and Greek-American relations.98 For instance, in 
March 1987, the US was obliged to intervene when Turkish-Greek relations seriously strained 
and the two sides came to the brink of an armed conflict. Upon Athens’ declaration that it was 
planning to drill for oil in the parts of the Aegean which were considered as international 
waters by Ankara, a Turkish research vessel was sent to the same area and subsequently 
relations were strained so seriously that a danger of an armed conflict emerged. At this point, 
the US and NATO had no other choice except for intervening in the tension between its allies 
and appeasing it. Eventually, the Özal government was persuaded by the Americans to stay 
outside the disputed area.99 As such, the crisis over the militarization of the Limni (Lemnos) 
Island and the Greek efforts to include the Island into the NATO exercise scheme in the 
Aegean in 1983 were other issues influencing Turkish-American relations.100 Such events 
continued to repeat in the future too, as in the crisis over Imia/Kardak in January 1996. 
Likewise, the Cyprus question was another factor casting shadow on Ankara-
Washington relations. Whereas the U.S. endeavored not to lose its influence on strategically 
important Cyprus by making the issue conditional on U.S. military interactions with Turkey, 
it became a source of disappointment and resentment for the Turkish side. Especially, the US 
Congress was quite decisive in this matter. When the arms embargo on Turkey was lifted in 
1978, the US administration was assigned to submit bimonthly report to the Congress 
certifying that headway was being made towards a solution on the Island. The declaration of 
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the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in November 1983 was condemned by both 
chambers of the American Congress and they called on the American administration to try to 
reverse it which was regarded as a dangerous move by the Turks. The Greek lobby also 
played certainly a crucial role in the attitude of the Congress; consequently the American aid 
bills tied sometimes the U.S. aid to unacceptable conditions for Turkey. For example, the aid 
bill in 1984 stipulated the presidential certification that “(a) the U.S. government was acting 
to prevent moves to partition Cyprus and was calling on Turkey to take steps to reverse the 
independence of Northern Cyprus and (b) Turkey was making efforts to insure that the 
Turkish Cypriots took no action in Maraş (Varosha) that would impede negotiations on the 
future of Cyprus.”101 Nonetheless, it should be noted that there was a marked difference in the 
attitude of the Congress and the Administration. In spite of the rigid attitude of the Congress 
against Turkey, the governments were relatively more lenient and constructive on the Cyprus 
question.102 
Since the Cyprus-related tensions threatened the peace and stability in the region, the 
American administrations felt compelled to put pressure on both sides for a permanent 
solution of the question. As a matter of fact, the norms of the day required to ease the 
potential conflicts between the allies and to save the energy for the enemy, the Soviet Block. 
Therefore, the collective identity formed in the security field was imposing the leader of the 
western block to take initiative in order to keep the potential disputes between its two allies at 
a limited level. These American initiatives were constructing the identities of the allies as 
leader and its followers, and were either consolidating or reconstructing their existing 
identities. However, the problem is so complicated and the peoples of both countries are so 
sensitive on the issue that even though the administrations had been willing to give 
concessions, it would not have been easy to achieve it.103 Thus, for Özal too, the Cyprus 
question has continued to be an impediment for Turkey’s foreign relations as well as for its 
relations with the USA.104  
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  4.2.2.5. The Armenian issue105 
The continuing efforts of the Armenian Diaspora to persuade some Congressmen to 
introduce resolutions caused resentment in Turkey and strained the U.S.-Turkish relationship 
during the 1980s as well.106 The Diaspora has "sought to establish a day of remembrance to 
commemorate ‘man’s inhumanity to man’, calling particular attention to the alleged genocide 
of Armenians at the hands of the Ottoman Turks early in the twentieth century and somehow 
associating the present-day Turkish Republic with those events.” Thus, the Armenian issue 
has ever since become another trouble source for the two allies. In fact, in the first half of 
1980s, some Armenians resorted to terrorism in order to promote the Armenian genocide 
claims. In this context, in the course of 1974-84, eighty Turkish diplomats and members of 
foreign representatives were assassinated by ASALA and JCAG terrorism.107 Yet, the 
Armenian terrorism lost its vital training and logistic base after the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon in 1982. As such, the Orly Airport attack on 15 July 1983, in which eight people 
were indiscriminately killed and several others were injured, gave rise to the withdrawal of 
the western sympathy to the Armenian cause, and the Turkish secret service received a green 
light to eliminate ASALA and JCAG targets worldwide. Consequently, by the end of 1984, 
the terror tactic ceased to be an effective force, upon which the Armenian Diaspora adopted a 
new tactic of politicizing the genocide claim by using their lobbying power in their respective 
countries of settlement and in the international platforms.108  
In this framework, the first Armenian attempt in the US Congress came in September 
1984. The House of Representatives approved a resolution to recognize the 24 April as 
‘Man’s Inhumanity to Man day’. Even if the Özal government saw these attempts as part of 
the US domestic political struggle for the upcoming elections, it had to deal with such 
attempts directly or indirectly until February 1990. In June 1985, the House of 
Representatives rejected in general vote the Draft of Armenian “Genocide”. Yet the lobby did 
not give up. In April 1987, it made another attempt and managed to bring the Draft of 
Armenian “Genocide” to the Commission of Postal and Civil Services of the House of 
Representatives. Ankara reacted to this development by calling back its ambassador to 
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Washington ‘for consultations’. Additionally, President Kenan Evren postponed his visit to 
Washington for May 1987.109 As a result, in August 1987, a vote on the proposal was refused 
by the Congress on procedural grounds.110   
 Another Draft of Armenian “Genocide” was accepted in October 1989 by the 
Committee of Justice of US Senate, which engendered a sharp reaction of the Özal 
government. Ankara froze bilateral relations and banned US F 16 flights from Incirlik air 
base.111 On the one hand, Turkey threatened Washington to take stronger actions in case of 
adoption of the resolution by the Senate. On the other hand, Turkey tried to make use of other 
means to hinder the resolution. To this end, it tried to engage both the Jewish lobby and US 
business community (the aerospace industry in particular) on Turkey’s behalf.112 Furthermore, 
President Turgut Özal paid a visit to Washington in January 1990 and met President Bush. 
Eventually, the Senate rejected to put the Draft into negotiation agenda.113 Meanwhile, in 
order to appease the Armenian lobby, President Bush made a formal written statement on 24 
April 1990 and described the events of 1915 as genocide but in name.114  Likewise, in order 
to appease the Turkish anger, the White House emphasized that “non-binding resolutions 
passed by Congress did not constitute major U.S. foreign policy pronouncements and that 
they were not connected directly to the foreign aid legislation or to the general tone of U.S.-
Turkish cooperation in security and defense matters.”115  
 The Armenian claims and the resolutions of Congress related to these claims have 
since 1980s constituted a major sore point in the Turkish-American relations. However, the 
mutual ideas existing in both sides both in the Cold War and post-Cold War periods as to the 
mutual need of both countries have always prevailed at the end of the day. Thereby, the 
controversies notwithstanding, the Armenian genocide claims have fallen short of destroying 
bilateral relations.   
  4.2.2.6. Cooperation in the Middle East 
As noted above, the beginning of 1980s witnessed the rise of superpower rivalry. 
Given the western dependence on the oil supply from the Middle East, the US faced two 
significant threats: radical Islam and Soviet encroachment. The Iranian Revolution of 1979, 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979 and the Iraq-Iran War of September 
1980 were the important developments at the beginning of 1980s, which re-enhanced Turkey 
to an indispensably significant position for the United States. Since American strategists 
regarded a moderate Sunni Islam as an antidote to both radical Islam stemming from Iran and 
communism, throughout the early 1980s, Washington encouraged its allies in the region to 
establish closer ties and form a united front of moderate Sunni Islam against Tehran and 
Moscow. At his point, Turkey’s democratic Muslim character and its NATO membership 
were two more important factors contributing to Turkey’s indispensability in the region.116 
Moreover, Turgut Özal as a person who managed to combine western values, such as 
                                               
109 Mustafa Aydın, Çağrı Erhan and Gökhan Erdem, “Chronology of Turkish-American Relations,” The Turkish 
Yearbook, Vol.XXXI, No.2, (2000): 253-254. 
110 Tuğtan, "Turkish-US Security Relations 1945-2003," 200-201. 
111 Aydın et al., “Chronology of Turkish-American Relations,” 254. 
112 Tuğtan, "Turkish-US Security Relations 1945-2003," 201. 
113 Aydın et al., “Chronology of Turkish-American Relations,” 254-255. 
114 Tuğtan, "Turkish-US Security Relations 1945-2003," 202. 
115 Uslu, The Turkish American Relationship Between 1947 and 2003, 265. 
116 Tuğtan, "Turkish-US Security Relations 1945-2003," 191. 
 159  
democracy and liberalism, with the Islamic-conservative values of his own society could be 
viewed as the best person to cooperate for the Americans. 
Iran Islam Revolution and the aggressive Soviet policy concerned also the military 
junta in Ankara and it was obliged to turn its face to the leader of the Western camp. Coupled 
with security concerns, need for international economic and political backup pushed the 
Turkish generals towards the US. In the wake of the military coup, the Europeans had 
severely criticized the human rights violations of the putschist administration. Conversely, the 
US was the sole ally in the western block which had been more understanding about “the 
necessities of the martial law.” Additionally, the Turkish economy suffered from a balance of 
payment crisis, thus, both direct American economic aid and support of international 
institutions such as the IMF was crucial for the success of the new economic program 
introduced in January 1980 under the architecture of Turgut Özal. Consequently, Turkey’s 
needs and its leaders’ interest perceptions, including Özal’s and Evren’s, converged with the 
interest perceptions of the Americans in the Middle East.117 
In this context, the military rule had already pledged to host American facilities for the 
Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, which had been formed in Florida to fly in and intervene 
to stop any emerging threat or act as a trip-wire to deter any aggressor in the Middle East.118 
Furthermore, Turkey had also started military cooperation with the Gulf States, Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia in the field of training, sales and joint investments. This cooperation continued 
following the takeover of the rule by the Özal government as well. For example, during 
President Evren’s visit to Saudi Arabia in February 1984, two countries signed a military 
training and cooperation treaty.119  
Özal was promoting good relations with the Middle East also at the institutional level 
and this was also converging with the anti-radical Islamist standing of the US. In this 
framework, the first Özal government increased Turkey's share to 160 million Islamic Dinars 
in 1985, becoming the fifth largest shareholder of the Islamic Development Bank, and 
therefore gaining the right to be represented at the Executive Committee.120 Similarly, for the 
first time a Turkish President, Kenan Evren, represented Turkey in the Casablanca Summit of 
the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in January 1984 and he was elected as 
permanent chairman of the OIC Economic and Commercial Cooperation Permanent 
Committee. Likewise, President Özal sought to make use of the Organization actively for 
Turkey’s economic and political interests as well as in international issues. For example, Özal 
called for additional meetings to discuss issues such as the Bosnian problem and Muslim 
minority problems in the Balkans. Turkey assumed a leading role in the acceptance of the 
Central Asian Muslim republics to the organization. Özal sought to free the OIC from Arab 
domination and inter-Arab conflicts. To this end, he showed special effort to integrate in the 
OIC the non-Arab countries of the Balkans and the Central Asia, Iran, Indonesia and 
Malaysia.121 In line with the American policy, Ankara advanced its relations with Israel and 
Egypt too.122  
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However, some unilaterally regulated relations of Turkey were also from time to time 
in contrast of America. Unrepentantly recognition of the new-born Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus (TRNC) by Turkey in November 1983 might be regarded in this respect.123 
Additionally, as a result of a “low-key policy” towards Israel with the aim of gaining Arab 
and Islamic support, Turkish policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict during 1980s did not overlap 
with the American policy either. The military rule had downgraded embassy in Tel Aviv to 
secondary status, to charge d`affairs level. Özal governments continued also a similar policy 
line and became one of the first countries that recognized Palestine. Despite the pro-
Palestinian stance of Özal government in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Özal's policy towards 
Israel was not hostile. It offered to mediate and host peace talks between Palestinians and 
Israelis.124 In this context, Özal offered in 1988 the "peace water pipeline project" in the 
Middle East, through which it was aimed to supply Turkish waters to both Arabs and Israelis. 
According to this project, two pipelines would supply extra waters of two Turkish rivers, 
Seyhan and Ceyhan. Yet, this project was rejected by Arab countries on the ground that it 
would give water to Israel too.125 
Furthermore, apart from the Arab-Israeli conflict, in line with the American 
aspirations, Turkish-Israeli relations entered into a development process. In essence, the US 
had already been promoting good relations between its two allies in the Middle East. Despite 
the cool relations during the military regime, the concern of both countries on Syria’s Soviet-
backed policies attracted them to each other. Secret information exchange of Turkish and 
Israeli experts in their common fight against terrorism which had started in the early 1980s, 
gained a new momentum during the terrorist bombing of Istanbul synagogue in December 
1986. Ankara fully cooperated with its allies, which pleased both Washington and Tel Aviv. 
Before the Gulf Crisis erupted, Turkish-Israeli relations had made a considerable progress. 
This reflected also to the attitude of Jewish lobby in Washington and it supported Turkey 
against the campaigns of Armenian and Greek lobbies in the Congress.126  
Iraq-Iran war was another issue that Turkey deviated from the American policy. 
During the war, contrary to the expectations of the west, Ankara conducted neither overtly nor 
covertly an anti-Iranian foreign policy, but pursued an “active neutrality” policy. 
Additionally, Turkey did not join in Western efforts to isolate Iran and Libya during the 
1980s. Instead, economic relations with these countries increased dramatically and Turkish 
companies became very active in Libya.127  
To sum up, as a consequence of the radical Islam and Russian threats emerged in Iran 
and Afghanistan as well the search for legitimization of the putschist generals in the 
international arena, Turkish-American cooperation increasingly continued throughout the 
1980s. Moreover, Turkey's value increased in the eyes of the United States, as the unique 
identity structure of the Özal leadership combining both Islamic and the western values was 
regarded as the alternative of the radical Islam understanding presented in Iran. Subsequent to 
his takeover of the office, PM Özal was also eager to improve the relations with the U.S. 
considering Turkey's need for the economic and military backing of Washington. 
Additionally, as an Islamic-conservative-liberal leader, along with high-profile relations with 
the west, Özal sought to add new dimensions to Turkey's foreign policy by developing 
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relations with the Muslim Middle Eastern countries and also by taking steps to find solution 
to the deep-rooted problems in the neighborhood, like the Israel-Palestine question. 
Nonetheless, despite the high profile relations between Turkey and the United States in the 
Middle East throughout the 1980s, one cannot claim that the relations were smooth. In 
contrast to 1950s, Özal leadership followed a relatively more active and independent policy in 
Middle Eastern issues.128 In spite of serious Turkish cooperation with the U.S. on Middle 
Eastern issues, the disagreements between the two allies on the Iran-Iraq war, Libya issue and 
Arab-Israeli conflict, which led to Turkey’s deviation from American policy line, illustrate 
relatively independent policy of Ankara. However, such frictions did not damage the 
institutional dimension of relations. 
  4.2.2.7. A General analysis of Turkey-US Relations during 1980s  
  from a constructivist perspective 
Several experiences took place prior to the 1980s such as the removal of the Jupiter 
missiles from Turkey in the aftermath of the Cuba missiles crisis of 1962, the Johnson letter 
of 1964 and the American arms embargo imposed as a result of Turkey's Cyprus peace 
operation in 1974 undermined Turkish policy makers' ideas as to the reliability of the United 
States and pushed Ankara to search for new foreign policy alternatives. However, the military 
junta which took over the administration in the wake of the September 12, 1980 coup d'état 
felt obliged to establish closer relations with the U.S. with a view to ensuring the international 
legitimacy. Considering the norms such as democracy and human rights as having secondary 
importance within the hierarchy of norms under the Cold War circumstances and aiming to 
see stable and west-oriented administrations in its allies like Turkey, the US administration 
disregarded the undemocratic practices of the military junta and demonstrated its will to re-
improve its relations with Ankara. Moreover, as Özal leadership’s alternative identity 
definition which combines Islamic and western values in itself was regarded as the antidote of 
the radical Islam understanding emerged in Iran, Turkey’s significance increased in the eyes 
of Washington and this consolidated the cooperation of the long-standing allies.  
Military junta’s successor, the Özal leadership attached also a considerable importance 
to the relations with the United States. In this situation, along with its ideas about the material 
circumstances of the day, Özal leadership’s foreign policy paradigm had also a significant 
role. Having educated and spent the most important part of his transnational socialization 
process in the U.S., Özal’s foreign policy paradigm was based on making Turkey an 
influential regional actor under the protective umbrella of Washington. Additionally, being en 
economist, Özal aimed to diversify Turkish-American relations by adding them a stronger 
economic dimension. While strengthening its ties with the United States, as a believing 
Muslim, Özal aimed to develop relations with the Muslim countries as well. At this point it is 
worthy of attention that having left aside the strict interpretation of secularism, Turgut Özal 
became the first Turkish head of state in the republican history who recognized Turkey’s 
Muslim identity. 
Having adopted the American liberalism, Özal leadership demonstrated effort in this 
respect to prevail democratic and liberal norms in Turkey. For the legitimacy of these norms 
in the country, Özal referred sometimes to Turkey’s Ottoman past. More precisely, he 
regarded the Ottoman tolerance the most important point of reference for the settlement of the 
Kurdish question. Furthermore, having been qualified later as a foreign policy approach and 
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called neo-Ottomanism, this approach signaled a rupture from the traditional foreign policy 
line which had been based on the principles of non-interference, westernization and 
secularism. In short, Özal tried to shape Turkey’s FP in accordance with his own identity 
paradigm which had been constructed as a result of societal and transnational socialization 
processes.  
 4.2.3. Turkish-U.S. Relations during early 1990s and President Özal 
 
  4.2.3.1. The Gulf Crisis and Turkish American relations 
As mentioned before, Özal’s weight in foreign political issues increased in parallel 
with the democratization process in the country and peaked during the Gulf Crisis.129 His 
approach to foreign policy making, as Sayari states, “…was best reflected in Turkey’s stand 
during the Gulf crisis…”130 When the crisis initially erupted, he was President. Nonetheless, 
owing to his strong influence in the ruling Motherland Party as well as in the government, he 
was able to conduct TFP virtually alone in the early 1990s. His strong leadership who did not 
hesitate to take initiatives if he deemed it necessary might be counted as another significant 
factor contributing Özal's dominance in the FP field. Considering Özal's unique role in the 
course of the Gulf Crisis in the early 1990s, it is worthy of scrutinizing this issue in detail.  
 However, before starting to discuss the issue, one should consider that the United 
States carried out another military intervention in Iraq in 2003, following the Justice and 
Development Party’s (AK Party) takeover of the office. Given the actors (the USA and Iraq) 
and circumstances of this crisis, it is reminiscent of the Gulf crisis of 1990-91. Thus, these 
two events, namely the Gulf Crisis of 1990-91 and 2003, present unique examples for 
comparison. Therefore it absolutely makes sense to explore these two issues in detail. At this 
point, the former event will be elaborated and the latter will be left to the next chapter.  
  4.2.3.2. Background of pro-US foreign policy during the Gulf Crisis 
As explained above, Özal was advocating an active foreign policy and the end of Cold 
War generated a convenient ground for his aspirations. Along with the breakdown of the 
Soviet Union, a new détente began between the East and the West. According to Özal, under 
the circumstances of the "new world," states should have acted expeditiously and the decision 
mechanisms of states should have been capable of keeping pace with events.  
Furthermore, Özal defended the argument that Turkey should have left aside the 
traditional policy line which had consistently preferred to stay out of the turbulent conflicts of 
the Middle East and followed politics of neutrality in frictions among Muslim countries. 
While augmenting the intensity of relations with the West, Turkey should have bolstered its 
relations with the Arab world too. In another word, in the face of changing conditions, Turkey 
should have played a bridge role between the East and the West.131 
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At this point the question arises, despite the traditional neutral stance of TFP towards 
the Middle East, why did Özal decide to follow an active policy and give a strong support to 
the United States during the Persian Gulf Crisis? Along with his personality traits and his 
identity, Özal's ideas and interpretations about the material conditions were also determining 
about his stance during the Gulf crisis. After all, as every single person perceives the events 
through his own lenses and interprets the events and defines his interests in accordance with 
his own identity definition, ideas about the material conditions are as important as the material 
factors. 
In this context, firstly, Turkey had been caught unprepared to the post Cold War term. 
At the outset of this new term, like all other states whose foreign and security policies were 
indexed to one polar, Turkey experienced a considerable shock as well. Throughout the Cold 
War, it had sought to be a part of the western world, and its efforts were supported by the west 
owing to its special geopolitical position against the Soviet Union. Consequently, due to the 
Soviet threat, Ankara could acquire a place as an equal member in the western security and 
political system.  Yet the end of Cold War initially decreased the importance of Turkey and 
channeled the interest of Europe to the East and Central Europe. Moreover, the Middle East 
and the Islamic world were depicted as the source of all developments and declared 'enemy' in 
the “new world order.” Thus, the end of Cold War was perceived as a great threat by virtually 
all groups in Turkey. Especially, it can be said that rejection of Turkey’s bid for European 
Community membership, European support to the separatist movements in Turkey and the 
inadequate American support to Turkey in this term gave rise to a considerable “panic” in 
Turkey.132 
At this stage, Özal wanted to make Turkey gain its ascendancy in the eyes of the West 
through an active policy during the Gulf Crisis. Stated differently, Özal viewed this crisis as a 
good opportunity to highlight Turkey’s importance to the western countries and to show its 
indispensability for them.133 Through an active involvement in the Gulf Crisis, Turkey's 
geopolitical and strategic importance would have been reminded to the West. This point was 
important for the Özal leadership, as Turkey's application for the full European Community 
membership had been declined short time ago.134 Moreover, through an active policy during 
the Gulf Crisis, Özal leadership was hoping to ensure a place at the table to be formed 
subsequent to the crisis and to direct the post-crisis order in compliance with Turkish 
interests.135  
Secondly, Özal saw a high likelihood of a war and aimed first of all to eschew 
consequences that may result from the war against Turkey.  As a further step, he regarded that 
crisis as a “golden opportunity” and wanted to take the advantage of the opportunities that 
may arise after the war. Özal’s “golden opportunity” assessments interpreted by both national 
and international media organs that he wanted to recapture Mosul and Kirkuk, which had been 
within the borders of National Pact of 1920 and had been left to the British mandate due to the 
special conditions of the day.136 In this context, the “invest one, get three” metaphor attributed 
to Özal was widely discussed in the media. In his comprehensive study, Gözen argues that he 
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did not find any evidence that Özal used explicitly such a metaphor.137 He rather claims that 
what Özal viewed as “golden opportunity” was to develop on the occasion of this crisis a 
positive image for Turkey and consequently increase its influence in the region, in the western 
world and even in the whole world.138 On the other hand, even though Özal had aspired to 
recapture Mosul and Kirkuk in return for his support to the US,139  he was aware that neither 
the countries in the region, Iran and Syria, nor the western countries, especially the USA, 
would have given their consent to a possible boundary change in the region. Moreover, 
Turkish army’s entrance into the northern Iraq was the precondition of such an aim. However, 
since the opposition in Turkey objected such a movement and the Iraqi army was defeated 
easily through an air operation; a suitable environment did not arise for Özal’s potential 
target.140 The last chance to enter into the northern Iraq was an attack from Iraq. Yavuz 
Gökmen underscores in this regard that President Özal waited eagerly for an Iraqi attack 
during the war. When this did not occur either, it was not possible any longer for President 
Özal to make any change with regard to the Mosul-Kirkuk question in favor of Turkey.141 
Thirdly, the main concern of Özal as to the post-crisis order was about the Northern 
Iraq. Likelihood of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq and the potentiality that this state would 
possess oil-rich regions of Iraq constituted Özal’s major apprehension during the crisis. 
According to Özal, Turkey should not have been subjected to the consequences of a future 
formed out of its control. Therefore, Turkey should have pursued an active policy, and by 
taking its place in the centre of events it should have tried to canalize the developments in line 
with its interests. In this context, while granting domestically more rights to the Kurds, Özal 
aimed to increase Turkish influence in northern Iraq and to take away the Kurdish card from 
Iran, Iraq and Syria.142  It might be claimed that considering the southern borders of Turkey as 
artificial, Özal was advocating a return to Ottoman borders in the sense of economic and 
cultural influence. In a nutshell, thanks to his close cooperation with the United States in the 
Gulf Crisis, Özal was hoping to raise Turkish influence in Northern Iraq, to take the Kurdish 
card off the neighbors’ hands as well as to gain the western backup on the Kurdish question. 
In this regard, Özal preferred an active and initiative taking policy to a reactionary one.143  
Fourthly, Özal was of the opinion that with its free market system and democracy, 
Turkey could have been a model for the Arab countries and a stability island in its region. 
Similarly, Özal was attributing Turkey a bridge role between the East and West and was 
drawing a parallel between Turkey’s weight in the East and the West.144 Özal had no doubt 
that if Turkey could play diplomatic and even military roles in the crisis, Turkey would 
increase its weight in the Middle East and this would reflect positively to Turkey’s weight in 
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the West.145 In this framework, in order to obtain Arab states’ confidence, Özal wanted 
Turkey to play its two cards during the crisis, namely high level relations with the west and 
Turkey’s Muslim identity. Hence, President Özal advocated that Turkey should have 
demonstrated its support to the Arab States and that in order to show Turkish support to the 
Arab world which was exposed to the Iraqi threat; it should have sent at least symbolically 
Turkish troops to the region.146  
Fifthly, pruning the military power of Iraq which was threatening the security of 
Turkey was of great significance.147 Özal was of the opinion that Saddam Hussein was a 
dangerous person. Subsequent to the eight-year war against Iran, he had begun to put Turkey 
to inconvenience by raising the matter of water. Saddam had also threatened Turkey on 5 May 
1990 by threatening the Turkish PM Yıldırım Akbulut. Iraqi leader had always dreamed of 
forming the Great Arab State, and it was not clear where he would go after Kuwait. In 
addition to Saddam’s aggressive and unpredictable behaviors, he was tolerating activities by 
Kurdish rebels of Turkish origin (PKK), who were using Iraqi territory for hit-and-run attacks 
inside Turkey.148  
Lastly, American interest and involvement in the Gulf Crisis as well as the enormous 
power of the USA were further reasons pushing Özal to pursue a pro-US policy. In the wake 
of the dissolution of the Soviet Block, the United States remained as the sole super power and 
a “uni-polar world” began to be a matter of discussion in terms of new world system.149 Özal 
was also aware of the change in the world system and the position of the USA in it. In the face 
of the decisive standing of this economic and military giant, Iraq had no chance.150 
Additionally, according to Özal, Turkey had stood on the losing party for many years because 
of its timidity and it was time to take place on the winning side.151 Furthermore, one should 
underscore once again the impact of the US on Özal’s identity and weltanschauung. His 
socialization process in the United States had always a significant role in his paradigm, with 
respect to the relations between Turkey and the US too. Özal closely witnessed the power of 
the US economic and political system and this strengthened the “unipolar” position of the 
United States in his eyes.   
According to President Özal, siding with Iraq or neutrality during the Gulf Crisis was 
not an option for Ankara. As a matter of fact, in addition to European countries, most of Arab 
and Islamic countries were on the United States’ side. With an accurate interpretation of Özal, 
“Iraq had challenged the whole world” and in this case Turkey did not possess much 
alternative.152 Moreover, considering Turkey’s need for the economic as well as technological 
support of the western world and US in particular, Özal knew that Turkey did not have much 
choice. Meanwhile, Özal was aware that remaining neutral in the crisis and sustaining the 
present relations with Iraq, which met a considerable part of its needs through Turkey and was 
marketing the main part of its oil to the world through Turkey, would mean an implicit 
backup for Iraq. In this respect, it was not rational for Turkey to challenge the anti-Iraq policy 
                                               
145 Gürbey, "Özal’ın Dış Politika Anlayışı," 299. 
146 Efegil, Körfez Savaşı ve Türk Dış Politikası Karar Verme Modeli, 217. 
147 Sayari, "Turkey: The Changing European Security Environment and the Gulf Crisis," 13. 
148 Ibid., 217-218. Sami Kohen, "Özal Counting on Closer US Ties," Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, 
(April 1991). 
149 Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” 23–33. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World,".5 
150 Gözen, "Turgut Özal ve Körfez Savaşı," 317-318. 
151 Sedat Laçiner, Ideology and Foreign Policy, (PhD diss., King's College, University of London, 2001), 325. 
152 Gözen, "Turgut Özal ve Körfez Savaşı," 318-319. 
 166  
of the United States.153 Consequently, Turkey should have sided with the winning party and 
sought to avoid any political and economic harm.154 
Consequently, along with his personality traits and his identity, Özal's ideas and 
interpretations about the material conditions were also determining about his stance during the 
Gulf crisis. Analyzing and interpreting the material conditions of the day through his lenses, 
Özal leadership defined Turkey's interest in favor of a pro-U.S. active foreign policy. Despite 
the strong domestic opposition, President Özal pursued an active, pragmatic and pro-
American policy. He almost single-handedly engineered the foreign policy of the country 
during the Gulf Crisis.155 He either bypassed the government, National Security Council, 
military and civil bureaucracy, which had been the traditional decision makers on foreign 
political issues, or motivated them to take decisions in accordance with his policy line. In fact, 
he achieved a considerable success in these efforts and put his own choices into practice, yet 
he could not be successful on some issues such as joining the hot war issue.156  
  4.2.3.3. A constructivist approach to the factors increasing Özal’s weight 
in TFP 
It might be claimed that Özal’s character and personality had a key effect in his role 
during the Gulf Crisis. Even though the psychological factors are disregarded by 
constructivists, I strongly advocate that President Özal’s foreign policy style during the Gulf 
crisis cannot be fully comprehended without considering his personality traits. That is, his 
practical, pragmatic, initiative-taking personality and pro- United States stand played a key 
role in his stance throughout the Gulf Crisis. Since the beginning of the multi-party 
democratic life in Turkey, none of Özal’s predecessors had used the presidential authority to 
shape TFP so actively and leadingly. In contrast to the established practices and the traditional 
decision making structure, Özal highlighted his presidential authority in foreign policy 
making during the Gulf Crisis. In this period, despite the serious opposition from his former 
party (Motherland Party), opposition parties, civil and military bureaucracy, Özal sought to 
conduct TFP almost alone and achieved a great success in doing this.157  
Another reason for Özal’s relatively significant success was the ideological vacuum 
and his rivals’ trouble to produce alternative solutions. Remembering the Gulf Crisis period, 
Iraq had invaded another state and refused to withdraw. From left to right, no Turkish political 
party was able to find a coherent solution to the issue. Bülent Ecevit, a social democrat, paid a 
visit to the invader, Saddam Hussein, in Baghdad. Likewise, the Islamist Necmettin Erbakan 
could not adopt a consistent attitude in a conflict between two Muslim countries. By 
espousing an aggressive stance, Iraq had become an assertive rival of Turkey in the region 
and had challenged the whole western world. While Russia, China and even the Arab world 
were siding with the US-led western alliance, except for the President, no other institution, 
including the security and foreign policy bureaucracy, could determine a clear stance. In such 
an environment, where politics and bureaucracy were not able to produce solutions, Özal’s 
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determined stance granted him a prominent place, and perhaps for the first time the President 
won the main decision-maker status in TFP.158  
Two further basic factors enabling Özal’s active involvement and extraordinary 
interventions in politics paved the way for Özal’s success. The first factor relates to the 
presidential authority and the constitutional power of the President. The second factor is 
pertinent to the internal political structure of the period i.e. Özal’s weight in the ruling 
Motherland Party as well as in the Parliament. The latter is of crucial importance, because it 
allowed Özal to use his constitutional authorities, position and role in an extreme manner. 
Stated differently, without the arithmetic superiority of the MP both in the government and in 
the parliament, Özal’s role in the policy-making could not have reached to such extreme 
levels.159  
President Özal adopted two tactics in order to realize his goals mentioned above. (1) 
He tried to approach the United States and employ its power in line with his own goals. To 
this end, he collaborated increasingly with the U.S. throughout the Gulf Crisis. Moreover, he 
sought to bolster in this respect a personal friendship with the US President Bush, emphasized 
this “close friendship” in his statements to the media and tried to reinforce it. He considered 
that in this way he could have had influence on the American President and indirectly on the 
US foreign policy. He tried to give a direction to American war policy in accordance with 
Turkish interests. (2) Özal strongly stressed that Turkey had a very significant power and 
geographical location and that it was an indispensable ally for the U.S. in the region. In order 
to prove this, he took every kind of measures against Iraq quickly and effectively. Ankara 
implemented the economic embargo on Iraq shortly after the United Nations’ resolution and 
closed the petroleum pipeline of Kirkuk-Yumurtalik. It adopted a hard attitude against 
Saddam and did not object the American use of Incirlik Base in southern Turkey. Özal’s 
support for the international mainstream was so strong that some even alleged that Özal was 
more eager for the war than the US itself.160 In the aftermath of Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait 
on 2 August 1990, the Council of Ministers (CM) made a statement rejecting the invasion and 
calling for Saddam Hussein to withdraw.  
Consequently, President Özal’s foreign policy paradigm and his ideas about the 
material circumstances of the day which were closely associated with his identity definition 
were considerably determining in his political approach towards the Gulf crisis. Additionally 
one should not disregard the role of his psychological qualities on his policy style and on the 
policy outcomes throughout the crisis. In a nutshell, President Özal’s intervention into the 
foreign policy of the country was considerably unconventional or more precisely 
unprecedented.  
  4.2.3.4. Path to the war 
In the wake of Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the Cabinet was inclined 
to determine its attitude in line with the attitudes of the UN and other international 
institutions. On the other hand, President Özal was making harder statements and articulating 
that the crisis was a dangerous development for both the Middle East and the West as well as 
for the other countries of the world. He was stressing that Saddam entered into Kuwait with 
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the goal of controlling a big part of the oil resources and controlling the oil prices. He also 
added that Saddam’s ultimate goal was the leadership of the Arab World.161 
On the third day of the invasion, Iraq's leader Saddam sent his Vice President, Taha 
Yassin Ramadan, to Ankara and tried to convince Turkey to remain neutral and continue its 
trade with Iraq, yet could not achieve any success. Subsequently, U.S. Secretary of State 
James Baker arrived to Ankara. Both the President Özal and the Turkish Government stated 
that Iraqi attack should have been stopped and Turkey would do its part to stop it.162  
On the fourth day of the Crisis, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted 
the resolution 661, and decided to impose an economic embargo against Iraq to enforce it to 
withdraw from Kuwait. Immediately after the UNSC decision, without waiting for the 
reaction of the international community, the CM gathered under the chairmanship of President 
Özal and closed the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik petroleum pipeline. In addition to this, trade with Iraq 
and transit transport through it was stopped, and its assets in Turkey were frozen.163 
Criticizing this demeanor of the government, opposition parties claimed that the government 
acted unnecessarily in haste and exhibited an anti-Iraq attitude. In the face of such critiques, 
despite its controversial legal foundations, Özal was taking the UNSC decision as the most 
important point of reference to Turkey’s support for the US-led camp.164 Furthermore, by 
acting quickly on the embargo issue, the government aimed both to make Turkey gain its 
ascendancy in the eyes of the West and to abstain from getting into a “degrading situation” by 
taking this step upon the American insist.165 As a matter of fact, President Özal reminded on 
this question the words of US Secretary of State James Baker who had visited Turkey in the 
wake of the UNSC resolution. Quoting from Baker’s words that “if you had not closed the 
pipeline, we would have blockaded Iskenderun (Alexandretta)”, Özal expressed that being 
aware of this intention of the Americans, they closed the pipeline immediately. President Özal 
argued that by this means Turkey gained ascendancy and eschewed getting into a degrading 
situation.166  
With regard to military support, Özal had already proclaimed before it was not clear 
whether it was going to be resorted to military power against Iraq to a CNN correspondent 
that Incirlik base could have been used by the Americans.167 Additionally, he advocated at the 
initial stage of the crisis that Turkey should have sent its troops to the region in order to 
demonstrate Ankara’s support to the Arab countries. The government agreed with Özal on 
this issue. However, the governmental motion to obtain a permission on the issues of 
declaration of a state of war, on the use of armed forces, sending them abroad or presence of 
foreign armed forces in Turkey was not approved by the parliament due to the strong 
opposition stemming from both opposition parties and from the ruling MP itself.168 Thereby, 
Akbulut government’s idea of giving support to the international alliance for show fell 
through. Under these circumstances, Özal began to advocate the needlessness of sending 
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troops to the international alliance and argued that deployment of forces at the Iraqi border 
would be more effective than sending troops to the region.169  
In the face of Saddam’s diplomatic maneuvers, President Özal sent Foreign Minister 
Ali Bozer to Iran, Syria, Jordan and Egypt, and tried to ensure their coordinated action. In the 
meantime, UNSC decided with the resolution 665 to impose a see blockade against Iraq. 
Upon this decision, Özal wanted at least to send a warship to the Gulf. He was of the opinion 
that sending a warship would ensure Turkey the right to speak during and after the war. 
Despite differences of opinion within the government on this issue, Özal used his influence, 
and the CM chaired by President Özal accepted the governmental motion which stipulated to 
authorize the government to send Turkish Armed Forces abroad and to permit the presence of 
foreign armed forces in Turkey. Eventually, some deputies’ dissentive votes from the ruling 
MP notwithstanding, this motion was adopted in the Turkish Parliament.170 Meanwhile, Özal 
was stressing in view of Saddam’s diplomatic maneuvers that Turkey was with the United 
States, and he was underlining that in an environment which had been strained due to the 
hostage crisis, Turkey would not object an American intervention into the crisis region. 
Nevertheless, in order to avoid creating an eternal enemy in the neighborhood and to lay the 
groundwork for relationship with future governments in Baghdad, Turkey drew a distinction 
between the Iraqi government and the Iraqi people. In this regard, Ankara was disposed to 
refrain from actions which would harm directly the Iraqi people. As a matter of fact, the 
demands to increase the pressure on Baghdad by cutting the waters of the Euphrates and 
Tigris were immediately rejected by the government on the ground that Iraqi people would 
suffer from such actions.171 Likewise, President Özal’s severe critiques focused on Iraqi 
leader Saddam and his administration. He pointed out that the Iraqi people should have been 
saved from Saddam's dictatorship.172  
By the way, with a view to alleviating the heavy burden of economic embargo on 
Turkish economy, the government embarked on a quest of acquiring international economic 
assistance. As a matter of fact, oil prices had risen to $ 40 and Turkish economy was severely 
hit when the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik petroleum pipeline was closed. Any kind of trade with Iraq 
as well as the services of the Turkish contracting sector in Iraq was stopped. Iraq froze its 
debts to Turkey and finally Turkish tourism sector entered into a recession. In order to 
compensate these economic losses, the government demanded more international assistance. 
However, President Özal explained his will in favor of technological investment by the 
western countries and joint investments instead of economic assistance. In this framework, he 
emphasized that the USA should have stretched the quota imposed on Turkish textile products 
and should have contributed more to the modernization of Turkish armed forces. Because, 
Özal advocated that economically supported and militarily reinforced Turkey could have been 
an element of balance in the Middle East and have played a key role to ensure the stability of 
the region. To this end, a contact was established with the U.S. both at the governmental and 
presidential levels and Americans made positive promises on the issues of economic 
assistance, extension of textile quotas as well as modernization of the Turkish army.173  
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However, Özal’s strong and extraordinary leadership style in favor of the U.S. placed 
him at odds with the majority of the Turkish society174 and with some members of the 
Cabinet. In mid-October, the government was shocked with the resignation of the Foreign 
Minister, Ali Bozer, who criticized President Özal’s demeanor during the Gulf Crisis and 
withdrew from the government. In the course of the Gulf Crisis, Özal had refused to take 
Foreign Minister Bozer into meetings with Americans in Washington.175 Furthermore, in 
contrast to Özal, Bozer had objected sending Turkish troops to the Gulf and he had learned 
the closure of the petroleum pipeline first from the press. Following Bozer’s resignation, 
National Defense Minister Safa Giray resigned as well.176  
In November, the American administration embarked on efforts to make the military 
option acceptable in the international arena. In this context, President Bush sent Secretary of 
State James Baker to Ankara to feel Turkey’s pulse. Even though the Turkish government 
gave the US administration the green light with respect to a military option, it preferred to 
exhibit an attitude in parallel with France, USSR and China which followed relatively soft 
policy towards Iraq. PM Akbulut underlined that results of the economic embargo should 
have been waited for before resorting to a military solution and that no military operation 
should have been carried out without a Security Council decision. Nonetheless, he told Baker 
that Turkey would not object any Security Council resolution to use force. President Özal, on 
the other hand, gave clearer answers to Baker about the attitude of Turkey in his own usual 
style. Accordingly, Ankara would give a boost to the military option, but with the following 
conditions:  
1. The United States should not have performed the operation alone.  
2. UNSC decisions were indispensible for the participation of Turkey to the military 
operation and it was hard for Turkey to provide political and military assistance without the 
UNSC resolution.  
3.  Considering the estimated reactions from the public opinion as well as from civil 
and military circles, Özal expressed that Turkey’s military role should have been limited to 
logistic support.  
4. It could not have been assumed that the crisis ended unless Iraq withdrew to its pre-
August 2 boundaries.177  
Subsequent to the UNSC resolution 678 which granted a 45 days respite to the Iraqi 
administration to withdraw, Ankara got into motion. In the meetings of National Security 
Council and CM chaired by President Özal, the resolution 678 and its implications were 
discussed. Taking into consideration of a possible war, the cabinet came to a decision to invite 
NATO Rapid Deployment Force to Turkey. Following the CM meeting, the Crisis Committee 
which was chaired again by President Özal and attended by PM Yıldırım Akbulut, Chief of 
General Staff Necip Torumtay, National Defense Minister Hüsnü Doğan and FM Alptemoçin 
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came together. Whereas the government was debating the quality of the resolution 678, rather 
than discussing its nature, President Özal was arguing that the military bases in Turkey should 
have been opened for use.  According to him, if the bases would not be used in case of a hot 
conflict, the end of the Gulf war would be risky, thus, Ankara should have opened the 
bases.178  
Contrary to Özal’s clear stance on the bases matter, there existed some cracks in the 
Cabinet. Whereas some members argued that the former permission obtained from the 
Parliament was invalid and that Turkey should have stayed away from the war, other 
members contemplated to the contrary. The opposition parties objected also to sending troops 
to the region and to opening the bases to the allies. By the same token, the General Staff and 
the bureaucracy of foreign affairs were uneasy about allowing the international mainstream to 
use the bases in Turkey.179 In this environment, Chief of the Staff Necip Torumtay criticized 
Özal’s foreign policy as ‘adventurist’ and resigned. It was for the first time in Turkey’s 
political history that a Chief of Staff resigned. In fact, this occasion signaled how influential 
President Özal’s leadership was on Turkish politics. Those who do not agree with Özal’s 
ideas felt compelled to resign. At this point, in addition to Özal’s strong leadership, one 
should also underline the strong backup of the United States in favor of Özal.180  
 On December 1990, Turkey asked for a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) from NATO 
against a probable Iraqi attack to Turkey to settle in the Southern Turkey.181 In doing this, 
Turkish government aimed to make use of the deterrence power of the RDF and to prove the 
NATO solidarity in the region. The government further aimed to react to a possible attack 
from Iraq with NATO and in this manner, not to impair Turkey’s credit before the Iraqi 
people. NATO answered Turkey’s call positively and on January 6-10 1991 the RDF came to 
Turkey and based Malatya Erhaç Air Base.182  
On the path to the war, while the Akbulut government was trying to enhance military 
power of the country through the NATO assistance and purchase of weapons, it was 
proclaiming that Ankara was in favor of a peaceful resolution, and it was sustaining its 
diplomatic efforts to this end. Fearing the unpredictable results of a war in the region, Turkey 
signed a joint declaration with Iran and Pakistan and called for an extraordinary meeting for 
the Organization of Islamic Conference. On the other hand, President Özal regarded the 
likelihood of a war 80 percent and evaluated the events with a pragmatic approach. Believing 
that a probable war would end to the disadvantage of Iraq in a short time, in the wake of a 
war, Özal predicted border changes in the region, new opportunities for the Arab-Israel 
question and a large wave of refugees towards Turkey. At this stage, he listed Turkey’s 
priorities as achieving a good peace, preserving the existing borders of Iraq and eliminating 
the capability of war of Baghdad. Moreover, Özal stressed that Turkey would not open a 
second front against Iraq as long as it does not attack its northern neighbor.183  
Towards the end of the deadline set by the UNSC’s resolution 678, the hot issue in 
Ankara was whether Turkey would allow the US-led coalition allies use Turkish bases. 
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President Özal was in favor of permission for the coalition forces. As a matter of fact, after 
the US warplanes began to bomb Iraq on January 15, the CM chaired by President Özal 
decided to ask for a comprehensive authority from the Parliament. Through this authority, the 
government would be entitled to dispatch Turkish Armed Forces to other countries as well as 
to permit the presence and usage of foreign armed forces in Turkey. In fact, by giving 
logistical support, government had intended to reinforce Turkey’s place in the equations of 
the post-war term. Consequently, despite the negative votes of the opposition, the Motherland 
Party government which enjoyed also the majority in the parliament obtained the permission 
from the legislative body. After hours of the obtainment of this permission, CM gave the 
coalition allies the green light to the usage of the Incirlik base. Following this permission, the 
US aircraft took off from Incirlik and began to bomb Baghdad.184  
Turkey’s assistance to the anti-Iraq coalition did not remain limited to permitting US 
military air craft access to the Incirlik air base for strikes into Iraq and the strong support to 
the economic embargo. Ankara extended the duration of the DECA in 1991 and thereby 
paved the way for the usage of the bases in Turkey by the American forces. Additionally, 
Turkey deployed nearly one hundred thousand troops on its Iraqi border and pinned down 
Baghdad to deploy a considerable part of its troops in the north.185  
  4.2.3.5. Outcomes of the Gulf Crisis and its beyond  
When Özal realized how serious the United States was on the issue of the Gulf crisis, 
he based TFP on eschewing from the dangerous consequences of an estimated war by siding 
with the winners and on seizing potential opportunities in the aftermath of the war. To this 
end, Özal employed the advantages of his presidential authority, his weight in the government 
as well as in the parliament and pulled the wires in Turkey’s Gulf war policy. By foreseeing 
the developments in the foreign policy field, he tried to take initiatives prior to demands of the 
US. Furthermore, by means of personal relationships (e.g. through his “close friendship” with 
the US President Bush), Özal sought to be influential on American foreign policy; thereby he 
strove to accomplish his foreign political goals mentioned in the preceding paragraphs.  
However, events did not exactly occur as Özal hoped. First of all, Turkey’s economic 
expectations were not fulfilled. Its economic losses caused by the economic embargo against 
Iraq were not adequately compensated by the United States and its allies. Admittedly, the US 
made some effort to assist Turkish economy. For example, it allocated an additional textile 
quota amounting to $ 282 million for Turkey, convinced the Arab states to give $ 5, 6 billion 
credits to it and ensured Egypt’s purchase of 40 F 16 aircraft from Turkey. Nonetheless, these 
efforts did not suffice to reimburse Turkey for its losses.186 As a matter of fact, when the US 
wanted to use Turkish territory to invade Iraq in 2003, the heavy cost of the first Gulf war of 
early 1990s played a key role in the objection of Turkish public opinion to such permission.  
On the other hand, contrary to Özal’s expectations, Turkey’s role during the crisis was 
not sufficiently appreciated by the European countries. Although Western European 
governments, Britain in particular, expressed their appreciation for Ankara’s Gulf policy, 
there was no discernible change in their attitude in the issue of closer EU-Turkish economic 
and political ties. Hence, another expectation of Özal was not fulfilled. Moreover, 
“Germany’s reluctance to participate in a symbolic NATO force that the Turks requested 
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against a possible attack from Iraq during the Gulf crisis strengthened Turkish misgivings 
about Europe’s commitment to Turkey’s defense in case of new Middle Eastern 
contingencies.”187 
Above all, the most important adverse effect of the Gulf crisis for Turkey was in the 
security realm, rather than in the economy. The post-war developments laid the groundwork 
for the emergence of a Kurdish state which had been regarded by Turkish policy makers as a 
nightmare. Subsequent to the official end of war, when Kurdish and Shiite uprisings in Iraq, 
particularly in the Northern part were brutally quelled by Iraqi forces, approximately 1.5 
million Kurds fled towards Turkish and Iranian borders fearing of a massacre by the 
Republican Guard. This refugee crisis engendered President Özal to come up with new 
projects. He was of the opinion that opening the borders to some 500.000 refugees would be a 
source of threat for Turkey’s security. In order to preclude this threat, Özal put forward that 
those refugees should have been sent to their respective country. Besides, with a view any to 
hindering any possible attack from the Iraqi army, “safe heavens” should have been created in 
Northern Iraq. When President Özal's “safe heavens” project was accepted by the US, the no-
fly zone over thirty-sixth parallel was declared and the refugees started to settle in the safe 
heavens. A joint force of US, France, Britain and Turkey assumed the protection of the 
refugees under the “Operation Provide Comfort”. Following the return of all refugees to the 
Northern Iraq, the first operation ended in mid-July and the second stage, Operation Provide 
Comfort II (also known as Operation Poised Hammer) started. Though initially the Combined 
Task Force-Poised Hammer,188 whose task was to implement the Operation Provide Comfort 
II, settled in Northern Iraq, it was later (in September 1991) transferred to the bases of Incirlik 
and Pirinclik in Turkey.189   
Theoretical dimension of the Poised Hammer (the force which implemented the 
Operation Provide Comfort) belongs essentially to President Turgut Özal. That is, he 
proclaimed that safe heavens should have been created in Northern Iraq190 and refugees 
should have been protected from the central government in Baghdad; yet he did not express 
any opinion as to how this would be done. This question was answered by the USA and other 
European countries by launching the Operation Provide Comfort. At the process of the shift of 
the Poised Hammer from northern Iraq to Incirlik and Pirinclik bases in Turkey, Mesut 
Yilmaz government played the decisive role, not President Özal. However, Özal did not raise 
any objection to the deployment of this force to Turkey. He even regarded the existence of 
this power in Turkey as a means to influence the US policy towards the region. Additionally, 
he considered that Turkey could suspend its control over northern Iraq by means of the Poised 
Hammer.191 
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Conversely, the idea of “safe heavens” led to a power vacuum in northern Iraq and by 
implication to the emergence of a de facto Kurdish-controlled zone under the supervision of 
the allied forces.192 This case underpinned in the long run a de facto Kurdish “state” which 
had been one of the primary nightmares of Turkish policy makers.193 It is clear that while 
proposing the creation of safe heavens, Özal leadership failed to foresee the process which led 
to the emergence of a de facto Kurdish state in the north of 36th parallel.194 Besides, when the 
evidences published in the media that the Poised Hammer carried out activities to the 
disadvantage of Turkey and it gave support to the establishment of a Kurdish state in the 
region, a serious reaction arose in the Turkish public opinion against the Americans. Thus, it 
was evident that Turkish and American interests began to diverge since the early 1990s. 
Whereas Ankara demanded whether under Saddam’s control or not a unitary Iraq, 
Washington wanted to see as much as possible a weak central authority in Baghdad. As a 
result, by contrast with Özal’s goal to prevent the emergence of a Kurdish state in the region 
by supporting the US-led coalition, the post-war developments went to another direction and 
the Gulf crisis brought about disastrous outcomes for Turkey in terms of the Kurdish 
question.195   
On the other hand, whenever Turkey wanted to conduct a military operation to 
neutralize the PKK terrorists in northern Iraq during 1990s, the US gave its consent. 
Therefore, these permissions given by Washington during the Özal era and after his death for 
trans-border military operations recurrently performed by Turkish troops might be regarded as 
a positive contribution of the Poised Hammer.196 As a matter of fact, having harshly criticized 
the existence of the Poised Hammer in Turkey, all governmental parties extended the duration 
of its task until 2003.197 However, the US tolerance to Turkish operations in northern Iraq did 
not change the rising PKK terrorism fact. As it was implied in the preceding paragraphs, one 
of the most significant results of the Persian Gulf crisis for the Turks was the growing PKK 
terrorism. Owing to the authority vacuum in Northern Iraq, the PKK found an appropriate 
groundwork for itself and intensified its violent campaign in southeastern Turkey. Thus, the 
Turkish authorities faced a growing problem in their attempts to control it.198 The Gulf war 
and the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq contributed to the raise of ethnic consciousness among the 
Kurdish population in Turkey. In addition, there were signs that Saddam Hussein had begun 
to give material support to the PKK for the purpose of punishing Turkey for its close 
cooperation with the allied forces during the Gulf crisis.199 
 4.2.4. Turkey-US relations towards the end of Özal era 
In the process that started with Mesut Yilmaz’s takeover of the Motherland Party, 
President Özal’s weight began gradually to diminish in TFP and this process gained a grower 
momentum in the wake of MP’s defeat in the elections of October 1991.200 As the top 
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political leader of Turkey since early 1980s, his performance became the most important 
theme of the October elections. The main critiques directed by the opposition parties to 
President Özal revolved around three issues: his personalized and single-handed conduct of 
governmental issues, the high visibility of his immediate family members in politics and 
business, and the failure the MP to curb Turkey’s soaring inflation rate. Even though the 
content of his foreign policy initiatives were subjected to relatively less criticism, Özal’s style 
in conducting Turkey’s foreign policy became a serious source of criticism.201 Opposition 
parties and their leaders harshly lashed Özal’s control on foreign policy making, his personal 
conduct of Gulf war diplomacy, his exclusion of government and foreign ministry from policy 
making processes. All of these critiques were referred to his tendency to “dictatorship.” 
President Özal’s active participation in foreign policy making was characterized as being 
undemocratic and unconstitutional.202  
Another criticism for Özal was his extreme pro-war image in the course of the Gulf 
war. His talkative personality and extraordinary active pro-American stance during the whole 
Gulf crisis gave rise to an image of extreme pro-war. However, Özal was left alone with his 
thoughts on war and peace, and he could achieve to convince neither the public opinion nor 
the domestic opposition. He failed even to convince the military and civil bureaucracy to send 
a battleship and Turkish troops to the Persian Gulf, let alone recapture Mosul and Kirkuk as 
mentioned above. Nevertheless, the fierce opposition in the country could not dissuade him 
from his active policy. Quite the contrary, Foreign Minister, Minister of National Defense as 
well as Chief of Staff who fell into disagreement with President Özal preferred to resign.203 
Even though it is hard to claim that Özal was fond of war, considering his hard-power 
oriented thoughts of solution with respect to northern Iraq and Mosul-Kirkuk questions, it is 
also not easy to argue that he entirely disagreed with the valid international norms of that time 
which were predominantly represented by the US hard-power policies. 
Although his power weakened to a certain extent in foreign political issues due to the 
changes in the balance of power in domestic politics, President Özal continued to be a 
significant actor on TFP in the recent years of his presidency too. Notable points of Turkish-
American relations during the last period of Özal concentrated on Turkey-US cooperation in 
the Balkans and the Central Asia. One may conclude that Turkish-American cooperation 
continued in this period as well.   
  4.2.4.1. Cooperation in the Balkans: Rising “neo-Ottomanist” identity 
albeit decreasing power of President Özal 
 
Another area of cooperation between Turkey and the U.S. during the Özal era was the 
Balkans. Turkey and the USA closely cooperated in the Bosnia and Kosovo crises. But this 
time Özal played a less active role in this cooperation. The major reason for that was Özal’s 
relatively decreasing weight in Turkish domestic and foreign politics because of the 
leadership change within the Motherland Party and subsequently the governmental shift in 
October 1991 in the wake of the defeat of the MP in general elections.204  
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When the dissolution process of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia began in early 
1990s, Turkey tried not to interfere in this question. Whilst Turkish public opinion strongly 
advocated to side with Muslims, Turkish leaders waited cautiously for the attitude of Europe 
and the US. Once the US and Europe defined their positions in favor of territorial integrity of 
Yugoslavia and preserving the status quo, Turkish policy makers also defended the territorial 
integrity of Yugoslavia. Along with the desire of positioning in the same line with the West, 
there were several other reasons behind Turkey’s non-interventionist policy. Above all 
Turkey and Yugoslavia had enjoyed good relations from the past. Moreover, Yugoslavia was 
a vital trade and transportation corridor between Turkey and Europe. Additionally, Turkey 
anticipated that any instability in Yugoslavia would bring about an emigration flow of 
Bosnians and Albanians living in the region towards Turkey and considered that such a 
scenario would generate trouble given Turkey’s limited resources. Perhaps most important of 
all of them was Turkish rulers’, except for the Özal leadership, attitude towards the region. 
They were concerned that an active TFP in the region would be perceived as a “neo-
Ottomanist” aspiration of the country. That is, they were worried that an active foreign policy 
for the benefit of Bosnia, Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia with which Turkey share 
historical, ethnic, cultural and religious ties would push Turkey to an adventure and would 
augment friction with Greece, Bulgaria and Russia.205  
 
Turkey’s attitude as regards the Yugoslavia question altered again in concert with the attitude 
of the West. Despite its moral support for Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Turkey 
officially recognized four republics emerged from the ashes of former Yugoslavia in February 
1992, only subsequent to the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia by the EU and the USA.206 
Additionally, when Serbian violence was widely reported in the Turkish media, Ankara 
sensed the need to formulate an active policy in the Balkans. This policy change was in nature 
a reaction to the growing pressure of the Turkish public opinion and to the indifferent posture 
of the western states to the Serbian massacres of Muslim Bosnians. Consequently, by focusing 
on both western organizations (e.g. NATO, European Council, Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe) and Islamic organizations (Organization of the Islamic Conference in 
particular), Turkey strove in all platforms with might and main to stop the war as of the 
second part of 1992.207   
 
Nonetheless it never acted alone in these efforts and remained committed to the 
principle of acting together with Western states as well as with international institutions. For 
example, though Turkey already declared from the very beginning that it was ready to send 
peacekeeping troops to serve in Yugoslavia, it preferred to act in unison with the international 
community and waited patiently for the United Nations’ invitation.208  
 
In contrast to government’s prudent attitude, President Özal’s eagerness to assume a 
more active role in the region and his defense of a more hawkish foreign policy in the Balkans 
caused discomfort in both the government and foreign affairs bureaucracy.209 Nevertheless, 
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the government followed a relatively more active foreign policy in the Balkans and it was 
claimed that President Özal’s active foreign policy approach had a certain psychological 
impact on PM Süleyman Demirel’s relatively active policy approach, who had been in a long-
standing competition with Turgut Özal. Accordingly, Demirel did not want to lag behind Özal 
in the foreign policy field.210 Stated differently, President Özal was in a sense a source of 
pressure on Demirel government on foreign policy. As a matter of fact, in the course of 
Bosnian crisis, Demirel was, incomparably to his earlier prime ministries, excessively 
interested in foreign policy. PM Demirel took a stand, unusually in the republican history, 
against President Özal and, for instance, he tried to hinder the impression that President Özal 
was using initiative on behalf of Turkey. With respect to Özal’s Balkan tour in February 1993, 
PM Demirel stressed that the authority belonged to the government both in domestic and 
foreign policy. Furthermore, he proclaimed with reference to Özal’s words “Turkey should 
take risk for Bosnia-Herzegovina” that Turkey should act and was already acting in unison 
with the world.211  
 
On the other hand, President Özal did not stand idle on the Balkans issue either and by 
bringing the Bosnia question in national and international platforms, he tried to influence 
Turkey’s Balkans policy. In this framework for example, during his visit to the USA between 
24 January and 9 February, he lobbied in favor of Bosnia and demanded a military 
intervention from President Clinton to stop Serbs.212 Additionally, prior to his Balkan trip 
mentioned above, he unusually gave support to a Bosnia solidarity open-air-meeting 
organized on 13 February 1993 and he even addressed a speech there. In his address, Özal 
underlined that “Turkey and Turkish nation would never allow a second Andalusia tragedy in 
Bosnia” (T.b.A.).213 Thereby he sought to mobilize public opinion and indirectly tried to exert 
pressure on the government.  
 
Consequently, even though the Demirel government sought to act together with the 
west and tried to avoid the steps which could be potentially perceived as a neo-Ottomanist 
policy, Turkey’s historical and cultural ties forced it to follow a more active policy in the 
Bosnian crisis. President Özal already viewed the Bosnian question as a part of Turkey’s 
Ottoman heritage and believed Turkey’s responsibility against the Bosnians.214 Therefore, he 
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tried in this respect to create pressure on the government to force it to pursue a more active 
policy. This neo-Ottoman identity understanding which had already had certain reciprocity 
within the Turkish society was consolidated also by the events in Bosnia and the neo-
Ottomanism began to rise. In a nutshell, despite the anti-Özal posture of the government, 
coupled with the public pressure, President Özal was one of the most important factors in 
Ankara’s relatively more active foreign policy in the Balkans during the period of 1992-93.215 
 
It was evident by the end of 1993 that the arms embargo imposed by UNSC 
Resolution 713, the EU-led negotiations and the UN peace-keeping force on the ground 
(UNPROFOR) failed to stop the war in Bosnia and served only to prolong it. At this point, the 
deepening human tragedy in Bosnian war required the US to assume the initiative. The 
leading role of the US in the crisis intervention and its positive contributions on the protection 
of Turkish and Muslim minorities brought Turkey and the USA together. To give an example, 
whereas Russia, France and England supported the Serbian pro-integrity party, and Germany, 
Austria and Italy backed Croats and Slovenes, Turkey and the US gave support to Albanians, 
Macedonians and Bosnian Muslims.216 
 
Turkey’s stance on the Bosnia crisis was clear: Ankara proposed since the early days 
of the crisis a limited military operation against the aggressor or the removal of arms embargo 
imposed on Bosnia-Herzegovina.217 In this context, Turkey’s proposal of the military option 
to end the humanitarian tragedies in the Balkans and the fact that solely the US possessed the 
will and capacity to realize such a military intervention made it indispensible for the Turks to 
cooperate with the USA.218 Turkish policy makers reminded to the American authorities the 
Gulf Crisis and pointed out that a similar international intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
was necessary.219 By the same token, President Özal tried to use his personal relationship with 
President Bush to urge the US to a military intervention.220 Furthermore, Turkey lobbied for 
the so-called “lift and strike” policy to end the war and the suffering of Bosnians. By early 
1994, the Clinton administration came to the same line with Ankara and began to support the 
“lift and strike” option. Meanwhile, the arms embargo notwithstanding, both countries had 
been secretly providing the Bosnians with weapons. In March 1994, a federation between 
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats was forged in Washington, and Turkey and the US 
indirectly endeavored to strengthen the Croat and Muslim forces. Towards the end of 1994, 
the new Bosnian Muslim-Croat army went on the offensive. Eventually, accompanied by the 
international pressure, NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serb positions culminated in the 
Dayton peace talks between the parties. 
 
  4.2.4.2. Cooperation in the Central Asia and Caucasus 
 Even though Turkey’s importance for the West diminished owing to the end of East-
West conflict, and the West did not need Turkey any longer as a fortress against the Soviet 
Union, ensuing events such as the Gulf War, ethnic conflicts in the Balkans and the 
independence of Turkic republics in the wake of the dissolution of Soviet Union proved that 
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Turkey was still a significant partner for both Europe and the USA. In the aftermath of the 
emergence of Turkic republics as independent units, in contrast to previous claims, it was 
commonly stressed that Turkey’s importance increased, new opportunities arose for it, and it 
could undertake new roles.221   
 In such an environment, President Turgut Özal was eager to seize the opportunities in 
Central Asia in favor of Turkey. Özal regarded Central Asia as a new field to expand 
Ankara’s influence, enhance its strategic value to the West and offset Turkey’s difficulties 
with Europe by opening to the newly emerged Turkic states.222 Once the iron curtain had lost 
its meaning and new horizons had been opened for Turkey, Ankara abandoned traditional 
isolationist Kemalist policy towards the Central Asia. Turkey became the first state in the 
world that recognized the independence of the newly born republics of Central Asia, many of 
which had cultural, linguistic, historical and religious ties with Turkey. With its market 
economy and relatively democratic system, Turkey was seen as a model to be emulated.  
In essence, a significant part of Turkish civil and military bureaucracy “which had 
adhered fairly closely to traditional, isolationist policies” was inclined to refrain from 
following an active policy towards the Central Asia. It was Özal leadership who strongly 
encouraged high level relations with this region. Özal visited Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in 
March 1991 and the President of Kazakhstan paid the first foreign visit to Turkey in the same 
year. Visits of Presidents of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan sustained this trend.223 President 
Özal excitedly proclaimed at the opening of a summit of Turkic leaders in October 1992 that 
the 21st century would be “the century of the Turks”. Additionally, he spoke of the need to 
establish a Turkic Common Market accompanied by a Development and Investment Bank.224 
In a mood of optimism following the end of Cold War, Özal leadership was ambitiously eager 
to play a “big brother” role for the Turkic republics in the Central Asia and ignored the 
passivism oriented reflexes of traditionally-minded bureaucracy. Therefore, this leadership 
mobilized all resources of the country and sought to provide economic and technical 
assistance to the new republics of Central Asia and supported them in all international 
platforms.225 One might claim that President Özal’s foreign policy approach which attached 
importance to cooperate with the countries with which Turkey enjoys historical and cultural 
denominators was also influential in his proactive approach towards the Central Asia and 
Caucasus.  
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With respect to Turkish-US cooperation, the post-Soviet republics of the Caucasus and 
Central Asia provided another area for American-Turkish strategic cooperation.226  “The USA 
had three major goals for the Central Asia: domination of energy sources and routes; keeping 
Russian resurgence, Chinese incursion and Iranian influence in check; and integration of the 
Central Asian states into the international system under the US tutelage. All three aims 
coincided with Turkey’s interests in the region, and the US needed Turkey” for the realization 
of its goals.227  Hence, American leaders began to give support to Ankara for its efforts to 
enhance Turkish influence in Central Asia so that it could fill the “power vacuum” in the 
region. In doing so, they hoped that Turkey, which comes from the same ethnicity and shares 
the same religion and language with the new Central Asian republics, could be helpful in 
precluding Russian and Iranian influence or at least in confining them.228  
In this respect, the new “Turkish Model” was presented to the Central Asian states.229 
The motive behind the promotion of this model was that Turkey’s secular and democratic 
political structure and its free market economy would set an example for the newly born 
states.230 On the other hand, in the face of Russian and Iranian competition, cognizant of its 
inadequate economic, military and political power for its projects in the region, Turkey 
closely cooperated with the US and gained the American support in investment, diplomatic 
initiative and economic leverage.231 
However, the Turkish and American interests did not always coincide either. Whereas 
Ankara strongly backed Azerbaijan up throughout the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict, the US 
followed a more pro-Armenian policy.232 In terms of Turkey’s stance towards this conflict, 
there were disagreements between President Özal and the government in Ankara. More 
precisely speaking, President Özal was in favor of a more hawkish policy than the 
government and advocated the exploitation of means of “hard-power”. As a matter of fact, 
President Özal declared at every turn that Turkey sided with Azerbaijan, that “Turkish 
nation’s patience should not be tried” and that the option of a military intervention in the 
conflict should be seriously considered.233 He even underscored in a statement that Turkey’s 
intervention in the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict was a matter of courage and he reminded 
that Turkey already demonstrated this courage in the Cyprus intervention.234 According to 
him, in this world it was not possible to achieve any result without taking any risk. 
Conversely, the then PM Süleyman Demirel underlined that Turkey would not use military 
force in the face of Armenian invasions in Azerbaijan.235  
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Opening a parenthesis before coming to the conclusion, one should note that Turkish-
American cooperation during the Özal era was not confined to the issues explained above. For 
instance, at the urging of the United States, Turkey participated in UN peace keeping and 
humanitarian actions. In this context, Turkey sent in December 1992 a military unit to support 
UN operations in Somalia and the UN peace-keeping force in this African country was led by 
a Turkish General.236 However, since the Özal factor is determinant in this analysis and his 
role in the events such as the US-Turkish cooperation in Somalia is relatively less relevant 
owing to the internal political developments mentioned in the preceding pages, I do not intend 
to analyze such issues here in detail.  
 4.2.5. Conclusion 
 This analysis of Turkey-US relations during the Özal era shows that despite ups and 
downs in bilateral relations at the periodic level; Turkish-American relations continued to a 
large extent to remain stable at the institutional level. In view of the Özal decade, it might be 
also concluded that the relations between the two allies witnessed high profile relations at the 
periodical level as well. This special relationship peaked particularly during the Gulf Crisis in 
the Middle East, in the Central Asia, Caucasus and Balkans in the wake of the Cold War.  
 As it was noted above, Özal period occupies an exceptional place in Turkish political 
history in many senses. In this term, Turkey witnessed serious novelties in numerous fields, 
especially in economy. Foreign policy field had also its share of these novelties and TFP went 
beyond traditional passivism, non-interventionism and pro-status quo oriented policy line, 
which was more visible in the post-Cold War process. Undoubtedly, inter alia, Özal’s 
conservative-Muslim and economist identities, his paradigm as well as his personality and 
psychological qualities played considerable roles in this new policy line. Therefore, without 
analyzing the quality of Özal leadership's identity definition, his personality and the 
socialization processes that he went through, a foreign policy analysis of the Özal era would 
be incomplete. As a matter of course, Özal’s identity and his correspondingly defined interest 
definitions for TFP had reflections on Turkish-American relations as well. 
Turkey-US relations which entered into a new period in the wake of the September 12, 
1980 military putsch continued the upwards trend under the Özal government as well. In spite 
of the high profile relations during the Özal era, relations with the US were not always smooth 
and free of periodic fluctuations, particularly until the end of Cold War. As a matter of fact, 
Armenian question, American aid issue, Turkey’s neutral standing during the Iran-Iraq war, 
Turkey’ rejection of joining the international coalition to isolate Libya, pro-Palestinian stance 
of the Özal leadership and diverging Turkish and American postures on the Azerbaijani-
Armenian conflict might be stressed as tension points in the course of Özal period. Despite 
these periodic fluctuations, the relations continued to be at a good level and they did not 
experience a deep crisis. Additionally, the American aid proceeded at a certain level. The 
drafts to recognize the 1915 events as “genocide” were somehow curbed in the American 
Congress and a serious break in the relations was forestalled by the American administrations 
through "middle ways."  
 When the Cold War ended, it was initially thought that Turkey's importance decreased 
substantially for the West. However, the developments in the coming period, particularly the 
Gulf crisis, proved it to the contrary. The end of Cold War provided a new environment which 
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was relatively free from Cold War restrictions which were imposing to side with one of two 
major blocks. As the Soviet Block dissolved and the Cold War came to an end, the new term 
required the members of both blocks to define a new foreign policy course. However, along 
with many other countries, Turkey had defined no strategy for the post-Cold War world 
either. A new reading of the world as well as a new strategy was necessary for Ankara. At this 
point, President Turgut Özal took the initiative and his foreign policy paradigm, identity 
definition as well as personal qualities stepped in. Because, even if the post-Cold War opened 
a new policy space for Ankara, a concert chief was necessary, and President Özal played this 
role. By utilizing his Presidential status as well as his influence on the ruling Motherland 
Party, he defined a new policy line for Turkey nearly alone. This new strategy included 
several elements such as active foreign policy and "a Turkish world from the Adriatic Sea to 
the Chinese Wall."  
 Özal regarded the developments in the post-Cold War term as presenting significant 
opportunities for Ankara and he aimed to seize them. Therefore, he followed an active foreign 
policy during the Gulf War and thereby tried to direct the crisis in favor of his country. As 
noted above, Özal leadership was advocating a proactive rather than passive foreign policy in 
the face of the events around Turkey. Therefore, an indifferent attitude towards a crisis on its 
doorstep was unthinkable. Additionally, Özal was of the opinion that an American attack 
against Iraq was indispensible and this war would end in a short time in favor of the 
Americans. Therefore, in a unipolar world, a possible confrontation with the U.S. in this 
subject would be to the detriment of Turkish interests. For such reasons, he spearheaded the 
close collaboration with Washington during the Gulf crisis. In this case, along with Özal's 
foreign policy paradigm, his analyzing and interpreting the material conditions of the day 
through his lenses were determinant. In this respect, Özal leadership defined Turkey's interest 
in favor of a pro-U.S. active foreign policy during the Gulf War. 
In the high profile relations between Ankara and Washington, Özal leadership's role 
cannot be ignored.237 As noted above, he spent an important part of his international 
socialization process in the United States, significantly impressed by the power, economic and 
political system of the U.S. and adopted its liberalism for his political weltanschauung. 
Additionally, Özal was capable of speaking English very well and was very familiar with the 
American mentality, and thanks to this he was able to communicate well with the Americans. 
He desired the strengthening of Ankara-Washington ties and strove for the diversification of 
relations by adding also an economic dimension to bilateral relationship. After all, as touched 
on above, in Özal’s foreign policy understanding, the USA had a quite exceptional place and 
gaining the support of this super power was of vital importance for Özal’s active as well as 
assertive policy in the region. Without the American backup, it was hardly possible for 
Turkey to achieve the goals set by Özal in the Middle East, Central Asia and Balkans solely 
on the basis of its own power. Thus, in the face of the emerging newly independent Turkic 
states of the Central Asia and the ethnic conflicts in the Balkans, Özal leadership considered 
again that a close alliance with the U.S. and its support was of vital importance for Turkey's 
interests in these regions.   
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On the issues mentioned so far, Özal's identity definition and his personality traits 
have an undeniable role. Firstly, Özal’s identity played a key role on the issues ranging from 
his ideas on Turkey’s foreign policy activism in its region to his recognition of Turkey’s 
Muslim social identity. Contrary to conventional Turkish policy line, while formulating and 
implementing TFP Turgut Özal preferred to benefit from Turkey’s cultural diversity and 
Ottoman legacy keeping an eye on towards country’s interests and pragmatic goals. 
Moreover, Özal's ideas and interpretations about the material conditions were also 
determining about his foreign political stance and practices. Secondly, his strong leadership 
based on his initiative- and risk-taking personal trait was of vital importance in his foreign 
policy approach and style especially after the disappearance of the Cold War restrictions. For 
instance, the strong opposition notwithstanding, he did not give up assuming a leading role 
during the Gulf Crisis. Even if he was not able to realize all of his considerations, he never 
lost his resolution to direct Turkey’s Gulf policy. With other words, though his hard power 
oriented suggestions, such as sending troops or at least a battle ship to the Gulf were not 
adequately appreciated by the opposition and Turkish people, Özal did not abandon his 
attitude to direct Turkey’s Gulf policy in concert with his own perspective and achieved a 
considerable success. This might be connected to his psychological traits which is not a 
situation envisaged by the constructivists.   
In this chapter, it has been stressed that without an identity-based approach, an 
analysis of foreign policy during the Özal era would be incomplete. In doing this, the 
constructivist foreign policy approach has been utilized and it has been also underlined that 
identity definitions of policy makers have a considerable impact on the foreign policy 
approach of them. Accordingly, policy makers view the material world through their lenses 
constructed during their socialization processes and heavily influenced by their identity 
definitions and define their policy approach and practices correspondingly. Furthermore, by 
adding the psychological factors to the analysis which have been ignored by the constructivist 
approaches, it was tried to fill a gap left by constructivists.  
In the following chapter, in addition to all these points, analogies between the Özal 
and AK Party era foreign policy practices will be emphasized. In doing this, the identity-
based approach of constructivism will be used again and I will seek to test my thesis which 
argues that there is a serious analogy between the two eras and AK Party's foreign policy 
applications seem like the extension of the Özal era foreign policy applications. 
 
CHAPTER 5: TURKEY-US RELATIONS DURING THE AK PARTY 
ERA 
 
5.1. A general appraisal of Turkish-U.S. relations during 1990s and early 2000s 
In the post-Cold War transition period, Turgut Özal leadership's active and initiative 
taking diplomatic style, which sought to adapt to the "new world order" and seize the 
opportunities offered by this new order, could not find the sufficient backup from Turkish 
bureaucratic circles who received their diplomatic training in the context of the Cold War 
parameters. Following President Özal's unexpected death in 1993, Süleyman Demirel took the 
office and the country entered into a decade of intense political and economic turbulence. The 
political vacuum in the center-right, coalition governments established one after another and 
economic crises accelerated the rise of bureaucracy as the most influential decision maker. 
This situation had also some reflections on the identity and interest definitions of Turkey. In 
this period, TFP entered into a securitization process. Instead of Özal's foreign policy 
principles such as highlighting Turkey's historical and cultural assets in foreign policy making 
and an active foreign policy aiming to construct interdependencies in the region and thereby 
to ensure peace and stability, Turkey's traditional reactive and pro-status quo oriented policy 
line began to be dominant again and even a conflictive approach was on the rise on account of 
the security concerns.1 Politicians and bureaucrats of this era whose mindsets were shaped 
according to the circumstances of the Cold War term were unable to grasp the specific 
conditions of this new period and these years became the weakest times of Turkish diplomacy 
ever. 2  
 
Turkish-U.S. relations on the other hand continued to remain at a high level 
throughout the 1990s. Some divergences on foreign policy such as the issue of Northern Iraq, 
the policy of dual containment3 and its negative consequences for Turkey, the appropriate 
way of dealing with Iran and the Cyprus issue did not undermine the prevailing positive 
climate of relations in the aftermath of the Cold War.4 Ranging from strategic tendencies5 to 
exclusivist attitude of the Europeans towards Turkey, a number of factors forced Ankara to 
keep its relations with the U.S. at a good level in the last decade of the 20th century. The 
hostile postures of neighboring countries, their support to terrorist organizations against 
                                               
1 Ahmet K. Han, “From “Strategic Partnership” to “Model Partnership”: AKP, Turkish – US Relations and the 
Prospects under Obama,” UNISCI Discussion Papers, No:23, (May 2010): 90-91. The way of thinking which 
might be advocated to be dominant among the decision makers of that time was summarized by a retired Turkish 
ambassador, Şükrü Elekdağ, in one sentence: “[N]o matter how capable a foreign policy might be, it cannot be 
stronger than the military might it relies on.” Ibid., 91. 
2 Hasan Kösebalaban, “AKP Döneminde ABD’yle İlişkiler: Kriz Yönetimi” [Relations with the USA in the AKP 
Era: Crisis Management], Anlayış, Sayı 55, (Aralık 2007), accessed 12.98.2012, 
http://www.anlayis.net/makaleGoster.aspx?dergiid=84&makaleid=867  
3 "Dual containment" is the name of official American policy defined in early 1990s against Iraq and Iran which 
were identified as significant threats to the US interests in the Middle East. The policy stipulated the containment 
of Iraq and Iran, isolation of both countries regionally and cutting them off from the world economic and trading 
system. Washington strongly supported the continuation of U.N. sanctions against both countries and 
simultaneously sustained its military commitments to Saudi Arabia and the smaller monarchies in the Gulf 
region. This adamant U.S. policy has had adverse impacts on Turkey's economic interests in particular. F. 
Gregory Gause, "The Illogic of Dual Containment, Foreign Affairs Magazine, (March/April 1994). 
4 Han, “From “Strategic Partnership” to “Model Partnership,” 91. 
5 Erhan, “Türkiye-ABD İlişkilerinin Mantıksal Çerçevesi,” 143-150. 
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Turkey, new problems of the post-Cold War period that arose in the neighborhood of Turkish 
borders might be also counted in this context, motivating Turkey to keep good relations with 
Washington. Additionally, 1990s might be also named as the years when Turkey was seeking 
to overcome its isolation in international arena with the American and Israel ties. 
 
Following the great earthquake of August 17, 1999, which hit the most important 
industrial regions of Turkey and gave rise to the death of more than 17.000 people, President 
Bill Clinton paid a five-day official visit to Turkey in November 1999. This longest-visit ever 
paid by a US President added both a new impetus to bilateral relations and conduced to the 
birth of a new concept to qualify Ankara-Washington relationship. During this visit, President 
Clinton made his famous declaration on US and Turkey being “strategic partners.” Even 
though Turkish policy makers frequently used the term "strategic" to underscore the strength 
of Turkish-American relations, it was for the first time that a US President described this long 
term partnership as "strategic".6 
 
While the 9/11 signaled the beginning of a new term in international politics, it 
connoted also the inception of a new era for Turkish-US relations. Responding George W. 
Bush’s call "you're either with us or against us in the fight against terror"7 positively in 
accordance with the shared international attitude, Ankara has sided with the U.S. government. 
Together with a number of other countries from Europe, Asia and the Middle East, including 
Iran, Germany, Russia, China and India,8 Turkey indicated its support to the US government 
by sending its troops to Afghanistan to support the US policies there. Ankara did not limit its 
backing to the United States only to sending more than thousand soldiers to the Afghanistan 
war, it assumed on 23 May 2002 the command of International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) established by the United Nations Security Council in December 2001 by Resolution 
1386.9 As a Muslim-majority NATO member, Turkey's involvement into the ISAF was of 
great importance both militarily and symbolically. It might be even claimed that the damage 
caused by the motion crisis of March 2003, which will be elaborated below, was partly 
mitigated by Turkey's consistent support in Afghanistan.10  
 
Iraq and Iraqi related issues has been in the last decade at the top of Turkey-US 
diplomatic agenda. Turkey has been advocating the territorial integrity of Iraq since the end of 
2001, when a probable American attack to Iraq became a topic of discussion. Furthermore, 
Turkey declared its red lines as follows: a new state to be formed in northern Iraq could not be 
tolerated and it was vitally important that lives and properties as well as the rights of the Iraqi 
Turkmens to be protected. Their convergence on many issues notwithstanding, Ankara and 
Washington have had seriously different views on Iraq.11    
                                               
6 “Moral veren sözler,” Milliyet, 16.11.1999, 12. 
7“You are either with us or against us,” CNN.com, 06.11.2001, accessed 12.09.2012, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/11/06/gen.attack.on.terror/  
8 David J. Gerleman and Jennifer E. Stevens, "Operation Enduring Freedom: Foreign Pldeges of 
Military&Intelligence Support," CRS REport for Congress, 17.10.2001, Order Code RL31152, accessed 
12.10.2012,  http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/6207.pdf   
9 Süleyman Özeren, Hüseyin Cinoğlu, Murat Sever, “ABD’nin Afganistan ve Irak’ta Terörle Mücadele 
Politikası” [U.S. Policy of War on Terror in Afghanistan and Iraq], UTSAM (Uluslararası Terörizm ve Sınıraşan 
Suçlar Araştırma Merkezi) Raporlar Serisi, (14, Ocak 2010): 13-14. 
10 Bülent Aliriza and Bülent Aras, “U.S.-Turkish Relations, a Review at the Beginning of the Third Decade of 
the Post-Cold War Era,” A Joint Report by Center for Strategic Research (SAM) and Center for 
Strategic&International Studies (CSIS), (November 2012) .6-7. 
11 Ali Ayata, “Ortadoğu Perspektifinden Türkiye –ABD ilişkilerinin Yeni Boyutu” [The New Dimension of 
Turkey-USA Relations from the Middle East Perspective], Akademik Bakış Dergisi, Sayı 22, (Ekim-Kasım-
Aralık 2010): 6. Prominent journalist Fikret Bila wrote that Turkey was at the beginning insistent on these red 
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As the bilateral relations in the 2000s centered around the Middle Eastern issues most 
intensively, in the following sections bilateral relations of both countries will be elaborated in 
the context of the Middle East. Subsequently, the relations will be analyzed in the context of 
the Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asian regions, where Turkish - American interests have 
been relatively closer. 
5.2. Turkey-USA Relations in the context of the Middle East 
 5.2.1. A constructivist analysis of Erdoğan leadership's policy paradigm about the 
relations with the U.S. and towards the “deepest confidence crisis” in Turkish-American 
relations 
 
The new security strategy of the Bush administration (or Bush Doctrine) in the post 
9/11 period was advocating a bellicose foreign policy based on leaving the liberal 
globalization policy of the Clinton term aside and pursuing a ‘preventive war’ strategy. While 
the outcomes of this strategy were closely felt in the Middle East, Justice and Development 
Party (or AK Party) achieved a great victory in Turkey in general elections of November 
2002. Thereby, after losing 1990s due to weak coalition governments as well as economic and 
political turmoil, Turkey began to enjoy once again a strong one-party government, just like 
during the Turgut Özal era of 1980s. Gaining the office in the wake of the general elections of 
November 2002, the Erdoğan leadership defined Turkey as a central state and argued that it is 
a European, Balkan, Mediterranean, Middle Eastern, Caucasian and Asian country at the same 
time. Furthermore, its weigh in the West would be a positive function of its activity in the 
east. Hence, it was argued that a central state like Turkey could not be indifferent to the events 
in its neighborhood, especially about the incidents taking place in the former Ottoman 
territories.12  Such an identity definition has constituted the main argument of an active and 
initiative-taking foreign policy approach of the Erdoğan leadership.     
     
While conducting a proactive policy line, the Erdoğan leadership has adopted a 
multilateral approach which takes other actors into account in addition to the existing ties with 
the west. In other words, foreign policy understanding of the Erdoğan leadership has been 
based on developing a balanced relationship with all global actors instead of regarding them 
alternative to each other. In this context, whilst establishing high level relations with the 
United States about which the ideas began to change as to its role as the "single super power" 
of the world in the 2000s, it has sought to give priority to its own interests and simultaneously 
tried to regard other global actors like the EU, Russia and China. Stated differently, instead of 
strictly following a block and indexing its foreign policy to it as in the Cold War period, it has 
given more priority to its own foreign policy strategy and sought to follow an Ankara-oriented 
policy line rather than a U.S.-oriented one. This approach might be interpreted as a demand of 
a new relationship model based on equality instead of a hierarchical one like in the Cold War 
                                                                                                                                                   
lines to the extent that it was discussed during the Prime Ministry of Bülent Ecevit to enter Iraq before the USA. 
After Ecevit, the idea of entering Northern Iraq along with the U.S. gained weight. Fikret Bila, “Kuzey Irak’ta 
ağzı sütten yanan Türkiye,” Milliyet.com., 29.07.2012. 
12 PM Erdoğan expressed in his visit to Malaysia on January 10, 2014: “We as Turkey have preferred not to 
follow the silence of the dominant powers but preferred the legacy that our history, civilization and ancestors 
impose us. (T.b.A.)” In this manner, he explicitly declared how his identity definition attaching importance to 
Turkey’s historical and cultural ties reflected on foreign policy approach. “Özgürlüğün olmadığı yerde…!” 
Zaman, 10.01.2014, accessed 11.01.2014, http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_ozgurlugun-olmadigi-
yerde_2192689.html 
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era. This demand and the continuing interactions between the two countries have generated on 
occasion fluctuating and other times very well going relations depending on the varying or 
overlapping interests of both countries.          
 
On the other hand, in the first half of the AK Party government, one of the most active 
periods of Turkish diplomacy was witnessed in terms of Turkey’s European integration. The 
intensively continuing relations with the European Union and Turkey's EU perspective which 
gained seriousness in the wake of the fulfillment of the Copenhagen Criteria by Ankara and 
the declaration of its candidate status have brought about the rise of soft power and good 
neighborhood policies in Turkey. As a matter of fact, despite the pro-American intention of 
the AK Party executive concerning the US demand to open a northern front against Iraq by 
using the Turkish territory in 2003, the dynamics in the country preferred a policy line in 
parallel with the EU norms. Consequently, the government was not able persuade the public 
opinion to open its soil for the US soldiers and the Turkish-American relations entered in the 
subsequent period into one of the most strained periods of bilateral relations.13 
 
After the Erdoğan leadership came to power in November 2002, Turkish-US relations 
experienced in March 2003 one of the most profound traumas that the relations of both 
countries witnessed ever. Washington contemplated to use Turkish soil to open a northern 
front in a prospective war against Iraq, thus it came into contact with the Turkish government. 
Subsequent to long negotiations, AK Party government submitted a proposal to the Parliament 
to allow more than 60,000 US troops to operate from Turkish bases and ports in the event of a 
war with Iraq. Yet, as the proposal could not gain the necessary majority of the votes in the 
parliament, it was rejected.14 As a consequence of this parliamentary rejection, Turkey-US 
relations were significantly deteriorated. "The decision showed the United States that in its 
strategic relationship with Turkey, it could no longer rely solely on past legacies of 
cooperation and its close ties with the Turkish military."15 In view of the significance of this 
crisis, which was called by some as a “constitutional wreck”16 it might be regarded as one of 
the most important milestones of Turkish- U.S. relations; therefore, it is worth of elaborating 
it in detail.  
5.3. Troubles pertinent to Iraq 
 5.3.1. “1 March Motion Crisis” of 2003, before and after 
 
 In the wake of 9/11 terrorist attacks, international terrorism became number one threat 
and enemy for the US administration. Hence, the US security policy underwent drastic 
changes in the face of this new threat which is known as "asymmetric threat/war". In the US 
threat perception, threats pertinent to terror gained an utmost importance, the countries 
"backing" terrorism were qualified as "axis of evil" and it was stressed that these countries 
would be fought. To this end, the "preventive war doctrine" or more widely known as the 
"Bush doctrine" was put forward and this new national security strategy began to be the 
                                               
13 Kösebalaban, “AKP Döneminde ABD’yle İlişkiler: Kriz Yönetimi.” 
14 "Turkey rejects U.S. troop proposal," CNNWorld, 01.03.2003, accessed 15.12.2012, 
http://articles.cnn.com/2003-03-01/world/sprj.irq.main_1_al-samoud-demetrius-perricos-prime-minister-
abdullah-gul?_s=PM:WORLD   
15 Jim Zanotti, “Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations,” CRS Report for Congress, (April 27, 2012): 24. F. 
Stephen Larrabee, “The ‘New Turkey’ and American-Turkish Relations,” Insight Turkey, Volume 13, No:1, 
(January-March 2011): 4. 
16 Özeren et al., “ABD’nin Afganistan ve Irak’ta Terörle Mücadele Politikası,” 31. 
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decisive element of the US foreign policy, which aimed to destroy the potential threats before 
they become active.17 Refraining from global cooperation, another feature of the Bush 
doctrine was its inclination to act unilaterally whenever the security of the USA was 
concerned.18 "The Bush Doctrine identifies three threat agents: terrorist organizations with 
global reach, weak states that harbor and assist such terrorist organizations, and rogue states" 
which include also Iraq along with Libya, Syria and Iran.19 
 
 In this respect, one of the most important rings of the preventive war strategy 
commenced by the US government was the invasion of Iraq. As from the very first day when 
the invasion of Iraq came to the agenda, Iraq has retained its primary position in Turkey-US 
relationship. In view of the troubles in Ankara-Washington ties in the last decade, the 
following argument of Larrabee seems quite convincing: "Many of the current problems in 
U.S.-Turkish relations are a direct outgrowth of the U.S. decision to invade Iraq."20 
 
Once a likely US attack to Iraq and a likely status quo shift came into question, 
Ankara shared its reservations with Washington. Security and economy took their places at 
the top of the list. The Turkish security establishment worried that any harm to Iraq’s 
territorial integrity might lead to the creation of a Kurdish state. A development of this kind 
could then bring about irredentist claims on the Kurdish-populated regions of Turkey, or 
"could encourage some among Turkey’s Kurds to become more insistent in their demands for 
independence."21 Additionally, the economic losses that Turkey subjected to in the aftermath 
of the Gulf War as well as the rising terrorist attacks of the PKK which intensified its 
activities thanks to the post-Gulf war environment led the Turkish public and policy makers to 
consider very carefully.22 Thus, when the U.S. asked for Turkey’s permission to use Turkish 
territory for the invasion of Iraq, another important item on the agenda in the negotiations 
between the parties was the issue of meeting Turkey’s potential economic losses.23 Above all, 
                                               
17 Ekrem Yaşar Akçay, Karar-Alma Yaklaşımı Çerçevesinde 1 Mart 2003 Tezkeresi, [The 1 March 2003 Motion 
in the context of Decision-Making approach] (master thesis, Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler 
Enstitüsü Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı, Isparta 2010), 66-67. 
18 Tayyar Arı, “Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri: Sistemdeki Değişim Sorunu mu?” [Turkish-American Relations: a 
Matter of Change in the System] Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika, Cilt 4, No:13, (2008): 25. As a matter of fact, 
even if the U.S. sought to comprise a consensus in the UN Security Council to justify a possible invasion of Iraq 
by claiming that the Iraqi regime possessed the weapons of mass destruction and  it was seeking to develop 
further similar weapons, it could not manage to achieve its goal due to basically the French, German, Chinese 
and Russian opposition. Upon this, contending that an additional UN resolution was not necessary to intervene 
militarily in Iraq and the UN resolution 1441 justified the war already, the US invaded Iraq. Bal, “Türkiye-ABD 
İlişkileri ve 2003 Irak Savaşının Getirdikleri,” 164, 167. See also Ömer Taşpınar, “Türkiye ile ABD arasındaki 
sorunların düzelmesi kolay değil” [Amelioration of the problems between Turkey and the USA is not easy], 
Radikal.com.tr, 02.10.2006, accessed 03.09.2012, http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=200334 
19 Jeffrey Record, “The Bush Doctrine and War with Iraq,” Parameters, (Spring 2003): 5. 
20 F. Stephen Larrabee, “Troubled Partnership, U.S.-Turkish Relations in an Era of Global Geopolitical Change,” 
RAND Project Air Force, (2010): 11. 
21 Kemal Kirişçi,  “Between Europe and the Middle East: The Transformation of Turkish Policy,” MERIA, 
Vol.8, no. 1 (March 2004): 4. 
22 Mark R. Parris, “Common Values and Common Interests? The Bush Legacy in US-Turkish Relations,” Insight 
Turkey, Vol.10, No:4, (2008): 7. Ziya Öniş and Şuhnaz Yılmaz, “Turkey-EU-US Triangle in Perspective: 
Transformation or Continuity?” (December 2004): 14-15, accessed 22.12.2013,  
http://istanbul2004.ku.edu.tr/syilmaz/public_html/doc/03.pdf. Larrabee explains the negative impact of the first 
Gulf War on the future of U.S.-Turkish relations with these words: “Although many American officials tend to 
regard the war as a kind of “golden age” of U.S.-Turkish cooperation, the Turkish perception is quite different. 
For many Turks, as Ian Lesser has noted, the Gulf War is “where the trouble started." Larrabee, “Troubled 
Partnership,” 7. 
23 “Ankara stands firm on Iraq demands despite mounting US pressure,” Hürriyet Daily News.com, 23.02.2003, 
accessed 15.8.2012, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ankara-stands-firm-on-iraq-demands-despite-mounting-
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US policy towards the Middle East was in contradiction with AK Party’s new foreign policy 
understanding whose one of the keystones was “zero problems with neighbors” based on 
solving Turkey’s problems with neighbors.24  
 
Even though Turkey and the United States diverged on their respective Iraq policies 
due to the reasons explained above, the real breaking point was the motion crisis in March 
2003. The repercussions of this break have been felt for a long time in bilateral relations. In 
the face of American request to invade Iraq by using Turkish soil, Turkey listed the following 
red lines: Turkish army was going to enter into Iraq separated from the international coalition 
to be forged and thereby it was going to be out of the direct campaign against Iraq. Ankara’s 
goal in doing this was to take precautions against a wave of refugees inside Iraq and to ensure 
the border security. Besides, Turkey requested that its troops were to act entirely independent 
and a Turkish general would be appointed to command Turkish soldiers in Northern Iraq. 
Usage of the bases in Turkey would be conditional upon a commitment on this issue. Another 
Turkish General would accompany American General Tomy Franks in the operation center in 
Qatar. Ankara was advocating the idea that the real mission of the American soldiers in 
northern Iraq would be to liaise between Turkish forces in northern Iraq and the American 
troops in the south of the 36th parallel. Ankara was also negotiating for a “common operation 
center” in Turkey where a Turkish as well as a US liaison officer at the level of generals 
would work. Moreover, Turkey demanded that distribution of weapons to the Peshmergas led 
by Jallal Talabani and Massoud Barzani as well as their collection at the end of the war would 
occur under its supervision. Turkey’s major concern on this question was to preclude the 
likelihood that these weapons fall into the hands of the outlawed PKK organization. 
Eventually, on the issues of Turkish supervision on the weapons to be distributed to the 
Peshmergas, the number of soldiers that Turkey would dispatch to the northern Iraq and 
where these soldiers would be deployed, no agreement could be reached.25 Nonetheless, the 
impression emerged in the public opinion that the negotiations locked primarily in economic 
terms.26 
 
Since the AK Party carried out a strong bargaining process with the U.S., the 
American side got the impression that Turks would be helpful on the US plans to open a 
northern front. However, the government was still retaining its suspicion, as a considerable 
part of the Turkish people strongly opposed the occupation of Iraq. As noted above, 
eventuality of the emergence of a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq, negative impact on the 
plight of the Iraqi Turkmens, possible economic losses as well as a refugee crisis similar to 
the one in 1991, were the further reasons of the hesitant behavior of the AK Party 
government. After six months of military, political and financial negotiations between 
Washington and Ankara, the government submitted a draft bill to the parliament which is 
publicly known as “1 March motion” for the purpose of authorizing the US forces to open a 
                                                                                                                                                   
us-pressure.aspx?pageID=438&n=ankara-stands-firm-on-iraq-demands-despite-mounting-us-pressure-2003-02-
23 . 
24 Larrabee, “Troubled Partnership,” 11. 
25 Arı, “Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri: Sistemdeki Değişim Sorunu mu?,” 27. 
26It was claimed that  the AK Party sent then Foreign Minister Yasar Yakis and the state minister responsible for 
the treasury, Ali Babacan, to Washington on 15 February 2003 to negotiate for a massive US aid package, 
including a grant of $6 billion, plus $20 billion in loan guarantees. In the subsequent period, President Bush 
reportedly likened the hard bargaining of the Turkish side to the horse trading of his native Texas. “Şok 
Diyalog,” Milliyet, 24.02.2003.  This gave rise to a very damaging impact on the Turkish public opinion. Koray 
Caliskan and Yuksel Taskin, “Turkey’s Dangerous Game,” Middle East Report Online, (March 2003): 2. 
“Tezkere hemen çıksın, bizim asker denizde indirmemiz lazım,” Milliyet, 15.02.2003, 7. 
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new front by using Turkish territory.27 Yet the motion did not receive the necessary majority 
vote from the parliament and it was rejected on 1 March 2003.28 This refusal of access for the 
US troops to Iraq via Turkish land shocked the White House and even forced the Pentagon to 
revise its war plans.29 Members of the Bush government claimed that Turkey’s rejection of 
US request was detrimental to the US interests since it lengthened their route to victory and 
complicated the post-war situation. Consequently, Turkish-US relations entered into a 
troublesome period and could not overcome the negative impacts of the “1 March Crisis” for 
a long time.30   
 
In fact, another governmental motion authorizing the government for the 
modernization of military bases and facilities as well as the ports had already been approved 
in a closed session of the parliament on 6 February 2003, voting 308-193.31 The motion had 
stipulated the deployment of US technical and military staff in Turkey for three months to 
engage in activities of renovation, modernization, construction and extension in Turkish 
military bases and facilities. To this end, the government was supposed to make the necessary 
arrangements.32 According to the first motion in question, Alexandretta and Mersin seaports, 
and Diyarbakir, Afyon, Çorlu and Sabiha Gökçen airports would have been modernized and if 
it would have been deemed necessary, other bases and ports would have been also included in 
the modernization program. Within this framework, approximately 5.000 American personnel 
and military equipment had come to Turkey. Yet American personnel were obliged to leave 
Turkey upon the rejection of the March 1 motion. In essence, the negotiations were not 
concluded and more importantly Ankara was not relieved with respect to its concerns on 
political, military and economic issues.33 
 
Considering Erdoğan leadership's motivation to cooperate with the US government, an 
operation against Iraq seemed indispensible from Ankara's perspective as well, just like 
during the first Gulf War. The war would occur in the immediate vicinity of its borders and 
Turkey would be willy-nilly influenced. Moreover, even though it had declined the American 
demands, Turkey was not in a position to dissuade the Bush government from the war. 
Therefore, like Özal, Erdoğan leadership aimed to cooperate with Washington and avoid the 
adverse effects of the war and post-war situation. In the face of the developments in its 
immediate neighborhood, Erdoğan leadership aimed to be active and direct the events instead 
of following a wait and see policy whose repercussions were unpredictable for Turkey. Were 
                                               
27 Full name of the motion was: “Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin yabancı ülkelere gönderilmesine, yabancı silahlı 
kuvvetler unsurlarının altı ay süreyle Türkiye'de bulunmasına ve muharip unsurların Türkiye dışına intikalleri 
için gerekli düzenlemelerin yapılmasına Anayasanın 92 nci maddesi uyarınca izin verilmesine ilişkin 
Başbakanlık tezkeresi” [“A draft Bill of the Prime Ministry to authorize dispatching Turkish Armed Forces to 
foreign countires, deployment of the units of foreign armed forces in Turkey for six months and the making of 
necessary arrangements to transfer the combatant units outside Turkey in accordance with the article 92 of the 
Constitution”], T.B.M.M. Tutanak Dergisi,[Minute Journal of the Turkish Grand National Assemby] Dönem 22, 
Cilt 6, Yasama Yılı 1, p.109. 
28 533 deputies voted on the bill, 264 voted for the bill, 250 voted against and 19 abstained. However, as the 
article 96 of the Constitution stipuated 267 positive votes for such a bill, according to which nearly 62.000 
soldiers, 255 war planes and 65 helicopters woud be deployed in Turkey for six months, it was deemed to be 
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2011), 57-59. 
31 “Irak tezkeresi AKP’yi çatlattı,” Milliyet, 07.02.2003, 16. 
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the Turks not to cooperate with the Americans, as the advocates of the motion frequently 
articulated, they would not have a voice at the table to be set up after the war and they would 
have to give up their red lines as regards the Iraq question. Even more importantly, a probable 
Kurdish state in northern Iraq as well as the outlawed PKK organization stationed in northern 
Iraq would increase Turkey’s fears in case Turkey remained out of the game.34  Additionally, 
as the Erdoğan leadership has advocated a proactive vs. reactive foreign policy approach and 
defined Turkey as a central state, an initiative-taking policy seemed a better option for 
Ankara. At this point, an active policy during the operation against Iraq seemed also in 
parallel with Wendt's logic of appropriateness thesis.  
 
 Despite the strong desire of the Erdoğan leadership to cooperate with the USA, the 
Turkish parliament did not agree with it. In spite of the high expectations of the US 
administration for Turkish support and Turkish government’s backing of the motion which 
possessed an overwhelming majority in the parliament and sustained its support, why could 
not the governmental motion get the sufficient vote from the National Assembly? “A 
constellation of factors played a critical role in Turkey’s initial decision not to permit the 
transit of U.S. troops to Iraq.” First of all, there was a strong opposition in Turkish society 
against the draft bill and this was manifested uncharacteristically in a forceful manner. 
Several public demonstrations with large participation were held, one of which held in front 
of the parliament the day before the vote. “An underlying factor here was that Turkish 
education and socialization emphasizes national independence, non-intervention in other 
country’s affairs, and deep suspicion of the “West” in general and the United States in 
particular. The “West” and the United States are portrayed as imperialist powers driven by 
their own interest.”35 
  Therefore, it was widely believed that the Bush administration had a hidden agenda 
such as controlling oil resources behind its promoted intention of ending brutal repression, 
promoting democratization, and dismantling weapons of mass destruction. The perception of 
Turkey portrayed in the United States as a greedy country merely trying to profit from the 
situation poured fuel to the fire too. This triggered a nationalist reaction in the country which 
was followed by comments in the Turkish media calling for the government to pursue 
independent policies and calling for the people to say ‘no’ against the war as a requirement of 
national pride which had a certain impact on the Turkish public opinion.36 Moreover, 
humanitarian as well as religious sentiments played also a certain role in the attitude of the 
Turkish public opinion. Accordingly, the Muslim people of Iraq and the miserable situation 
that they would fall in case of a war played a key role in the anti-war stances of Islamic-
conservative circles as well. The speaker of parliament, who was also of a conservative origin 
and has had a considerable weight in the governmental party, did not hide his view that it was 
an operation directed against a Muslim people.37 In such a mood, a possible support to the 
Americans would be a serious political challenge for a government which carries a 
conservative democrat identity. 
Secondly, Turkey’s Gulf War experience was also influential in the anti-American 
standing of the Turkish public opinion.38 In this context, several arguments were effectively 
                                               
34 Bal, “Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri ve 2003 Irak Savaşının Getirdikleri,” 168-170. 
35 Kirişçi, “Between Europe and the Middle East: The Transformation of Turkish Policy.” 
36 Bal, “Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri ve 2003 Irak Savaşının Getirdikleri,” 170-171. 
37 Kirişçi,  “Between Europe and the Middle East: The Transformation of Turkish Policy.” 
38 According to the opinion polls of that time close to 90 per-cent of the Turkish population opposed the invasion 
of Iraq. Larrabee, “Troubled Partnership,”11. 
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articulated. Accordingly, for instance, Turkey would be again one of the biggest losers of the 
war just like in the aftermath of the Gulf War. The war would impose a serious burden on 
Turkish economy which was already in trouble and the Arab public opinion would turn 
against Turkey. Additionally, Turkey would be internationally more isolated if it would act 
with the US government collectively. On the other hand, while Turkish circles were agitating 
against the American demands, the U.S. acted on the assumption that it would certainly 
receive Ankara’s support. This paradoxically gave rise to insufficient lobbying activities and 
underestimating the power of the opposition in the public opinion. Turkish governments’ 
staunch pro-U.S. attitude in the past was misleading for the Bush administration. The sharp 
criticisms from varying segments of Turkish society notwithstanding, backing of various 
governments to the Operation Provide Comfort and the subsequent Operation Northern Watch 
might be assessed in this framework. In addition to this, while the negotiations continued 
between Ankara and Washington, authorization of some American personnel to come to 
Turkey with the aim of modernizing military bases and seaports in Turkey through a motion 
approved on 6 February 2003 was another development filling the American side with hope.39  
Thirdly, as Larrabee argues, the US side carried responsibility on the rejection of the 
motion by the Turkish parliament as well. The U.S. had already raised the bar by making a 
demand other than the Turks had been used to be, such as allowing the U.S. to use the Turkish 
airspace. Besides, the Americans demanded to invade a Muslim country from a government 
with a strong Islamic base which had been in power only for a few months and had had a 
limited experience in foreign political issues. As a matter of fact, the U.S. Secretary of State 
of that time, Colin Powell, had already expressed his doubt “about Ankara’s willingness to 
agree to the movement of large numbers of land forces, especially heavy armored or 
mechanized divisions, across Anatolia to invade another Muslim country.” However, these 
doubts of Powell were disregarded by the Bush administration.  
Fourthly, the army which had been a major actor in Turkish politics did not want to 
assume a leadership role regarding the American request and remained relatively neutral.40 
Larrabee explains this neutral position of the Turkish General Staff on the motion issue with a 
hidden political agenda. Accordingly, the army which distrusted the AK Party government 
due to its Islamist roots, aimed to pass the buck on the government on an issue which was 
considerably unpopular among the Turkish people and thereby sought to undermine the public 
support that the AK Party had enjoyed.41 Furthermore, the representatives of the army 
conducted very detailed and complex negotiations with the U.S. counterparts in January and 
February 2003. As the military and security elite regarded the possible emergence of an 
independent Kurdish state as well as the presence of armed PKK militants in northern Iraq as 
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expected the leadership of Turkish Generals on the bill issue, yet their expectation had not been met. As a matter 
of fact, then U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfovitz, made this statement " I think for whatever 
reason they (Turkish Generals) did not play the strong leadership role on that issue that we would have 
expected.” and thereby connoted  his discontent. Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfovitz Interview with CNN-
TURK, (Interview Cengiz Çandar and M. Ali Birand), Congressioanl Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 
108th Congress First Session, Volume 149-Part 9, May 14, 2003 to May 21 2003, United States Government 
Printing Office, Washington, 2003, pp.12107-12108.  Then Chief of Staff, Hilmi Özkök, on the other hand stated 
that despite the expectations of Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz, Turkish Generals did not pressure 
the government as they regarded this issue as a political one on which the last decision belonged to the 
politicians.  “ABD 1 Mart tezkeresinde baskı yapmamı istedi!”[The USA asked me to put pressure about the 1 
March motion], Milliyet.com.tr, 04.08.2012, accessed 0908.2012, http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/abd-1-mart-
tezkeresinde-baski-yapmami-istedi-/gundem/gundemdetay/04.08.2012/1576049/default.htm 
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a major threat to national security, the representatives of the military were urgent about 
deploying Turkish troops in Northern Iraq. Yet the U.S. rejection to allow a Turkish military 
presence played a critical role in the military's silence on backing U.S. demands to invade Iraq 
through Turkey. In connection with this, Turkish generals did not raise their voice in the 
National Security Council meeting as well which ended up with the absence of a clear 
recommendation from the Council meeting “just before the decisive parliamentary session 
which was a critical factor in the government’s failure to mobilize the necessary votes to win 
on the issue" as well.42 
 Fifthly, the Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer also sided with the opposition on 
the American proposal to use Turkish soil for Iraqi invasion. Coming from a legal 
background, he underlined the necessity for international legitimization. He further underlined 
that for a possible support to the U.S. intervention, a UN or multilateral authorization needed 
according to the Turkish constitution. It might be claimed that this attitude of the head of state 
had a certain impact on the parliament and at least caused some hesitations.43 The 
government, on the other hand, was caught between the unpopularity of supporting the U.S. 
intervention44 and remaining out of the game which was an undesirable situation for a "central 
state." 
     Finally, with regard to the governing AK Party’s stance on the issue, there was a 
blurry outlook. In the AK Party, there were representatives from several segments of Turkish 
society such as those who share a moderate view of Islam, who share a more conservative 
view of Islam as well as protest votes reacting to the former governments. It was already a 
great challenge to bring all these different segments together on such a critical issue. As a 
matter of fact, there was a strong opposition within the party.45 Along with Deputy Prime 
Minister Ertuğrul Yalçınbayır, many Members of Parliament from AK Party and more 
importantly, one of the founders as well as influential figures of the AK Party and the then 
speaker of the Parliament, Bülent Arınç, opposed the deployment of American troops for the 
invasion of Iraq.46 Moreover, members of the AK Party were under the strong pressure of 
their electorate and the public reaction which was materialized through the public 
demonstrations organized by NGOs.47 On the other hand, while the repercussions of the 
February 28 post-modern putsch were still felt within the country, it was not powerful enough 
to direct the whole political processes in the country (the dialectic of iktidar-muktedir).48 As a 
matter of fact, the plans of military putsch like Balyoz and Ayışığı whose accuracy have been 
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later approved by the judiciary authorities demonstrate indeed how slippery the political 
ground was at that time. On such a variable and instable political atmosphere, considering the 
strong resistance from its own party members as well as from the other circles of the society, 
the Muslim-conservative people in particular, the Erdoğan leadership could not be very 
insisting on the March 1 governmental bill. That is, in the face of the possible interventions 
into politics by non-democratic actors, the Erdoğan leadership which was feeling hardly safe 
against such threats refrained from weakening its ground by forcing its deputies to vote for the 
motion. 
Nonetheless, the Erdoğan leadership was trying to convince the other parliamentarians 
to vote for the motion. AK Party leader Erdoğan who was not Prime Minister and then PM of 
the time, Abdullah Gül, were in favor of the motion.49 Nevertheless, Erdoğan leadership 
strikingly did not take a ‘group decision’ to force the AK Party deputies to vote for the 
motion; to the contrary, the deputies were left free on the color of their votes.50  Importance of 
this political act of the AK Party leadership to let its deputies to make their own decision 
rather than imposing its own agenda was appreciated later on by the then Chief of General 
Staff, Hilmi Özkök, with these words: “Had the governmental party taken a group decision, 
the motion would have been approved by the parliament.”(T.b.A.)51 Eventually, 90-100 AK 
Party deputies voted against the draft bill of the government and it was rejected by the 
parliament since the necessary majority could not be achieved.  
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Parliament’s decision came as a shock for the Erdoğan leadership, which had expected 
success and hoped that the financial arrangements associated with the deal would help revive 
the economy. The decision was shocking also for the U.S. government and military, which 
were also confident that at the end of the day Ankara would act in a way befitting a long-
standing ally. Thus, having made their plans on the assumption that Turkey would grant the 
permission sooner or later, the United States had already begun to prepare its troops for 
deployment in Turkey on the basis of a previous Turkish governmental decision made after 
the parliamentary vote on February 6, 2003.52 This certainly aggravated the disappointment of 
the American side. “The irony, of course, was that this decision was the result of the working 
of a democratic process which the United States had long urged on Turkey.”53 
As a result, although the Erdoğan leadership planned to follow an active policy by 
cooperating with the US government during the U.S.-Iraq war, it failed to achieve this goal. 
The diversified and stronger civil society infrastructure which was elaborated in the second 
chapter and its objection to the government's pro-US demand stance contributed inter alia to 
the construction of an anti-war norm. Even though the AK Party was in office and enjoyed 
having a great majority in the parliament, it fell short of constructing a widely shared pro-war 
idea. In a political climate where the repercussions of the February 28 post-modern coup 
d’état were still felt, Erdoğan leadership abstained from embarking on an activity which may 
have brought about the decreasing public support. Thus, instead of taking a binding decision 
for its deputies in the parliament, Erdoğan leadership left its members free in their votes 
regarding the 1 March vote and this culminated in a deep crisis in the relations with 
Washington.  
 
 5.3.2. The crisis process: deteriorating Turkish-American relations 
 
 The shock following the March 1 motion crisis started to reflect to the bilateral 
reactions negatively. Despite the efforts of the Turkish government as of immediately after 
the March 1 crisis to get rid of the adverse consequences of it, relations of the long-standing 
ally entered into a troubled period which had rarely been seen in Ankara-Washington 
relationship history. Interests of both countries conflicted often in this period and they shared 
different views especially on Iraq until November 2007. Moreover, the fluctuations in 
bilateral relations influenced the Turkish public opinion negatively as well, in consequence of 
which anti-American sentiments peaked in Turkey.54 
  
 Since Ankara did not want to see the collapse of bilateral relations, with the beginning 
of the operation against Iraq, Turkey began to discuss authorizing the American forces to use 
Turkish airspace and decided on which corridors to be assigned to the U.S. forces. 
Parliamentary resolution of 763 adopted on 20 March 2003 authorized the government for six 
months to dispatch Turkish armed forces to northern Iraq, use these troops when needed 
according to the principles to be laid down and make the necessary arrangements to allow 
                                               
52 “Without Turkish bases, US would lose option of opening a northern front,” Hürriyet Daily News.com, 
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foreign air forces to use Turkish airspace in line with the principles and rules determined by 
the Turkish authorities. This resolution stipulated on the one hand permitting the U.S. forces 
to use Turkish airspace and on the other hand sending Turkish troops to the northern Iraq.55 In 
the post-motion crisis process, the first tension arose right at this point as the American 
authorities did not welcome the idea of entering Turkish troops into northern Iraq.56 
Therefore, one might conclude that in spite of the government's willingness to keep good 
relations with Washington which implied this desire by opening Turkish air space to the US 
for flights during the invasion operations and indirectly supported the USA, Bush 
government's frustration did not calm down and the impact of the 1 March crisis continued to 
be felt in bilateral relations.57  
 
  On the other hand, speaking generally, given Turkey's strategic importance for the 
future of both the US war in Iraq and the post-war period, the Bush administration did not 
desire completely to alienate its long-standing ally. Therefore, the U.S. government also tried 
to limit any damage to bilateral relations as well as to its own war effort.58 In this context, in 
the additional $79 billion budgetary draft requested by the Bush administration for the 
ongoing war in Iraq, it was stipulated to grant $1 billion (or $8.5 billion credit) to Ankara in 
the framework of the Economic Support Fund. In fact, this step was important in terms of 
U.S. approach to Turkey. Though the U.S. administration made this assistance conditional 
upon Turkey's cooperation in the operation, maintaining its support for the humanitarian 
assistance as well as not deploying its troops to the northern Iraq unilaterally,59  it indicated 
that by offering this economic assistance, Washington still attached importance to Ankara and 
did not want to alienate it.60 
 
 However, developments were different and divergence of interests between the two 
countries endured to undermine the long-standing alliance. Once a possible U.S. intervention 
in Iran and Syria began to be discussed in early May, Ankara adopted a determined attitude 
and declared that it was against the use of force which might lead to a new chaos in the 
region. Policy difference between the parties surfaced more clearly in the common press 
conference of Turkish foreign minister Abdullah Gül and Israeli foreign minister Silvan 
Shalom. In the face of Israeli minister's words targeting Syria, Gül announced that Turkey did 
not want to see new conflicts in the region, thus Turkish government was against the use of 
military force.61 
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 5.3.3. The “hood event” or "the greatest confidence crisis" 
 
 The most critical development in terms of Turkey-U.S. relations in the post-Iraq war 
process was the arrest of 11 Turkish Special Forces members by American forces on July 4, 
2003, alleging that they were planning to assassinate the newly appointed Kurdish governor 
of Kirkuk.62  In this incident, Turkish soldiers were roughed up and sacks placed over their 
heads, as if they were members of an enemy army. This publicly known “hood event" 
occurred in Suleymaniya in northern Iraq in the summer of 2003 seriously hurt both the 
Turkish army and Turkish citizens, which was terribly hard to explain with the terms of a 
long-standing alliance relationship. One of the detained Turkish soldiers complained that "the 
(U.S.) marines treated us as if we were war detainees.” The Turkish foreign minister Abdullah 
Gül commented on the "hood event" which was widely covered in the Turkish media that the 
American allegations were "unconvincing".63 The Turkish Chief of General Staff, Hilmi 
Özkök, however, made the most gnomic comment on the deep crisis between the two allies by 
describing it "the greatest confidence crisis between Turkey and the United States.”64 
 
 This arrest of Turkish soldiers clearly illustrated "the precarious nature of relations and 
the lack of trust among the parties." In consequence of this development, "Turkish-American 
relations reached their lowest ebb in years giving way to a mutual questioning of the meaning 
and viability of the concept of Turkish-American ‘strategic partnership.’"65 As the hood event 
was perceived by the Turkish public opinion as humiliating, it had repercussions on the 
Turkish public opinion as well. Anti-American sentiments increased dramatically which 
reflected to the polls conducted by the German Marshal Fund. Accordingly, reports by the 
Fund since 2003 and particularly in 2008 indicated that the Turks regarded the U.S. in first 
place among nations viewed as threatening Turkey’s security.66 Additionally, another "public 
opinion poll conducted in Turkey in 2003, nine out of ten respondents (88.3 percent) did not 
accept American explanations for the incident, while seven out of ten (70.2 percent) argued 
that the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government, which was acting cautiously 
so as not to further damage bilateral relations with the U.S., did not take a tough enough stand 
on the incident."67 
 
It was even argued that the hood event which undermined the confidence of 53 years 
NATO alliance of Washington and Ankara stemmed from the U.S. intention to watch over the 
PKK terrorist organization. Accordingly, the Americans preferred the PKK and northern Iraq 
Regional Administration to the Turks and felt itself responsible to protect them against 
Turkey. The U.S. signaled at the same time that it would not allow Ankara to perform 
operations in northern Iraq freely as it did during the 1990s. Stated differently, while the 
Washington administration tried to punish Turkey owing to the 1 March motion, it sought to 
reward the Kurds who almost unconditionally supported the Americans. It also indicated that 
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as the "conqueror of Iraq" it would not permit other actors to be active there without its 
consent.68   
 5.3.4. Continuing troubles centered around Iraq 
 
Another tension between Turkey and the U.S. arose upon the looting events in Kirkuk 
by Peshmergas following the invasion of Baghdad and the attacks against the Turkmens in 
this context.69 Turkish government reacted these events harshly and demanded the US 
government to take the region under control.70 In doing this, Ankara signaled that it could 
dispatch its troops to the region. Having been disturbed by Turkey’s probable intervention in 
the region, Washington came into action and took steps to regain the control of the city.71   
 
 U.S. troubles to control the country in the face of guerilla activities emerged following 
the end of regular war and the subsequent American demand for Turkish army's assistance 
was a further significant development in Washington-Ankara relationship.72 Another 
governmental motion authorizing the government to send Turkish troops abroad was prepared 
and submitted to the parliament. This time the motion was approved by the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly (TGNA) on 7 October 2003.73 As US General Myers pointed out, the U.S. 
request was in the nature of testing Turkey-Washington ties. Ankara answered this demand 
positively with the aim of indicating that it was eager to sustain the good relations, that 
Washington still mattered and that both countries were still allies.74 However, mostly by 
reason of the reaction of the Kurdish groups in northern Iraq, despite Turkey's positive 
answer, the White House gave up this claim. After all, consolidation of Turkey's position in 
Iraq which had had plans as well as concerns about Iraq would weaken the position of the 
Kurdish groups and necessitate a revision of American plans on Iraq. Consequently, the White 
House withdrew its request reasoning that Turkish soldiers were not very necessary. Aware of 
a possible negative U.S. decision, AK Party government had already declared on November 7, 
2003 that it was not going to use the parliamentary permission to dispatch Turkish troops 
abroad.75 No doubt, it was the Kurdish leaders in northern Iraq who were the most pleased 
and breathed a sigh of relief.76   
 
On the other hand, despite the efforts to mend the fences, interests of both countries 
went on remaining divergent. As a matter of fact, Iraqi transitional administrative law (Iraq's 
provisional constitution) indicated that Turkey's concerns were not taken into consideration. 
Washington did not take any step to clear the air by refraining from the initiatives that Ankara 
claimed on the status of Kirkuk and clearance of the PKK units located in northern Iraq.77  
PM Tayyip Erdoğan on the other hand described the U.S. bombings of civilians in Iraq and 
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Israel's bombings of Palestinians as "state terror" and thereby in other words uttered the 
reaction of Turkish public opinion loudly against the American administration.78 
 
The troubles on the Iraq question notwithstanding, positive developments in other 
policy fields brought a partial relief to the bilateral relations. U.S. initiatives on the Cyprus 
question, especially its symbolic steps to eliminate the isolation of the TRNC79 and its 
continuing support to Turkey's EU membership perspective might be viewed as the causes of 
short-term softening of bilateral relations.80 Likewise, PM Erdoğan's U.S. visit between 25 
January and 1 February 2004,81 and his attendance to the G-8 Summit on behalf of Turkey as 
a "democratic partner";82 US President George W. Bush's visit to Turkey on the occasion of 
NATO summit in June 2004,83 US Secretary of State Condoleza Rice's visit to Turkey in 
February 2005 within the framework of her first tour to the region after her inauguration,84 
and PM Erdoğan's visit to the U.S. in June 200585 can be seen as important developments in 
terms of fixing Turkish-American relationship. Rhetorically, both sides declared that relations 
would continue in the context of strategic partnership. Moreover, Turkey took steps also 
unilaterally to foster the relations. Two months before PM Erdoğan's visit to Washington in 
June 2005, Ankara awarded the $1.1 billion tender which stipulated the modernization of 117 
Turkish F-16 war planes to an American firm.86  In the same period, just like in 2003 and 
2004, the U.S. use of Incirlik Airbase was ensured with a decree of the CM adopted on 18 
April 2005 for logistical purposes.87  
 
In spite of all these steps and symbolic gestures as well as Turkey's unilateral attempts 
to recover the relations, Iraq and Iraqi related issues carried on straining/poisoning the long-
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standing alliance. "The ongoing chaos and instability in Iraq and its repercussions, particularly 
the growing risks and dangers such as the fragmentation of Iraq, emergence of a Kurdish state 
and change of Kirkuk’s status led to an incremental increase of anti-Americanism at the social 
and political levels in Turkey."88 The rising PKK terror and the US reluctance of cooperating 
with Turkey against the PKK terrorism caused a significant annoyance among the Turkish 
public, particularly until November 2007, and this displayed that the troublesome post-1 
March motion crisis period continued. Furthermore, whereas the elections held in January 
2005 launched the transition period in Iraq, Jalal Talabani's presidency who had been the 
leader of Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) gave rise to mixed feelings in Turkey.89 
 
 5.3.5. Effects of deteriorating relations on Turkey’s PKK question  
 
In the post-1 March 2003 period, the US reluctance to actively assist Ankara in its 
struggle against the PKK became a serious source of trouble between the parties. The rising 
terrorist attacks by the PKK in 2006 were pushing the Turkish government to take steps which 
culminated in a major military buildup along the Turkish-Iraqi border. This step of the 
government in the summer of 2006 which looked like a preparation for a large-scale military 
incursion into northern Iraq worried particularly the U.S. officials. A possible Turkish military 
incursion could lead to a military confrontation between Turkish and Iraqi Kurdish forces and 
destabilize northern Iraq. Thus the US government demonstrated an intense diplomatic effort 
to hinder a Turkish military operation and became successful. But Washington learned from 
this experience that Turkey was serious as to the incursion into Iraq, hence it sensed the 
necessity to take Turkish concerns into consideration.90  
 
In this respect, a "Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue to Advance the Turkish-
American Strategic Partnership"91 document was commonly revealed by Turkey and the U.S. 
in July 2006. Even though this document was commented as the beginning of a new 
momentum in bilateral relations, the developments over time were not in parallel with such 
comments.92 At the rhetorical level, the document was quite successful which expressed the 
intention for a structured dialogue, underlined the existence of “strong bonds of friendship, 
alliance, mutual trust and unity of vision” and stressed shared set of values and ideals in terms 
of regional and “global objectives” like “the promotion of peace, democracy, freedom and 
prosperity.” This document, however, was not signed by the parties. It seemed that the 
document was prepared and announced mainly upon Turkish side's demand93 and the lacking 
signatures revealed the difficulty to structure a dialogue around a shared strategic vision.”94 
 
Another important development in bilateral relations in 2006 was the formation of the 
Coordination Group for Countering the PKK. In order to defuse the tensions with Ankara and 
respond to the Turkish concerns about the PKK, the Bush administration appointed Gen. 
Joseph Ralston, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, as special envoy with 
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responsibility for coordinating policy towards the PKK. This step of the US government was 
initially welcomed by the Turks and regarded "as a sign that Washington seemed finally to be 
taking Turkish concerns about the PKK seriously."95 However, this mechanism did not work 
effectively either. In fact, only a few months after the declaration of Shared Vision Document, 
President Bush and PM Erdoğan referred in their October 2006 meeting in the White House to 
the Shared Vision Document and the strategic partnership between the parties. In the meeting 
yet,  by not saying a single word about the PKK and handling it in the general context of 
"cooperation against global terrorism", President Bush demonstrated that the U.S. was not on 
the same line with Turkey about the PKK question. As a matter of fact, the coordinator 
mechanism ended de facto when the Turkish envoy General Edip Başer was removed from 
the office following his public criticisms of the US attitude on 21 May 2007.96  The 
Coordinator mechanism came entirely to an end when Başer's American counterpart Joseph 
Ralston quit nearly five months later and left Turkey. Consequently the project proved 
abortive.97   
 
Assessing the post-Iraq war process generally, one might easily realize that most of 
Turkey's fears in the pre-war period, those relevant to security issues in particular, 
materialized and Ankara became once again one of the biggest losers of the U.S. invasion of 
Iraq. Firstly, the invasion brought about an increase in sectarian violence among the Iraqi 
groups and the fragmentation of the central government’s control over the country. Secondly 
and ironically, the invasion led to an increase of Iranian influence in Iraq as well as in the 
region more broadly. Thirdly, Turkish security elite's nightmare became almost real when the 
Iraqi Kurds took another giant step on the way of gaining their autonomy and eventual 
independence. As noted above, Turkish officials have always been concerned as to the 
irredentist claims of a possible Kurdish state in northern Iraq on the grounds that it could rise 
separatist pressures in the country and pose a threat to its territorial integrity.98 
 
Finally, the most annoying development for Turkey has been certainly the upsurge of 
violence perpetrated by the PKK terrorism. The PKK has caused to the death of more than 40 
thousand Turkish and Kurdish people and had declared a unilateral ceasefire in the wake of its 
leader, Abdullah Öcalan's capture by Turkish forces. In consequence, the violence had 
subsided temporarily until the PKK took up arms again in June 2004. Ever since it launched 
repeated attacks on Turkish territory from sanctuaries in the Qandil Mountains in northern 
Iraq which have resulted in the death of several hundred Turkish security personnel as well as 
Turkish and Kurdish civilians. Larrabee summarizes Turkey's attitude and demands from 
Washington in the face of rising PKK threats and the concerns of the US administration in 
case of a Turkish operation in northern Iraq as follows:  
 
“As the PKK attacks increased, the Erdoğan government came under growing domestic 
 pressure to take military action to halt the PKK threat, and it repeatedly requested U.S. 
 military assistance to help eliminate the PKK training camps in northern Iraq. However, 
 Washington was reluctant to take military action against the PKK because an assault against it 
 would have diverted troops needed to combat the insurgency in Baghdad and other parts of 
 Iraq. U.S. officials also feared that military action against the PKK would destabilize northern 
 Iraq, which was relatively calm compared to the rest of the country. The Iraqi Kurds were the 
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 staunchest backers of U.S. policy in Iraq, and the U.S. administration officials regarded 
 Kurdish support as essential to maintaining a unified Iraq.”99 
 
All in all, Ankara's requests from the U.S. for military assistance against the PKK did 
not get serious high-level policy attention for a long time. Despite the rhetorical support for 
Turkey's fight against terrorism, the White House remained reluctant to provide Ankara 
concrete military and intelligence support, especially by the end of 2007. In addition to its 
indifference on Turkey's terror problem, Bush administration did not welcome any Turkish 
"cross-border military operations against the PKK training camps and sanctuaries in northern 
Iraq" either, "fearing that this could destabilize the Kurdish-dominated areas in northern Iraq, 
which were relatively stable in comparison with the rest of the country."100 
 
 5.3.6. Turkey’s reconsideration of foreign policy approach towards the U.S. and 
its reflections upon the practical policy domain 
 
 While the "hood event", the US reluctance to collaborate with Turkey on the PKK 
question and its opposition to Ankara's military incursion into Iraq had already increased the 
anti-American sentiments in the Turkish public opinion, allegations that American heavy 
weapons were found in the hands of the PKK terrorists and even that these weapons were 
given them by the Americans reinforced the existing anti-American feelings in the Turkish 
society.101 This case was proved also by the public opinion polls. A survey undertaken by the 
Pew Charitable Trust in 2007 indicated that whereas 30 percent held a positive opinion of the 
United States in 2002, it dropped to 9 percent in 2007. The same survey exhibited that "83 
percent of respondents said that their attitude towards the United States was unfavorable, 
including 75 percent who felt very unfavorably." These results do not seem reasonable for a 
long-standing alliance relationship, which elevated Turkey to the second place in terms of 
anti-Americanism among the Middle Eastern nations behind Palestine.102  
 
The US reluctance to collaborate with Turkey on terrorism on the other hand 
encouraged Turkey to give more weight to its relations with Iran and Syria whose territorial 
integrity was also threatened by a prospective emergence of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq. 
In this respect, Iranian military operations against the PJAK (The Party of Free Life of 
Kurdistan) which is known also as the Iranian branch of the PKK, gained the support of the 
Turkish public opinion and paved the way for developing relations with Tehran. Both 
countries declared their common determination to diversify and deepen the relations which 
had been developing in the security field against the common enemy. To this end, Turkey and 
Iran reached a natural gas deal in June-September 2007 term and thereby Turkey was 
authorized to operate some natural gas reserves in northern Iran. Likewise, the parties began 
to work on a shared project to market the Iranian natural gas via Turkey. However, these 
developments caused a serious inconvenience in Washington.103  
 
On the other hand, at the beginning years of the new millennium, Turkey was virtually 
among a few countries (Iran, Venezuela, N. Korea) backing Syria which was under a heavy 
pressure from the international community. In this period, bilateral Turkish-Syrian relations 
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reached such a good level that this country became almost the flagship of Turkey's "zero-
problems policy with neighbors." In essence, the Syrian regime was more isolated in the post-
Cold War period when Russia withdrew its backing. In the wake of the Hariri assassination, 
upon the intensification of U.S.-led international pressure, Syria was obliged to withdraw its 
troops from Lebanon. In this international environment, whereas even traditional allies such 
as Russia and France did not give support to the Assad regime, Turkey not only improved its 
relations with Damascus but also did not hesitate to follow a common policy with respect to 
the Palestine and Lebanon questions as well as concerning the relations with Iran. Though the 
developing Turkish-Syrian relations caused concern in Washington, Ankara went on 
disregarding US concerns basically because of its displeasure about the USA’s Iraqi policy 
and the US indifference in the face of Turkish demands on the PKK issue. Especially, when 
the Bush administration acted with deliberation against a possible Turkish cross-border 
operation in October 2007, which came to the agenda upon serious upsurge in the PKK 
terrorist attacks and it showed reluctance even to force the Iraqi Kurdish leaders to move 
against the PKK, a deep suspicion dominated the Turkish public opinion as to the 
improvability and sustainability of the "strategic partnership." This situation of course pushed 
Ankara to seek a new balance policy in terms of its own security. In other words, in the course 
of the post-March 1 crisis, the deteriorating Turkish-American relations and the growing anti-
American sentiments in the Turkish public consolidated the multidimensional foreign policy 
paradigm of the ruling Erdoğan leadership.104   
 5.3.7. A common ground for cooperation albeit strained relations in the Middle 
East: The Greater Middle East Initiative 
 
Afghanistan and Iraq wars and the corresponding problems indicated to the U.S. 
government that along with the military methods, other methods and projects were necessary 
in order to perpetuate its hegemony and to deal with the global and regional problems. As a 
matter of fact, as the U.S. has been able to carry out the occupations quickly owing to its huge 
military capabilities, it is not equally successful to bring stability. Afghanistan and Iraq 
experiences clearly illustrated that international terrorism cannot be rooted out solely by 
means of military methods. Thus Washington embarked on a quest for a new project with a 
view to being able to cope with the new problems, to fix its frayed image and to justify its 
new policy towards the Middle East, just like the Truman Doctrine or Marshall Plan which 
were put into practice after the Second World War by the US government.105 
 
At this stage, the Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI) was launched by the Bush 
administration as "a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East" in November 2003. "The 
policy emerged as a central plank in the ‘war on terrorism’ just as Operation Iraqi Freedom 
began to encounter stiff resistance to the US occupation of Iraq. Marketed as a "brand new 
strategy" of "ending autocracy" in the region and bringing democracy to those deprived of 
freedom, officials claimed that the policy was designed to "clean up the messy part of the 
world."106 However, some claimed that the US aimed in fact with this democratization 
rhetoric to boost its efficiency in the region and sustain its influence on the global economy 
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by means of its control of natural resources.107 To implement this new project, Washington 
felt the need to regional allies and this need brought about a new rapprochement in Turkish-
American relations. After all, with its unique location in the immediate vicinity of the energy 
basins of the world, cultural and historical ties with the region; its efforts to integrate with the 
West, democracy experience as well as its economic and military potential, Turkey offered a 
great partnership potential for the US project.108 Moreover, the ruling Erdoğan leadership was 
advocating an active policy in Turkey's region, and contrary to the Kemalist paradigm it was 
not hesitating to interfere into the Middle Eastern politics. As noted before, as grandsons of a 
nation who ruled the region for centuries, Erdoğan leadership argued that Turkey has to deal 
with the issues in the Middle East and had no luxury of turning away from the region.  
  
In this context, the Erdoğan leadership declared its support to the new American 
policy which was first called as the GMEI and later as "The New Middle East" or "The Great 
Middle East Project" whose parameters were not clear enough.109 President Bush and PM 
Erdoğan came together in Washington after the terrorist attacks in Istanbul in 15-20 
November 2003 and discussed the project. Subsequent to the meeting, PM Erdoğan 
announced that he and President Bush agreed on a strategic vision. While PM Erdoğan added 
that Turkey was a model country which was able to combine Islam and democratic culture, he 
underscored that with its Muslim identity, Turkey would spearhead the efforts to spread the 
universal values in its region. Yet this would be only in the sense of inspiring. Every society 
could find its own solutions to its own problems.110 Additionally, by assuming the co-
chairmanship of the GMEI, Ankara once again indicated its willingness to establish a close 
relationship with the United States.111 
 
Whereas the AK Party government understood from the GME project economic and 
democratic development and modernization of the region, the Bush administration understood 
it differently. It was claimed that this project aimed to solve the security problem of Israel, 
consolidate American efficiency in the region and preserve its global position.112 Furthermore, 
the ongoing Palestine-Israel problem and the violation of human rights by the American 
forces in Iraq (e.g. Abu Gharib torture and prisoner abuse113) raised doubts about the US 
project.114 In the end, "the deepening of communal conflict in Iraq, and the reluctance of Arab 
reformers to being associated with the United States" were further reasons why the GMEI 
became dysfunctional, "lost its credibility, and was given a backseat in US regional policies. 
Turkey also lost enthusiasm for the project, initially in tandem with its embroilment in the 
security risks posed by the resurgence of PKK terrorism and later by its initiation of the 
economic integration projects in the Middle East."115  
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Despite all these difficulties, the Greater Middle East Initiative continued to be a 
positive element of progress in Turkey-U.S. relations. As a matter of fact, Turkey appreciated 
the Bush's successor, the Obama administration's quest for dialogue with the Muslim world 
and its peaceful policy approach as well. "The popular uprisings that swept the Middle East 
and North Africa in 2011 reiterated once again the two countries’ mutual stakes in acting in 
concert to ensure regional stability and facilitate social and economic transformation in the 
region."116 
 
5.4. Rising efficacy of the Erdoğan’s leadership in Turkey’s domestic politics and the re-
burgeoning bilateral relations with the Washington administration 
Whereas the Erdoğan leadership was in favor of an active foreign policy, Turkey's 
chronic Kurdish question was continuing to bother Turkey substantially and it was continuing 
to be a significant impediment against Turkey's policies in the region. Turkey witnessed an 
explosion of the PKK attacks on Turkish territory in the fall of 2007. The PKK attack against 
a Turkish military post in Dağlıca on the Iraqi border on the 21st October 2007 became the 
last straw that broke the camel’s back. In the wake of this attack, the Erdoğan government 
came under increasing domestic pressure, including from the Turkish General Staff (TGS), to 
take unilateral military action against the PKK. Despite the mounting pressure from neo-
nationalist groups, the government and the military officials preferred not immediately to 
launch military operations into northern Iraq as a response to the PKK attacks. Instead, 
keeping the military option available, the government embarked on a diplomatic effort as 
well.117 Simultaneously, “to defuse public pressure and underscore his government’s 
determination to deal forcefully with the PKK, in mid-October 2007, Erdoğan obtained 
parliamentary approval to conduct a cross-border strike into northern Iraq.” This 
parliamentary permission reinforced the government’s hand politically both at home and 
abroad.118 Erdoğan government embarked on a new dialogue with the USA in order to launch 
a military operation against PKK terrorists as well as to make the Bush administration exert 
pressure on the Iraqi government and the Iraqi Kurds to change their attitudes towards 
Turkey. In the end, ironically, such PKK attacks heralded a new period in Turkish-American 
relations.119 
 
At the same time, in order to pressure the Iraqi central government and the Kurdish 
Regional Government (KRG), Ankara continued to take diplomatic, economic and political 
measures. In this respect for instance, the Turkish National Security Council adopted a 
decision as to an economic embargo on northern Iraq. Additionally, the government took 
further diplomatic initiatives and informed European and Middle Eastern countries about its 
policies. In the context of an active policy approach of the Erdoğan leadership, the Extended 
Neighbors of Iraq Conference was organized on 2-3 November 2007 in Istanbul. The 
participating countries of this Conference adopted a declaration that supported Turkey’s 
perspective on the PKK and the Kirkuk referendum.120 In short, Turkey’s determination on a 
military operation and its active diplomatic attempts forced the U.S. government to take 
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Turkish demands more seriously which correspondingly brought about re-bourgeoning of 
Turkey-U.S. relations.   
 
Another factor promoting the United States to take the Erdoğan leadership's demands 
into serious was the emergence of the AK Party as a stronger government in the aftermath of 
the military intervention attempt which is publicly known as "e-memorandum" incident. On 
April 27, 2007 a warning statement to the government as to the presidential election was 
published on the Web site of the TGS. In the statement," the General Staff threatened “action” 
if the government does not take action to preserve the secular tradition of the republic. The 
statement mainly targeted the AK Party after its decision to nominate then-Foreign Minister 
Abdullah Gül as a presidential candidate, whose wife wears a headscarf. The military believed 
that a headscarf-wearing first lady would threaten the secular order in Turkey."121 Following 
this so called e-memorandum, while the U.S. authorities remained silent nearly for one week 
and adopted a policy of wait and see, "the AK Party government gave an equally harsh 
response to the statement. In its response, the government stressed that the Turkish Armed 
Forces (TSK) was an institution at the command of the government and added that “it is 
regrettable that there were utterly wrong expressions about the relation between the 
government and the General Staff. All the institutions of our state should be more sensitive 
and careful."122 In essence, whereas the Turkish democracy was used to military interventions 
into democratic processes and institutions, reaction of the government as well as the civil 
society was extraordinary which called "the military to return to its barracks and refrain from 
expressing its opinion on politics-related issues."123 In addition to the democratization process 
of the country in the recent years, this strong reaction of the government might be also 
associated with the strong leadership of Erdoğan who has been sensitive to protect Turkish 
politics from non-democratic interventions.  
 
In the aftermath of the e-memorandum, the government decided to turn to the 
electorate and achieved to win the support of 47% of the public; government thereby sent a 
strong signal to the top rank military officials along with their likeminded secular civilian 
allies in terms of its determination not to step back from its power in the government. 
Furthermore, the beginning of the Ergenekon case124 and Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül's 
election as the new president of the country consolidated the position of the Erdoğan 
leadership which led to a shift of all accounts on Turkey. In consequence of all such 
developments, Washington began to see the Erdoğan leadership as a permanent actor and 
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decided to review its relations with Ankara which had been troublesome in the post- March 1 
crisis process.125  
 
 Additionally, Erdoğan leadership's proactive policy on the Iraq question helped to 
prove its value as a significant partner for the US government to bring peace and stability to 
Iraq after the US invasion of the country. For instance, “Iraq’s Neighboring Countries 
Process”, which was initiated by Turkey on the eve of Iraq’s invasion in 2003, might be 
counted in this context. The initial goal of this process was to prevent the U.S. invasion of 
Iraq during the Saddam regime and to find a peaceful solution to the problem through 
diplomatic ways. The American government strongly opposed this initiative of Turkey. 
Despite the US objection, the first meeting of this process was held on 23 January, 2003 in 
Istanbul with the attendance of foreign ministries of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran and 
Syria. The Bush administration criticized the attendance of Iran and Syria to the meetings in 
particular. However, in the face of its troubles to bring peace and stability to Iraq, the value of 
the Iraq's Neighboring Countries Process increased as it provided a platform to discuss the 
troubles in Iraq and find a settlement for them. Eventually, the U.S. came together with Iran 
and Syria after a long time in a meeting organized in this context on March 10, 2007 in 
Baghdad.126 Consequently, "this initiative of Turkey evolved into the Enlarged Ministerial of 
Neighboring Countries Meetings, now comprising the neighbors of Iraq, P-5 and G-8 
Countries, as well as the UN, OIC, Arab League and the European Commission."127 
 
Furthermore, Turkey's rising influence in the region as a result of its active role in Iraq 
to ensure the involvement of Sunnis into political process and its contributions to the 
resolution of conflicts also urged the U.S. government to put the relations back on track with 
Ankara.128 Consequently, Erdoğan leadership's effective political activism and diplomatic 
success in the Middle East and in Iraq in particular mounted its value as a partner to cooperate 
in the face of the American troubles experienced in the post-war process of Iraq.  
 5.4.1. Turning point in Turkey-U.S. relations: Meeting of PM Erdoğan and 
President Bush in November 2007  
 
 PM Erdoğan's visit to Washington on 5 November 2007 marked a turning point in 
Turkish-U.S. relations. At the end of a historic meeting, PM Erdoğan and President Bush 
agreed on cooperation on sharing intelligence against the PKK. This agreement signaled the 
beginning of a new period of cooperation between Ankara and Washington, which stipulated 
cooperation for the reconstruction of not only Iraq, but also Middle East in general.129 In 
addition to the “actionable intelligence,” Bush reportedly gave up objecting Turkey’s limited 
cross-border military operations to the PKK camps in northern Iraq.  
 
 As a matter of fact, after Erdoğan’s November 2007 visit to Washington, Turkish-U.S. 
military cooperation against the PKK has markedly improved. Initially, “launching the first 
operation on 1 December 2007 against the PKK camps in northern Iraq, Turkey has carried 
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out a number of cross-border strikes against the PKK—reportedly with the aid of U.S. 
intelligence. The attacks have been aimed at striking PKK camps and units, not attacking the 
Iraqi Kurdish population or the KRG leadership.” Secondly, Bush administration decided to 
carry out another Turkish request as to exerting “stronger pressure on the KRG to crack down 
on the PKK.”130 This begin of cooperation has also brought about a slight decrease in the anti-
American sentiment among Turkish citizens.131 
 5.4.2. Changing U.S. attitude towards Turkey 
 
In the changing U.S. attitude towards Turkish demands, together with Turkey’s 
seriousness on a military operation against the PKK camps in northern Iraq as well as its 
playing its cards well, undoubtedly, the troubles of Washington in ensuring security and 
stability in Iraq played a key role. The everlasting turmoil in Iraq forced the Bush 
administration to search for new policy alternatives. At this point, as a result of its active and 
effective policy in Iraq, Turkey arose as a valuable partner and gaining its support would be to 
the interest of Washington. Baker-Hamilton Iraqi Report of 2006 played a decisive role in the 
construction of this idea. The report underlined the troubles of U.S. policy towards Iraq as 
well as the region and the necessity of a policy shift to reverse the process in a positive 
direction. Whereas the first dimension of the new policy was to integrate all Iraqi groups in 
the government, the other pointed out the indispensability to start cooperation with the 
neighbors of Iraq, particularly with Turkey. An implementation of the second dimension of 
the report required correspondingly a radical change in Bush administration's policy approach 
towards Turkey. "It realized the importance of Turkey’s key role in the restructuring of Iraq 
and in the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. Thus, the structural and institutional importance 
of Turkey-USA relations was ‘suddenly’ re-discovered. In the following period, the Bush 
administration accelerated rapprochement with Turkey."132 
 
Put it differently, just as Turkey's problems to ensure internal security caused by the 
PKK had been imposing Ankara to seek the American support,133 the troubles to ensure 
security and stability in Iraq pushed the USA to re-define its "ideas" about its long-standing 
ally and mount the collaboration with it. As a matter of fact, while the U.S. administration 
was in trouble to stop the Sunni resistance, Turkey managed to get in touch with all groups, 
the Sunnis in particular and increased its influence in Iraq. Furthermore, Turkey developed its 
relations with Syria, mediated the Israel-Syria indirect talks and became one of the main 
actors in Iraq ensuring participation of Sunni groups into political processes, all of which 
pointed out a rise of Turkish influence in the region,134 which consolidated the Turkish 
identity as a peace and stability producing regional actor. The success of the new proactive 
foreign policy approach of the Erdoğan leadership should be underlined at this point. Such an 
influential Turkey might have been helpful to the U.S. purposes which were intending to 
implement a policy change in the Middle East and needed allies in the region.  
 5.4.3. 2008: Relations revitalize, yet divergences still exist 
 
The year of 2008 witnessed a positive impact of the intelligence sharing agreement on 
Turkey-United States relations. The positive atmosphere in the relations commenced towards 
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the end of 2007 and the decision to cooperate against the PKK was reinforced by President 
Abdullah Gül's visit to Washington in January 2008.135 In the aftermath of this visit, Turkish 
land forces conducted cross-border operations against the PKK in February and March. These 
operations mattered in view of materializing the oral agreement between the two countries for 
intelligence sharing.136 
 
On the other hand, the surging PKK attacks were increasingly pothering the AK Party 
government and the need to the intelligence provided by the Bush administration following 
the agreement of November 5, 2007 was soaring. This need resulted in the establishment of a 
new mechanism in fighting against the PKK. Turkish Interior Minister Beşir Atalay paid a 
visit to Baghdad and held a tripartite meeting on November 19, 2008 with the representatives 
of the Iraqi central government and the United States. At the end of the meeting, the parties 
agreed "to establish a permanent commission to streamline Turkish, American and Iraqi 
efforts in fighting the PKK and to regulate Turkey’s access into Iraqi airspace and territory to 
carry out cross-border operations."137  
 
While mutual high-level visits continued unabated between Turkey and the United 
with a view to developing bilateral relations, Erdoğan leadership's proactive foreign policy 
understanding produced another fruit. Turkey was elected to the non-permanent membership 
in the UN Security Council with 151 votes of 192 countries. This increased Turkey's value 
even more as an ally for the United States.138 This success of Turkish diplomacy might be 
considered also as an outcome of the Erdoğan leadership's proactive foreign policy 
understanding.   
 
However, despite the upwards momentum in the relations, Russia-Georgia war of 
August 2008 revealed the tenuous nature of bilateral relations. Reminding the Montreux 
convention to the NATO ships intending to enter the Black Sea to help Georgia, Turkey did 
not make any exception and this gave rise to negative reactions in the U.S. capital.139 Even 
though the American ships were allowed in compliance with the limits of the Montreux 
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convention140 to pass through the Turkish straits and carry aid to Georgia,141  this trouble 
between the two allies demonstrated that the relations had a much different nature in 
comparison to the pre-March 1, 2003 period. More importantly yet, the financial crisis 
emerged initially in the U.S. influenced nearly the whole world and the contraction in the 
world economy correspondingly brought about the obligation also for the U.S. administration 
to cut spending in some certain areas. As a result of this crisis which led to a relative retreat of 
the Washington in world politics, countries like Turkey which felt the negative repercussions 
of the global economic crisis relatively less continued to pursue a more influential foreign 
policy.142   
5.5. Obama’s Presidency: A new term along with a new paradigm in the bilateral 
relations (Model Partnership) 
Barack Hussein Obama’s assumption of the USA’s administration on 20 January 2009 
might be regarded as a cornerstone in the Turkish-American relations. Obama has proved that 
his foreign policy approach would be different from that of his predecessor George W. Bush 
both in terms of its content and geopolitical priorities. Obama's motto in his election 
campaign had been "change," therefore he had been contemplating to alter the foreign policy 
style of the United States as well. He intended to develop a different and positive relationship 
with the Islamic world and with the Middle Eastern countries. The new American President 
Obama declared the main lines of his new approach in his Cairo speech on June 5, 2009.143 
He announced that he wanted to make “a new beginning” with the Islamic world, 
"terminating the mistaken practices of the past, and to develop a new kind of relationship 
based on mutual interests and respect."144 Obama’s famous Cairo statement along with on 
other accounts145 have been implying that he would pursue a more multilateral, peaceful and 
pro-dialogue orientation in the new American foreign policy; albeit without any change in the 
focus of the US foreign policy, towards the Islamic world, Middle East, Caucasus and Central 
Asia.146 
 
For the implementation of his policy, Obama needed allies in the region to cooperate 
with, among which Turkey would be the most appropriate and significant actor.147 Turkey's 
rising prestige in its region owing to Erdoğan leadership's proactive foreign policy had made 
it a significant potential partner for the materialization of Obama's vision. Stated differently, 
Erdoğan leadership’s and Obama administration’s foreign policy positions overlapped or 
closely coincided with each other on a number of points such as the spread of certain values 
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like democracy, human rights, peace and international legitimacy.148 “Just like Obama’s 
foreign policy, the AK Party’s seven-year foreign policy was based on a “vision of peace as 
well. All of the AK Party’s practices in the context of the EU’s Copenhagen criteria, its 
performance in the Cyprus problem and relations with Greece, and even its attitude towards 
the American-led invasion of Iraq, were aspects of this vision of peace. Turkey’s foreign 
policy within this content found support both in the east and in the west. Its liberalism-
oriented foreign policy was well perceived by the whole world, including the US and other 
western countries in particular. As a result of such a growing sympathy, Turkey was elected 
(after a long time) as a non-permanent member to the UN Security Council for the period 
2009-2010.”149 
 
Turkey’s election to the non permanent UNSC membership might be regarded as a 
factor promoting the development of Turkey-U.S. relations in 2009. After all, Obama had 
shown rhetorically that the UN would play an important role in US diplomacy under his 
rule.150 Given the principally peace-promoting nature of the UN and its potential contribution 
to the peaceful foreign policy understandings of Obama and Erdoğan administrations, it might 
be concluded that the UN provided a good platform for the cooperation of both countries. 
Stated more precisely, considering the mission of the UNSC on the solution of international 
problems, the increased cooperation between the US and Turkey is easy to comprehend.”151 
 
In fact, even before Obama’s inauguration, there had already existed a hope in Turkey 
that bilateral relations would foster when Obama takes the office over due to the likely 
common ground where Obama’s peace- and dialogue-oriented foreign policy and Turkey’s 
vision of peace could have met. Then Foreign Minister of Turkey, Ali Babacan, attending a 
program on private NTV channel, said that Turkey and USA's priorities in foreign politics 
were totally in line with each other.152 Then Chief Foreign Policy Advisor of PM Erdoğan, 
Ahmet Davutoğlu had expressed his expectation with respect to Ankara-Washington relations 
after Obama’s inauguration with these words: “Turkish-American relations are about to enter 
a golden era.”153 
As a matter of fact, by paying his first overseas trip to Turkey, Obama demonstrated 
the importance he attached to Turkey. He officially visited Turkey on 5-6 April 2009, met 
President Gül as well as PM Erdoğan and addressed the Turkish Grand National Assembly. 
Obama came also with civilian groups together such as religious, cultural groups and students 
and thereby launched a public diplomacy initiative in order to fix the existing negative image 
in the eyes of the Turkish public regarding the USA. In fact, as revealed in the media 
channels, the perception about the Obama administration was different from that of Bush in 
the Turkish public opinion.154 Therefore, one can see that there was a warming climate in the 
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Turkey-U.S. relations thanks to Obama’s warm approach to Turkey, his gestures that show 
the importance he attached to Turkey by performing his first overseas trip to Turkey.  
Apart from the concepts used until that day such as "strategic partnership" or "durable 
alliance," Obama described Ankara-Washington ties in his visit to Turkey with a new concept 
used for the first time: "Model Partnership,"155 which gave strong hints of the start of a new 
period between the two countries. Even though President Obama connoted partly what he 
meant with "model partnership" in his address in the Turkish parliament, initially, this new 
concept led to an ambiguity which brought about a number of speculations.156 As there had 
been no official definition of this new concept, it was foreseen that the policy practices over 
time would imply what was really meant with it.157  
Examined in some detail, Obama's model partnership seems to have a couple of 
messages. Firstly, he demonstrated that he was aware of the fact that a revision was required 
in the hierarchical nature of the relations formed in the Cold War period. With its independent 
foreign policy in some certain fields especially since the 2003 Iraq war, Turkey had already 
indicated that instead of following the U.S. policy as in the Cold War, it was keeping its own 
interests at the forefront, and in this respect it implicitly showed its demand to be seen as an 
equal partner.158 Although President Obama's revisionist approach to the relations could not 
fully meet Turkey's demand, he demonstrated his awareness that relations were not 
sustainable with its Cold War structure. Secondly, with the partnership to be formed with 
Turkey, Obama declared that he was aiming to overcome the anti-American sentiments raised 
in the Muslim world particularly during the Bush era. In other words, with this new 
partnership model, it was intended to establish a "model" for the future partnerships in the 
Middle East, Central Asia, Caucasus and Balkans.159 
President Obama stressed in his speech in the Turkish parliament the common points, 
values as well as historical ties between Ankara and Washington and tried to explain why 
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both countries should have cooperated. He underlined that leaving aside the tensions in the 
past; the deep-rooted relations between the two parties ought to be developed on the basis of 
cooperation. Obama put also emphasis on the need for multilateral cooperation to cope with 
the challenges that the world faces such as economic crisis, terror, climate change and 
proliferation of the world’s deadliest weapons. Thereby, "Obama reconfirmed his strategy 
based on multilateralism, diplomacy, peace and dialogue, and signaled a clear departure from 
Bush’s unilateralist strategy." Furthermore, the new American President added that Turkey 
and the U.S. share common interests in a number of regional issues: (1) both countries favor 
the "two states" solution in the Israel-Palestine question, (2) they both desire an Iraq which is 
secure, united and does not serve the terrorists as a safe heaven, (3) Turkey and the U.S. 
regard terrorism as a common threat, (4) they share the common goal of denying Al Qaida a 
safe haven in Pakistan or Afghanistan. As the successor of the Bush administration, Obama 
insisted that Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions were a policy priority for his administration. 
However, unlike his predecessor, President Obama underscored the diplomatic methods, 
rather than war and conflict. In a nutshell, Obama's interest in Turkey was heavily influenced 
by his multilateralist and peaceful foreign policy strategy and correspondingly Turkey's 
potential contribution to his new diplomatic approach.160 One should also not forget at this 
point the role of Erdoğan leadership's proactive foreign policy and Turkey's rising soft-power 
in international politics. Erdoğan leadership's unique identity which reconciles both eastern 
and western values was also essential for Obama's interest in Turkey which has been showed 
as a model for the Muslim world. 
Obama's new strategy and his new definition of Turkey-U.S. relations as "model 
partnership" were welcomed by the AK Party government which had already been 
uncomfortable with the policy strategy of the Bush government.161 Foreign Minister 
Davutoğlu expressed Turkey’s positive approach in a speech he made before his departure to 
the US on 31 May 2009, soon after his appointment to the office on 1 May 2009, with these 
words:  
"The main point of these contacts is a sort of follow-up to President Obama’s visit to Turkey 
 and meetings with him thereof. In the coming period, there are a number of issues in the 
 international agenda that the USA and Turkey must together deal with. Iraq, Caucasus, 
 Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Middle East and Cyprus are the issues on which Turkey and the 
 USA should have a close coordination."162  
 5.5.1. New dynamism in relations 
After Barack Obama's presidency, bilateral diplomatic contacts between the USA and 
Turkey have significantly increased. Following Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's and 
President Barack Obama's visits in March and April 2009 respectively; PM Recep Tayyip 
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Erdoğan visited Washington twice, while Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu paid three visits 
to the U.S. Additionally, a number of contacts were held at bureaucratic, ministerial as well as 
NGO levels.163 Hence, this intensity of the bilateral contacts indicated a clear momentum in 
Turkey-U.S. relations in comparison to the Bush era. In these contacts, of course, both parties 
had various expectations from each other. The Turks expected the U.S. backing on several 
issues like fighting against the PKK, promoting security, resolving financial and economic 
problems, Armenian question, the Cyprus problem as well as EU membership of Turkey. The 
Americans on the other hand expected to utilize Turkey's increasing prestige and its efficiency 
in the Middle East which might be viewed as a result of Erdoğan's proactive and pro-soft 
power FP practices. In this respect, they expected support from Ankara to play a role in the 
resolution of problems in Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan in the process of withdrawal of 
American military forces from Iraq, especially in the Arab-Israeli peace process, and in other 
regional and global issues.164 
Turkey's increasing foreign policy efficacy at international and global institutions also 
contributed to the dynamism in Turkey-United States relations. As noted above, Turkey's 
election as a non-permanent member to the UN Security Council for the period 2009-2010 
had already paved the way for cooperation. As a matter of fact, Ankara and Washington 
advocated similar views in the UNSC meetings held in 2009 with respect to several issues 
such as Afghanistan and Palestine. Moreover, Obama administration gave support to the 
United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC) initiative proposed initially by Spain at 
the 59th General Assembly of the UN in 2005 and was co-sponsored by Turkey.165 In this 
respect, along with many other world leaders, President Obama attended the Alliance Summit 
held in Istanbul on 6-7 April 2009.166 
Another element consolidating Turkey's international structural position and 
increasing its value as a partner for the U.S. was Turkey’s involvement in the G-20 process, 
which started in 2009. Turkey participated in two G-20 summits in April and September and 
these summits both strengthened Turkey's position in the global financial system and 
witnessed, in parallel with Turkey's rising economic power, another fostering dimension of 
Turkey-U.S. relations through bilateral contacts at the level of heads of states.167 Along with 
the dynamism in other fields, the security field, which had traditionally constituted the main 
basis for cooperation, also endured to be another area of dynamism in bilateral relations.  
The first close contact between the Obama administration and the AK Party 
government took place in the NATO summit held at the level of Heads of States in 3-4 April 
2009 in Strasbourg and Kehl. The Afghanistan question and the election of the new Secretary 
General of NATO were at the top of the agenda in this summit. Represented by President 
Abdullah Gül, other members' consensus notwithstanding, Turkey objected to the 
appointment of former Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen as Secretary General 
of NATO because of his handling of a 2006 crisis over cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad in 
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a Danish newspaper.168 Yet after long negotiations and adoption of some of Turkish requests 
such as the appointment of a Turk as assistant secretary general as well as with the 
intervention of President Obama, Turkey gave its consent to the appointment of Rasmussen to 
the post of secretary general.169 In further ministerial meetings of the NATO in June in 
Brussels, in October in Slovakia and in December in Brussels again, the main agenda was 
again the Afghanistan issue. It was decided at the end of the meeting in Brussels in December 
that member states would send more combat troops to Afghanistan. However, Turkey once 
again raised its voice to the NATO demand which had been in line with Obama's new strategy 
on Afghanistan. Instead of combat troops, Turkey preferred to send peace-making forces only. 
Though this attitude of Turkey seems as a refusal to the US request, it was appreciated by the 
U.S. government. Turkey's "soft power role" in Afghanistan (e.g. training Afghan soldiers and 
police, constructing infrastructure) made a significant contribution to the restructuring of 
Afghanistan as well as by implication to the war on terror.170 Furthermore, “Turkey found the 
US policy of singling out Taliban problematic, and argued that a lasting solution would 
require the inclusion of all factions into Afghanistan’s political processes. In line with this 
policy, Turkey spearheaded many regional initiatives such as the Regional Economic 
Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA), which brought together representatives 
from various Afghan groups as well as Afghanistan’s neighbors. The support such initiatives 
received from the Western powers is an important indication of the receptivity towards 
Turkey’s sui generis approach, as it was seen in Washington’s acknowledgement that it would 
maintain bilateral relations by taking into account Turkey’s priorities.”171 
As a result, whilst Turkey increased its efficacy in the political as well as economic 
structure of the world, Turkey's assertiveness and its relatively more independent FP rooted in 
the high self-confidence of the Erdoğan leadership engendered frictions with the Bush 
administration. The Bush government desired to see a Turkey which would adapt its policies 
to the US policies compliantly. However, defining Turkey as a central state and regarding 
proactive foreign policy as a necessity because of Turkey's historical and geopolitical depth, 
the Erdoğan leadership had its own foreign policy agenda. Therefore, it was not very willing 
to accept the unilateral policy approach which led to rising disputes in the bilateral relations 
especially until November 2007. As of this date, bilateral relations entered into a re-definition 
process. However, it is hardly possible to claim that the relations in this term were smooth. 
Obama's election to the Presidency in 2009 has constituted another cornerstone and the 
mutual adaptation process has gained another dimension. In addition to the commonalities 
between Erdoğan and Obama leaderships' foreign policy approaches, Obama has 
demonstrated a consenting attitude as regards the Erdoğan leadership's identity definition and 
tried to make use of it. As a matter of fact, an additional value has been attached to Turkey's 
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identity which proves that Islam and democracy can co-exist and it has been depicted by the 
US government as a model for the Muslim world. Moreover, the long-standing alliance 
relationship between the two countries has been qualified by the Obama leadership as a 
"model partnership" for the Islamic world. The common norms that Erdoğan and Obama 
leaderships share such as multilateralism and emphasis of diplomacy in the solution of 
problems paved the way for the development of relations. Even though the interests and 
policies of both countries were not identical, a clear dynamism in bilateral relations was 
visible after President Obama took the office. In addition, Turkey maintained its policy during 
the Obama era as well which had been implying its willingness to sustain a partnership with 
the U.S. on the basis of equality. However, despite the positive signals from both sides, 
Turkey's independent foreign policy approach caused some tensions between Ankara and 
Washington particularly in 2010, especially on the Iran's nuclear activities question. 
 5.5.2. The Iraq question and Turkish-U.S. relations after Obama’s inauguration 
The cooperation on Iraq launched after the meeting of President Bush and PM 
Erdoğan on November 5, 2007 continued after Obama's take over too. In essence, both 
countries share a common ground on the protection of Iraq's territorial integrity and ensuring 
the domestic stability. Likewise, in parallel with the development of relations between Turkey 
and Iraq in the post-November 2007 period, a trilateral security mechanism had been formed 
by Turkey, U.S. and Iraq with the intention of streamlining the efforts of three countries 
against the PKK and “to regulate Turkey’s access to Iraqi airspace and territory to carry out 
cross-border operations in northern Iraq.” This mechanism maintained its activities also 
during the Obama era. Even though it is hard to see concrete outcomes of this cooperation, 
this mechanism continued to work and constituted a significant platform for dialogue among 
the related countries.172 For instance, despite the temporary decrease in PKK attacks in 2010 
also as a result of actionable intelligence provided by the U.S. authorities, this decline did not 
indicate a quality of sustainability. Following the end of ceasefire declared unilaterally by the 
PKK in 2010, PKK's terrorist attacks increased again.  
Considering northern Iraq, Ankara's attitude towards the KRG had already began to 
change as of November 2007 and since then the Turkish government had already been 
increasing its dialogue with the Iraqi Kurds. This dialogue increasingly continued after 
Obama's inauguration as well. In this respect, a number of high level reciprocal visits took 
place between Turkey and the KRG. The President of Iraqi Kurdistan Region, Massoud 
Barzani, paid an official visit to Ankara in June 2010 and held meetings with President Gül, 
PM Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Davutoğlu.173 In the following period, on 29 March 2011, 
Erdoğan became the first Turkish PM ever visited the Kurdish Regional Government in 
northern Iraq. While Erdoğan consolidated Turkey's ties with the KRG, he expressed his 
satisfaction with the increase in the welfare of Kurdish people and also put a special emphasis 
on the integrity of Iraq.174 As the mutual contacts were maintained in the following period,175 
Turkey-KRG relations intensified both in political and economic spheres.  
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On the other hand, Turkey's political activism continued in the Middle East and it 
assumed a key role in ensuring stability in Iraq in the Obama term as well. To this end, 
Ankara demonstrated a significant effort to ensure the participation of all Iraqi groups, the 
Sunnis in particular, in the political process and accomplished it considerably. Additionally, 
following the general elections in 2010, by forming dialogue with all groups in Iraq, Turkey 
played an active mediator role in the process of the establishment of the government. As all 
groups in Iraq paid high-level visits to Ankara in 2010, its role in this process might be easily 
seen when the reciprocal visits within 2010 are reviewed.176 
In the process of the establishment of the government in Iraq, Turkey and the U.S. 
were favoring Ayad Allawi owing to his secular and pro-West views. Another motive of this 
preference was the stronger position of the Allawi-led Iraqiya bloc in comparison to the 
former elections. However, the fact that Allawi did not possess the majority in the parliament 
and he failed to convince the Shiites and the Kurds to form a coalition government indicated 
once again the limits of Turkey-U.S. cooperation in Iraq. Some commented on this issue that 
the U.S. and Turkish reluctance notwithstanding, Maliki's establishment of the government 
instead of Allawi demonstrated the weak position of Ankara-Washington facade against Iran. 
Therefore, one might claim that Turkey felt a short-term 'resentment' against the Shiites and 
the Maliki government. This sense of resentment could be overcome only with PM Erdoğan's 
visit of Iraq on 28-29 March 2011.177  
Turkey and the U.S. cooperated also in the process of pulling the US soldiers out of 
Iraq. Turkey's contribution to this process occurred both directly and indirectly. Ankara kept 
its all military facilities and its geographic advantage open to the U.S. forces to support the 
withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq. Turkey allowed the Americans to have access to the 
Incirlik airbase, Turkish air space as well as other related military zones for the US 
withdrawal operation. Turkey's indirect contribution was its assistance to the peaceful and 
secure restructuring of Iraq. This contribution was materialized through Ankara's role in the 
establishment of the government after the 2010 elections, through its active role in the 
trilateral mechanism as well as its improving diplomatic and economic relations with 
Baghdad.178 
The High Level Strategic Cooperation Council formed in July 2008,179 led to further 
development of economic, commercial, diplomatic and security relations between Turkey and 
Iraq. In this context, after President Gül's visit to Baghdad on 23-24 March 2009, which had 
been the first presidential level visit to Iraq after 33 years,180 48 Memoranda of Understanding 
were signed in many fields, ranging from security to energy, education, transportation and 
health.181 While these agreements aimed to improve cooperation between the parties in 
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several areas, they meant differently for Turkey and its ally, the United States. "From the 
Turkish point of view, the rapprochement with Iraq was important for such goals as cleansing 
PKK terrorists from northern Iraq, preventing the establishment of a Kurdish state, and 
promoting the territorial, national and political integrity of Iraq. It was important from the US 
point of view for such goals as ensuring an easy withdrawal of US military forces from Iraq, 
ensuring Iraq’s stability after the withdrawal, and reducing the influence of Iran in particular 
or any other country in general in Iraq’s domestic affairs."182 Consequently, Ankara-Baghdad 
relations became routine, and contrary to the post-2003 period, the crisis of confidence or 
mutual threat became exceptional cases in bilateral relations. This positive momentum took 
place in parallel with the improving Ankara-Washington ties.183 Put it differently, "Turkey’s 
close relationship with Iraq, the struggle to form a new order, and the launch of military 
operations in northern Iraq were all implemented in coordination with, and support of the 
United States."184 
However, in the subsequent period, especially in 2012, relations have started to 
deteriorate between Turkey and the Iraqi central administration. In the course of time, Turkey 
and the KRG increasingly re-approached and oil and natural gas agreements were concluded 
between the KRG and Turkish firms by excluding the Iraqi central government. Arbil 
administration intended in this way to sell the energy resources to be produced in the region to 
the world markets via Turkish territory. As the KRG and Turkey did not consult Baghdad 
with respect to their bilateral relations, the Iraqi central government demonstrated a harsh 
reaction and this downgraded Ankara and Baghdad relations once again. Moreover, the fact 
that Turkey has been playing host to the former vice-President Tariq al-Hashimi who was 
convicted and sentenced to death by the Central Criminal Court of Iraq on 9 September 2012 
and that it has been expanding already strong economic and commercial cooperation with the 
northern Iraq through energy cooperation outraged the Maliki administration.185 Iraqi Prime 
Minister Nouri al-Maliki openly accused Turkey of intervening in the internal affairs of Iraq 
and of orchestrating a sectarian approach.186 Turkey's answer to this harsh criticism did not 
delay and mutual accusations continued with a verbal note of protest of Iraq.187 Undoubtedly, 
these tensions in the relations have impeded the momentum of bilateral relations which had 
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been upwards until then.188 In this context, for instance, Turkish Energy Minister Taner 
Yildiz's jet which took off to go to Arbil had to land in Turkish province Kayseri upon the 
closure of Iraqi airspace for international flights by Baghdad.189 This unconventional 
maneuver of Baghdad reflects actually its reaction to the Turks who bypass the Iraqi central 
government in their relations with the Iraqi Kurds.  
Regarding the issue of how the tensions in Ankara-Baghdad line reflected to the 
Turkish-American ties, one might conclude that the U.S. administration did not want to 
interfere in them much, as the U.S. interest was inward-looking due to the presidential 
elections in 2012. It might be foreseen that aware of the oil agreements of the U.S. firms 
signed with the northern Iraq, Obama administration would not desire to exclude the Maliki-
led Iraqi Shiites and make them more dependent on Iran. Hence, despite the calls of the Turks, 
it seems difficult that Washington would adopt an attitude against the Baghdad regime.190 The 
U.S. has been pursuing a conservative policy towards Iraq and seeking to protect the delicate 
balance both within the country and in the region in order to preclude the fragmentation of 
Iraq. Therefore, as Henry Barkey points it out, Iraq would probably retain its potential crisis 
position between Turkey and the U.S.191 
To conclude, the relatively rapprochement of Ankara and Washington on the Iraq 
question gained momentum as of November 2007 and increasingly continued with Obama's 
inauguration in 2009 in parallel with the mutual redefinition process of both countries and 
with the evolving ideas about Turkey on the American side. However, it is hardly possible to 
come to the conclusion that Ankara-Washington interests as well as policies on Iraq are 
totally on the same line. Therefore, Iraq continues to carry its potential of tension between the 
two allies. Furthermore, Iraq has not been the sole point of divergence for Turkey and Ankara 
in the Middle East. As the world and Turkey change, Turkish and American policies diverge 
from time to time on some other issues as well. Thus, from this point on, these issues, namely 
the Iran, Syria and Palestine questions which become now and then theme of tension in 
Ankara-Washington line will be discussed.   
5.6. The Iran dimension of Turkey-U.S. relations 
 Examining the history of Turkey and Iran, one could easily see a never ending 
competition between them. These two have been heirs to the Ottoman and the Persian 
Empires respectively. In retrospect, a number of wars and military conflicts took place 
between Iran, which has been the center of Shiism since the Safavid Empire in 1501, and the 
Ottoman Empire which had been the center of caliphate and Sunni Islam. The border between 
these two countries has not changed since the Kasr-i Sirin treaty of 1639 and this treaty is still 
in effect today. Despite the historical rivalry between the two neighbors, ironically, this 
border drawn in 1639 might be seen as the oldest border that Ankara and Tehran have had.  
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  In the wake of the Iranian Islamic Revolution (1979), Ankara and Tehran positioned 
themselves in different camps. Turkey's secular political structure which might be labeled 
nearly as the anti-thesis of the Iran's Islamic regime escalated the rivalry between the parties. 
Fearing a possible export of the Iranian revolution, Turkey was careful to stay politically 
away from Iran. Tehran on the other hand "resented its neighbor, a NATO member, a staunch 
regional ally of the United States, and a strong supporter of Israel."192 In spite of the U.S. 
opposition, Turkey followed the so called "active neutrality" policy during the Iran-Iraq war 
and sought to improve its economic relations with Iran as well as with Iraq.193 Then PM 
Turgut Özal, was of the opinion that close economic relations with Iran was in the interest of 
Turkey, thus he objected to the isolation of Tehran in a term when almost the entire world 
sided against Turkey's south-eastern neighbor. In return, Tehran attached Turkey a special 
importance in the field of economic cooperation, particularly during Özal's Prime Ministry. 
With the attempts of PM Özal, the Regional Cooperation for Development was revived and 
the ECO's membership portfolio was extended.194 Thus, mutually constructed ideas of Turkey 
and Iran in terms of constructivism were in favor of the economic interests while the political 
competition remained behind economic cooperation during the Özal era. 
 In the course of 1990s, relations of these two old neighbors were not very positive for 
various reasons. First of all, Turkey and Iran embarked on a competition to increase their 
influence on the Muslim-Turkic states which emerged after the dissolution of the Soviets in 
the Central Asia and Caucasus.195 In this competition, whereas Turkey was in cooperation 
with Washington, Iran preferred to side with Moscow. Another reason of low-profile relations 
of Ankara and Tehran throughout the 1990s was the anti-Iran standing of the ruling Turkish 
elite because of the pro-security understanding that then prevailed in Turkish domestic 
politics. Advocating the homogenous identity of the state and taking a though line against the 
Islamists, the secular Turkish security elite regarded the Islamist identity as a danger to the 
security of Turkey and viewed Iran as a threat owing to its Islamist regime. Furthermore, the 
PKK terrorism which had been considerably annoying Turkey during the 1990s was another 
complicated issue of Ankara-Tehran relations. The claims that Iran was backing the PKK 
were another significant motivation of the Turkish security elite to be at odds with the 
Iranians.196 Turkey-Israel rapprochement on the other hand materialized during the 1990s also 
with the urge of the USA was the leading issue bothering the Iranian side in terms of Ankara-
Tehran relations.197 
 5.6.1. Improving relations with Iran in the 2000s 
 After a long break, Turkey-Iran relations have begun to revive in the new millennium. 
The AK Party government which has been advocating foreign policy principles like multi-
dimensional foreign policy and zero problems with neighbors and has been underscoring that 
rising economic interdependence in its region would bring about a "welfare circle," sought to 
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develop its relations with Iran as well, particularly in the economy field. 198 Contrary to the 
secular Turkish elite who dominated Turkish politics during 1990s, Erdoğan leadership has 
viewed Iran as a significant economic partner and has not considered the Islamic regime as a 
danger for Turkey. This change of idea about Iran which is rooted in the identity and interest 
definition of the Erdoğan leadership has brought about the development of Ankara-Tehran 
ties particularly in the economic sphere.   
 As in the case of Iran-Iraq war, even though the Turkish and American approaches 
have not always coincided, Ankara and Washington's interests were largely in conformity 
regarding Iran. This country has been perceived by the U.S. as a serious threat since the 1979 
Revolution. Hence, it is hardly possible to claim that the U.S. welcomed the revival of 
Turkey-Iran relations in 2000s. It is widely known that the U.S. has been opposing Iran's 
efforts to develop its own nuclear technology on the ground that this would enable Tehran 
also to develop its own nuclear weapons. In order to hinder the Iranian efforts, Washington 
has been exerting pressure on the Iranian administration with both diplomatic and economic 
means. A possible military attack against Iran is by no means desired by Ankara since this 
might lead to the destabilization of the region and directly influences Turkey as neighbor of 
Iran and damage its interests. Consequently, Iran has been in recent years a major point of 
divergence in U.S.-Turkey relations.  
 5.6.2. Rising commercial relations 
The cooperation in the energy realm which had been launched even before the AK 
Party came to power, continued also in the 2000s. The natural gas pipeline was activated in 
December 2001 which had been built in accordance with an agreement signed between 
Turkey and Iran in 1996 and created strains in relations with Washington as it had 
undermined directly the U.S. efforts to constrict trade and investment with Iran.199 Thereby, 
despite the problems emerge from time to time in gas supply, Iran has become the second 
largest natural gas supplier after Russia. Additionally, Turkey and Iran signed a memorandum 
of understanding in July 2007 for the purpose of building a new pipeline and to carry 30 
billion cubic meters of gas per year from Iran to Turkey and then to Europe. To this end, the 
Turkish state petroleum corporation TPAO would develop Iran's South Pars gas field, which 
was planned to produce 20 billion cubic meters per year.200 When this project failed to get 
international financing, TPAO announced in October 2007 that it would fund the $3.5 billion 
project from its own resources and thereby it indicated its determination about the completion 
of the project.201 The main motive behind Turkey's determination was its dependence on 
Russia for natural gas and its aim to reduce this reliance. This project was also in line with 
Erdoğan leadership's active FP in its region and building interdependencies with neighboring 
countries.  In this respect, Erdoğan leadership shares Turkey's strategic goal "to act as a major 
conduit for non-Russian gas to central and eastern Europe, via the planned Nabucco pipeline 
project. In this way, Turkey’s approaches to Iran were tied in to its hopes of becoming an 
important energy corridor between the Caspian Region, the Middle East, and Europe."202 
The strongest opposition to this enlarged gas pipeline project came from Washington. 
“Reminding Turkey that under the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 any foreign company 
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investing more than 20 million dollars in Iran’s gas and oil sector was subject to U.S. 
sanctions, US officials repeatedly expressed their disapproval.203 In fact, no company had 
been subjected to these sanctions as the U.S. President could officially ignore them on 
grounds of national security. However, a stricter legislation passed by Congress in September 
2007 removed this loophole and the field of action in this regard was narrowed. As a matter of 
fact, two energy majors, Royal Dutch Shell and Total S.A. along with Spain’s Repsol, pulled 
out of deals to develop Iran’s South Pars field under pressure from the U.S. authorities.204  
Despite the U.S. warnings, Turkey did not step back from its energy cooperation with 
Iran. In August 2008, for example, American and Israeli objections notwithstanding, Iranian 
President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad paid an official visit to Turkey for the first time since 
coming to power in 2005. Though there was an expectation as to a final agreement on the 
South Pars project, this expectation was not met. Even though some explained this with the 
U.S. pressure, Turkish officials announced that the two parties failed to reach a deal due to 
Iran's tough buy-back conditions.205 
In terms of international trade, Iran has been one of the most important partners of 
Turkey. While Turkey exported to Iran more than $3.5 billion in 2011, it imported 
approximately $12.5 billion.206 Due to Turkey's large amount of energy import from Iran, as 
the figures clearly illustrate, the trade balance is by far against Turkey. In spite of the 
problems stemming from Iran's domestic market conditions and the difficulties created by 
Iranian authorities to open Iran's market,207 bilateral trade relations continue to improve. 
Turkish contractors on the other hand, who have continued to hold onto second place in 2011 
in the world behind their Chinese counterparts, have increased their investments in Iran.208 In 
this context, total amount of projects undertaken by Turkish contractors in Iran reached today 
nearly to the level of $2 billion, almost half of which was undertaken in 2010.209  
 In the banking sector, Turkish-Iranian relations are in trouble because of the U.S. and 
UN Security Council sanctions against Iran on trade, trade financing and oil sector in 
particular. Whilst the U.S. prohibits its banks to open letters of credit to Iran, it tries 
simultaneously to prevent other countries from mediating Iranian trade. In this respect, the 
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U.S. administration has frequently expressed its discomfort about Turkey-Iran cooperation in 
the banking sector and has warned Turkish banks cooperating with their Iranian 
counterparts.210 Turkey, however, underlines that only UN Security Council resolutions on 
sanctions against Iran are binding for itself, not the individual decisions of states.   
 Suffering from the sanctions, the Iranian companies have turned to Turkey and sought 
to overcome the impact of the sanctions through their activities in Turkey.211 The troubles 
arose between Ankara and Tehran with respect to the banking services are sought to be solved 
through the banks like the Iranian Bank Mellat operating in Turkey and Turkish state-owned 
banks, Halkbank and Ziraat Bankası operating in Iran. However, activities of the Bank Mellat 
reduced in Turkey to a large extent owing to the U.S. pressures.212 Nevertheless, the Iranian 
banks maintain their applications for banking license to operate in Turkey.213 
 Turkish-Iranian economic cooperation has also expanded in the tourism industry and 
tourism has constituted another significant economic tie between the two countries.214 The 
number of Iranian tourists visiting Turkey for instance have constantly increased since 2000 
and reached 1.879 thousands in 2011. Thereby, Iran became the fourth among the countries 
sending the most visitors to Turkey after Germany, Russia and England.215   
 In the face of the measures taken by the U.S. against Iran, a risk emerged that Turkish 
firms could be subjected to the U.S. sanctions. "It was stipulated in a US law signed by 
Obama in December 2011 that countries have to greatly reduce oil imports from Iran until 28 
June or those banks which work with the Iranian Central Bank because of oil import will be 
subjected to the sanctions. Upon Turkey’s reduction of the oil purchased from Iran and its 
turn to other providers such as Saudi Arabia and Libya, the US administration exempted 
Turkey along with South Korea, Malaysia, South Africa, Sri Lanka and Taiwan from the 
sanctions."216 The US did not sustain its requests from Turkey on cutting oil import from Iran 
and another likely trouble between the U.S. and Turkey was overcome.217 
 Last of all, the commercial relations between Turkey and Iran has been booming 
despite the structural problems, the troubles stemming from domestic politics and the strong 
U.S. pressure. The Erdoğan leadership continues to see the economic relations with Iran as a 
significant part of its project to establish interdependencies with neighbors. Thus, Ankara has 
been trying to resist the U.S. pressure. Moreover, the Erdoğan leadership seeks to make a 
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distinction between political and trade issues pertinent to the relations with Turkey's old 
neighbor. In this manner, it aims to preclude a possible damage of political tension on trade 
relations.  
 5.6.3. Rising cooperation against the PKK terrorism 
 Erdoğan leadership's proactive foreign policy approach has had reflections on its 
policy about the Kurdish question as well. Accordingly, while it sought to develop its 
relations with the neighboring countries in the context of zero-problems policy, Erdoğan 
leadership tried to increase cooperation with Iran and Syria against the PKK terrorism. 
Moreover, the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and its chaotic aftermath had already provided an 
appropriate ground for Turkish-Iranian cooperation in this respect. Additionally, Turkish 
losses as a result of PKK attacks which were re-started after a five-year unilateral ceasefire by 
the PKK led to a serious trouble in the Turkish public opinion.218 The rising pressure on the 
government in this regard might be regarded as a further factor pushing the Erdoğan 
leadership to intensify its cooperation with Tehran as well.  
 Turkey and Iran signed a security cooperation agreement during PM Erdoğan’s visit to 
Tehran in July 2004 and named the PKK a terrorist organization. Furthermore, both countries 
revitalized Turkey-Iran High Security Committee, which was established in 1988 but largely 
remained ineffective in the subsequent period.219 On the other hand, since 2004, Iran has also 
faced a Kurdish insurgency which was organized as the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK), 
which is based in the Qandil Mountains in northern Iraq and has close ties with the PKK. 
Consequently, defeating the PKK/PJAK has become a point of convergence for Turkey and 
Iran and the two countries have stepped up cooperation to protect their borders.”220 
  The reviving Turkish-U.S. relations as from November 2007 did not damage Turkish-
Iranian cooperation on terrorism. Iran remained silent about the Turkish cross-border military 
operations against the PKK camps in northern Iraq towards the end of 2007 and early 2008. 
Tehran "took a sympathetic posture and reinforced the Iraqi border to prevent the PKK 
members from escaping into Iran. During a historic visit to Iraq in March 2008, President 
Ahmadinejad explained that he understood the concerns about the PKK that had motivated 
Turkey to send troops across the border, but that Iraq’s sovereignty needed to be respected 
and there needed to be coordination between Turkey, Iran and Iraq."221 
Both countries maintained their cooperation on the PKK/PJAK question in 2008 as 
well. Turkey-Iran High Security Commission, which had been hold for more than a decade, 
gathered 12th times in Ankara in April 2008 to discuss fight against terrorism and declared 
determination on joint struggle against the PKK and PJAK. Additionally, in order to increase 
security cooperation and exchange intelligence to combat these two groups, as well as to fight 
organized crime, drug trafficking, extradition of criminals and the maintenance of border 
security, a memorandum of understanding was concluded between the parties. Then Chief of 
Staff, İlker Başbuğ, affirmed that this MoU did not remain on paper, but implemented to a 
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great extent and he stated that Turkey and Iran, even though not conducting joint operations 
against the terrorists, were sharing information and coordinating their operations.222  
On the other hand, the close cooperation between Ankara and Tehran on terrorism 
worried Washington on the grounds that Turkey may be sharing the U.S. intelligence with 
Iran. Although Turkey repeatedly guaranteed that it was not accurate, the U.S. allegations that 
Iran’s Quds Forces (the elite and covert foreign operations wing of the Revolutionary Guard) 
are supplying, training and funding Shiite militias in Iraq put Turkey in a difficult position to 
defend its security cooperation with Iran.   
Despite Turkish-Iranian cooperation on the PKK/PJAK question, it is hard to claim 
that this cooperation eradicated the Ankara-Tehran rivalry entirely. A nagging mistrust, for 
instance, still exist among the Turkish military about Iran given their history of supporting 
subversive activity within Turkey and the two countries’ major policy differences. While the 
Iranian side is not happy about Turkey's rising activism and increasing soft power in Iraq, 
Turkey does not welcome Iranian interference in Iraqi politics.223 Likewise, whereas Turkish 
military has strongly advocated a slow, staged pullout in order to prevent a sudden security 
vacuum in Iraq, Tehran advocated that the U.S. troops should have withdrawn immediately.224 
 Turkish-Iranian cooperation against terrorism continued until the fall of 2011.225 
However, Turkey's reviving relations with the U.S. undermined to a certain extent the 
sustainability of Turkish-Iranian cooperation. Ankara's consent to host the NATO missile 
shield on its soil in September 2011 as a result of strong U.S. insist226 has become so to say a 
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turning point for Ankara-Tehran cooperation.227 The AK Party government engaged in serious 
negotiations with the NATO allies that the missile shield would not directly target Iran,228 and 
became successful in its attempts and ensured that Iran was not mentioned in the project.229 
Nevertheless, Iran disregarded Turkey's efforts and began to see its ties with it in a distinctive 
manner. Stated differently, seeking to pursue a multilateral foreign policy, Turkey has been 
attempting to maintain good relations both with Iran and the U.S. and in this respect tried not 
to damage its bonds with Iran because of the missile shield project. However, its achievement 
in this regard remained limited so much so that Iran declared that it could strike Malatya, the 
Turkish city where the NATO radar base is located, in case of a U.S. or Israeli attack against 
Iran.230 As of this date, threatening statements from Iranian officials began to be heard more 
frequently.231 Moreover, Iran accomplished to eliminate the PJAK as a result of its military 
operations to a large extent and it was claimed that the Iranian administration made an 
agreement with the PKK/PJAK and resumed its support for the terrorist organization.232 
According to the Turkish media reports the Iranian government would turn a blind eye to the 
terrorist organization's outposts along the Turkish border. This deal led also to PKK's 
acquisition of Russian-made heavy weapons from Iran and these weapons were used in the 
August 2012 attacks by the PKK in the Şemdinli district of the eastern province of Hakkari.233 
 The turmoil in Syria began in the wake of the so called Arab Spring constituted 
another turning point in terms of Turkey-Iran relations. Explaining this case from a 
constructivist perspective, as it was noted in the first chapter, constructivism does not 
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disregard the material factors such as balance of power. Yet it argues that the ideational 
meaning attached to the material factors by actors are more determining on their behaviors. In 
this context, even if Iran and Turkey regarded each other as rivals until 2011, Erdoğan 
leadership's zero-problems policy and the chaotic situation in Iraq in the post US operation in 
2003 paved the way for the development of bilateral relations. However, The Syrian civil war 
has brought about the rising role of identities. Thus, although Ankara and Tehran have 
sustained their economic relations, the role of their identities has gained a certain weigh in 
their perception about each other. Consequently, Turkey and Iran positioned themselves in 
different camps.234 With its Muslim conservative-democrat identity, Erdoğan leadership 
aimed to see Muslim-democrat regimes in the Middle East which are able to reconcile 
democratic western values (such as respect for human rights, respect for people’s will and 
secularism) with the values of Islam. Thus, the Erdoğan leadership defined its attitude in favor 
of democratic demands of the Syrians and sided with the Syrian opposition.235 On the other 
hand, with its strong Shiite identity, Tehran provided unconditional support to the Assad 
regime with a view to preserving the "Shia crescent" extending to Israel.236 
Whilst the developments in the process of the Arab Spring have undermined Turkey's 
zero problems policy, they gave rise to the escalation of Turkish-Iranian competition in the 
region. The increasing rivalry between Turkey and Iran because of its unconditional support 
for the Syrian regime as well as its rising influence in Iraq and Lebanon led the Turkish 
government to regard Iran as the leader of an emerging de facto Shia front seeking to curb 
Turkish influence in the Middle East and thereby pushed Ankara towards its traditional 
security allies.237 Therefore, one might conclude that although the Turkish government set the 
goal of "zero-problem with neighbors," the events taking place out of its control forced the 
Erdoğan leadership to redefine its policies in the region in accordance with its identity 
definition. Considering that the massacres in Syria are compatible neither with Islam nor with 
the norms of human rights, the government has felt the need to push the zero problems policy 
to a secondary position and has tried to adopt a "moral" approach. At this point, Ankara has 
embarked on a political competition with the biggest supporter of Syria, namely with Iran.  
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 5.6.4. Iran's nuclear efforts and indirectly straining Turkey-U.S. relations 
 Despite Turkey’s rising cooperation with Iran in economy and energy fields in 
particular, the West and Iran’s dispute over Tehran’s nuclear program left Ankara in the lurch. 
Iran’s ambitious nuclear program and the fear of European countries, Israel and the United 
States in particular that Tehran enriches uranium with the intention of acquiring nuclear 
weapons complicated Erdoğan leadership's goals to develop economic interdependence based 
on good neighborhood relationship in its region; thereby to create a security, peace and 
stability environment. Even though Turkey and the US have rhetorically had similar goals 
about Iran’s nuclear program in terms of general objectives, -i.e. in principle, Iran can have a 
nuclear program for peaceful aims, but must not be allowed to develop nuclear weapons- they 
differed on the methods and means to reach this goal. Whereas the US tended to use coercive 
methods especially during the Bush era, Turkey has advocated the use of soft-power, 
persuasive methods such as diplomacy and dialogue238 and desires by no means a military 
conflict in the region. Therefore, Ankara sought to spearhead the mediation efforts for the 
solution of the problem and this indirectly led troubles in the relations with the U.S.239  
 By contrast with the relatively tougher stance of the U.S. and Israel, one might claim 
that Turkey acts somewhat unconcerned about Iran’s nuclear program. This relatively 
unconcerned stance of the AK Party government is explained by some scholars with Turkey’s 
Cold War experience which had to live side by side with the Soviet Union, another super 
power of that time, for longer than fifty years. Accordingly, the NATO, which protected 
Turkey during the Cold War against a nuclear power, could do this again. Moreover, it is 
considered that in view of Ankara’s rising cooperation areas with Tehran, there would be no 
reason for Iran to attack Turkey. After all, Turkey and Iran have not gone to war with each 
other since the 18th century. However, Ankara would most likely only be at risk if there were 
an American and Israeli confrontation with Iran.240 Therefore, Turkey has been advocating the 
diplomatic solution of the problem and aims to stay away from both economic and security 
damages of an armed conflict that Turkey and its region would face, if the dispute ends up 
with a war. Given this approach of the AK Party government, “it would be highly unlikely for 
Turkey to allow its bases or its airspace to be used for an air strike against Iran’s nuclear 
facilities.”241 Additionally, with its emphasis of the diplomatic channels for the solution of the 
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problem, Turkey’s approach seems in parallel with the “constructive engagement policy” of 
the European Union.242  
 On the other hand, Turkey’s objection to a military strike should not be interpreted 
that it welcomes the Idea of Iran obtaining nuclear weapons. Governmental officials 
repeatedly announced that they were not against Iran’s nuclear activities exclusively for 
peaceful purposes. Yet this does not mean a blindly support for Iran’s nuclear program. 
Turkey by no means desires the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region.243 In addition, 
while Turkey objects to Iran’s procurement of nuclear weapon, it has also brought a 
principled approach to the issue. Accordingly, the whole Middle East region should be 
purified from nuclear weapons. No doubt, this call points out that no single actor, including 
Israel, should possess nuclear weapons in the region.244 On the other hand, in the face of 
emerging missile threats in the region, Turkey has been exploring the possibility of acquiring 
its own anti-missile defense system. In this respect, while increasingly investing in its own 
defense industry, Ankara seeks to purchase anti-missile defense system from foreign 
suppliers, such as U.S. and Russia.245 
  5.6.4.1. Tehran declaration on nuclear fuel swap 
 While it has advocated the solution of the question through peaceful methods, given its 
good level of relations with both the U.S. and Iran, Turkey embarked on playing the role of 
mediator. However, its mediation efforts between Iran and the West and the subsequent 
incidents caused serious troubles in terms of Ankara-Washington relations. In this context for 
example, “Turkey made a considerable contribution to the holding of the meeting between the 
P5+1 and Iran in Geneva on October 1. In this process, an agreement was reached on 
Turkey’s mediation as to the swapping of enriched uranium between the Vienna Group and 
Iran” in 2009.246 According to the agreement, Iran was supposed to stop its nuclear program, 
more precisely, its uranium enrichment program. Yet there was a disagreement as to how to 
make this swap. The P5+1 group demanded that the swap should have been realized by means 
of Russia or France in a manner that all of the enriched uranium that Iran possessed should 
have been included. But neither the amount of the uranium nor the arbitrators were accepted 
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by the Tehran administration. Consequently, due to the problems in the implementation of the 
swap, the Geneva agreement could not be put into practice. In order to break this deadlock, 
Turkey stepped in to persuade Iran to sign the nuclear fuel swap deal.247 
 Along with AK Party’s proactive foreign policy paradigm, other actors’ urges played 
also a significant role on Turkey’s eagerness to play a mediator role and take an initiative to 
this end.248 President Obama for example requested Muhammad El Baradei, then Director 
General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), then Brazilian President Lula da 
Silva and Turkish PM Erdoğan to make contribution to the process between Iran and P5+1.249 
It was reflected to the media organs that President Obama wrote a letter to Lula and Erdoğan 
with a view that they demonstrate effort for the swap deal with Tehran.250 Similarly, both el 
Baradei’s and Obama’s demands from Turkey to persuade Iran for the swap deal reflected 
also to the explanations of Turkish foreign minister Davutoğlu.251 Additionally, Washington’s 
rising pressure on Ankara to support the sanctions against Iran was another motivation for 
Turkey’s intensification of its efforts to solve the problem through diplomatic channels.252 
 The main agenda of all talks in the Nuclear Security Summit held 11-13 April 2010 in 
New York was the efforts of Turkey and Brazil to convince Iran for the swap deal. 
Immediately after the summit, Turkey and Brazil launched intensive talks with Iran. 
Following this intense diplomatic traffic, nuclear fuel swap agreement was eventually signed 
by Turkish, Brazilian and Iranian foreign ministers on May 17, 2010 in Tehran. The swap 
agreement, which was signed after a tri-partite summit by Turkish PM Erdoğan, Brazilian 
President Lula Da Silva and Iranian President Ahmedinejad, stipulated the shipping of 
1,200kg of low-enriched (3,5%) uranium to Turkey and eventual transfer of this uranium to 
the Western countries. In return, 120kg more highly enriched uranium (20%) was expected to 
be delivered to Iran by the P5+1 for a research reactor.253  
 The swap deal was essentially regulating the compromise reached at the Geneva 
meeting. However, this agreement interestingly could not get the support of the U.S. 
administration. Even before the ink of the agreement dried, the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton and Israeli officials announced that the deal was not enough to bring the solution, thus 
it was unacceptable as the Iranian administration did not pledge to completely shut down its 
nuclear reactors and dissolve its nuclear program.254 Clinton made it clear in a statement one 
day after the signing of the treaty of swap that the agreement would not be able to hinder a 
comprehensive embargo decision of the UN Security Council against Iran. She declared also 
that the U.S. was in agreement with its partners in the Security Council on a package of strong 
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new sanctions to impose on Iran over its suspect nuclear program.255 Subsequently, a draft 
resolution prepared by the US to impose an embargo on Iran submitted to the UN Security 
Council and was approved there.  The voting in the 15-member council was 12 in favor of the 
U.S.-drafted resolution, with Lebanon abstaining and Brazil and Turkey voting against.256 
Even though Turkey and Brazil's 'no' votes could not change the result, it caused discontent in 
Washington. According to press reports, President Obama had requested PM Erdoğan at least 
to remain abstaining.257 
 Different views of Turkey and the U.S. in the UNSC vote triggered a new tension. It 
was claimed that the Obama administration realized that it could not trust the AK Party 
government on strategic and national security issues which implied a confidence crisis 
between the two allies.258 On the other hand, Turkey maintained to underscore that the whole 
Middle East region should have been purified from nuclear weapons. Considering in this 
context that Iran's nuclear problem entered into the path of solution, PM Erdoğan announced 
that the attentions should have been focused then on the Israel problem. Erdoğan also 
criticized the international community which has been strongly reacting to the possibility of 
Iran obtaining nuclear weapons, yet remains indifferent to Israel's nuclear weapons.259 
 In fact, Turkey's 'no' vote in the Security Council despite the US urges might be 
assessed in the context of respecting a text for which Ankara demonstrated a great effort. 
Otherwise, ignoring the swap agreement and voting for the sanctions even before the ink of 
the deal dried would be able to put Turkey to an unreliable position in the international arena 
(even to a position of a US agent in the region) which might have also undermined Turkey's 
"play maker" and "mediator" roles that it has been trying to play in its region.260 Furthermore, 
in spite of the calls from the Western actors urging Turkey to contribute to the solution of the 
problem, disregard of the swap deal by these actors disappointed Turkish officials deeply.261 
One might also come up with the idea that PM Erdoğan believed the swap agreement and 
trusted Iran. As mentioned before, defending the people and institutions at any price that he 
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really trusted is one of Erdoğan's personal qualities. Therefore, one might conclude that 
Turkey's 'no' vote was also a requirement of Erdoğan leadership's personal character.262 
  Consequently, on the Iran issue, instead of acting blindly with the U.S., Turkey gave 
its own policy a higher priority and acted independently. Thereby it once again indicated that 
the hierarchical relationship of the Cold War era between Ankara and Washington would not 
be sustainable any longer and that the relationship between the two long-standing allies 
should have been conducted on the basis of equality.263 Additionally, Erdoğan leadership 
highlighted its mediator role and adopted a policy line accordingly. For the sake of being 
consistent and of preventing any doubt about its role, it voted against the sanctions on Iran, 
the US insistence to the contrary notwithstanding.   
On the other hand, the U.S. reaction to Ankara's 'no' vote in the UN Security Council 
was not as heavy and long-lasting as some expected.264 As it was mentioned above, Turkish-
American relations entered into a new positive path owing to the factors such as the uprisings 
in Syria, Iran’s sectarian policy line and its anti-Turkey activities in this respect. This process 
in which Turkey and the United States have closely cooperated in the initial years of the so 
called “Arab spring” and Ankara gave its consent to the radars of NATO missile shield was 
qualified by some political analysts as another “golden age” of Turkish-U.S. relations.265   
 
5.7. The Syrian dimension of Turkish-US relations 
Turkish-Syrian relations have been problematic for decades. Cold War rivalry, legacy 
of the Ottoman past and the stereotypical images of each other were the basic sources of this 
troubled relationship. The questions of water (i.e. the waters of the Euphrates which originates 
in eastern Turkey and flow through Syria and Iraq to join the Tigris in the Shatt al-Arab, 
which empties into the Persian Gulf) and territory (Syria’s claims on Hatay/Alexandretta 
located in southern Turkey) were further points of tension in bilateral relations of the two 
neighbors.266 Once the Damascus administration began to use terrorism as a diplomatic 
leverage against Turkey as of 1980s, terrorism was added to the list of problems between the 
two countries. Syria allowed the terrorist PKK to use its soil, harbored its leader Öcalan and 
supported also the Armenian terrorist organization ASALA which targeted especially Turkish 
diplomatic representatives. In order to solve the problems with Damascus and get rid of the 
terrorism handicap, then Prime Minister Turgut Özal paid a visit in July 1987 to Syria, signed 
a protocol with the Damascus regime and pledged to give 500m3 water per second to Syria. 
During this visit, the PKK terror was also on the table and Özal was able to get some support 
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from Syrian policy makers which was also reflected in a security protocol signed at that time. 
“Several security protocols were signed over time, but Syria never fully granted support to 
Turkey in its war against the PKK and continuously denied the existence of the PKK 
members in Syrian and Lebanese territories.”267  
However, whenever Turkey hardened its policy to a large extent and put a military 
conflict into perspective, Ankara-Damascus relations came to a turning point.268 Turkey 
threatened in October 1998 to wage a war against Syria if it did not stop supporting the PKK. 
“Faced with Turkey’s overwhelming military superiority, Syria backed down, expelling PKK 
leader Abdullah Öcalan, closing PKK training camps on its soil as well as terminating the 
logistical support for the organization. The expulsion of Öcalan and the closing of the PKK 
camps opened the way for a gradual improvement in Turkey’s relations with Syria, a trend 
that has gained increased momentum”269 when Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership was 
declared in 1999. 
The upwards trend in Turkey-Syria relations continued also during the AK Party 
government. Bilateral relations boomed in economy, security and political fields significantly 
and reached such a good point that Ankara-Damascus relations were described as the 
cornerstone of AK Party’s zero problems policy with neighbors.270 Seeking to ensure security 
and stability by increasing interdependence in its region, Turkey improved its economic 
relations with Syria considerably. The two countries signed a free trade agreement in 2004. 
The foreign trade volume which has largely been in favor of Turkey reached over $2.5billion 
in 2010, whereas it had been $729 million in 2000.271 Even though this figure corresponds to 
a small proportion of Turkey’s total foreign trade, it matters for two countries which nearly 
came to the brink of a war almost a decade ago.272 
During the 2003 Iraq war, the Bush administration realized that it would not be able to 
get support from Damascus, thus it put pressure on Syria to force it to withdraw the Syrian 
troops from Lebanon and end its interferences into Lebanese domestic politics. To this end, 
the UN Security Council adopted under the leadership of the United States the resolution 
1559 in September 2004 and called for Syria to withdraw from Lebanon. Despite the Bush 
government's efforts against Syria which was described in the "axis of evil" by the US 
President, Turkey demonstrated its reluctance to join the international pressure to be 
established on the Syrian regime through PM Erdoğan's visit to Damascus in December 2004. 
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Moreover, beyond the Kurdish concern, due to the antagonist approach of the U.S. towards 
Damascus and the fact that they became neighbors after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Syria was 
more uncomfortable about its own fate within the US plans to reconfigure the Middle East.273 
In the face of the rising US-led international pressure following the assassination of the 
Lebanese President Rafic Hariri in February 2005, whereas even traditional allies of 
Damascus such as Russia, France and Saudi Arabia did not side with the Syrian regime, 
Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer paid a visit to Syria and thereby indicated that Turkey 
would not join the international pressure against its southern neighbor.274 Furthermore, 
Turkey and Syria signed even a security cooperation agreement a few months after President 
Sezer's visit.275 In short, as in the case of Iran, Erdoğan leadership's preference for 
engagement has conflicted with the U.S. desire to isolate Damascus and Ankara has 
independently followed its own FP priorities. Eventually policies of Turkey and the United 
States diverged once again.276   
While developing its ties with Syria in the context of zero-problems policy with 
neighbors, Ankara sought to make use of this close relationship to find a solution for the PKK 
terrorism as well. The Assad regime responded Ankara positively in this respect and 
cooperated with Turkey against the PKK until 2011 when the uprisings in Syria began. The 
two countries entered also into close military cooperation and conducted even joint military 
exercises in 2009 and 2010.277  
On the other hand, Ankara-Damascus relations gained a new dimension when the 
High Level Strategic Cooperation Agreement signed on September 16, 2009. This agreement 
stipulated also mechanisms, such as the Turkey-Syria High Level Strategic Cooperation 
Council278 and concrete steps to help develop Turkish-Syrian relations in every sphere. In this 
framework, visa requirements were lifted for visits under 90 days for both countries’ citizens. 
In addition, Turkey and Syria held even joint cabinet meetings.  
This rapprochement with Syria brought about also the ignorance of the problems 
rooted in the past. Syria’s claim for example to the province of Hatay (Alexandretta), which 
was annexed by Turkey in 1939, was effectively shelved.279 The long-standing Hatay dispute 
moved towards de facto resolution with Prime Minister Erdoğan’s groundbreaking visit to 
Damascus in December 2004, when both sides publicly acknowledged that there were no 
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longer any border issues between them.”280 Eventually, subsequent to the Syrian President 
Bashar al-Assad’s visit to Turkey on 6-8 January 2004, Hatay issue became officially out of 
agenda in Turkish-Syrian relations when Assad put his signature on documents explicitly 
recognizing Turkey in its current borders, by implication accepting Hatay as a part of 
Turkey.281 "Apparently the two sides made progress even in settling their long-running 
dispute over the division of waters of the Euphrates, which flows from Turkey into Syria, and 
from there into Iraq."282  
The so called "Arab spring" however became a turning point in terms of Ankara-
Damascus relations.283 Demonstrations started in 2011 against the regime began gradually to 
evolve into conflict towards the midyear and hence an influx of Syrian refugees arose towards 
Turkish borders.284 In the face of the uprisings in Syria, the U.S. government called on Turkey 
to break relations with the Assad regime, but Ankara wanted to give the Syrian regime a 
chance to reform and remained determined on its own policies.285 While the AK Party 
government criticized the operations against the civilians, it called at the highest level on the 
Syrian leader, Assad, to undertake reforms and thereby to ensure the transition to democracy 
without bloodshed.286 Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu's visit to Syria on August 9, 2011 
and his three-hour meeting with President Assad as well as three and a half hour meeting with 
other Syrian officials was a milestone in terms of Turkey's calls for the Syrian regime to stop 
the bloodshed and take the demands of Syrian people into consideration.287 Despite few 
positive steps taken by Damascus after FM Davutoğlu's visit, the bloodshed did not cease and 
the regime maintained its operations against the opposition groups. Following the Houla 
massacre of the Assad forces on May 25, 2012, in which according to the UN, 108 people 
were killed, including 34 women and 49 children, Turkey made a declaration through the 
Web site of foreign ministry. In a move to protest this deadly Syrian attack in Houla town, 
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Turkey gave a diplomatic note to the Syrian authorities, demanded the diplomatic personnel 
to leave Turkey in 72 hours and suspended its diplomatic relations with Syria.288 
 In the coming period, the Syrian regime adopted also a hostile attitude against its 
northern neighbor. An unarmed Turkish jet was shut down by Syria on 22nd July 2012 which 
launched another crisis between the two countries and brought them nearly to the brink of a 
war.289 Even though Damascus announced at the outset that they did not know that F-4 
Phantom belonged to Turkey and expressed sorrow about the issue, it did not apologize from 
Ankara.290 Furthermore, Syrian shells killed five Turkish civilians in Akçakale, a town on the 
Turkey-Syria border on October 3, 2012, which prompted military retaliation from Turkey 
and caused the death of 34 Syrian soldiers.291 
 Other factors annoying Turkey with respect to the Syrian question have been the 
danger of sectarianism and Damascus' resumption of support to the PKK terrorism. As Aliriza 
and Aras noted:  
 "The cruelty and sectarianism of the Syrian regime has provoked a similar response from the 
 insurgents and consequently made it inevitable that sectarian radicalism will be a major factor 
 in the post-Assad equation in Syria and probably beyond. This is especially unwelcome for 
 Ankara, which has endeavored to avoid a Sunni-Shia divide in the Middle East. It is also 
 concerned with the possibility of a Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria as the conflict 
 worsens, coupled with the resumption of Syrian support for the terrorist activities of the PKK 
 inside Turkey."292 
 On the other hand, the refugee flow to Turkey continued and reached over one million 
in June 2014.293 Spending these refugees nearly $ 3 billion, Turkey has been one of few 
countries sensing the Syrian question most closely.294 Therefore, Ankara has been ambitiously 
seeking to solve this problem. Trying to use also diplomatic channels, Erdoğan leadership has 
been supporting the opposition groups logistically and provide them food and medicine.295 
Turkey's success however in solving the crisis remained limited as the Syrian crisis quickly 
escalated from a purely domestic conflict into an international crisis. Whilst Damascus 
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enjoyed the backing of Russia at the diplomatic level and Iran at the operational level, the 
opposition groups were supported by Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia as well as by the 
Friends of Syria group including the United States and a wider international consensus backed 
by the UN General Assembly.296 Consequently, given this international quality of the 
problem, Turkey's influence on the crisis remained limited.  
 In spite of all U.S.-Turkish cooperation on the Syria crisis noted above, it has not been 
effective enough from Ankara’s perspective. "As the crisis has become protracted, the 
financial, human, and diplomatic costs of the conflict have mounted for Turkey. As Ankara 
has repeatedly made clear, dealing with the Syrian crisis alone is beyond its own capabilities. 
Turkey needs the United States to give more concrete support for it to be able to exercise its 
own regional influence to help end the conflict.”297 However, Washington seems reluctant to 
spearhead the effort in Syria as part of the Obama administration’s multilateral “leading from 
behind” approach.298 Moreover, it has been argued that "having fought with Islamist 
extremists for over a decade after the September 11 attacks, there has been a very real 
reluctance on the part of Washington to provide greater backing for the Syrian opposition due 
to the presence of what it considers to be potentially hostile radicals in its ranks. The paradox 
is that this approach has had the effect of forcing the opposition in its desperate struggle to 
look elsewhere not only for arms, but also for additional volunteers from the extremist fringe. 
At the same time and even more importantly, it has led Ankara to question the scope and 
depth of U.S.-Turkish cooperation, which has seen its limitations exposed in the face of a 
challenge to the entire Arab Spring process."299 In addition, despite Obama's victory, Turkey's 
expectations for more intensive U.S. backing following the November 6, 2012 US presidential 
elections have still not been fully met.300   
 In short, the Syrian dimension of US-Turkey relations has been a significant theme in 
bilateral relations in the Erdoğan era. Despite the opposition of the United States, Turkish 
government eagerly developed the Ankara-Damascus relationship in many fields in 
accordance with Erdoğan leadership's identity and interest definitions until early 2011. In the 
pre-Arab spring period, Erdoğan leadership's zero-problem policy found reciprocity in Syria 
and relations soared so extensively that they became the flagship of Turkey's good 
neighborhood policy. However, the events in the Middle East started with the so called Arab 
Spring and spread to the Syria as well constituted virtually a breaking point in Turkey's stance 
towards the Middle East. From a constructivist point of view, as a result of the Arab spring, 
identity began to occupy a wider space in the foreign policy perception of the actors. At this 
point, with its Muslim and democrat credentials, the Erdoğan leadership preferred to see 
similar regimes in the Middle East which could reconcile Islamic and democrat western 
values. Thus it supported the democratic demands of the Arab peoples and sided with them 
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against the autocratic regimes in the neighboring countries.301 Consequently, civil unrests in 
Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Syria have brought Ankara and Washington closer, as they both 
initially shared fairly similar attitudes regarding the democratic demands of peoples owing to 
their common democratic credentials.   
 Nonetheless, American and Turkish policies towards the region have diverged to a 
certain degree in the ongoing process. Considering the Syrian instance, while Turkey has been 
sensing the negative impact of the conflicts in Syria very closely, the Erdoğan government has 
plunged into the Syrian question in favor of the opposition groups. Turkey has been providing 
logistical support for the Syrian opposition groups as well as pursues an active diplomacy, 
whereby it has been expecting the overthrow of Assad regime as soon as possible. 
Simultaneously, the AK Party government has been hoping the end of bloodshed in Syria and 
more concrete steps from the U.S. to this end as well as its leadership on the Syrian question. 
However Obama administration has preferred the regime change to take place through its own 
dynamics instead of direct US intervention as in Iraq and Afghanistan. In other words, Obama 
prefers a method of "managing behind the scenes." Therefore, one might conclude that the 
unity of purpose but difference in the method is once again in question between Ankara and 
Washington just like in the case of Iran.302 While Ankara has objected American hard-line 
approach towards Iran, Turkey's demands for a more active U.S. policy in Syria are ignored 
by Washington. 
5.8. Israel-Palestine dimension of Turkish-US relations  
As mentioned before, security was in the forefront during 1990s in TFP mainly 
because of the 'paranoia' that Turkey was surrounded by enemies. The problems caused by the 
PKK terror as well as the support supplied by neighboring countries to the PKK were further 
reasons for Turkey's security-oriented foreign policy. Therefore, Ankara was in search for 
allies in the region and with its ‘secular’ and ‘democrat’ identity, Israel was presenting a good 
potential for the Turkish policy makers. Furthermore, some other internal and external factors 
encouraged also Turkish-Israeli cooperation. In the face of rising Islamist and Kurdish 
movements, the civil and military bureaucracy increased its weight in Turkish politics, which 
has traditionally dedicated itself to the protection of "democratic" and secular nature of the 
country. Having also a voice in foreign policy issues in a manner which was incompatible 
with contemporary democracy practices, these civil and military bureaucratic elite considered 
that Turkey and Israel had common denominators in the fields of secularism and democracy 
as well, thus pursued a policy of collaboration with Tel Aviv. With other words, for the ruling 
Turkish elite who was extremely sensitive on the secular part of Turkish identity even on 
foreign political issues, Israel was presenting a good potential with its secular and democrat 
identity.  
 
Additionally, one may claim that the American encouragements were also influential 
on booming Turkish-Israeli relations whose support was essential in terms of securitization of 
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TFP.303 Finally, the need to get the support of the Jewish lobby - whose backing depends on 
good relations between Turkey and Israel- in order to balance the influence of anti-Turkey 
Armenian and Greek lobbies in the United States motivated Turkish policy makers for closer 
relations with Israel. Turkey’s links with Tel Aviv can thus be seen as heavily influenced by 
its relations with the USA.”304 Consequently, Turkey-Israel relations reached an 
unprecedented good level particularly in the second half of 1990s.305 Several agreements were 
signed between the two countries which stipulated cooperation especially in military and 
intelligence fields.  
 
At the end of 1990s, Turkey's security oriented foreign policy began to lose its 
influence and relations with Syria, Iran and Greece started to soften. It might be claimed that 
Turkey's EU membership candidacy, its increasing democratization process, expansion of 
civil politics, decreasing 'Islamism' danger as a result of the closure of Islamist parties such as 
Welfare and Virtue Parties as well as the diminishing terror danger after the capture of PKK 
leader, Abdullah Öcalan, played significant roles in this new term of TFP. Moreover, Israeli 
violence against the Palestinians increased in the wake of the Second Intifada which triggered 
a great deal of reaction among the Turkish public who has traditionally been sensitive about 
the fate of the Palestinians.306  This reaction of Turkish public opinion reflected also to the 
rhetoric of politicians and it narrowed the movement area of Turkish generals to direct the 
relations with Tel Aviv.307 AK Party's "zero problems with neighbors" policy and 
correspondingly acceleration of the de-securitization process in foreign policy as well as 
reforms undertaken in the context of EU membership process were further reasons which 
reduced the weight of military and civil bureaucracy in Turkish politics and expanded the 
space for civil politicians.308 Civil politicians on the other hand have not hesitated to criticize 
heavily the Israeli violence against Palestinians. PM Tayyip Erdoğan for instance accused 
Israel of practicing "state terrorism" after the assassination of HAMAS leader Ahmed Yasin 
and described Israeli military operations in Gaza in May 2004 as "state-sponsored terrorism," 
and these statements caused a great discomfort in Tel Aviv.309 
 
As a leadership attaching special importance to Turkey's historical and cultural 
heritage and coming from a strong religious cultural background, Erdoğan leadership has 
always put special emphasis on the Palestine issue. This special interest was also closely 
related to the identity definition of Erdoğan leadership and the social circle that it was coming 
from. However, whereas the AK Party government harshly criticized the hard-line stance of 
the Israeli government at the rhetorical level, it refrained from retreating from the military 
agreements as well as from cooperation on intelligence sharing and from the steps which 
could interrupt the trade relations. Therefore, one might conclude that until the Mavi Marmara 
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raid in 2010, “the shift in Turkish policy towards Israel has largely been one of tone and style 
rather than substance." 310 Furthermore, the Erdoğan leadership sought to make use of its ties 
with Israel pragmatically within the framework of its mediation efforts in its region311  and 
tried to play a mediator role in the Arab-Israeli question. In this respect, Turkey made many 
mediation attempts between Syria and Israel in the course of 2005-2008.312 
 
“Despite Turkey’s facilitation of proximity talks between Israel and Syria, which was 
also supported by the US, Israel’s aggressive policy on Gaza undermined the Turkish-Israeli 
relationship.”313 Israeli military launched an operation in Gaza only four days after the Israeli 
PM’s visit to Turkey to discuss the Syria-Israel peace on December 22, 2008.314 This act of 
the Israeli government disappointed and irritated Turkish PM Erdoğan considerably.315 
Considering to be deceived by Israel,316 he demonstrated a strong response to Israeli assault 
on Gaza and described Israeli actions as disrespect against Turkey, which was striving for 
peace in the region.317 Under the influence of this disappointment, PM Erdoğan participated in 
Davos World Economic Forum in early 2009 and this forum witnessed an emotional reaction 
which could be rarely seen in diplomacy history. As the moderator allowed the Israeli 
President Peres to speak nearly twice as long as the other participants and did not give a 
chance for PM Erdoğan to response President Peres appropriately, PM Erdoğan reacted to the 
moderator sharply and stormed out of the forum where the Israel-Palestine question was 
discussed. While he storming out, Erdoğan announced that Davos was over for him and he 
would not come back to Davos ever again.318 Even though President Peres called PM Erdoğan 
and attempted to soften the climate after this incident which is publicly known as "one 
minute" crisis,319 the impact of this event has been profound on Turkey-Israel relations. For 
instance, Israel was excluded from the Anatolian Eagle Exercise in October 2009 by means of 
canceling international participation which had been regularly held until then. The exclusion 
of Israel by Turkey from the exercise caused criticism from Washington.320 
 
However, the impact of the deteriorating Turkish-Israeli relations on Washington-
Ankara relations did not become as bad as it was expected. The heavy critics of the US media 
notwithstanding, the newly-elected Obama administration did not want the relations with its 
ally to be worsened in the context of its new foreign policy understanding which overlapped 
with Erdoğan leadership’s foreign policy principles in a number of points. Stated differently, 
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“the Obama administration supported Turkey, simply because Turkey’s efforts were 
compatible with the US general strategy and interests."321 
 
In fact, Turkey and the U.S. have had a partially overlapping approach on the Israel-
Palestine question. During the Bush era, the United States was supporting the Roadmap for 
Peace Plan with the target of a two-state solution and this goal was maintained by the Obama 
administration as well. Delivering a major speech on the Middle East and North Africa, 
President Obama said:  
 
"The United States believes that negotiations should result in two states, with 
permanent Palestinian borders with Israel, Jordan, and Egypt, and permanent Israeli 
borders with Palestine. We believe the borders of Israel and Palestine should be based 
on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps, so that secure and recognized borders 
are established for both states..."322  
 
So, advocating a two-state solution, the Obama administration and the Erdoğan 
leadership are in this regard principally in the same camp. However, as any tangible progress 
in the peace process was not materialized in the continuing period, the two parties began to 
take place in different camps. 
 
 Erdoğan leadership’s distinctive approach towards Hamas became a source of tension 
between Turkey and the U.S. just like between Ankara and Tel Aviv. Following Hamas’s 
victory in the Palestine Legislative Council elections, Ankara advocated recognition of Hamas 
as a legitimate political actor and hosted Hamas leader Khaled Mashal in February 2006. 
However, this visit was arranged without consulting Washington and Tel Aviv, and "it 
provoked strong irritation in both capitals because it directly undercut U.S. and Israeli efforts 
to isolate Hamas until it meets a series of specific conditions, including acceptance of Israel’s 
right to exist.”323 This movement of the AK Party government was capitalized on by both 
neo-conservative groups and the pro-Israeli lobby to start a new debate on the alleged axis 
shift of TFP. Nonetheless, such discussions accusing Turkey of changing its major foreign 
policy direction from the West towards East did not alter AK Party's stance on the Palestine 
question, rather Turkey "started to vocally criticize Israel’s blockade over Gaza and the 
inhumane treatment of the Palestinians on international platforms.”324 Turkish policy makers 
were justifying their policy with the argument that they were striving not to marginalize the 
Hamas and keep it in the game. Accordingly, “Hamas was in search of allies in the Middle 
East to put an end to the economic and political blockade it was facing from the international 
system. In such an environment, without Turkey’s intervention, the only possible entry for 
Hamas was the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah axis.”325 Therefore, instead of marginalizing Hamas, AK 
Party government advocated to bring it into the game. 
The Mavi Marmara raid of summer 2010 brought Turkish-Israeli relations on the 
verge of collapse which had already been in trouble for a few years.326 Israeli commandos 
raided the Gaza flotilla in the international waters of the Mediterranean which consisted of six 
ships and included activists from 32 different countries. The flotilla was carrying 
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humanitarian and construction materials with the intention of breaking the Israeli blockade of 
the Gaza Strip. In the Israeli raid, eight Turkish nationals and one American national killed as 
well as many were wounded. This event has brought Turkish-Israeli relations to a point 
difficult to fix. In the wake of this attack, Turkey withdrew its ambassador to Israel, 
suspended joint military exercises, and barred Israeli military aircraft from Turkish 
airspace.327 Turkey declared that a rapprochement between Turkey and Israel depended on the 
meeting of three conditions; namely Israel's official apology, payment of compensation for 
the families of victims and lifting of the blockade imposed by Israel on Gaza. Simultaneously, 
Ankara has tried to isolate Israel in international platforms and sought to put pressure on it 
through diplomatic channels.  
However, Turkey encountered the U.S. backing of Israel when it tried to take concrete 
steps against Tel Aviv.328 Actually, although the U.S. also did not entirely approve of the 
Israeli attack against the Mavi Marmara flotilla, it abstained from openly blaming Israel329 
and opposed radical sanctions or decisions against it.330 This case was more clearly seen when 
the US sided against the demands of a UN investigation into the Mavi Marmara raid.331 
Washington has blocked the demands at the UNSC for an international inquiry into Israel's 
bloody assault on the Turkish ship. Furthermore, the United States "also blocked criticism of 
Israel for violating international law by assaulting a ship in international waters in a Security 
Council statement proposed by Turkey, the Palestinians and Arab nations. The US instead 
forced a broader statement that condemned "those acts which resulted in the loss" of life.” 332 
Again the U.S. was the sole country which voted against the report prepared by the U.N. fact-
finding mission in September 2010 that accused Israeli commandos of executing six 
passengers on a Turkish aid flotilla in May 2010.333 Ultimately, unable to find the American 
support against the Israeli aggression in the Mavi Marmara affair, Turkish policy makers 
disappointed. On the other hand, the strong pro-Israel lobby in the US capital launched a 
campaign against Turkey in general and the AK Party government in particular.334 
Even though a UN Inquiry panel (publicly known as Palmer Commission) set up by 
the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon with the US initiative with a view to ending the 
tension between Ankara and Tel Aviv and normalizing their relations was initially welcomed 
by both Turkey and Israel,335 it caused later new tensions between them, let alone ensuring the 
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desired improvement.336 Following the release of the Palmer Report, Israel declined the 
Turkish demands for compensation, apology and lifting the Gaza blockade, whereupon 
Turkish government decided to expel Israel's ambassador and senior Israeli diplomats and to 
suspend military agreements.337 In the face of this situation, the United States has called for 
restraint for both countries.338 
Despite the strong encouragement of the US government to develop Turkish-Israeli 
ties since 1990s, gradually deteriorating Ankara-Tel Aviv relationship since early 2000s has 
negatively influenced Turkish-American relations as well. Recently, the U.S. has been trying 
to ease Turkish-Israeli tensions while continuing to maintain the closest possible cooperation 
with Turkey. "However, due to sustained U.S. backing of Israel and in contrast, because of 
Turkey’s increasing advocacy of Palestinian rights," the troubles in Turkish-Israeli relations 
will continue to have grave repercussions on Ankara-Washington ties as well as to be one of 
the troublesome dimensions of bilateral relations.339 
The most recent samples of this case have been seen during the Israeli bombing of 
Gaza in November 2012 and in the recognition process of Palestine as an "observer state" on 
29 November 2012. Turkey harshly criticized Israel when it bombed Gaza on the ground of 
carrying out operation against Hamas and killed approximately 100 civilians including 
women and children.340 The United States on the other hand declared its support for Israel's 
"right to self-defense from rocket attacks" as many other western states did.341 PM Erdoğan 
criticized the U.S. without openly naming Obama with these words: “They say Israel is using 
its right to self defense. Israel is the attacker, yet they say it defends itself. What kind of 
justice is this?”342 Foreign Minister Davutoğlu expressed with a softer tone the wide 
divergence of opinion in this way: “Turkey cannot agree with the U.S. rhetoric over the 
deadly Gaza strikes but this does not signal a rift between Ankara and Washington.”343 
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The second example was witnessed in Palestine's application for recognition as a state 
by the United Nations and during the subsequent process. Turkey supported Palestine in this 
regard strongly.344 FM Davutoğlu even addressed the UN General Assembly and sought to 
persuade other countries to vote "yes" for the recognition of Palestine as a state.345 By contrast 
with Turkey, the U.S. sided with Israel and advocated that recognition of Palestine as a state 
at that stage would be counterproductive and would not help solve the problem.346 In the 
voting held on November 29, 2012, 138 countries voted in favor of the resolution while along 
with the United States only 9 voted against. The resolution has elevated Palestine's status 
from "non-member observer entity" to "non-member observer state.347 PM Erdoğan criticized 
the US opposition openly: “You were the ones, who wanted a two-state solution. Now, why 
do you stand against Palestine as a state? I can't understand that." He also underscored 
Turkey's decisiveness to support Palestine until it gains the full membership to the UN as a 
state.348  
To sum up, in view of Turkey's deep historical and cultural ties with Palestine and the 
value that the Erdoğan leadership attaches to them, it has always been interested in the 
Palestine question. That seems a reasonable choice for Erdoğan leadership who takes the 
bonds emerged during the four centuries-long Ottoman rule into account. However, though 
the AK Party government criticized Israel rhetorically on a number of occasions, it practically 
maintained its commercial, economic and political relations with Israel until 2010. As of May 
2010 however, considering the stern policy of the Israelis against the Palestinians, Turkey 
took openly its place in the anti-Israel camp. A psychological quality of PM Erdoğan, namely 
his emotional personality played also a significant role in the relations with Tel Aviv. Firstly, 
despite the continuing negotiations between Israel and Syria mediated by Ankara, the Israeli 
attack against Palestine in 2008 caused a deep disappointment for PM Erdoğan. Considering 
that he was cheated by the Olmert administration, Turkish PM criticized Israel with severe 
words. Another emotional reaction of him against the "injustice" that he was subjected in the 
Davos forum of 2009 and his louder critiques against the Israeli governments further strained 
the relations. Eventually, the Mavi Marmara raid of 2010 led to a breaking point in the 
bilateral relations.          
The U.S. on the other hand has tried to oversee a certain balance with respect to the 
relations with Turkey and Israel, particularly after Obama's inauguration. In spite of its 
traditional pro-Israeli stance, Washington has been careful not to burn the bridges with 
Turkey given its need to Turkey regarding the Syria, Iran and Iraq issues. Likewise, even 
though it criticized the US government now and then, Turkish government has not been eager 
to see a deep crisis with Washington and by maintaining close dialogue with the Americans, 
Ankara sought to ensure the U.S. support with regards the Palestine question. Nevertheless, 
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the Israel-Palestine question and pro-Israeli stance of the United States on critical issues will 
apparently continue to be another subject of tension between Turkey and the United States.349  
5.9. “Arab Spring” and Turkish-U.S. relations 
"Turkish model" has actually been put into words by various US presidents since the 
end of Cold War. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey was presented as a model to 
the newly independent republics of Central Asia as an attempt to counter the Iran’s efforts to 
fill the power gap in the region. Its market economy, secular as well as democratic system 
was crucially important to present it as a model.350 For instance, President George H. W. Bush 
underscored the changing nature of the relationship in his visit to Turkey in July 1991. He 
highlighted that “Turkey’s importance as an ally had developed beyond being purely the 
“bulwark of NATO’s southern flank.” Accordingly, Turkey served as a “model” to the newly 
independent Turkic states.351 Embracing the role of being a "model", Ankara tried to play a 
"big brother" role for the newly independent Turkic states.352 
 
The concurrence in this context continued also in the new millennium. With regards 
the Greater Middle East Project (GMEP), which allegedly aimed to transform the autocratic 
regimes into democratic ones in the Middle East, Turkey has been offered by Washington as a 
model this time to the Middle Eastern countries.353 Turkey volunteered again and even 
assumed the co-chairmanship of the project. However, underlining that every country has its 
own special dynamics and circumstances, Ankara has expressed its desire to be seen only as a 
source of inspiration to the Middle East and it still maintains the same argument.354   
 
The actors of the democratization movements (the so-called "Arab Spring")355 arose in 
the Middle East in 2011 turned their attention to Turkey in view of its democracy experience, 
Islamist-leaning AK Party government in power and its strong steps towards democratization. 
As a matter of fact, Turkish model refuted the thesis that conservative Islamist values cannot 
be reconciled with democracy.356 Furthermore, the Erdoğan leadership has showed that 
"religious political movements in the Muslim World can take the lead in introducing greater 
social, political and economic freedom to their societies."357 Turkey's success in combining 
Islamic and Western values, and interest of the Middle Eastern societies in the Turkish 
experience led the Western countries to support more Turkish involvement in the Arab spring 
process.358 
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AK Party government supported also the democratization movements in the Arab 
world and declared with the US backing that more freedom and democracy demands of Arab 
peoples must have been met.359 Having perceived the beginning of a new term in the Middle 
East, Turkey made a strong and early call in favor of the Arab peoples.360 In the early days of 
the Arab spring, while no strong voice rose even from the EU which was expected to be the 
most rigorous advocate of democracy,361 Turkish PM Erdoğan made a strong call to the 
President of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak, in his address broadcasted live in several TV channels, 
including the Al-Jazeera, to meet his people's demands for change and hand over the 
administration.362 Likewise, on the occasion of public revolts in Tunisia and Libya, PM 
Erdoğan stressed again the norms such as democracy and human rights and called the leaders 
of these countries to take into account the demands of their people.363 The AK Party 
government displayed a similar approach also in the process upon the victory of HAMAS in 
the Palestinian elections in January 2006. While the United States and the European Union 
halted financial assistance to the Hamas-led administration, the Turkish government criticized 
their attitude, hosted Hamas leaders several times in Ankara and declared that all the related 
parties should respect the result of democratically conducted elections.364  
 
Actually, from Erdoğan leadership’s point of view, it is understandable that it 
demonstrates effort to spread the values it advocates and supports the proliferation of regimes 
with similar qualities of its own, namely Muslim and democratic. More importantly however, 
the AK Part government envisages that it could establish closer relations with the regimes 
which take the demands of people more into consideration.365 In other words, Erdoğan 
leadership expects that the transformation of the autocratic regimes in the Middle East 
towards democratic ones would constitute an appropriate ground for the collective identity 
definitions in the region. With Wendt's conceptualization, a possible "homogeneity" of 
political regimes has been regarded useful for the construction of collective identities. 
Although this argument seems accurate considering the Tunisia and Libya cases, it has been 
severely criticized in terms of relations with Syria. Turkey’s approach to the Arab spring led 
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to the collapse of Turkish-Syrian relations, which had been viewed as the cornerstone of AK 
Party’s zero problems with neighbors policy, as well as brought about the comments that the 
“zero problems” turned into “zero neighbors” considering Turkey’s recent relations with 
Syria, Iran and Iraq.366  
 
 When the Assad regime turned a deaf ear to the calls of Turkish government to reform, 
the ruling AK Party government left aside the “non-interference” principle, one of the most 
important foreign policy principles of the republican era, and took a clearly negative stance 
against the Syrian regime.367 It did not confine itself solely verbal backing and provided 
logistical support for the opposition groups and pursued an “open-door policy” in favor of 
Syrian refugees. It has carried hundreds of millions US dollars cost of them. Even though this 
policy of AK Party government has seemed contradictory with its “zero-problems policy with 
neighboring countries”, it seems that there is certain logic in itself. As it was noted above, the 
Arab spring triggered the rise of identity politics in the region. As a Muslim-Democrat 
leadership, Erdoğan leadership aimed to see Muslim-democrat regimes in the Middle East 
which are able to reconcile democratic western values (such as respect for human rights, 
respect for people’s will and secularism) with the values of Islam. Therefore, it supported the 
democratic demands of Arab peoples. This should be seen as a natural outcome of the 
Erdoğan leadership’s identity which adopted the western values such as democracy, state of 
law and respect for human rights as an integral part of its identity as a result of long societal 
and transnational socialization processes.    
 
Erdoğan leadership’s attitude during the Arab spring has received also critiques 
especially with respect to the future of zero problems policy. In the face of critiques as to the 
fate of the zero problems policy, FM Ahmet Davutoğlu discusses a hierarchy of 
norms.368Accordingly, the zero problems policy which aims to solve the problems and 
develop mutual cooperation with neighbors hierarchically comes after the norms such as 
human rights and justice. Moreover, a country which is respectful for human rights norms 
cannot ignore the human rights violations at its doorstep.  These words of the FM underscore 
actually how Erdoğan leadership’s identity has been determinant in its policy about the 
turmoil in the Arab countries.  
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Considering the US approach to the Arab spring, as noted above, “President Barack 
Obama has sought, from the start of his presidency, a “new beginning” for America’s 
problematic relationship with the Muslim world. He has given unqualified support to those 
campaigning for change in the major Arab capitals, actively encouraging the overthrow of one 
of Washington’s longest-serving allies, Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak, and backing the 
military campaign to overthrow Libya’s Colonel Muammar Gaddafi.”369  In this context, the 
overlapping interests have given rise to a new area of cooperation between Turkey and the 
United States. Moreover, Turkey’s political activism and its efficiency in its region as well as 
in the Arab spring process enhanced Turkey’s value to a higher level for the Obama 
administration. 370 Consequently, the Arab spring paved the way for the revival of Turkish-US 
relations which had been fluctuated due to the Mavi Marmara incident and Iran’s efforts on 
nuclear technology in 2010.  The rising “phone diplomacy” between President Obama and 
PM Erdoğan in 2011 indicated the re-improving relations between the two allies. As a matter 
of fact, after British PM Cameron, Obama held quantitatively the utmost telephone 
conversations with PM Erdoğan.371 
 
On the other hand, despite the American support for the change in the Middle East, a 
possible evolution of the regional countries from autocratic regimes towards more radical 
administrations initially worried Washington. In fact, materialization of this likelihood could 
put the USA in a difficult position in view its already negative image in the Middle East 
owing to its traditional pro-Israel policy with respect to the Israel-Palestine question and its 
backing the authoritarian regimes in the region. Even though one might claim that the US 
image underwent a positive change after Obama came to power in the United States,372 it has 
highly been possible that the approaches of the new administrations could be against 
Washington in case the demands of local people are represented in the new governments.373 
Furthermore, a prospective radicalization would isolate Tel Aviv more in the region. 
  
Along with the U.S. and Israel, Turkey did not welcome a transition from autocratic 
regimes to radical administrations as well. Hence, the common goals of the United States and 
Turkey to facilitate the transition as smooth as possible away from dictatorship to democracy 
while countering the appeal of radicalism constituted another point of convergence.374 Turkish 
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PM Erdoğan’s call for the new Egyptian government to adopt a secular government model in 
his visit to Egypt has constituted an outstanding example in terms of preventing radicalism in 
the region as well as promoting the spread of western values in the Middle East.375 Thereby, 
the Erdoğan leadership emphasized also the western side of its identity which has been 
improved through socialization processes.  
 
Likewise, when the Egyptian army intervened in the Egyptian politics in the summer 
of 2013 and overthrew the Mohammed Morsi government, who had come to power through 
democratic elections, considering their own interests, many countries, including the United 
States and the European Union, did not qualify the military intervention as a "coup" and tried 
to exhibit a balanced approach.376 The Turkish government on the other hand clearly declared 
that the army's intervention was illegitimate and that the legitimate government has still been 
the Morsi administration which had taken over the power by democratic means. Turkish PM 
Erdoğan criticized also the West for not terming the army intervention a "military coup" and 
stated that this does not fit into the values of the West.377 Stated differently, the democratic 
norm which stipulates that the shift of government should certainly take place through 
democratic ways has been disregarded on the ground of "undemocratic" practices of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Whereas the military intervention has been indirectly tolerated by the 
West, Erdoğan leadership has not regarded the undemocratic takeover of the government 
convenient to democratic norms. For this reason, it has sided on another camp with respect to 
the Egypt question contrary to the United States and the European Union.     
 
All in all, the rising identity politics in the course of the so called Arab spring initially 
triggered the booming relations between Ankara and Washington. The norms such as 
democracy, respect for human rights and liberalism which constitute the common 
denominators of the United States and Turkey brought about similar interests and a shared 
attitude in favor of the democratic demands of the Arab peoples. However, the close dialogue 
and cooperation between Ankara and Washington in 2011 on Tunisia, Egypt and Libya has 
begun to lose momentum.  Because, despite their common goal, Turkey and the United States 
have diverged on methodology as to how to deal with the Syria issue. Moreover, they took 
place in different camps on the Israel-Palestine problem.378 More importantly, while the 
Erdoğan leadership severely reacted to the military intervention in Egypt and has not 
recognized the putschist regime as the legitimate administration of the country, the Obama 
leadership did not qualify the military intervention as a coup d’état and recognized the 
military rule legitimate.379 This case might be explained with the varying norms that they have 
adopted during the Arab revolts, despite the expectations to the contrary considering their 
democrat identities. In other words, whereas the U.S. implicitly regarded the "undemocratic" 
practices of the Muslim Brotherhood as a sufficient reason for the Army intervention into 
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politics, the Turkish government has declared that no single reason could justify the 
overthrow of a democratically elected government.380 
 
5.10. Turkey and USA’s Reciprocal Foreign Policies towards the post-Soviet Domain  
As it was mentioned before, Turkish policy makers tried to show on a number of 
occasions that Turkey did not lose its strategic importance in the new world order in the 
aftermath of the Cold War. In this context, Turkey aimed to develop its relations with the 
newly established Turkic republics in the Central Asia and Caucasus with which Turkey 
enjoyed historical, cultural as well as religious ties. Under the President Turgut Özal 
leadership, Turkey sought also to seize the opportunities emerged in the wake of the Cold 
War with the American support. The United States on the other hand presented Turkey as a 
model for the new Turkic republics in Central Asia and sought to ensure the adaptation of 
these states to the international system under the U.S. tutelage. Both countries’ interests 
converged on the point of bolstering the political freedom of Central Asian and Caucasian 
countries and precluding these states from falling under the hegemony of other major actors in 
the region, Russia and Iran in particular. To put it more clearly, the United States supported 
Turkey in the Central Asia with the intention that it would fill the power vacuum in the region 
in the post-Soviet course. Additionally, it offered Turkey as a model for these countries. On 
the other hand, cognizant of its inadequate economic, military and political power for its 
projects in the region, Turkey aimed to increase its influence in the region by utilizing the 
American backing. This close Turkish-American cooperation in the Central Asia led even to 
such comments that Turkey was actually a US agent in the region. 
 
While Özal leadership was ambitiously interested in the Central Asia, following 
President Özal’s death in 1993, it began to move out of the sphere of interest of Turkish 
policy makers for several reasons. First of all, the securitization process of TFP on account of 
the terror problem during the 1990s and other domestic reasons, such as rising Islamism, 
brought about an inward-looking policy. Considering foreign policy, 1990s were described as 
“lost years” for Turkey which followed mainly a security and conflict oriented foreign policy. 
Thus, Central Asia was not as meaningful as early 1990s. Furthermore, the severe economic 
crises in the country in the 1990s and early 2000s prevented Turkey from deepening its 
economic ties with the region. Finally, in the wake of the declaration of Turkey’s EU 
membership candidacy in 1999, the interest of TFP was again focused on Europe which 
indirectly downgraded the importance of the Central Asia for Turkish policy makers.381 
 
 After Erdoğan leadership’s takeover of the government in 2002, it launched a multi-
dimensional foreign policy which aimed also to improve relations with the neighboring 
countries. This policy has also had reflections on policies towards the Caucasus and Central 
Asia. Yet, AK Party’s interest towards these regions began actually to increase as of 2008. 
AK Party's relatively indifferent attitude in the pre-2008 period lied in the intense agenda of 
the government with international and domestic developments such as the US intervention in 
Iraq, ups and downs in Turkish-EU relations, Cyprus-related domestic discussions, the PKK 
terrorism, Kurdish issue and lastly the possibility of closure of the AK Party by the 
Constitutional Court. The relatively political indifference towards the Central Asia 
notwithstanding, AK Party focused on developing economic relations with the Caucasus, 
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particularly through the pipeline projects. Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas pipeline which 
became operational in March 2007 might be regarded in this respect. Additionally, Turkey, 
Georgia and Azerbaijan agreed in February 2007 on a railway project which bypassed 
Armenia and connected Turkey with these countries as well as with the Central Asia. In terms 
of its political and economic meaning, this project became one of the most important 
developments in the Caucasus region in the pre-2008 period.382 
 
 2008 was an important year in terms of Turkey’s policies towards the Caucasus, 
because Turkey refocused its attention on the region in a serious way. August 2008 crisis 
between Georgia and Russia, which showed once again the very volatile nature of the region, 
was important in this sense and it necessitated Turkey's proactive involvement to ensure peace 
and stability in the region. In the aftermath of this crisis, Turkey began to pay more attention 
to the regional developments and took its own initiative with respect to the future of the 
Caucasus: The Caucasus Stability and Economic Cooperation Platform which brought 
together Turkey and Russia with the three Caucasian states.383  
 
 Furthermore, with regards to the Central Asia, "Turkey has recently moved to 
revitalize platforms to facilitate cooperation among Turkic nations too. Notably, in 
coordination with Kazakhstan, Turkey spearheaded multi-lateral initiatives to contribute to the 
regional stability. Such initiatives in Central Asia were not directly coordinated with the 
United States, and were shaped on the basis of Turkey’s own priorities."384 Thus, one might 
conclude that Erdoğan leadership’s relatively independent and self-confident foreign policy 
understanding has weakened the perception that Turkey’s relations with the Central Asia was 
an extension of the US agenda about the region and consolidated the perception that AK Party 
began to pursue a foreign policy strategy which keeps Ankara's own interests and priorities in 
the foreground.385 
 
  Learning its lesson from the past, another novelty that the AK Party government 
applied with respect to the relations with the regional countries has been its effort to revitalize 
and diversify its relations with these countries on the basis of principles such as equality and 
brotherhood. Put it differently, to improve its relations with the Turkic republics, Turkey 
continued to see its cultural and historical ties with the region as the most important point of 
reference. However, as a result of the process of mutual construction, Ankara has realized that 
the "big brother" role has not been sustainable with respect to the relations with the Turkic 
republics; therefore, it has tried to develop a relationship with these countries based on mutual 
respect and equality.386 
 
  Considering Turkish-American cooperation in the region, Turkey and the United 
States' interests converge on a number of issues regarding the Central Asia, such as ensuring 
stability in the region, undermining the Russian and Chinese influence by consolidating the 
institutional capacity of the regional states, help them carry out democratic reforms, ensuring 
the transition to a free market economy as well as respect for human rights.387 "The United 
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States and Turkey have overlapping interests also concerning regional security issues in the 
region. They both support better relations between the Central Asian states and NATO 
through the Partnership for Peace program, which helps to counter the destabilizing influences 
of turmoil in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. In addition, the United States and Turkey have 
closely cooperated on drug trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism issues in the Central 
Asia. Ensuring the safety of the Northern Distribution Network for Afghanistan has been yet 
another common interest of the United States and Turkey.”388 
 
 Considering the political reforms in the region, the common part of Turkish and 
American identities attract attention, namely democratic, respectful for human rights and the 
terms of free market economy. However, despite Washington and Ankara's long-standing 
backing of democratization processes in the region, which has been intensified following 
Kyrgyzstan's Tulip Revolution in 2005, the authoritarian regimes in the region began to 
abstain from "further developing their relations with the United States and Turkey, partly due 
to their ruling elites’ fear of losing their privileges during the democratization process. As a 
result, despite the greater push for democratic political reform in these countries, both the 
United States and Turkey still have a lot to do to enhance their bilateral cooperation as they 
promote democratic reforms in this region.”389 
 
  5.10.1. The Russian dimension 
 
In the framework of multidimensional diplomacy, zero problems and maximum 
cooperation with Neighbors policies, Turkey markedly developed its relations with Russia 
particularly in the field of economy. Moscow has been Turkey’s largest trading partner and its 
biggest natural gas supplier. It is also a significant market for the Turkish construction 
industry. “Projects in Russia account for about one-fourth of all projects carried out by 
Turkish contractors around the world. Energy has been an important driver of the recent 
intensification of ties between Ankara and Moscow. Russia supplies 65 percent of Turkey’s 
natural-gas imports and 40 percent of its crude-oil imports.”390 
 
In the last decade, Turkish-Russian political ties have improved too. Paying a visit to 
Turkey in December 2004, Putin became the first Russian head of State to visit Ankara in 32 
years. The visit was crowned by a joint declaration on the “Deepening of Friendship and 
Multi-Dimensional Partnership” which makes reference to a wide range of common interests, 
to the mutual trust and confidence that have developed between the two countries in recent 
years.”391 Through this “multidimensional partnership”, “the two countries have endeavored 
to deepen their bilateral relationship while trying to approximate their positions on 
neighborhood issues in the Caucasus and Black Sea.”392 Moreover, since then high-level 
contacts between Ankara and Moscow have visibly increased. President Gül’s visit to 
Moscow in 2009 was considerably important in this respect. In order to show the importance 
they refer to Gül’s visit, Russia hosted him at state level, the highest level of protocol. During 
the visit, President Gül and Medvedev signed a joint declaration highlighting their 
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commitment to mutual friendship and multi-dimensional cooperation.”393 As of April 2011, 
even the visa requirements of the Russian and Turkish nationals for visits until 30 days were 
mutually lifted.394 
 
 Booming ties between Turkey and Moscow have made Ankara more sensitive to the 
Russian concerns in the Caucasus and Central Asia.395 Thus, throughout the 2000s, Turkey 
had to think twice when it was called by the West to coordinate its policies against Moscow. 
“As the United States focused its attention on the Middle East following the Iraq war, Russia 
increasingly consolidated its power in Eurasia. Despite the West gaining advantage by 
advocating democratic regimes, epitomized by the colored revolutions, such gains were soon 
reversed. The United States was generally acquiescent towards Russia’s attempts to regain 
influence and to balance US power in the Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Black Sea basin 
in the second half of the decade.”396 
 
Turkey has tried to follow a balanced policy in the undeclared competition between 
Russia and the West, and, in contrast to the 1990s, has avoided taking actions that could be 
perceived as anti-Russian. Both Turkey’s relatively independent foreign policy which self-
consciously distanced itself from the US agenda in its neighborhood and its concern to 
dampen political tensions with Russia in order to maximize gains from commercial exchanges 
(as well as Turkey’s dependence on Russia in terms of energy) played their roles in producing 
this outcome.”397 However, Turkey’s “neutral” posture led now and then to frictions in 
Ankara-Washington relations. For instance, “while Turkey was lukewarm towards U.S. 
efforts to expand U.S. and NATO military power into the Black Sea basin, it was comfortable 
cooperating with Russia to bolster maritime security in the Black Sea. “Black Sea has been 
one strategic area of US-Russia competition, with significant implications for Turkey. On the 
one hand a resurgent Russia is trying to firm its grip over the stormy shores of the Black Sea, 
while on the other; the United States and NATO are also aiming to increase their presence and 
influence in this volatile, yet highly strategic area.  
 
Both Turkey and the United States are trying to promote peace, stability and economic 
cooperation in this region and there is a strong convergence of interests in this respect. There 
is some divergence of approach, however, in the Black Sea strategies of the two allies. 
Whereas the United States wants to increase its presence and NATO’s naval power in the 
Black Sea region, Turkey believes that increasing NATO’s naval presence would raise 
tensions in the region. Instead, Turkey, already as the representative of NATO in the Black 
Sea basin, argues that in line with the Montreux Treaty, regional cooperation among and 
ownership by littoral countries should be the main focus of international efforts.”398 In 
accordance with the logic that the Black Sea should remain under the sovereignty of regional 
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states and no interference from outside should occur,399 the Black Sea Naval Cooperation 
Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR) was formed in 2001 with Turkey’s initiatives. This Group 
aims to protect the Black Sea against threats and challenges such as terrorism, organized 
crime, illegal trafficking and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.400 American 
demands however to participate in this structure has not yet received any positive response 
from Ankara.401 
 
Likewise, Turkey's approach to the "color revolutions" and European energy security 
was sometimes far from alignment with the American position, while its policy seemed closer 
to that of Russia. These kinds of differences became most visible during the Russian-
Georgian War of 2008.402 “Russia’s attack against Georgia in August 2008, when Georgia 
used force in an attempt to recapture its separatist pro-Moscow region of South Ossetia, 
caused significant turmoil in the region. Against condemnations by the United States and 
European Union about troop deployments and bombings deep inside Georgia,”403 Ankara 
tried to take again a balanced position. Invoking the terms of the Montreux Convention, 
Turkey restricted the passage of U.S. warships through the Turkish straits into the Black Sea 
on their way to Georgia and this led friction with its American ally.404 Furthermore, Turkish 
decision makers acted carefully during the Russia-Georgia crisis with the aim of easing the 
tension and offered a regional platform idea, "the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation 
Platform" to solve the regional problems.405 "This move, combined with its subsequent shuttle 
diplomacy in the region, stemmed from Ankara’s belief in the notion of regional ownership 
and its ability to help solve regional problems without external involvement.”406 
 
Seeking to establish a balanced relationship with all international actors instead of 
preferring one to another, a possible tension between Russia and the West has been 
undesirable for the Erdoğan leadership. "Turkey has a strong stake in a benign climate 
between Washington and Moscow. As Lesser has noted, Turkey’s ability to conduct a policy 
of breadth rather than depth—to engage diverse partners with conflicting interests 
simultaneously—would be severely constrained by more-overt competition between Russia 
and the West. Since the end of Cold War, Turkey has had the luxury of not having to choose 
between its Western and Eurasian interests. However, a sharpening of US-Russian 
competition would make it more difficult for Turkey to balance these competing interests, 
particularly in the Caucasus, and increase the pressure on Ankara to choose.”407 For such 
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reasons, Turkey warmly welcomed the U.S. policy of "reset" with Russia408 as it promised 
some relief from the burden of balancing its ties with the United States and Russia.409 
 
Furthermore, Ankara has been encouraging nearly every development which has the 
potential of stabilizing the relations between Russia and the West. In this context, Turkey “has 
been supporting Russia-NATO security cooperation and continued talks on the missile shield, 
the future of nuclear weapons in Europe, the application of the Treaty on Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe in the Caucasus, and the enlargement of NATO parallel to its bilateral 
dialogue with its northern neighbor. Given Washington’s own commitment to developing its 
own non-confrontational relationship with Moscow, it seems unlikely that the Turkish-
Russian relationship will cause serious problems in the U.S.-Turkish relationship.”410 
 
However, in recent years, Turkey has inclined to keep its deep-rooted alliance with the 
West in foreground and this has begun to strain the relations with Russia at least at political 
level. Turkish government's decision for instance to consent to the installation of NATO’s 
early warning radar system despite Moscow’s opposition led to another theme of friction 
between Ankara and Moscow. Similarly, "Ankara gradually came to the conclusion that 
Moscow was not as forthcoming as it had hoped it would be on neighborhood issues, such as 
the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute.”411 
 
On the other hand, as it was noted above, the so called Arab Spring led to rising 
identity politics. It pushed Ankara to make choice in the face of the Arab revolts against 
autocratic regimes. As a Muslim-democrat leadership, Erdoğan leadership’s interests 
converged with the US interests to side with the Arab peoples’ democratic demands. In this 
context, Ankara-Washington relations entered into a new period of golden age.  However, this 
case resulted in a relative decline in Ankara-Moscow political bonds.412 In contrast to Russia's 
backing of the Assad regime, Turkey's actively anti-Syrian regime stance caused sometimes 
disputes between Turkey and Russia. For example, Turkey forced a Syrian passenger plane 
took off from Moscow to land in Ankara based on the information that it was carrying 
military material. According to Turkish officials, "military" equipment was found in the plane 
and confiscated. This event caused a temporary tension between Turkey and Russia.413 
Whereas the US government expressed support for Turkey, Moscow criticized Ankara's 
behavior.414 However, Turkey and Russia were scrupulous about not confronting415 and this 
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incident did not reach a level of crisis.416 As a matter of fact, Putin postponed his visit to 
Turkey in the wake of the passenger plane event, which had been planned before the Syrian 
plane was forced to land by Turkish jets.417 Yet President Putin paid this visit on December 4, 
2012. During this visit, he attended also the Turkey-Russia High-Level Cooperation Council 
Meeting418 and a total of 11 cooperation agreements were signed between companies, 
institutions and ministries of both countries.419 Considering his cancel of all external trips due 
to health problems for two months, President Putin's visit to Ankara was associated with the 
political and economic importance that Russia attaches to Turkey.420 
 
 Last but not least, Russia also expressed its unease about the Patriot air defense 
system that Ankara requested from NATO against the possible threats from Syria. Turkish 
call received a positive response from the United States, Germany and Netherlands and the 
Patriot missiles were deployed in the near of the Turkish-Syrian border in early 2013. The 
Russian government on the other hand announced at various levels its opposition against the 
deployment of these missiles in Turkey.421 
 
In consequence, Erdoğan leadership has developed Turkey’s relations with Moscow in 
the context of multi-dimensional foreign policy understanding. In some cases, it even 
disregarded the American demands and followed its own foreign policy priorities with a 
relatively independent FP approach. However, along with the so called Arab spring, an 
identity-oriented foreign policy understanding began to be dominant in the Middle East. 
While this case reflected to Turkey’s relations with the United States positively, Turkish-
Russian relations have been adversely affected from this development. Turkey and Russia 
have sided in the rival camps on the Syrian civil war. While Ankara actively supported the 
opposition groups, Moscow sustained its staunch backing of the Assad regime. Nevertheless, 
the economic relations have not been heavily influenced by this political friction and 
continued to develop.  
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 5.10.2. The Energy dimension 
 
In recent decades, the world energy demand has been rapidly increasing and the global 
struggle over access to and the control of energy resources has intensified. In this world, with 
their wide energy resources, the Caucasus and Central Asia have come into prominence and 
the delivery of these resources to the world markets has constituted another point of 
convergence between Ankara and Washington. By utilizing its geopolitical advantage -located 
at the center of East – West, North – South and South – North energy corridors- Turkey aims 
to become an important energy transit country, energy terminal as well as the fourth energy 
source of Europe after the North Sea, Russia and the Middle East.422 Furthermore, in order to 
meet its energy need which is expected to increase 4% annually by 2020, Ankara intends to 
diversify its energy sources and wants to secure more reliable energy imports as both the 
Iraqi-Turkish and Iranian-Turkish pipelines are undependable. For these reasons, Ankara aims 
to host oil/natural gas pipeline projects.423 While trying to use the energy card as a political 
tool for integration into the EU, Ankara simultaneously regards the pipelines as a means for 
peace and stability in its region and desires to ensure a "welfare circle" also by increasing 
energy ties with its neighbors such as Iran and Russia.424 Thus, pipelines might be regarded as 
significant cornerstones of Erdoğan leadership's efforts to generate and strengthen 
interdependencies in Turkey’s region.  
 
The United States, on the other hand, aims to ensure the safety of the world's energy 
supply and reduce the dependence of the Caucasus and Central Asian states on Russia to 
deliver their hydrocarbon resources to the world markets.  Thereby, the American 
administration desires to prevent Russia re-gaining power by re-creating energy-cartel in the 
region and to hinder its efforts to become a superpower again.425 The U.S. also plans to 
forestall the rising influence of China in the region which has increased its energy ties with 
the region in view of its booming energy need.426  
 
Considering Turkish energy policy, Turkey defined its energy policies in a pro-
Western direction throughout the 1990s and "sought to gain a place in oil and natural gas 
transportation through its integration into the US-led East-West energy corridor, which was 
championed by the West against the North-South corridor supported by Russia and Iran.”427 
“The East-West Energy Corridor, initiated through intensive collaboration between Turkey, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia and the United States, aims primarily at transporting the Caucasian and 
Central Asian crude oil and natural gas to international markets via safe alternative routes to 
Russia and Iran. The major components of this sizeable energy outlet include Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan (BTC) crude oil pipeline, the Shah-Deniz natural gas pipeline (Baku-Tbilisi-
Erzurum), as well as the other Trans-Caspian Natural Gas Pipeline projects (i.e., the Turkey-
Greece-Italy Inter-connector Project and the Nabucco Project), railroads and complementary 
infrastructure. The completion of the BTC pipeline project has been particularly significant in 
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terms of Western energy security by opening an oil transit route that would present an 
alternative to Russia in order to get the landlocked Caspian oil to global energy markets.”428 
 
The BTC pipeline, completed in 2006, is the first and most important leg of the East-
West Energy Corridor through which one million barrels of Caspian crude oil is pumped 
everyday to mostly Western markets. “The feasibility of the BTC pipeline increased further 
when Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan signed a Transit Agreement in June 2006 to connect Kazakh 
oil to BTC. Both countries’ parliaments have ratified the agreement, and as of October 2008, 
Kazakh oil started to flow into BTC. Consequently, BTC opened a very significant new East-
West energy corridor providing an alternative energy route to Russia and Iran for crude oil. 
Hence, it also enhanced the geo-political significance of Turkey by turning it into a critical 
energy corridor.”429  
 
Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) natural gas pipeline constitutes the second component of 
the East-West Energy Corridor through which gas began to be pumped in May 2006. This 
pipeline, through which approximately 6.6 billion cubic meters Azerbaijan’s gas would be 
annually exported, might be viewed as the second most important ring of the East-West 
corridor.430 One should additionally note that both the BTC and BTE could be realized thanks 
to the strong U.S. and Turkish backing and coordinated action.431  
 
The third and the most important part of the East-West Energy Corridor was the 
Nabucco project. Through this project, it was aimed to transport the Central Asian, Caucasian 
as well as the Middle Eastern natural gas to Europe. To diversify the energy resources of 
Europe and reduce its dependence on Russian gas were also crucially important.432 With the 
completion of this project, which was backed by the United States and the European Union, 
the transportation of 31bcm natural gas to Europe through Turkey, Romania, Hungary and 
Austria was envisaged. It was expected that the Nabucco Project would consolidate Turkey's 
position as an energy corridor, reinforce its role as a regional actor and offer an alternative 
source for Turkey's booming energy need. For all such reasons, Ankara has provided a serious 
support for the project.  
 
However, the construction of the project could not be launched yet. There are a 
number of reasons for this result. Firstly, Moscow has sought to preclude this project through 
alternative projects such as the South Stream. Besides, it concluded accords with the potential 
suppliers of the Nabucco, like Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.433 On the other hand, although 
it is the main beneficiary of the Nabucco project, the EU did not take the expected lead on the 
Nabucco and the project gave rise to squabbles among the EU countries especially in terms of 
its financing. The dispute between Turkey and the EU about the issue of pricing led also 
setbacks on the project. Furthermore, the question marks over the suppliers of the pipeline 
project were also not cleared. The turmoil and uncertainties in other potential suppliers of the 
project, like Egypt and Iraq, raised doubts about the future of the project as well. A possible 
join of Iran in the Nabucco project was strongly blocked by the United States. Eventually, in 
the face of the troubles pertaining to the other suppliers, given its potential, Azerbaijan as the 
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projected main supplier of the Nabucco did not seem likely to meet the 31bcm potential of the 
natural gas pipeline.  
 
In January 2009, when Russia decided to cut off gas to Ukraine and left much of 
Southern and Eastern Europe to face a bitter winter with no gas for weeks, many European 
countries were forced to accelerate their search for other alternatives to reduce their 
dependence on Russian energy, natural gas in particular. In this respect, with the strong 
support of the USA and the EU, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Austria and Turkey signed an 
intergovernmental transit agreement on July 13, 2009. This agreement was expected to give 
Nabucco a new impetus and enhance its credibility with suppliers.434 However, the problems 
and uncertainties did not come to an end, which pushed Ankara and Baku to explore other 
alternatives.  
One of the projects proposed in this context is the Trans Anatolian Gas Pipeline 
(TANAP) project, whose finalization and imminent construction of the Trans-Anatolian 
Pipeline most likely ends the Eastern end of the Nabucco.435 TANAP stipulates the delivery of 
Azerbaijan’s gas to Turkey's western border. This $7 billion project, which is expected to be 
completed in six years in accordance with the agreement signed on June 26, 2012,436 will 
make Turkey a gas transit corridor for nearly 100 years. For the European market, which has 
been in search of an alternative to the Russian gas, the TANAP is very important both 
economically and politically. For the transfer of the Shah Deniz 2 natural gas from Turkey's 
western border to Europe, the Nabucco West, a scaled down version of the Nabucco and 
Trans Adriatic Project (TAP) are discussed. It is envisioned that the Nabucco West or TAP 
will be fed by the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline.437  
 
On the other hand, the troubles associated with the Nabucco project pushed the United 
States to review its policy. As a matter of fact, Washington signaled that it maintains its 
support for the Southern Corridor to transfer the Caspian gas to Europe. However, considering 
that the projects in this regard should have been also commercially viable, the US government 
signaled that Nabucco constituted no longer the center of gravity in its energy politics. 438 
Thereby, the United States implied indirectly that it was inclined to give support to the 
projects such as TANAP, Nabucco West and TAP, offered as alternatives to the Nabucco.   
 
To make an overall appraisal, in comparison to the effective cooperation between 
Ankara and Washington on strategic energy collaboration throughout the 1990s, as Mark 
Parris, former United States ambassador to Turkey, stated, the past eight years seems a tragic 
loss of opportunity.439 The poor state of cooperation seems to lie largely in a lack of US 
interest in these projects, as it increasingly involved in Middle Eastern affairs and this resulted 
in limiting room for joint action in Eurasia. Recently, US-Turkish coordinated action in 
Eurasian affairs has gained pace again with the Obama administration’s appointment of 
Richard Morningstar as special envoy for Eurasian Energy.440 
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As a matter of fact, Turkey and the United States have been in close cooperation to 
encourage Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to export their oil and natural gas through Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipelines, which could be materialized as a 
result of close cooperation of the U.S. and Turkey, as well as that of Azerbaijan and Georgia. 
"The United States and Turkey have also been in agreement on the need to resolve tensions 
between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. Particular sources of tension between Turkmenistan 
and Azerbaijan stemming from the status of the Caspian Sea and conflict over the 
Kepez/Sardar oilfield have undermined the development of the Trans-Caspian Pipeline 
project and consequently of the EU-backed Southern energy corridor.”441 
 
On the other hand, Erdoğan leadership’s multidimensional foreign policy, based on a 
delicate balance between Russia, Iran and the United States narrows from time to time 
Turkey's room for maneuver. The US policy towards Iran for example, "based on sanctions 
and exclusion, set important obstacles to Turkey’s efforts to deepen ties with that country in 
the energy sector, a situation most vividly observed in Turkey’s plans to include Iran into the 
Nabucco project which have been thwarted by the United States."442 Nonetheless, Ankara 
insists on the multidimensional policy. Despite the suspicion of some circles in Washington 
about Turkey's growing ties with Moscow in energy sector, the Turkish government continues 
to follow its own FP agenda and maintains and even deepens its ties with Russia in the energy 
sector. Ankara's consent to the Russia-led South Stream, the biggest rival of the Nabucco 
project, to pass through the Exclusive Economic Zone of Turkey, which created confusion in 
some quarters in the West, might be explained in this context.  
 
 5.11. The Armenian question dimension of Turkey-U.S. relations 
The Armenian question has been dangling like the sword of Damocles since early 
1980s over the Turkish-American relations and has been a matter of tension in bilateral 
relations. Ambitious efforts of the Armenian Diaspora to introduce a “genocide” resolution 
condemning Turkey for the tragic events of 1915443 and its endeavors to put Turkey in a 
troublesome position in the international arena causes so to say a vicious circle in Turkey-US 
relations. When the Armenian question comes to the agenda of the US Congress or its lower 
bodies, such as the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, this gives rise initially to a 
discord between Ankara and Washington and this dispute results sometimes even in the recall 
of Turkish ambassador to Ankara for consultations contingent upon how likely the Armenian 
draft resolution to be accepted by the relevant institution. Subsequently, the Armenian draft 
resolution is hindered usually with the last-minute attempts of the American administration 
and eventually Turkish-American relations get through another "crisis" successfully. This 
scenario was lastly repeated in 2007 and 2010.  
 
Moreover, the Armenian issue comes periodically to the agenda of bilateral relations 
every year in April and causes a concern in the Turkish side. In accordance with a decision 
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taken in 1975, the US Presidents were asked to make a statement on every April 24 
condemning the terrible events that Armenians exposed in 1915. Although the concept of 
"genocide" was used only once during the presidency of Ronald Reagan in 1981, every year 
in April the Turkish authorities experience an excitement, anxiety and even fear, whether the 
American President will use the term of "genocide" pertaining to the events of 1915.444 
 
Pursuing zero problems and maximum cooperation policies with neighbors and aiming 
to make Turkey first a regional and then a global power, Erdoğan leadership intended to solve 
and get rid of this problem which has been an impediment to TFP for decades.445 In this 
context, with the intention of reducing the pressure over Turkey, the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly issued a declaration in 2005 and called for both Yerevan as well as the other 
relevant countries to form a common commission to scrutinize the 1915 events and to open 
the archieves mutually to this end.446 However, this call got a positive response neither from 
the Armenians nor from the international public opinion to the extent that Ankara desired. In 
the coming period, despite the efforts of the Bush administration, an Armenian draft 
resolution containing the Armenian claims was approved in October 2007 by the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee with 27 votes, against the 21 negative votes.447 Even though this 
draft resolution was later shelved with the attempts of the Bush administration,448 it strained 
once again Ankara-Washington ties.449 
 
During the Obama administration, the Armenian question maintained its importance in 
the US-Turkish agenda. During his election campaign, Obama was clearly labeling the 1915 
events as genocide. He announced during the campaign that as President he would recognize 
the Armenian Genocide.”450 Therefore, one might conclude that in addition to Erdoğan 
leadership's aspiration to get rid of the foreign policy impediments with a view to making 
Turkey a global player, Obama’s victory of December 2008 elections had been one of 
important factors urging Ankara to normalize its relations with Yerevan.  Along with the 
international pressure that Turkey faced until then,451 Obama administration’s pro-Armenian 
stance pushed the Erdoğan leadership to take steps on the Armenian question. In this context, 
it was not a surprise that Turkey’s search for a dialogue with Armenia gathered pace 
following President Obama’s calls for the solution of the problem during his visit to Turkey 
on 5-6 April 2009.452  
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In fact, after long and secret negotiation traffic, Turkish President Abdullah Gül had 
paid a visit to Armenia in 2008 in order to watch the World Cup qualification match between 
the Turkish and Armenian national teams and thereby he had commenced the so called 
“football diplomacy.” 453 The softening climate arose as a result of the football diplomacy, 
“culminated with the signing of two protocols in October 2009, establishing diplomatic 
relations and paving the way to start examining their troubled history.”454 The American side 
on the other hand supported the efforts to normalize the bilateral relations between Ankara 
and Yerevan with a constructive attitude. As a matter of fact, “there were in the meantime 
statements and signals emanating from the US administration that Washington would caution 
against taking any steps that might disrupt the ongoing efforts of Turkey and Armenia to 
reconcile and normalize. This meant for the most observers that the word "genocide" would 
not be uttered if “the process” was ongoing.”455 Through its pro-solution stance, the American 
administration was hoping to attain two strategic results. Firstly, a possible rapprochement 
between Turkey and Armenia could facilitate the Armenia’s move away from the Russian 
sphere of influence towards the US/NATO sphere of influence. Secondly, a likely 
improvement of Ankara-Yerevan relations could facilitate the flow of the rich energy 
resources of the Caucasus and Central Asia to the West.456 
 
The protocols signed in October 2009 stipulated the formation of a joint history 
commission to investigate the events of 1915 and mutual opening of the archives with a view 
to meeting Turkish demands. A rebuilding of political and diplomatic relations cut in 1992 
was stipulated in the second phase. The third step required the opening of borders between 
Turkey and Armenia to trade and tourism which had been closed in April 1993 by Ankara 
upon the Armenian invasion of the Azerbaijan's Nagorno Karabakh region. In spite of some 
preliminary steps taken by both Armenia and Turkey to implement the protocols, some 
reasons such as the domestic political calculations, mutual distrust between the parties as well 
as the reaction of the third parties like Azerbaijan hampered the implementation of the 
protocols.457 In this respect, Turkey's efforts to link "the implementation of the protocols to 
significant developments in the Karabakh issue and Armenia seeking to change the meaning 
of some of the articles of the protocols through the Constitutional Court” might be regarded as 
further important factors hindering the implementation of these protocols.458  
 
On March 4, 2010, the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs voted ‘yes’ with 23-
22 votes to a draft resolution recognizing the 1915 events as "genocide" and the American 
administration remained indifferent to prevent the approval of the resolution until the last 
minute.459 This led to a new tension in Turkish-US relations460 and in order to protest the 
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resolution of the Committee, Ankara recalled the Turkish Ambassador to the United States 
and announced that Turkish-American relations would be damaged in case the process would 
be completed. “This warning was commonly interpreted as including a threat to curtail at least 
partially or temporarily U.S. access to Turkish bases and territory for transporting non-lethal 
cargo to missions in Iraq and Afghanistan”461 Turkish Ambassador stayed nearly a month in 
Ankara and he returned to Washington only after US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had a 
one-hour talk with her Turkish counterpart, Ahmet Davutoğlu, on the phone.462 Consequently, 
as the resolution had to reach the floor for an up-or-down vote of the full U.S. House of 
Representatives, this effort also could not be successful just like the other former three 
attempts in the last eleven years.463 President Obama did not use also the term "genocide" in 
his April 24 statement, commemorating the Armenian Remembrance Day and another crisis 
rooted in the Armenian question was temporarily resolved. 464 Even though new efforts were 
launched for the passage in the U.S. Senate of an “Armenian genocide” resolution in June 
2011465 and March 2012, no success could be accomplished mainly on account of US 
administration’s stance against the bills as well as the Republicans’ attitude against the 
Armenian resolutions who took control of the chamber in 2011.466 Nevertheless, "this issue 
might be brought to the US agenda depending on the changing political climate, and hence 
poison bilateral relations.”467 
 
To sum up, in the context of zero problems with neighbors policy, the Erdoğan 
leadership aimed to solve the chronic problems of Turkey and pave the way for its 
development. However, Turkey's steps in this regard towards the resolution of the problems 
with Armenia notwithstanding, the success of its efforts remained very limited due to the 
parties' inability to conclude this process. Though the U.S. urged and welcomed the efforts of 
both parties to normalize their relations, the process could not be completed; hence the 
Armenian issue continues to be a potential flashpoint in Ankara-Washington relations. 
Despite the pledges of the Obama administration during the election campaign to recognize 
the "Armenian genocide", it has not yet kept its word and even precluded a debate in the 
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House of Representatives on draft legislation concerning Armenian claims of genocide in 
March 2010. In this manner, he indicated the importance attached to Turkey's strategic 
value.468 In other words, considering Turkey's strategic value and its unique political system 
which reconciles Islam and western norms, Obama leadership is not willing to alienate 
Turkey from the Western structure. However, as the year of 2015, the 100th anniversary of 
the supposed "Armenian genocide," has been determined as the "target year" by the Armenian 
Diaspora, and the Diaspora aims to ensure the recognition of the Armenian claims in all over 
the world, including the United States,469 it is highly possible that the Armenian question will 
strain Turkish-American relations in the short term again.470 
 
5.12. Greece and Cyprus dimensions of Turkey-US relations 
Despite the American reluctance, Turkish-Greek relations have been occupying the 
US-Turkish agenda for decades. As the leader of the western block, Washington had to 
repeatedly interfere in the tensions between Ankara and Athens. This case was repeated again 
during the Imia/Kardak crisis, which brought both countries to the brink of a war in 1996 and 
a military conflict could be prevented only with the last-minute intervention of the United 
States. Likewise, “while the Cyprus dispute itself has not been an issue of equal significance 
for the United States, its importance for Ankara and its implications in the international arena 
have helped to ensure it a place on the U.S.-Turkish agenda.”471 
 
In the aftermath of the capture of the PKK leader in 1999 and the "détente process" 
emerged between Ankara and Athens in the wake of the earthquakes occurred in August 1999 
in Turkey and in September 1999 in Greece, Turkish-Greek relations began to foster in the 
areas of trade and tourism.472 Cooperation on energy has also gained momentum which was 
"bolstered by the opening of a $300-million gas pipeline (November 2007) that creates an 
energy corridor connecting the rich natural-gas fields in the Caucasus with Europe.” 473 With a 
view that it could develop better relations with a country obeying the norms and standards of 
the European Union, Greece supported Turkey's EU membership prospect and this 
contributed to the ease of tensions between Ankara and Athens.474 In addition, AK Party 
government's zero problems with neighboring countries policy and its willingness in this 
respect to maintain the positive climate already existed between the parties before it came to 
power ensured the continuation of the positive momentum in bilateral bonds.  
 
Along with the confidence building measures, the first meeting of the High Level 
Cooperation Council was held in 2010 in Athens with the attendance of Prime Ministers of 
Turkey and Greece, and 22 Memorandum of Understandings were signed between the parties 
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which stipulated cooperation in a wide range of areas. Even though the second round of the 
Council could not be gathered owing to the outbreak of world economic/financial crisis, both 
sides have expressed their will to continue the meetings.475 This rapprochement of Turkey and 
Greece reduced the potential of Ankara-Athens relations to occupy the Turkish-American 
agenda. After all, the United States has been so busy with issues such as Iraq, Afghanistan and 
Syria that the last thing it would desire has been a crisis between its two allies in the East 
Mediterranean.476 
 
On the other hand, considering the chronic problems between Turkey and Greece such 
as the Aegean and Cyprus problems,477 despite the positive climate and developments in 
bilateral relations, there has been little progress in resolving them. As long as these disputes 
remain unresolved, "there is always a danger that some incident could lead to an unwanted 
confrontation, as almost happened in 1996 when the two countries nearly went to war over the 
islet of Imia/Kardak."478   
 
It seems that the Cyprus question occupies in this context a relatively wider space. In 
essence, the AK Party government endeavored seriously between 2002 and 2004 to throw off 
the burden in foreign politics caused by the Cyprus question. Despite the rising opposition 
within the Turkish society, the government assumed the risk and demonstrated a great effort 
to convince the Turkish Cypriot community to vote "yes" in the referendum for the Annan 
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Plan.479 However, although 65 percent of the Turkish Cypriots voted in favor of the Annan 
Plan, 75 percent of the Greek Cypriots voted against the Plan on 24 April 2004 and thereby 
showed their determination towards deadlock.480 The admittance of the Greek Cypriots to the 
European Union in May 2004 despite the lack of solution in the island has changed the 
context and dynamics of the Cyprus issue in important respects. In this manner, Cyprus has 
become the major issue in Turkish–EU relations, 481and consequently, the focus of attention 
on Cyprus has shifted from Washington to Brussels.”482  
 
Simultaneous to the accession of Cyprus into the EU, U.S. attention to the Cyprus 
question has also declined.483 “While the United States remains committed to its position that 
the problem should be solved, its focus has been on pursuing joint policy goals with Turkey in 
other areas without the Cyprus problem getting in the way. This is not only because it gives a 
much higher priority to the other issues on which it cooperates closely with Turkey, but also 
because it does not have a sense of urgency about this “frozen conflict,” particularly after the 
collapse of the UN effort” between 2002 and 2004.484 
 
On the other hand, though the US administration has appreciated the positive 
contribution Ankara made to the peace process by supporting the Annan plan, Turkish policy 
makers find this attitude of Washington insufficient and expect the Americans to put greater 
pressure on the Greek Cypriot side, which was rewarded with the EU membership, their 
rejection of the UN plan notwithstanding. Whereas the Greek Cypriots have utilized the 
prerogatives of international recognition and used its EU membership as a political leverage 
against Turkey, the Turkish side felt disappointed as it could not receive a recompense for its 
efforts, and because the promises were not kept with respect to the international recognition of 
the Turkish Cypriots.485 
 
In recent years, as the Greek Cypriot administration has conducted oil and gas 
exploration in the south of the island and has concluded oil and gas agreements to this end 
with the Mediterranean countries, it has faced a fierce Turkish opposition and its activities led 
to a new tension in the region.486 “Turkey has assertively opposed efforts by the Republic of 
Cyprus and other Eastern Mediterranean countries—most notably Israel—to agree upon a 
division of offshore energy drilling rights before Cyprus’s political future is resolved. In 
response to drilling initiated in September 2011 by the Republic of Cyprus in the Aphrodite 
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gas field off Cyprus’s southern coast, Turkey sent its own seismic research ships with a naval 
escort to the waters off the Cypriot shore in agreement with the Turkish Cypriot regime. 
Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots oppose Greek Cypriot drilling without a solution to the 
larger question of the island’s unification.”487 Against these developments, "the United States 
has voiced concern about tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly because the 
Greek Cypriot offshore drilling is being conducted by Texas Company Noble Energy.”488 
“Washington is also concerned about the dangers of a new arena of confrontation between 
Turkey and Israel because of the latter’s growing cooperation with the Greek Cypriots, as they 
both exploit gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean.”489 
 
To sum up, while the relations between Turkey and Greece gained a relative stability 
particularly in the EU membership process of Turkey, unresolved issues, such as the Aegean, 
and Cyprus problems might threaten Turkish-Greek relations and thus such issues might 
occupy again the Turkish-US agenda. Despite the strong efforts of the Erdoğan leadership in 
accordance with its new foreign policy paradigm to settle the Cyprus question and to get rid 
of this impediment in international relations, it fell short of getting a positive result. 
Additionally, since the Turkish and Greek communities are a long way from reaching a 
negotiated settlement based on a bi-zonal and bi-communal federal arrangement, the Cyprus 
question continues to be another potential flash point and retains the potential to affect 
Turkey-U.S. relations negatively, especially in view of the strong Greek lobby in the United 
States which is directly interested in the issues related to Turkey and Greece.490 
 
5.13. Balkans dimension of Turkey-U.S. relations 
 Balkans has been a stable cooperation area in terms of Turkey-US relations in the 
aftermath of the Cold War. Close cooperation developed during the Bosnia and Kosovo 
conflicts in 1990s continued in the 2000s particularly in the field of ensuring security and 
stability. However, since the resolution of the Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts as well as the 
problems in Macedonia, U.S. interest in the Balkans has been eroded and consequently, the 
level of cooperation between Washington and Ankara has been less intensive in comparison 
to 1990s.491 Nevertheless, this cooperation continues at a certain level. For instance, both 
Ankara and Washington supported the independence efforts of Kosovo during 2000s and 
while the U.S. became the second country after Costa Rica to recognize Kosovo when it 
declared independence on February 17, 2008, Turkey became the third to recognize it.492 
 
Even though the U.S. interest in the Balkans relatively decreased in the new 
millennium,493 it is a significant region for Washington particularly owing to the NATO 
connection. One of the most important missions of the NATO is ensuring the European 
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security. Therefore, considering its strategic importance for the security of Europe, the NATO 
and indirectly the United States would never disregard the security and stability of the 
Balkans. Furthermore, the Balkans has always carried a great crisis potential due to its 
historical ties, strategic location as well as the interest of some particular countries, like 
Russia and some of the EU member states.494 Together with the EU, the US administration 
aims to take this unstable region under control over time which may pose in the long run a 
threat to the security and order of Europe. Washington seeks also to integrate the regional 
countries into the Euro-Atlantic institutions and, in this way, to hamper potential crises 
requiring NATO intervention.495  
 
In terms of its geostrategic location, connecting Turkey to Europe, the Balkans is a 
significant region for Ankara as well. Additionally, just like during the Özal era, Erdoğan 
leadership views Turkey’s existing cultural and historical as well as social ties with the 
Balkans as a significant part of new Turkish identity and feels itself responsible for the former 
subject people of the Ottomans, especially Bosnians and Kosovons. This increases Turkish 
interest in the peace and stability of the region. For instance, as Turkish FM Ahmet Davutoğlu 
stated, there were more Bosnians in Turkey than in Bosnia-Herzegovina and more Albanians 
than in Kosovo. 496  In fact, Turkey’s close interest in the region is not a new phenomenon, 
because the Balkans was one of the most significant application fields of the so called neo-
Ottomanist foreign policy approach during the Özal era of early 1990s. The Erdoğan 
leadership reiterates particularly since the mid 2000s a similar approach, and aims at 
enhanced cooperation and integration with the Balkans as with other surrounding areas. 
“Since the AK Party government feels, in tune with its foreign policy paradigm, responsible 
towards this geography which remained under Ottoman rule for several centuries, through its 
activism in the Balkans, Turkey has been seeking to create bilateral and multilateral dialogue 
mechanisms”497 and contribute to the peace and stability in the region. The Balkans gained a 
renewed place in TFP agenda particularly after 2008. “Having highlighted the risks posed by 
the West’s neglect of the ongoing inter-communal tensions and inability to establish a 
sustainable peace in Bosnia, (Foreign Minister) Davutoğlu initiated preventive diplomacy in 
an effort to prevent the outbreak of a new conflict.”498 
 
In recent years, the most constructive initiative of Ankara to ensure peace and stability 
in the Balkans as well as to normalize the relations between Sarajevo and Belgrade has been 
the formation of the Trilateral Consultation Mechanism of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of 
Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia in October 2009.499 It is evaluated that this 
mechanism operated at the level of foreign ministers repeatedly has made a significant 
contribution to the peace in the region.500 In this context, a Tripartite Balkans Summit was 
held on 24th April 2010 in Istanbul with the participation of the Heads of States of Turkey, 
Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the end of the Summit which had brought the leaders 
of Serbia and Bosnia together for the first time since the war, the Istanbul declaration was 
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issued.501 With this declaration, while three Balkan countries pledged to improve cooperation 
and work towards EU integration, Ankara appeared as a key player in the stability of 
Southeastern Europe. Furthermore, aiming for a psychological breakthrough in the region, 
which suffered from wars, ethnic conflicts and destruction in the previous century, Turkey has 
achieved a considerable progress in improving previously difficult relations with Serbia, 
Bulgaria and Greece. AK Party government attaches also a great importance to promoting 
regional cooperation through the South East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) and 
seeks to lay foundations for economic interdependence with a view to ensuring peace and 
stability in the region. All of Turkish activities in the Balkans aim to buttress regional peace 
and stability.502 
 
Turkish-US interests pertaining to the Balkans overlap in many respects, particularly 
in terms of ensuring security and stability in the region. Therefore, the U.S. welcomes 
Turkey’s efforts to in the region. Furthermore, Ankara’s perspective on the Balkans has been 
to encourage the integration of all countries of the region to the European and Euro-Atlantic 
institutions which also parallels American objectives.503 Additionally, "energy security in the 
Balkans is also a major concern for both the United States and Turkey. Turkey’s potential 
contribution through various pipeline projects is an example of Turkish-American cooperation 
in this region.”504 
 
As a result, the Balkans has been an important region for the global power, the United 
States, owing to its geostrategic location. However, it has become a zone of secondary 
importance to Washington following the NATO enlargement and the acquisition of military 
bases in the Balkans. By contrast, this region matters for the Erdoğan leadership in many 
respects, including historically, ethnically, religiously as well as strategically. Thus, in line 
with its recent foreign policy paradigm, Ankara has been making attempts to secure peace and 
stability in the region and its initiatives generally receive support also from the American 
administration. After all, the procurement and maintenance of security and stability in the 
Balkans, is important also for the United States. Hence, the Balkans sustains its position of 
being a stable cooperation area for Turkey and the United States. 
5.14. Economic relations of Turkey and the U.S. 
Economic relations continue to be the weakest link in Turkish-American relations in 
the 2000s as well. As mentioned in the preceding chapter, economy has been occupying a 
significant place in TFP agenda since early 1980s, when export-oriented development model 
was adopted under the Turgut Özal leadership. In this connection, Ankara sought to develop 
its economic relations with Washington alongside the already advanced military and security 
oriented ties. The famous slogan of PM Turgut Özal on this subject at that time is still 
remembered: "trade not aid." Although the US-Turkish economic bonds have progressed 
considerably in consequence of Özal's efforts and of the focus of the U.S. on big emerging 
markets that included Turkey in the early 1990s, the situation has not changed much, hence 
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U.S.-Turkish economic relations remain far behind the level of political strategic/military 
relations.505 
 
Turkey has demonstrated in the decade since 2002 a serious economic growth 
performance with an average annual growth of 5.45%.506 Though nearly the whole world was 
affected from the economic crisis emerged initially in the United States in 2008, the Turkish 
economy maintained its growth. In parallel with this performance, Turkey's foreign trade 
volume has expanded dramatically as well. While the Turkish foreign trade volume was 
around $82.776 billion in 2000, it reached, with almost five-fold increase, $389 billion in 
2012.507 However, Turkish-American trade volume has not mounted with the same speed. 
Whereas it was $7,046 billion in 2000, this number has come to $19,31billion in 2012 which 
indicates that Turkey-U.S. trade has increased less than three-fold.508 
 
Turkey exported $5.6 billion to the United States in 2012 with an increase of 22.5% 
compared to the previous year, while imported $14.131billion with 11.9% decrease in 
comparison with 2011. Whilst the U.S. has constituted the 9th biggest market for Turkish 
products, it is the fourth country that Turkey has imported most in 2012.509 It is easily visible 
in the figures that foreign trade balance has continued to be to the disadvantage of Turkey as 
for decades, which lies mostly in the sales by U.S. aviation and defense industries to 
Turkey.510 With the figures of 2012, whereas the Americans has been the fifth biggest partner 
of the Turks in terms of foreign trade volume,511 Turkey’s share in US trade seems trivial, 
with 4 per thousand in American foreign trade of around $4.931 trillion.512 Furthermore, in 
terms of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to Turkey, the United States ranked fifth in 
2011, and its share in the overall total FDI of $11.1 billion was only $1.4 billion or 12.6 per-
cents. In order to improve this situation, Turkish policy makers has been demanding from 
their American counterparts to designate Turkey as one of the six preferential markets in the 
World, yet this request has received so far no positive response from Washington.513 
 
Although economic bonds remained behind political and military relations, a joint 
desire for the improvement of economic relationship has been on the agenda for both Turkish 
and American authorities.514 With a similar understanding, the Framework for Strategic 
Economic and Commercial Cooperation (FSECC) was established by Presidents Gül and 
Obama in 2009 and is the only Cabinet-level mechanism for discussion of U.S.-Turkish 
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commercial and economic relations.515 Institutionalized bilateral mechanisms such as the 
Trade and Investment Framework Agreement, bilateral investment and tax treaties, as well as 
a variety of high-level dialogues, including the FSECC and Economic Partnership 
Commission indicate the joint will to develop Turkish-American economic ties.516 
 
In sum, “the significantly low level of investments in both directions and the slowly 
increasing, but still limited level of bilateral trade volumes do not help change the perception 
of Turkey for the US policy-makers only as a political and strategic pivotal actor. The lack of 
economic elements supports the traditional and Cold War era perception of this partnership, 
which prevents new openings that might significantly contribute to reshaping it with the new 
realities on the ground.” Stated differently, less-developed economic ties hinder the 
development of interdependency by adding a strong economic dimension to the long-standing 
alliance relationship. Finally “the lack of economic foundations in the larger picture makes 
this partnership more vulnerable to political fluctuations and considerations in both 
countries.”517 
 
5.15. Military relations 
Turkish-American military relations have traditionally been at a high level since the 
early years of the Cold War and constituted the strongest link of bilateral relations. In the 
wake of the Cold War yet, military relations have suffered a setback at some dimensions. For 
instance, whereas approximately 15.000 US soldiers were deployed in the Incirlik Base in 
southern Turkey towards the end of 1980s, this figure has declined to 2000 today. Moreover, 
in accordance with its self-confident and relatively independent FP paradigm, Turkey has set 
serious limitations to the American operations to be conducted from the Incirlik Air Base and 
modified its stance towards the use of the base mainly for logistic purposes. Thus, the 
Washington administration "cannot automatically assume that it can use Incirlik for purposes 
beyond those spelled out in the 1980 Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement, 
particularly combat missions in the Middle East."518  
 
Considering the issue in terms of cooperation on defense industry, whereas Turkey 
had possessed an "infant" defense industry before entering into the NATO, after joining the 
Alliance, it left its domestic industry aside, sought to modernize its army by means of NATO 
as well as American assistance and preferred to meet its needs through import and foreign 
assistance. The fallacy of this policy was proved in the wake of the Johnson letter of 1964 and 
the American arms embargo imposed on Turkey due to the Cyprus Peace Operation of 1974. 
Consequently, Turkish policy makers began to give more weight to the development of 
domestic defense industry and thereby to decrease the dependence on import and foreign aid. 
Özal era witnessed in this respect a major breakthrough in terms of improving Turkish 
defense industry. Özal leadership stimulated the investment of foreign firms in Turkish 
defense industry with a view to realizing technology transfer and ensured the establishment of 
joint ventures in Turkey by foreign companies. Through the joint venture model, cooperation 
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with the American companies was also ensured and in this way, for instance, manufacture of 
some parts of the F-16 fighter jets and their assembly were completed in Turkey. In this 
manner, Turkey sought simultaneously to meet the needs of Turkish army as well as to obtain 
export revenues by selling them to other countries, like Egypt.519    
 
Efforts to develop domestic defense industry continued throughout the 1990s as well 
as 2000s. However, as in the 1980s, the Cyprus question and allegations of human rights 
violations in Turkey continued to cast shadow over the military relations of Ankara and 
Washington. The US Congress delayed or prevented a number of major weapons sales to 
Turkey on the grounds of its policy towards Cyprus and its human rights policy. Therefore, 
one might infer that the role of Congress has maintained its damaging role on U.S. Turkish-
defense cooperation.520 Moreover, the strained relations due to the motion crisis of 2003 and 
the U.S. disregard of Turkish requests until the end of 2007 to support its fight against the 
PKK as well as the pro-Israeli US stance during the Mavi Marmara crisis indicated that the 
U.S. was not much reliable in terms of security and this reinforced Turkish policy makers' 
determination to improve Turkey's own defense industry. Therefore, without destroying the 
military ties with the U.S.,521 Ankara has been seeking to foster its own defense industry and 
decrease its dependence on import. On the other hand, given the limitations imposed by US 
regulations on some technology transfers as well as the blockade of the American Congress, 
US arms producers have failed to compete with other suppliers from rival countries in tenders 
for supplying arms and equipment to the Turkish army.522 
 
Turkey has been investing huge amounts of money both in research and development 
projects as well as in the joint projects with foreign companies. In this framework, “Turkey 
has undertaken joint projects with Italy and South Korea to produce attack helicopters and 
main battle tanks, respectively, as well as developing national warship and unmanned aerial 
vehicle projects. Partly as a reaction to the exclusion of US producers from defense contracts, 
the United States is said to be reluctant to sell some advanced weapons systems to Turkey, 
which arguably has led to deficiencies in Turkey’s anti-terrorism struggle.”523 Turkish major 
efforts notwithstanding, it has still not been able to finish its military dependence on the 
United States, particularly in intelligence gathering, anti-missile defense systems, and attack 
helicopters. Ironically, this dependence plays a stabilizer role in Ankara-Washington bonds 
and acts as a brake against a total breakdown in bilateral relations.524 
 
In spite of the independent FP practices of the Erdoğan leadership, the deep-rooted ties 
of Turkey and the United States in the field of defense industry might be regarded as one of 
the main stabilizers of bilateral relations. However, anti-Turkey stance of the US Congress as 
well as the US laws restricting the technology transfer to other countries put the American 
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firms in a disadvantageous position in competition with South Korean and Italian companies. 
Turkish army is in trouble especially to purchase critical equipments from the United States in 
fight against terrorism. For example, even though the Pentagon announced its decision to sell 
the AH-1 Super Cobra helicopters to Turkey,525  the sale has still not been materialized. As 
such, there is also no significant development on Predators issue, another important subject on 
the US-Turkish agenda. Ankara has been intending to buy American unmanned aerial vehicle 
Predators since 2008, yet it has been facing again the blockade of US Congress.526 Ambitious 
in developing its national defense industry, Turkey has been collaborating with companies of 
other countries outside the United States, thereby aims for technology transfer and to increase 
the domestic share in meeting its defense needs.  
 
In consequence, Turkish defense industry sustained the strategy introduced in the Özal 
era and accomplished to produce the T-129 ATAK helicopter in the 2000s. Additionally, 
tanks, unmanned aerial vehicles, warships (the MILGEM Project) and medium-range missile 
systems (e.g. 2.75-inch laser-guided missile CIRIT, the anti-tank long-range and medium-
range MIZRAK-U and MIZRAK-O, Stand-Off Missile (SOM)) could be produced with 
domestic capabilities. While the ratio of domestic production in the military procurement total 
was only 20 percent in 2004, it reached 52.1 percent in 2010.527 Consequently, the 
accomplishments both in economy and defense industry fields have constituted two important 
elements increasing the self confidence of the Erdoğan leadership.  
 
Another dimension of Turkish-American military relations has been occurring under 
the NATO umbrella. In this respect, Turkey's reflexes have varied from those during the Cold 
War in parallel with the transformation in TFP and complications in Turkey-NATO relations 
became more visible. In fact, Turkey has repeatedly announced that NATO is still the 
backbone of its security and defense policies. "In this regard, for instance, it became a major 
contributor to peace support operations, took a leading role in the Partnership for Peace 
program and supported the Alliance’s transformation.”528 However, seeking to pursue a more 
influential policy in its region in the post-Cold War process and to foster its bonds with 
neighbors, the Erdoğan leadership has adopted an attitude aiming to have more weight in the 
Alliance and demanding to be treated as an equal partner like all other members. Turkey's 
initial effort to block the selection of Danish PM Anders Fogh Rasmussen as NATO Secretary 
General because of his role in the widely publicized Islamic cartoon crisis in 2006,529 
Ankara's avoid of approving the return of France to NATO's integrated command structure 
until 2009, its opposition to the NATO missile shield project up to September 2011 and its 
restriction of the American ships' entrance in the Black Sea without conceding the rules of the 
Montreux convention during the 2008 Russia-Georgia war might be explained only in this 
context.  
 However, aside from the divergence of opinion on the Georgia Crisis of 2008, it is 
hard to call such events as "crisis" in terms of Turkey-US relations as they hardly led to deep 
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crises in Ankara-Washington relations. To the contrary, Turkey usually withdrew its 
objections after the United States involved in the issues and indicated that it did not desire its 
ties neither with the United States nor with the NATO to be damaged.530 For instance, Ankara 
removed its objection on the selection of Rasmussen as NATO Secretary General in the wake 
of Obama's intervention in the subject.531 Similarly, Ankara gave its consent to the NATO 
missile shield project despite its improving relations with Tehran and Moscow and the rising 
objections from these capitals. Although it tried to take the sensitivities of Russia and Iran 
into consideration,532 in the final analysis, Turkey has used its preferences in favor of its 
traditional ally, the United States and NATO.  
Consequently, with its high self-confidence, the Erdoğan leadership conducts a 
proactive and multi-dimensional foreign policy. This reality has also had some reflections on 
the relations with NATO. Turkey has raised its voice on NATO-related issues with a view to 
increasing its role and weigh in the NATO. In recent years however, Ankara-NATO relations 
have revived in parallel with the progress in Turkey-U.S. relations as well. As a matter of fact, 
Turkey's permission to the deployment of the radar system on its territory in the framework of 
NATO Missile Defense System led to the comments of a new "Golden Era" in Turkey- 
Alliance relationship.533 Additionally, upon Ankara's request of the Patriot missile systems 
against the potential threats from Syria, the Patriots have been deployed in southern Turkey 
and this has also become a significant factor which has consolidated the description of 
"Golden Era."534 
5.16. Conclusion 
By contrast with the 1990s, the beginning of new millennium witnessed serious 
fluctuations in terms of Turkey-United States relations which rooted mostly in the issues 
related to the third countries. In the wake of the September 11 attacks, the US administration 
focused its attention on the Middle East, more precisely on the countries such as Afghanistan, 
Iraq, Syria and Iran. Therefore, as a country sharing common borders with the countries in 
question, the new orientation and foreign policy approach of the United States closely 
influenced Turkey, and Ankara-Washington relations revolved mostly around the issues in the 
Middle East. 
 
Defining Turkey as a central state with multiple identities, the Erdoğan leadership has 
drawn a parallel in terms of Turkey's efficacy in the east and the west. Accordingly, the more 
weigh it has in the east, the more value it would be attached by the western states. Moreover, 
considering its historical and geographic depth, it has been argued that a central state would 
not be able to avert its face away from the events happening around it, especially in the 
territories with which Turkey shares common history and culture. Such an identity description 
and the great targets to make Turkey a global player have brought about an interest definition 
which stipulates leaving aside the passivist and reactive attitude and underscores the necessity 
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of a multi-dimensional, initiative-taking proactive foreign policy approach for the Erdoğan 
leadership.535   
 
Adopting a multi-dimensional, self-confident and independent foreign policy 
approach, while it has been trying to give priority to its own interests, Erdoğan leadership has 
sought in the 2000s to conduct a balanced foreign policy in terms of the relations with global 
powers instead of a strict pro-western diplomatic approach as in the Cold War era. This 
approach has signaled that the Cold War mentality of the state elite which sustained its 
influence throughout the 1990s was being replaced by a new and self-confident mindset 
which was giving prominence to its own interests and seeking a more equal relationship with 
the United States instead of a hierarchical one of the Cold War era. This demand on the other 
hand has caused a fluctuating relationship model between the two allies.  
 
The first serious test in the Erdoğan era with respect to the relations with the U.S. took 
place on the occasion of the March 1 governmental motion. Even though the Erdoğan 
leadership intended to allow the US army to invade Iraq from north by using Turkish territory, 
the Turkish Parliament refused the governmental bill on March 1, 2003. Thereby, Erdoğan 
leadership fell short of achieving to realize its policy due to a number of reasons explained 
above and this culminated in an unusual recession process in the alliance history of both 
countries. Stated differently, it might be argued that the anti-war norm predominated in 
Turkey and the Muslim-conservative identity of the Turkish society prevailed over Erdoğan 
leadership's active FP aspirations about Iraq and its northern part in particular. In the 
recession process which was ignited by the crisis of motion, as the constructivism strongly 
underlines, the meaning of their alliance and the correspondingly converging or diverging 
interests began to be re-assessed at the ideational level.  
In the post 2003 period, although Turkey has gradually demanded to be seen as an 
equal partner of the United States, the unilateral foreign policy style of the Bush 
administration tended to sustain the Cold War habits and expected Turkey to adjust its 
position to the American policies as in the Cold War era. When Ankara did not meet its 
expectations, the neo-conservative US government wanted to punish Turkey and did not 
respond Turkish demands positively especially in terms of the chronic terrorism trouble of 
Turkey. This turbulent period in the bilateral relations gained a new dimension as of 
November 2007 and entered into a transition process. Nevertheless, it is hardly possible to 
evaluate that relations were smooth in this period. Obama's victory in the elections of 
presidency has signaled a new term considering the mutual-construction of the long-standing 
alliance. In addition to the commonalities as regards the foreign policy approaches, Obama 
leadership has demonstrated a consenting attitude towards the Erdoğan leadership's active and 
independent FP practices and tried to make use of it. Furthermore, an additional value has 
been attached to Turkey's identity which proves that Islam and democracy can co-exist. In this 
regard, Turkey has been depicted by the US government as a model for the Muslim world. 
Moreover, the long-standing alliance relationship between the two countries has been 
qualified by the Obama leadership as a "model partnership" for the Islamic world. The 
common norms that Erdoğan and Obama leaderships share such as multilateralism and 
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emphasis of diplomacy in the solution of problems as well as the spread of democratic norms 
in the Middle East paved the way for the development of relations. Even though the interests 
and policies of both countries were not identical, a clear dynamism in bilateral relations was 
visible after President Obama took the office. In addition, Turkey maintained its policy during 
the Obama era as well which had been implying its willingness to sustain a partnership with 
the U.S. on the basis of equality.  
 However, contrary to the expectations for the development of bilateral relations, 2010 
witnessed several disputes between Ankara and Washington, as it was seen in the case of 
Iran's nuclear program and the Mavi Marmara event. Together with Brazil, Turkey's "no" vote 
to the sanctions against Iran in the UN Security Council gave rise to discontent in 
Washington. Whilst the members of the AK Party government tried to explain this "no" with 
moral values (accordingly, it would be an unprincipled behavior to ignore an agreement 
signed with their intensive contribution), American officials avoided as much as possible to 
make Turkey's attitude a subject of criticism and thereby showed that they were not willing to 
see another crisis similar to the one experienced in March 2003. In fact, such disputes have 
implied once again that Ankara has been conducting its foreign relations no longer on the 
basis of Cold War parameters and that it was inclined to see the end of the hierarchical order 
of the Cold War times. Whereas such demands for equality were not widely acknowledged by 
the Bush administration, Obama's approach highlighting dialogue and multilateralism has 
seemed closer to Turkey's demands.  
 
 Liberation movements in the Middle East have re-approached the interests of the two 
countries again in 2011. As previously detailed, the so called Arab spring led to the rise of 
identity politics in the Middle East region. In the face of the democratic demands of the Arab 
peoples, with its conservative Muslim-democrat identity, Erdoğan leadership wanted to see 
similar regimes in the Muslim world where western and Islamic values can co-exist. In this 
context, Erdoğan leadership's interests converged with the US interests to side with the pro-
democracy and human rights demands of the Arab people. However, there are still 
disagreements between Ankara and Washington about their policies towards the Middle East, 
e.g. the military putsch against the Morsi government took place in Egypt in July 2013 and 
how to deal with the Syrian problem. 
 
On the other hand, varying intensities notwithstanding, as in the Özal era, Turkey and 
the United States have sustained their collaboration in the Erdoğan era as well in terms of 
their policies in the Central Asia, Caucasus and Balkans. While this cooperation has focused 
mainly on ensuring peace and stability as well as promoting the establishment of democratic 
regimes in these regions, it has encompassed also the economy field as it has been seen in the 
pipeline projects, like the BTC oil pipeline, the BTE gas pipeline and the TANAP project. 
However, whereas this US-Turkish collaboration took place in the Balkans relatively 
smoothly, Russia factor has caused on occasion disagreements between the two NATO allies. 
Turkey's strong economic ties with Moscow which reaches in the energy field nearly a level 
of dependency forces Ankara at least to a certain extent to remain neutral in the undeclared 
competition between Russia and the west. However, Ankara’s ties with the West as well as its 
NATO commitments still constitute its priority engagement. This case was viewed especially 
during the Arab spring and Syria crisis. Even though Turkey has been developing its relations 
with its northern neighbor in economic, political and cultural terms, and tries to follow a 
balanced policy between Russia and the West, in the final analysis, the rising identity politics 
in the Middle East led Moscow and Ankara to side in different political camps.   
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In terms of economic relations, “the significantly low level of investments in both 
directions and the slowly increasing, but still limited level of bilateral trade volumes do not 
help change the perception of Turkey for the US policy-makers only as a political and 
strategic pivotal actor. The lack of economic elements supports the traditional and Cold War 
era perception of this partnership, which prevents new openings that might significantly 
contribute to reshaping it with the new realities on the ground.” Stated differently, less-
developed economic ties hinder the development of interdependency by adding a strong 
economic dimension to bilateral relations. Finally “the lack of economic foundations in the 
larger picture makes this partnership more vulnerable to political fluctuations and 
considerations in both countries.”536 
 
The accomplishments both in the economy and defense industry fields have been 
crucial in the self-confident foreign policy of the Erdoğan leadership. This self-confident 
approach has also had certain reflections on the relations with the North-Atlantic Alliance. 
With its self-confident identity structure and rising economic and technological power, 
Turkey has sought to increase its weigh within the NATO as well. However, it has been 
careful not to allow the emergence of a crisis between Ankara and the western alliance. In 
recent years, in parallel with the progress in Turkey-U.S. relations, Ankara-NATO relations 
have revived as well. As a matter of fact, Turkey's permission to the deployment of the radar 
system on its territory in the framework of NATO Missile Defense System led to the 
comments of a new "Golden Era" in Turkey-NATO relationship.537 Additionally, upon 
Ankara's request of the Patriot missile systems against the potential threats from Syria, the 
Patriots have been deployed in southern Turkey and this has also become a significant factor 
which has consolidated the description of "Golden Era."538 
 
 To sum up, with its high self-confidence rooted basically in Turkey's historical and 
regional depth, Erdoğan leadership has defined Turkey as a central country and specified its 
interests accordingly. In this respect, it has advocated that Turkey is a significant regional 
actor and it should follow an active and multi-dimensional foreign policy instead of a 
passivist and status quo oriented FP line. This approach has had reflections on the U.S.-
Turkish relations as well.  In this context, instead of engaging in the US foreign policy agenda 
as in the Cold War period, Turkey has exhibited in the new millennium a new foreign policy 
approach which gives priority to its own interests and foreign policy agenda not only on the 
issues related to the Middle East but also on the relations with Russia, Iran and Armenia. 
Therefore, Ankara has not hesitated to say "no" to the US demands in the cases that it deemed 
Turkish-American interests were not overlapping. While this attitude of Turkey led to a 
serious crisis in bilateral relations in the post-March 1 motion crisis, the two countries have 
felt the need over time to re-determine their ideas towards each other. Consequently, the 
interactions and troubles in the March 1, 2003 process have brought about the re-construction 
of ideas of the two actors about each other, just like it is argued in the mutual construction 
thesis of the constructivists. It has been understood in this process that the plans about Turkey 
would not be taken for granted as in the Cold War period. In terms of Turkey on the other 
hand, the changing political structure of the world and the emerging economy of Turkey 
consolidated the self confidence of the Erdoğan leadership who already has enjoyed it on 
account of Turkey's historical and cultural credentials.  
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In the ongoing process, considering the new structure of bilateral relationship which 
was first severely shaken and got gradually back on the track, Ankara-Washington relations 
have been continuing to transform. In this process, the democratic nature of both countries led 
Turkey and the U.S. to define their interest as standing next to the democratic demands of the 
Arab peoples at least until the summer 2013. This identity-based convergence of interests 
triggered the beginning of a new golden era which resulted also in Turkey's positive response 
to the US demand in favor of the NATO missile shield project at the expense of its improving 
relations with Russia and Iran. All in all, being aware of the need they feel to each other, the 
bilateral relations take place today at the level of a "balanced" partnership.   
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6: A GENERAL EVALUATION AS TO THE ACCURACY 
OF THE HYPOTHESES AND CONCLUSION 
6.1. An analogy of Özal and Erdoğan foreign policies 
This final chapter will be stressing two major subjects: 1) Firstly, the foreign policy 
commonalities as well as the differences of Özal and Erdoğan leaderships will be repeated 
briefly at the theoretical level. In doing this, the identity concept will keep its primary position 
as a point of reference to explain the foreign policy understandings of both leaderships. 2) 
Subsequently, the reflection of the theoretical approach to the practical level of each 
leadership will be handled in the case of Turkey-U.S. relations and the common as well as the 
diverging policy practices will be stressed in short. At this point, a reasonable explanation will 
be sought as to, why, despite their similar identity definitions, different policy practices 
emerged. Finally, the strong and weak sides of constructivism in explaining TFP of 1980s and 
2000s will be highlighted.  
It has been aimed in this dissertation to prove the thesis that constructivism and 
identity offer a great explanatory power for the analysis of foreign policy. In this context, it 
has been advocated that the distinctive foreign policy line observed in the Erdoğan era is 
actually an extension of the foreign policy line of the Özal era. It has been intended to prove 
that just like in the Özal period, along with exogenous reasons, indigenous factors like the 
identity of the groups coming to power in the country and their identity and interest 
perceptions have an essentially explanatory power for someone who seeks to comprehend the 
current distinctive foreign policy understanding of Turkey. Hence, it has been argued that 
without an appropriate analysis of identity and its transformation, a comprehensive 
explanation of the transformation of TFP in the last decade would be incomplete. It is also 
hypothesized that TFP has been undergoing a transformation process since the early years of 
the new millennium and there are several factors exerting influence on the transformation of 
Ankara’s foreign policy understanding, ranging from leaders personalities to domestic 
dynamics and to changing international structure, among which the identity and interest 
definitions of the government members have a special place.  
The focus of this dissertation has been mainly on the ruling Erdoğan leadership's 
foreign policy with an additional reference to the Turgut Özal era with a comparative 
approach. Therefore, while the impact of identity on foreign policy is analyzed, identities of 
the Turgut Özal and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan leaderships, both of whom come from Islamist 
backgrounds, were analyzed and the "middle way" they have developed in their political lives 
with respect to Islamist and Western values and the reflection of these "middle ways" to the 
TFP are discussed.  
In this connection, the main research question followed in this study has been "is the 
Erdoğan leadership's foreign policy seriously "new" or it represents a continuity considering a 
foreign policy line which already exists in the past of the Turkish Republic1 and how could it 
be explained with an identity based approach. While searching for answers to these questions, 
foreign policy paradigms as well as principles of Özal and Erdoğan terms have been analyzed 
                                               
1 Gökhan Çetinsaya, “İki Yüzyılın Hikâyesi: Türk Dış ve Güvenlik Politikasında Süreklilikler,” in Türk Dış 
Politikası Yıllığı 2009, Burhanettin Duran et al., (Ankara: SETA Yayınları XIII, Mart 2011), 623. Gülistan 
Gürbey, “Wandel in der Türkischen Aussenpolitik unter der AKP-Regierung?, Südosteuropa Mitteilungen, 
(02/2010). Ahmet Sözen, “A Paradigm Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy: Transition and Challenges,” Turkish 
Studies, 11:1, (2010): 103-123. 
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by emphasizing the identities of both Özal and Erdoğan leaderships. Finally, as Ankara-
Washington relations cover a wide area; Turkish-U.S. relations have been selected for 
empirical analysis. This long-standing alliance relationship offers a good opportunity for 
comparison because similar subjects retain their places in Turkish-U.S. agenda in both Özal 
and Erdoğan eras. 
 6.1.1. Theoretical level 
 
Considering the common points of Özal and Erdoğan eras, one would realize that both 
leaders come from religious families and Islam constitutes a significant part of their identities. 
They both perform ritual prayers on a regular basis, their paths intersected at the Nakshibendi 
order of dervishes and their discourses bear the stamp of Islamic sources such as Quran and 
Hadith. They both have similar civilization understandings, that is, they represent an 
analogous line which does not deny Turkey’s historical legacy stemming from the Ottoman 
past and share a similar point of view vis-à-vis the West. They are westernist indeed, yet in a 
different sense. Both consider that just as the East, the West has positive as well as negative 
sides. Therefore, without ignoring the “virtues” of their respective civilization, they adopt the 
modern/western values.  Furthermore, a combination of their self-confident stances as regards 
the West with their Muslim identities paves the way for a multidimensional foreign policy, i.e. 
without changing the conventional direction of Turkey; they develop alternative relations with 
the Islamic world and other countries. Consequently, their common Muslim identities as well 
as their unique posture towards the western values bring them to a distinctive position.  
 
Both leaderships have adopted a proactive foreign policy and associated it with the 
historical, cultural and geographical qualities of Turkey. One of the main elements of the 
Erdoğan era foreign policy philosophy has been the historical responsibility of Turkey in its 
region emanating from the Turkish history. More precisely saying, the Erdoğan leadership has 
been of the opinion that Turkey carries a responsibility on account of its historical bonds, 
particularly against the nations which lived in peace under the Ottoman rule for several 
centuries. This argument has been regarded by Erdoğan as the most important point of 
reference for his proactive foreign policy approach. This idea actually seems to a large extent 
in parallel with one of the main arguments of President Özal’s ideas in the post-Cold War 
process in the face of the emerging events/conflicts in Turkey’s region. President Özal’s great 
efforts to stop the bloodshed in Bosnia during the Bosnia war were also a result of the 
historical sense of responsibility rooted in the Ottoman past which was named by some as 
“neo-Ottomanism.” Therefore, the historical and cultural ties of Turkey constituted one of the 
main reasons pushing the Özal leadership towards a proactive policy as well.  
 
Moreover, Turkey’s geopolitical location has been also one of the basic reasons of 
proactive policy preferences of both leaderships. However, there is a rhetorical difference 
between Özal and Erdoğan leaderships’ foreign policy approaches with respect to the 
geopolitical definition of the country. While the Erdoğan leadership defines Turkey as a 
“central country,” Özal leadership defined it as a “bridge” between the east and west.  
Nevertheless, this rhetorical difference seems trivial when one reviews the reflections of these 
concepts to the policy field. As a matter of fact, both leaderships agree that the importance of 
Turkey in the eyes of the west is a positive function of its efficacy in the east. Consequently, 
Özal and Erdoğan leaderships converge on the point that the most appropriate policy option 
for Turkey has been a proactive one. In this respect, considering its historical and cultural ties 
as well as its geopolitical location, Turkey would not be able to afford to remain indifferent to 
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the events around it. Hence, a reactive and passive foreign policy is no longer an option for 
Ankara.  
 
Furthermore, both leaderships have attached a considerable importance to ensure unity 
within the country by means of democratic reforms and regarded the strong domestic peace as 
a precondition of assertive foreign policy. Thus, they have taken very serious steps on the way 
of democratization of the country. Though it was in varying degrees, both leaderships have 
adopted a multi-dimensional foreign policy understanding. Likewise, both leaders are 
economists and economy has been among the top foreign policy priorities of both leaderships. 
Ensuring peace and stability in the region by means of constructing economic 
interdependencies has been another commonality of both leaderships. The strong leadership 
traits of Özal and Erdoğan have brought about the rise of their weigh in the foreign policy 
arena as well. In this case, both leaderships’ strong steps towards the democratization of the 
country as well as towards decreasing the weight of military and civil bureaucracies in the 
country have also played their roles.  
 
On the other hand, although the role of identity is undeniable at the theoretical level, 
some differences emerge when it comes to the practical level. Because, the varying 
domestically and internationally shared ideas and norms might impose different policy 
practices, the similar identity and foreign policy goals notwithstanding. Additionally, one has 
to stress the role of psychological factors which have been ignored by the constructivists in 
terms of policy practices. From this point on, the practical level of Özal and Erdoğan foreign 
policy understandings will be handled and especially the different policy practices in terms of 
Turkey-United States relations and their reasons will be in concern.  
 6.1.2. Practical level 
 
In order to empirically analyze the commonalities and differences of Özal and 
Erdoğan leaderships’ foreign policies, Turkish-U.S. relations have been selected as the case 
study. It might be concluded at the end of the analysis that the analogy between the foreign 
policy paradigms of Özal and Erdoğan eras at the theoretical level exists in general terms at 
the practical level as well and that both leaderships have attached a critical importance to the 
relations with the United States. However, a nuance attracts attention considering the 
perspectives of both leaderships in connection with Turkey-US relations. Though Özal 
envisaged a balanced relationship with the regional and global actors because of Turkey’s 
“bridge role,” he did not give up regarding the USA as the main axis of TFP. As noted above, 
his ultimate goal was to install Turkey as an influential regional power under the protective 
umbrella of the USA. In other words, whilst Özal regarded the USA as the main axis of TFP, 
he sought to decrease Turkish dependency on the United States by improving relations with 
other actors (e.g. with the European Community). On the other hand, by defining Turkey as a 
“central country,” Davutoğlu vision has been stricter in terms of developing balanced 
relations with all actors. In this respect, this vision did not see the dimensions of “new” 
foreign policy as alternative to each other. Hence, as long as the Turkish interests are 
concerned, it saw no harm in developing closer relations with the Middle Eastern neighbors, 
such as Iran and Syria, increasingly at the expense of its ties with the U.S.2 Consequently, a 
slight difference in the role and in the ideational meaning that Özal and Erdoğan leaderships 
attach to the United States draws attention. Even though a high level collaboration has been 
                                               
2 Nicholas Danforth, “ Ideology and Pragmatism in Turkish Foreign Policy: From Atatürk to the AKP,” Turkish 
Policy Quarterly, Volume 7 No.3, (Fall 2008): 91 
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aimed during the Erdoğan era as well, a relatively more equality-based relationship model has 
been demanded instead of a hierarchical one as in the Cold War period and this has caused 
relatively more disputes between the long-standing allies especially in the Middle Eastern 
dimension of bilateral relations.  
 
In fact, in spite of the “golden age” descriptions of Ankara-Washington relations 
during the Özal era which peaked particularly during the Gulf war, relations with the United 
States did not take place smoothly either. As a matter of fact, disagreements arose on the 
Armenian question and on the US aid issues. Likewise, despite the American urges, Özal 
leadership maintained the neutral stance of Turkey during the Iran-Iraq war. As such, Ankara 
and Washington advocated also different arguments in the Armenian- Azerbaijani conflict. 
However, Özal leadership regarded the transatlantic relations as an important leverage to 
create both an economically and politically influential Turkey in its region. From Özal 
leadership's perspective, it did not seem possible to realize the goals set by Özal without the 
assistance of the Americans in the Balkans, Central Asia and Middle East only by making use 
of Turkey’s own resources. Furthermore, Özal sought to seize the opportunities with a 
proactive policy and tried pragmatically to turn the crises into opportunities for Turkey, as it 
was seen in the Gulf war.    
 
It is possible to make similar observations for the Erdoğan era as well. In fact, a 
relatively more independent foreign policy has been visible in the 2000s, in comparison to the 
1980s. However, when the interest perceptions overlap, one might conclude that Turkey-U.S. 
bilateral relations have peaked now and then in the Erdoğan era too. On the other hand, the 
relatively more assertive foreign policy in the course of Erdoğan era caused repercussions on 
the relations with Washington. Eventually, the Turkish-American relations entered into a 
turbulent period after the Iraq war of 2003. In this period, the US indifference about the PKK 
terrorism until the end of 2007, Russia-Georgia war of 2008, the Mavi Marmara crisis of 
2010, Iran's nuclear program, Turkey's mediation efforts about it and eventually Turkey's 'no' 
vote for the sanctions against Iran in the UN Security Council have constituted further tension 
points in bilateral relations. In a nutshell, even if there existed troubles with respect to Turkey-
U.S. relations in the Özal era as well, the disputes of both countries have relatively more 
deepened in the Erdoğan era owing to relatively more assertive FP of the Erdoğan leadership.  
 
Turkey and the United States have sustained their collaboration in the Central Asia, 
Caucasus and Balkans, varying intensities notwithstanding, in both Özal and Erdoğan eras. 
However, whereas this US-Turkish collaboration took place in the Balkans relatively 
smoothly, Russia factor has caused on occasion disagreements between the two NATO allies 
in the Erdoğan era. Turkey's strong economic ties with Moscow which reaches in the energy 
field nearly a level of dependency forces Ankara to remain, at least to a certain extent, neutral 
in the undeclared competition between Russia and the west. While seeking to form a welfare 
circle around Turkey by developing economic interdependencies, Erdoğan leadership attaches 
significance to the relations with the neighboring countries and tries not to damage 
particularly the economic relations.  
 
On the other hand, considering Turkey-U.S. relations during the Özal and Erdoğan 
eras, one might come to the conclusion that the real divergences have been experienced in the 
context of Middle East. Although a general analogy might be drawn between Özal and 
Erdoğan eras considering the Middle East dimension of bilateral relations with the U.S., it is 
observed that both leaderships' policy practices towards the Middle East took place at some 
points differently. The most important issues in this context are the US interventions into Iraq 
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which allow a comparison between the Özal and Erdoğan eras as these military interventions 
into Iraq took place in both leaderships' terms. What draws primary attention at this point is 
the serious analogy between the policies that both leaderships aimed to follow during the US 
invasions of Iraq both in 1991 and 2003. In essence, as previously detailed, both leaderships 
aimed to pursue a proactive FP in Turkey's region; therefore it would not be appropriate 
remaining neutral in case of a crisis in the immediate neighborhood. Furthermore, as they 
considered a war inevitable, both Özal and Erdoğan leaderships have aimed to collaborate 
with the United States during its war against Iraq and thereby sought to avoid the negative 
consequences of the war. Additionally, they hoped pragmatically to turn it into an opportunity 
for Ankara. The main concern and goal of both leaderships was to gain a seat at the 
negotiating table to be set up after the military operation. 
 
However, despite the analogous intentions of both leaderships, the support that they 
were able to provide for the United States took place at varying levels. While the US 
government was able to get the support that it expected from the Özal leadership during its 
operation to Iraq to a large extent, it fell short of receiving a similar level of assistance, the 
ruling Erdoğan leadership's intention to collaborate with the Americans notwithstanding. 
Despite the opposition from both his own ruling Motherland Party and from the opposition 
parties, President Özal did not give up active policy during the Gulf crisis. As a matter of fact, 
being uncomfortable from the leading role of President Özal in the foreign policy making, 
firstly FM resigned in October 1990 and later Defense Minister and Chief of Staff resigned in 
the December 1990 in protest of President Özal's political stance. However, AK Party foreign 
policy throughout the 2003 Iraq war was relatively low-profile in favor of the United States in 
comparison to the first Gulf War policy of the Özal leadership. This case and the slightly 
different policy practices of Özal and Erdoğan leaderships towards the U.S. in terms of the 
ME dimension of bilateral relations might be explained at domestic and international levels: 
 
From a domestic point of view; 
 
the first gulf war in 1991 coincided with a time period when President Özal's impact 
on the government peaked and he enjoyed his high political experience in directing the 
political processes. In other words, President Özal who psychologically carried an ambitious 
leadership quality was at the zenith of his political power. The Iraq war of 2003 however 
coincided with the early months of the Erdoğan leadership in the office. Therefore, it had less 
experience in the government, and the country had more sensitive conditions both 
economically and politically. The repercussions of the February 28 post-modern putsch were 
still felt within the country. Even though the AK party came to office, it was not powerful 
enough to direct the whole political processes in the country.3 As a matter of fact, the plans of 
military putsch like Balyoz and Ayışığı whose accuracy have been later approved by the 
judiciary authorities demonstrate indeed how slippery the political ground was at that time. 
On such a variable and instable political atmosphere, considering the strong resistance from 
its own party members as well as from the other circles of the society, the Muslim-
conservative people in particular, the Erdoğan leadership could not be very insisting on the 
March 1 governmental motion. That is, in the face of the possible interventions into politics 
by non-democratic actors and the relatively less developed democratic norms, the Erdoğan 
leadership felt hardly safe against such threats and refrained from weakening its ground; 
hence it did not take a binding decision for its members in the Parliament to force them to 
vote for the March 1 motion. 
                                               
3For the meaning of  the dialectic of" iktidar-muktedir" which was used for the AK Party government in its 
initial years in power, see the footnote 48 in chapter 5. 
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On the other hand, considering the political actors with the capacity to influence the 
government, a sociological difference between the two terms draws attention. Although the 
NGO's and alternative power centers representing the Muslim-conservative circles of the 
Turkish society (e.g. Anatolian tigers) began to burgeon during the Özal era, they did not 
sufficiently develop to exert influence on the political processes. In the 2000s yet, the circles 
with conservative-Muslim line have achieved a considerable progress in terms of organizing 
themselves within the society. It is clear today that the conservative quarters supporting the 
AK Party government do not only consist of the lower layer of the society and that they 
demand to participate in the administrative processes. As a matter of fact, the Islamic-
conservatives have gained critical positions in the economy field through the rising Anatolian 
capital and its organizations such as MUSIAD and TUSKON. Additionally, the rising number 
of TV channels, news papers as well as the internet media reflecting the demands of the 
conservatives has granted them a significant capacity and means of power to influence foreign 
policy processes and outcomes. These groups began to emerge especially in the Özal era and 
they have been living their period of maturity in the 2000s along with the democratization in 
the country. The bottom line about the rising influence of these circles on Turkish politics is 
the impact of religious identity on their strong resistance against the Erdoğan leadership's pro-
U.S. policy. The Muslim-conservative quarters strongly opposed to help the United States to 
invade another Muslim country by using Turkey.  
 
Along with their religious and humanitarian sensitivities, the past experiences were 
also influential in the opposition of the Islamic-conservative circles to Erdoğan leadership's 
pro-US policy. The economic bill of the first Gulf crisis had been too severe for the Turkish 
economy as Turkey had lost one of the biggest export markets as well as one of the biggest 
trade partners. More importantly, in the wake of the war, Turkey began increasingly to be 
disturbed by the PKK terrorism which had effectively made use of the vacuum of authority in 
northern Iraq. In view of all these experiences, the majority of the Turkish society opposed the 
Erdoğan leadership's intention to allow the United States to open a northern front by using the 
Turkish territory. In consequence, a relatively more democratic participation of the Muslim-
conservative groups to the policy-making processes as well as their higher capacity to 
influence the foreign policy of the country through their NGOs and media institutions has 
been salient in the Erdoğan era. These groups' opposition was determinant in the failure of the 
Erdoğan leadership to convince all of the members of the conservative-democrat AK Party to 
cooperate with the U.S.  This observation about the development of the civil society in Turkey 
seems one of the most important major differences between the Özal and Erdoğan eras which 
resulted in different policy practices of Özal and Erdoğan leaderships, their similar policy 
approaches notwithstanding 
 
On the other hand, although the high self-confidence of both leaderships rooted in the 
historical and cultural values of Turkey constitutes an important commonality, the 
infrastructure backing it presents a different view in the Özal and Erdoğan eras. Above all, the 
country has a much different economic outlook in the 2000s both quantitatively and 
qualitatively by comparison with the 1980s. The export-oriented development model 
introduced by the Özal leadership has been sustained in the new millennium too and the 
Turkish economy indicated a considerable growth in the Erdoğan era. This upwards 
momentum of the economy has made a considerable contribution to the rise of the self-
confidence of both the rulers of Erdoğan leadership and its supporters. The GDP was $131.6 
billion at the end of the Özal era and the export volume of the country was $41 billion in 
 285  
1994.4 In the wake of the AK Party government, the Turkish economy has demonstrated a 
significant performance and while the GDP reached $786 billion in 2012, the foreign trade 
volume became $388 billion.5 Today, Turkey has the world's 17th largest nominal GDP and 
15th largest GDP by PPP. Turkey has demonstrated in the decade since 2002 a serious 
economic growth performance with an average annual growth of 5.45%. and it passed even 
China in 2004 with 9.9%. Though nearly the whole world was affected from the economic 
crisis emerged initially in the United States in 2008, the Turkish economy has maintained its 
growth and has still been among the countries which have been least affected by the global 
economic crisis. This economic success story of the Turkish economy has become one of the 
most important factors increasing the self-confidence of the Erdoğan leadership.  
     
The strong steps taken in the field of defense industry has further consolidated the self-
confidence of the Erdoğan leadership. The development strategy for Turkish defense industry 
introduced by the Özal leadership in 1980s has increasingly been adopted by the Erdoğan 
leadership as well. Accordingly, Turgut Özal stimulated the establishment of joint ventures in 
Turkey by foreign companies; thereby he aimed simultaneously to meet the needs of Turkish 
army as well as to obtain export revenues by selling them to other countries, yet more 
importantly to realize the technology transfer to Turkey. In the 2000s, Turkish defense 
industry sustained the strategy introduced in the Özal era and accomplished to produce the 
ATAK helicopter, tanks, unmanned aerial vehicles, warships and medium-range missile 
systems with domestic capabilities. While the ratio of domestic production in the military 
procurement total was only 20 percent in 2004, it reached 52.1 percent in 2010. Consequently, 
the accomplishments in the defense industry and in the economy fields have become elements 
underlying the self-confidence of the Erdoğan leadership.  
 
Finally, although the Turkish-US relations seriously damaged in the wake of the 
decline of the governmental motion of March 1, 2003, over time the need to revive bilateral 
relations re-emerged. This case, inter alia, has demonstrated that it was not as costly as in the 
Cold War circumstances to say 'no' to the American demands. As a matter of fact, the horror 
scenarios were not materialized and the relations had to be restored. Eventually, as of the 
meeting of PM Erdoğan and President Bush in November 2007 Turkish-American 
cooperation resumed particularly on combating PKK terrorism. This case also strengthened 
the self-confidence of the Erdoğan leadership and paved the way for a more independent TFP.   
 
All in all, even though the Özal and Erdoğan leaderships have similar identity 
definitions and they have shared similar goals in the course of the US interventions into Iraq 
both in 1991 and 2003 respectively, their policies reflected to the practical field differently. 
This difference firstly emanated from their divergent abilities to direct the political 
mechanisms under the terms of the day. Besides, varying economic, political and sociological 
structure of the country played also their roles. Particularly, the rising influence of the 
Muslim-conservative groups in the country and their identity-based approach to the issue was 
of particular significance. After all, it was too optimistic to convince all members of a 
Muslim-democrat political party to support the invasion of another Muslim country by a 
western power. 
                                               
4 Cevat Gerni, Ö.Seçuk Emsen and M.Kemal Değer, "İthalata Dayalı İhracat ve Ekonomik Büyüme: 1980-2006 
Türkiye Deneyimi," (paper presented at the 2.National Economics Congress, DEÜ İİBF İktisat Bölümü, İzmir, 
20-22 February 2008, accessed 11.11.2013, http://www.deu.edu.tr/userweb/iibf_kongre/dosyalar/deger.pdf  
5"Dış ticaret açığı 2012'de 83.9 milyar dolar oldu," Milliyet, 31.01.2013, accessed 1.1.2014, 
http://ekonomi.milliyet.com.tr/dis-ticaret-acigi-2012-de-83-9-milyar-dolar-
oldu/ekonomi/ekonomidetay/31.01.2013/1662730/default.htm.  
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From an international point of view; 
 
in order to be able comprehend the divergences of Özal and Erdoğan leaderships' 
foreign policy practices; one has to consider the foreign policy lenses of both leaderships as 
well. Turgut Özal was in power immediately before and after the end of Cold War. In this era, 
the Cold War circumstances as well as the post-Cold War conditions drew attention. There 
was nearly a consensus about the existence of a unipolar international political structure after 
the dissolution of the SU. Özal leadership aimed to get pragmatically the backing first one of 
the worlds' two super powers which remained as the only one after the collapse of the SU and 
thereby to make Ankara influential in the regional and global politics. Therefore, first the 
limits of the Cold War conditions imposed on the TFP; subsequently the ideas about the 
unipolar structure of the world were the significant facts while conducting TFP in general and 
during the Gulf crisis in particular. Saying with other words, the ideas as to the unipolar world 
structure consolidated the perception in the eyes of the Özal leadership that Turkey did not 
have multiple alternatives in case of a US operation against Iraq. These ideas were also 
consolidating the argument that Özal leadership would not be able to reach the desired goals 
in the Central Asia, Balkans and in the Middle East without the backing of the sole super 
power of the world. Consequently, by siding with the allies during the Gulf war, Özal 
leadership wanted to indicate Turkey's importance both for the super power U.S. and for the 
rest of the western states. 
 
In the Erdoğan era however, though the U.S. has sustained its position as a super 
power, the ideas about the US position as the only super power of the world has not been as 
evident as it was in the Özal era. The European Union, Russia and China have increased their 
powers in the world politics and a judgment has begun to be prevalent about the nature of a 
multipolar world.6 As a matter of fact, while Washington had not faced much trouble to form 
a coalition against Iraq in 1990 and had got the support of the major actors of world politics, it 
fell short of building a consensus in the UN Security Council against Iraq because of French, 
German, Chinese and Russian oppositions.  
 
In this international political structure, Turkey's EU membership process entered into a 
significantly dynamic process in the early years of the AK Party government and the 
negotiations for the full membership of Ankara began in 2005. This case led to the rise of EU 
oriented norms in TFP making, particularly until a few years ago. One should remember that 
in the first Gulf war there was a Turkey whose application for the full EU membership had 
been refused and it had been alienated by Brussels. In 2003 however, there was a country 
whose EU membership candidacy had been declared in 1999 and there was also a strong 
governmental will to make Turkey an EU member. Owing to this optimism about the prospect 
of Turkey's EU membership, there was a wing within the ruling AK Party which did not feel 
entirely compelled itself to accept the American demands contrary to the case in the first Gulf 
war. After all, the European Union was also against an operation towards Iraq and this fact 
was an important factor reinforcing the anti-war shared idea of the Turkish society.  
  
In short, the circumstances as well as Özal and Erdoğan leadership’s ideas about them 
were considerably different especially in terms of international politics and this situation 
constitutes one of the major elements of the different policy practices of both leaderships in 
                                               
6 Daniella Huber, et al., "The Mediterranean Region in a Multipolar World: Evolving Relations with Russsia, 
China, Inidia and Brazil," GMF paper series, Mediterranean paper series 2013. Ulf Engel and Manuel João 
Ramos ,  African Dynamics in a Multipolar World, (Leiden: BRILL, 2013).   
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terms of the U.S.-Iraq-Turkey triangle, their analogous identity and interest definitions 
notwithstanding.    
6.2. Strengths and weaknesses of the constructivist approach in explaining TFP 
Considering the identity construction processes of Özal and Erdoğan, a two-
dimensional socialization process is salient. Firstly, as a result of societal socialization 
processes, Özal and Erdoğan have strongly adopted the values of their society whose religious 
and cultural references are strong and gained thereby a conservative identity structure. The 
conservative identity structure of both leaderships has heavily influenced their world views 
and this has had a considerably constructive impact on their interest definitions in every field 
of their lives, ranging from social to political fields. Another dimension of Özal and Erdoğan's 
identity has been constructed as a result of the transnational socialization process and this has 
ensured them to adopt the modern western values. Even though both leaders have not gone 
through identical processes, Özal and Erdoğan have eventually made similar western values 
an integral part of their identity. As both leaders belong to the excluded sectors of the society 
and as they are the close victims and witnesses of the military interventions into politics, they 
have adopted the values such as democracy, respect for human rights, and liberalism which 
are rooted mostly in the west as a way out in order to be able to secure their political 
existences. Consequently, when Özal and Erdoğan leaderships came to power in 1983 and in 
2002 respectively, they had conservative-democrat-liberal identities which aim to combine 
both eastern and western values and create an alternative identity structure. This has also had 
significant reflections on their foreign policy paradigms and practices.    
 
It would be useful to remember the importance that constructivists attach to social 
identities of individuals and states in order to explain the interest formation process with a 
view to being able comprehend the impact of identity definitions of Özal and Erdoğan 
leaderships on their foreign policy approaches. As the constructivists put it, “identities inform 
interests and, in turn, actions.” Considering TFP, policy makers' decisions are deeply 
influenced how they see the world through their lenses which is closely connected to their 
identity definitions. As noted above, Özal leadership defined Turkey as a bridge country and 
viewed a close relationship with its activity in the east and its weigh in the west. Likewise, 
while Erdoğan leadership defined Turkey with a different concept, it agreed with the Özal 
leadership with respect to the positive correlation between Turkey's weigh in the east and the 
west. As a result, in accordance with the "logic of appropriateness" argument of 
constructivism, both leaderships have considered proactivism and multi-dimensionalism as 
the appropriate policy choice for a bridge or central country which enjoys deep historical and 
cultural ties as well as a unique geopolitical location.7  
 
The identity definitions of Özal and Erdoğan leaderships and the correspondingly 
specified foreign policy principles and practices have undoubtedly had determining effects on 
Turkey-United States relations as well. In this context, aiming to follow an active policy, Özal 
leadership set getting the backing of the United States, the leader of the western block and 
after the end of Cold War the only super power of the world, at the center of its foreign policy 
                                               
7 Prime Minister Erdoğan expressed in his visit to Malysia on January 10, 2014: “We as Turkey have preferred 
not to follow the silence of the dominant powers but preferred the legacy that our history, civilization and 
ancestors impose us (T.b.A.).” In this manner, he explicitlydeclared how his identity definition attaching 
importance to Turkey’s historical and cultural ties reflected on foreign policy approach. “Özgürlüğün olmadığı 
yerde…!” Zaman, 10.01.2014, accessed 15.01.2014, http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_ozgurlugun-olmadigi-
yerde_2192689.html. 
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understanding. Furthermore, Özal aimed to seize other foreign policy alternatives, hence tried 
to take other policy dimensions into consideration and thereby sought to a certain extent to 
diversify TFP. Aiming first to increase Turkey’s influence in its region and then to make it a 
global player, Erdoğan leadership’s foreign policy understanding on the other hand has been 
based on developing balanced relations with the global actors instead of regarding them 
alternatives. In this respect, while establishing relations with Washington whose role as the 
only super power of the world has begun to be undermined in the 2000s, it has sought not to 
disregard other global actors along with its own interests.  In other words, instead of indexing 
TFP to the western block as in the Cold War, Erdoğan leadership tried to follow its own 
foreign policy agenda.  
 
As it is argued in the mutual construction thesis of constructivists, the troubles and the 
corresponding interactions in the March 1 process have brought about the reconstruction of 
ideas that both actors have had about each other. It has been understood in this process that 
the United States would not be able to make its calculations about Turkey as taken for granted 
as in the Cold War era. This approach might be interpreted as a demand of the Turkish 
government for a more equality-based relationship model with the US government instead of 
a hierarchical one as in the Cold War period. This demand however has given rise to 
fluctuating relations with the United States depending on the converging or the diverging 
interest definitions of both countries. In the end, one might conclude that while foreign 
policies of Ankara and Washington overlapped to a larger extent in the Özal era, a relatively 
visible increase in the divergences of the allies has been salient in the 2000s.  
 
On the other hand, this study seems to support the accuracy of another constructivist 
thesis: "normative or ideational structures are as important as material structures in shaping 
the behaviors of social and political actors, e.g. individuals or states." Considering the foreign 
policies of Özal and Erdoğan eras, Özal and Erdoğan leaderships have not adopted the 
traditional ideological foreign policy approach which stipulates the understanding that Turkey 
is surrounded in its geography by enemies and that Turkey should turn its face only towards 
the west. Again these leaderships have left aside the prejudices and the hostile attitude that 
some groups in Turkey have traditionally had against the Arab countries due to the alliance of 
some Arab groups with the Great Britain against the Ottomans during the World War I. 
Instead, they have highlighted the common historical and cultural past which exists between 
Turkey and other nations from the Balkans, Caucasus and Middle East all of which lived 
together under the Ottoman rule for centuries. They have regarded this shared past as a reason 
for responsibility to deal with the troubles of the former Ottoman subjects and a significant 
ground for cooperation. Consequently, the ideational change in the perception of friends and 
enemies of policy makers which is rooted basically at their identity definitions have brought 
about a multidimensional foreign policy understanding, namely taking into account of the 
eastern dimension of Turkish diplomacy without ignoring its western dimension.  
 
Furthermore, in accordance with their multidimensional foreign policy practices, Özal 
and Erdoğan leaderships have neither given prominence to the Islamic world nor pushed the 
ties with the west to a secondary position just like the Islamic Welfare Party government did 
in 1997. Instead, while sustaining Turkey's western connection, both leaderships aimed to use 
Turkey's until then ignored historical and cultural ties pragmatically. For instance, despite the 
strong Islamic tendency in the party base, no decline was observable in Turkish-Israeli 
relations in the first years of the AK Party government. Conversely, the provisions of the 
military agreements signed in the 1990s continued to be applied and the commercial relations 
increasingly advanced. This case began to change upon the Israeli attack against Palestine in 
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2006 and PM Erdoğan severely criticized the Tel Aviv government. In this reaction of the 
Erdoğan leadership, along with the sensitivities of the Turkish public on the Palestine 
question, its own susceptibilities to the events in the former Ottoman geography became 
influential. In other words, it seems unthinkable to remain indifferent towards the Palestine 
issue for a government which defines Turkey as a central country and underscores the 
historical and geographical depth of it.  
 
Evaluating TFP in the context of another thesis of constructivism, namely "agents and 
structures are mutually constituted," it might be observed that the Erdoğan leadership has 
been seeking to play a more active role than the Özal leadership did. In essence, both 
leaderships have demonstrated effort to spread the western values in the world that they have 
adopted as a result of socialization processes. In this respect, the Özal leadership closely 
cooperated with the US government for the establishment of democratic and human rights 
norms in the newly emerged Turkic states after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. On the 
other hand, Erdoğan leadership cooperated with the Bush government on its Greater Middle 
East Project and even assumed its co-chairmanship. In the face of the rising identity politics in 
the Middle East after the eruption of the revolts in the Arab world in 2011, Erdoğan 
leadership collaborated this time with the Obama administration and supported the democratic 
demands of the Arab peoples in accordance with its Muslim-democrat identity. In these ways, 
both leaderships have tried to make western norms more prevalent in the world. However, the 
Erdoğan leadership has gone one step further in contributing to the international norms by 
assuming the co-chairmanship of the UN-sponsored Alliance of Civilizations project. In doing 
this, PM Erdoğan has been attaching a particular importance to the issue of fighting with 
Islamophobia and he has made several appeals for the international recognition of it as a 
crime against humanity.8 He has undoubtedly used for such appeals predominantly the 
platform of Alliance of Civilizations and in this manner has tried to contribute to the 
construction of an internationally shared norm. 
 
 Repeating the weaknesses of constructivism briefly in terms of explaining TFP and its 
transformation which have been elaborated in the first chapter, Wendt has explicitly bracketed 
state identities and interests to be explained by mutual constitution, that is, identities and 
interests of states are assumed to be formed through inter-state interaction. Consequently, 
“social construction at the level of individual agents, or more generally, at any domestic level 
is neglected.” However, neither the political and historical context in which national interests 
are shaped nor the intersubjective meanings which define state identities and interests can be 
limited to those meanings constructed solely in inter-state relations. Therefore, adopting 
Wendt's systemic approach would preclude comprehending the socialization processes of the 
domestic actors, the identities that they acquired at the end of these processes and their impact 
on the foreign policies of the countries. In this respect, neglecting the domestic dimension 
would prevent to see the whole picture. Thus, a holistic approach to TFP which seeks to take 
the domestic and international as two faces of a single social order and engages in 
accommodating all factors affecting the identities and interests of state seems a more useful 
way to make a foreign policy analysis.  
                                               
8 PM Erdoğan: “Islamophobia is also a very serious hate crime trampeling humanitarian values just like terror, 
racism, violance and anti-semitism"(T.b.A.), “Özgürlüğün olmadığı yerde…!” Zaman. “PM Erdoğan: 
Islamophobia should be recognized as crime against humanity,” Today’s Zaman, 16.09.2012, accessed 
15.01.2014, http://www.todayszaman.com/news-292579-pm-erdogan-islamophobia-should-be-recognized-as-
crime-against-humanity.html. “Turkish PM Erdoğan: Islamophobia, anti-Semitism same,” Hürriyet Daily 
News, 28.02.213, accessed 15.01.2014, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-pm-erdogan-islamophobia-
anti-semitism-same.aspx?pageID=238&nID=42019&NewsCatID=338.  
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At this stage, one should repeat an issue that constructivism has difficulty to explain. 
While constructivist concepts such as identity, mutual construction, highlighting the 
ideational factors vs. material factors provide very important tools for analysis to explain TFP 
of 1980s and 2000s, constructivists leave a very important point open by disregarding the 
psychological qualities of the decision makers which might be regarded as a material factor 
rather than a social one. Thus analyzing the psychological qualities of the decision makers 
might be complementary to the constructivist thinking. The inborn psychological features of 
the decision makers such as being emotional, not avoiding taking risk and being ambitious 
might occasionally be the basic factors directing the behaviors of the leaders, in the face of 
unexpected events in particular. Therefore, their personal characteristics would be crucial in 
understanding Turkey's foreign policy preferences. Especially, if the decision making occurs 
during a crisis or under certain conditions such as high stress and high uncertainty the impact 
of psychological factors would be greater.9  
 
In this regard, both Özal and Erdoğan's psychological qualities have been decisive on 
their foreign policy styles. Their risk taking personalities, their warm personal relations with 
the foreign leaders and their efforts to make use of these relations in favor of Turkey put them 
at a different point in the Turkish political history. President Özal's initiative-taking, 
ambitious and strong leadership was determining especially during the First Gulf War who 
virtually dominated the TFP and directed it with his own political paradigm. Without making 
a reference to President Özal’s psychological qualities, it seems hardly possible to fully 
explain TFP during the Gulf crisis. Likewise, PM Erdoğan’s emotional reaction in the Davos 
Forum in January 2009 and its subsequent reflections on the TFP can be explained with the 
terms of psychological factors. His indomitable character has become determinant on a 
number of domestic and international issues. Hence, anyone analyzing TFP during the AK 
Party era has to keep psychological features of PM Erdoğan in mind, in order to be able make 
a comprehensive analysis. Therefore, without taking the psychological traits of the decision 
makers into consideration, comprehending the whole picture of TFP seems difficult. In view 
of this analysis, it might be also concluded that distinctive human natures as material factors 
have had considerably determining impacts on the foreign policy practices of both Özal and 
Erdoğan eras. 
6.3. Conclusion and final words   
In this dissertation, TFP of 1980s and 2000s has been comparatively analyzed using 
the case of Turkey-United States relations with constructivist lenses. More precisely 
expressing, foreign policy approaches as well as practices of Özal and Erdoğan leaderships 
have been comparatively analyzed, who have become successful in constructing an alternative 
identity by reconciling their conservative identities with the western values and defined their 
interests in line with these alternative identity perceptions. As in many other fields, these 
leaders have achieved revolutionary transformations in the foreign policy field as well. In this 
respect, their re-interpretation of Turkey's historical, geographical and cultural identities in 
accordance with their identity definitions and their corresponding proactive and 
multidimensional foreign policies attract considerable attention. 
 
It has been advocated throughout this study that the foreign policy principles and 
practices of the Özal and Erdoğan leaderships are considerably analogous and that the 
                                               
9 Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, Tim Dunne, Foreign Policy:theories, actors, cases, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 20. 
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multiplicity of commonalities of these leaderships' foreign policies is closely associated with 
their identities which have been constructed in consequence of societal and transnational 
socialization processes. In other words, analyzing the foreign policies of Özal and Erdoğan 
eras, one would conclude that each leadership is reminiscent of the rings of a Muslim-
democrat chain in Turkey and that both leaderships' identity qualities which carry 
simultaneously the signs of both eastern and western values have been decisive on their 
foreign policy approaches as well as on their policy practices.  
 
At this point, for the sake of a more consistent analysis, a distinction between 
theoretical and practical levels has become a significant necessity. In this respect, it has been 
concluded that the theoretical dimension of Özal and Erdoğan leaderships' foreign policies are 
to a large extent overlapping. Stated differently, foreign policy principles and approach of 
Erdoğan leadership seem just like an extension of the foreign policy principles and 
understanding of the Özal leadership. Yet they have been intellectually more developed by the 
Erdoğan leadership and set on a better academic foundation. In terms of the practical level of 
both leaderships' foreign policies on the other hand, it has been aimed to clarify to what extent 
this theoretical overlapping reflected to the practical field with an empirical analysis of 
Turkey-U.S. relations. 
 
Özal and Erdoğan leaderships have suggested that Turkey possesses several identities 
and they have correspondingly followed a multidimensional, proactive and self confident 
foreign policy. By contrast with the conventional TFP line, they have accepted that Turkey is 
an eastern as well as a western country which carries both Muslim and western values at the 
same time. They have also considered that Turkey has strong historical and cultural ties in its 
region and this was not something to be neglected for the sake of a strict westernization 
project. They further argued that Turkey's importance in the eyes of the west is a direct 
function of its efficiency in its region. All these factors have brought about the 
multidimensional and proactive foreign policy approach and practice. Nevertheless, it has 
been observed in this case study that both Özal and Erdoğan leaderships have continued to 
attach a special importance to the relations with the United States. In this case, together with 
their assertive and proactive foreign policy aspirations, Turkey’s limited resources as a 
regional power have played essential roles. However, the level of the need to cooperate with 
the U.S. was relatively different in each era.  In this situation, how Özal and Erdoğan 
leaderships perceived and interpreted the domestic and international structure was 
determinant about their policy towards the United States. One should not forget at this point 
the role of identity in the construction of the lenses through which both leaderships view and 
perceive the material world. 
 
In the big part of the Özal era, the Cold War circumstances were dominant and 
subsequent to the end of it a consensus arose as to the reality of a unipolar world system. 
Under such conditions, Özal leadership considered getting the support of the United States as 
a precondition to achieve its foreign policy aspirations. In this perception about the U.S., 
Özal's identity played also an important role, as he spent a significant part of his transnational 
socialization process in the U.S. under the Cold War conditions. Additionally, he aimed to 
diversify Turkey's foreign policy alternatives by utilizing its historical and cultural ties and 
sought to increase its efficiency in its region.  
 
In the Erdoğan era on the other hand, the domestic and international norms and 
structures have undergone significant transformations. Domestically, the Muslim-conservative 
circles have mounted their efficiency on politics and become closely involved with the 
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governmental policies which resulted in the rising impact of historical and cultural identities 
on the TFP agenda. Internationally, the unipolar position of the United States has begun to be 
undermined in the 2000s and other global actors have started to raise their voices in global 
politics. In the initial half of the first decade of the new millennium, Turkey's EU membership 
perspective was strengthened and this led to the increasing impact of the soft power norms 
represented by the European Union on Ankara. Furthermore, the developing relations with the 
EU have promoted the perception in the country that Turkey possessed other policy 
alternatives rather than the U.S. and it would not have to necessarily cooperate with the U.S. 
government during the Gulf War of 2003. Moreover, Turkey has reached a far stronger 
economic power and technological capacity than it had in the Özal era. All these factors have 
consolidated the self confidence of the Erdoğan leadership. In this context, Turkey has started 
to demand a new relationship model with Washington based on equality instead of the 
hierarchical one as in the Cold War period. This new Turkish approach has increased the 
number of disputes between the two allies as the "new" Turkey was able to say "no" to the 
American demands when it deemed that they did not overlap with the Turkish interests. 
 
Both in the Özal and Erdoğan eras, serious parallels have been observed in the 
Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asian dimensions of Turkey-United States relations. However, 
in the Middle East dimension which constituted the centre of gravity of bilateral relations in 
both periods, some different policy practices are salient. As it has been elaborated above, 
despite their similar political approaches of Özal and Erdoğan leaderships, the foreign policy 
outcome of Turkey during the First Gulf War (1990-1991) and the Iraq War (2003) was 
different. While in the former case, Turkey supported the US-led coalition forces rather 
enthusiastically, in the latter case, Turkish support to the U.S. remained relatively limited. 
This political outcome, namely the failure of the Erdoğan leadership to cooperate with the 
U.S. government to a larger extent was explained how these leaderships viewed and 
interpreted the aforementioned domestic and international circumstances of 1980s and 2000s. 
 
In the post March 1, 2003 process, while Erdoğan leadership has been careful not to 
damage its relations with the U.S. and has been attaching particular importance to gain the 
American backup for its FP aspirations, it has occasionally ignored the US urges and followed 
its own foreign policy priorities. For instance, in the face of the rising identity politics in the 
Middle East after the eruption of the revolts in the Arab world in 2011, Erdoğan leadership 
closely collaborated with the Obama administration until the military putsch in Egypt and 
supported the democratic demands of the Arab peoples in accordance with its Muslim-
democrat identity. However, Erdoğan and Obama administrations have disagreed about the 
legitimacy of the change of rule in Egypt in the summer of 2013. While Erdoğan leadership 
strongly criticized the Army intervention into politics and has not recognized the 
undemocratic putschist rule, the Obama administration has not seemed to care as to whether 
the government has changed through democratic or undemocratic ways. Nevertheless, being 
aware of the need they feel to each other, Turkey-U.S. relations continue today at a 
“balanced” level. 
 
It has been concluded at the end of this dissertation that constructivist theory provides 
very explanatory tools to comprehend the TFP approach and practices in the Özal and 
Erdoğan eras. However, it has been observed that constructivists disregard two important 
points. Firstly, the inborn psychological qualities of the decision makers such as being 
emotional, not avoiding taking risk and being ambitious might occasionally be the basic 
factors directing the behaviors of the leaders, especially in the face of unexpected events. 
Without taking this point into account, focusing solely on the socially constructed identities 
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brings about some difficulties in explaining some issues in the Özal and Erdoğan eras. 
Furthermore, just like Wendt does, excluding the most important source of identity and the 
changes in it, domestic field, from the analysis for the sake of a systemic analysis limits the 
empirically explanatory power of constructivism. As a matter of fact, the domestic processes 
have been crucial in the identity construction of Özal and Erdoğan leaderships and they have 
had the opportunity to direct TFP again by means of domestic processes. Therefore, rather 
than focusing only on one dimension to explain foreign policy of a country, a holistic 
constructivist approach seeking to take all dimensions of foreign policy making into 
consideration with a view to providing consistent and comprehensive explanations seems a 
more appropriate method.      
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